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Captives in Roman warfare are often overlooked yet played a key role in Roman 
society. Scholarship has previously considered institutions which involved captive-
taking, including slavery and Imperialism, but there has not yet been a comprehensive 
study of the stages involved in acquiring captives. 
Previous scholarship has been confined by linguistic parameters, such as studies which 
have focussed on those labelled as ‘hostages’ or enslaved people exclusively. I have 
taken an holistic approach and use ‘captive’ as an umbrella term which refers to 
individuals captured by the Romans during warfare, including those who were, or 
have been in recent scholarship, described as: hostages, enslaved people, or prisoners 
of war. This has enabled me to compare the treatment of individuals or groups of 
people who were not explicitly labelled using language associated with captive or 
hostage-taking, but who held a similar status in Roman society. 
The different stages of captive-taking have been defined by the treatment captive 
people experienced at the hands of the Romans. Captive-taking in the Roman world 
was used for or involved: military intelligence, massacre, sexual violence, enslavement, 
hostage-taking, and the appearance of captives in triumphs. I address each of these 
factors in turn, arguing that the Romans recognised a process of captive-taking which 
involved treatment designed to humiliate an enemy people, thereby rendering them 
more compliant with Roman demands.  
This thesis uses Greco-Roman literature, art, and iconography to outline and explore 
the process of captive-taking in Roman warfare. Greco-Roman evidence relating to 
captive-taking is written from a Roman perspective, or a viewpoint heavily influenced 
by Roman culture. Therefore, it has been necessary in this thesis to utilise examples 
which were written by the elite and promotional in nature to consider the historical 
realities and expectations implicit within such sources and to develop a fuller picture 
of captive-taking practices. The Roman elite were acutely aware of representation, and 
the treatment of captives was also influenced by such consideration. I have also made 
use of comparative examples of captive-taking and the processes briefly outlined above 
from modern history and current affairs to further discussion where Roman sources on 
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i. Captive-taking in the Roman World 
Captive-taking is a fundamental and enduring part of warfare in all world cultures.1 In 
The Culture of War, military historian Martin van Creveld argues that prisoners taken 
during warfare are ‘valuable, whether by way of their labor (both men and women), as 
sexual partners and breeders (women), or as a future source of manpower (children).’ 
Van Creveld’s brief discussion of captive-taking links to archaeologist Catherine M. 
Cameron’s research which suggests that captives, as an ‘invisible class of people’, are 
overlooked in scholarship across all fields of study as they are reduced to the practical 
functions useful for their captors.2 
This thesis is an attempt to remedy scholarship’s neglect of the process of captive-
taking in the Roman world. It also aims to recognise the important role captives played 
in Roman culture and society during the late Republic and early Imperial periods, 
albeit for the benefit of their captors. This involves considering the practical functions 
of captives and captive-taking within Roman warfare and society, in addition to elite 
representations of captive-taking. I use the term ‘captive-taking’ to refer to the process 
by which the Romans took prisoners during warfare and their subsequent 
management of the captives, i.e. the decisions made by Roman figures as to whether 
captives were killed, enslaved, freed or used as hostages. The majority of evidence we 
have from the Roman world, with the exception of archaeological remains, is from a 
pro-Roman perspective. Therefore, when attempting to uncover historical realities, we 
must be wary of how evidence may present us with a warped perspective. The sources 
in question were written by elite, male writers with a pro-Roman agenda, who utilised 
representations of captives to suit their own promotional needs. It has therefore been 
necessary to consider how the elite presented their interactions with captives as it 
informs us of the treatment captives were subjected to, and the motivations behind 
such treatment. 
That being said, it is important to remember that captives were human beings who 
suffered under Roman dominion, and the usually poor treatment they were subjected 
to was justified by Roman authors. Such attitudes could therefore be perpetuated by 
the strategic attacks on their person and status, and subsequent representations of their 
treatment by the Roman elite. This enabled the cycle of Roman aggression and captive-
taking to continue as captives were degraded in the eyes of their captors, thus enabling 
such treatment to be justified. It has therefore been necessary throughout this thesis to 
consider how captive-taking was used in elite self-representation. 
The time period in question (the late Republic and early Principate), which we shall 
discuss in more detail shortly,3 will enable comparison between Republican and early 
Imperial captive-taking practices. However, given the sparsity of evidence for captives 
 
1 Lagrou, 2005: 3. 
2 Cameron, 2016: 2. 
3 Cf. pp. 14-16. 
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in this period, references to sources concerning earlier and later periods have been 
used where pertinent, in order to discuss Roman expectations of captive-taking or how 
practices became established in Roman culture. Such expectations act as a benchmark 
by which we can compare the treatment of different types of captives within this 
period. The differences in captives’ treatment were usually the result of the context in 
which they were taken, the language used to define them (e.g., captive, hostage, 
enslaved person) which reflected perceived status classifications, their socio-economic 
position in their own societies, their gender, and the expectations which theoretically 
dictated the Romans’ conduct towards them. Such variations in treatment ultimately 
impacted upon captives’ subsequent portrayal in elite art, iconography, and literature. 
A key aspect of such representations centres on the terminology used to identify a 
captive’s social position and the implications such a position had on their treatment by 
their Roman captors, which we shall address in more detail later in this chapter.4 
We will discuss the Romans’ understanding of captive-taking shortly but, as a basis for 
comparison, it is important to address our own understanding of captive-taking in 
recent history. Firstly, I have on occasion drawn on scholarship relating to recent 
conflict to discuss some aspects of warfare as certain behaviours are universal. For 
instance, sexual violence and the reasons for its implementation in warfare were not 
discussed in detail by the Romans, yet we can turn to recent conflict to see how there 
are clear motivations which transcend cultural boundaries. Furthermore, 
acknowledging our own understanding is necessary because we view the ancient 
world with attitudes and perspectives borne of our own cultural heritage, religion, or 
socio-economic background, to name just a few factors.5 Essentially, when we study 
the ancient world, we are inherently biased. Nevertheless, this should not prevent us 
from using studies of the ancient world to reflect upon our own times or cultures. As a 
case in point, there was varying legal and cultural terminology for captives in the 
ancient world, and this has parallels in modern times. Such similarities enable us to 
understand the Romans’ attitude towards captive-taking, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging factors which impact upon our comprehension of the practice, both 
then and now. 
ii. Modern Captives 
Over the past century alone, there have been frequent references made to individuals 
or groups taken captive during conflict.6 Military combatants interned by the enemy 
are labelled as ‘Prisoners of War’ (henceforth PoWs). PoWs, according to the Third 
Geneva Convention, can be classified as: ‘members of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces,’ who have ‘fallen into the power of the enemy.’7 In addition, any members of a 
group raising arms against an invading enemy must also be treated as PoWs, in line 
with the Geneva Convention. As a result of the Convention’s definition, and the nature 
 
4 Cf. pp. 7-9. 
5 Schaps, 2011: 374. 
6 Cameron, 2016: 16-17. 
7 Geneva Convention 3.4. 
3 
 
of warfare in recent times, the majority of PoWs have been male combatants, usually 
involved in the military or militia groups. Furthermore, as a result of recent cultural 
depictions of PoWs, we tend to associate PoWs with those engaged in fighting during 
the First and Second World Wars.8 Research has largely centred around illuminating 
the experiences of PoWs of all nationalities during these wars, particularly their lives in 
internment camps. For example, Wilkinson has considered the experiences of British 
PoWs in internment camps in Germany during the First World War,9 and there is an 
ongoing project at the University of Leeds which concerns diary entries written by 
German PoWs at Raikeswood Camp in Skipton, Yorkshire, during the First World 
War.10 Other research centres on the reintroduction of PoWs into their societies 
following the conclusion of a war. Weinand’s research addresses the return of PoWs to 
Germany following the Second World War,11 and Moore and Hately-Broad’s edited 
volume concerns the repatriation of PoWs of all nationalities after the Second World 
War, illuminating common themes and issues PoWs faced when returning home.12  
The individuals discussed in the aforementioned scholarship would all fall under the 
Geneva Convention’s definition of a PoW, and would be recognised by signatories of 
the convention as a protected class of people in warfare. Despite this, abuses have 
occurred since the Conventions were ratified in 1949,13 and, given human nature, are 
likely to do so for as long as warfare continues. However, issues of definition and 
identity are significant within discussions of both modern and ancient captive-taking 
as they dictate the application of laws or, in Roman times, customs influencing the 
treatment of captives. Conventions which protect PoWs, like those created at Geneva, 
can only extend in practice to states which are recognised as being ‘legitimate’ by the 
international community and, in turn, acknowledge the sovereignty of other nations. In 
addition, the states in question must also have agreed to abide by similar conventions 
or laws dictating, in the case of the Third Geneva Convention, the treatment of 
prisoners taken in warfare. As we shall see in the following chapter and throughout 
this thesis, the Romans applied their ‘rules of war’ pragmatically and were careful to 
stress the alien or illegitimate status of their enemies to avoid breaching their own 
wartime customs.  
As we shall discuss shortly, the Roman elite used specific language to refer to different 
types of captives, i.e. captive or hostage, and such terminology had associated 
expectations relating to the treatment of captives. The Romans’ ‘rules of war’ were 
 
8 The association prevails in both scholarship and culture. Scholarship on PoWs during the First 
and Second World Wars is prevalent, cf. Jones, 2011, Moore, Hately-Broad, 2005, Reiss, 2005: 
475-504. Cultural works, often based on true stories, include books and their subsequent film 
adaptations such as The Great Escape, Slaughterhouse-Five, The Railway Man, and Unbroken. 
9 Wilkinson, 2017. 
10 University of Leeds, 2017. Other examples of scholarship using first-hand accounts from 
PoWs includes Neitzel’s Soldaten which uses recordings taken of German PoWs in British camps 
during the Second World War, cf. Neitzel, 2011. 
11 Weinand, 2015. 
12 Moore, Hately-Broad, 2005. 
13 Jones, 2008: 338-339, Reed, 2004. 
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unwritten, but we have witnessed recently how even in relation to written legislation, 
language can be used to distinguish individuals as something other than PoWs (a 
protected class) which has enabled abuses to occur. In recent years, we have seen that it 
is possible to argue that certain types of prisoners do not qualify for protection under 
the Geneva Convention. This is evident in the actions of the United States of America’s 
government in the continued abuse of detainees at facilities like Guantanamo Bay. In 
2002, US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld argued that the prisoners interned in 
Guantanamo Bay were “unlawful combatants”, and the Geneva Convention could not 
be applied as they were not PoWs from a ‘legitimate’ nation, as the Convention 
dictates.14 This example shows how important definitions are in dictating how 
prisoners are treated by their captors, a factor which is paramount in the study of 
Roman captives. 
In addition to the Guantanamo detainees, there are other individuals taken during 
conflict who cannot be classified as PoWs. These individuals were often the victims of 
the extremist groups the USA was fighting. This further justified the USA’s detention 
of prisoners in Guantanamo. These include those captured by terrorist groups, such as 
ISIS (henceforth Daesh) and Boko Haram.15 Despite being taken by force, usually in 
conflict zones, the captives are without the protection of the Geneva Conventions as 
their captors are not ‘legitimate’ states. In addition, the terrorist groups are not 
signatories of the Conventions, nor do they recognise the authority of bodies operating 
on behalf of the international community, including the International Courts or the 
United Nations. Furthermore, the conflict in which they are engaged cannot be called a 
‘war’, as it is not between two recognised states.16 Therefore, the Geneva Convention, 
which sets out treatment of prisoners in warfare, does not apply. As a counter point, 
how terrorist groups identify their captives (or victims) is significant here. For instance, 
those killed in the Manchester Arena attack in 2017, including children as young as 
eight,17 were labelled ‘crusaders’ by Daesh.18 Evidently, Daesh see their victims as 
combatants, effectively claiming that those we would consider to be innocent are their 
enemies. Issues of recognition cannot be underestimated, and perspective is especially 
evident in discussions of Roman captives, as the majority of the evidence we have was 
written by those who were a part of, or heavily influenced by, Roman culture and 
society. 
iii. Defining Ancient Captives 
Turning to the Romans’ understanding of captive-taking, it must be acknowledged that 
their definitions of different types of captives are as murky and mercurial as our own. 
The Romans based the treatment of their captives on what we would term the ‘rules of 
 
14 Reed, 2004. As Reed points out, even if the United States did not break the Geneva 
Convention in their treatment of the detainees, they violated numerous other international laws 
to which they were party, including the Convention against Torture. 
15 For instance, the 276 girls taken from a school in Chibok, Nigeria in 2014, cf. Amnesty 
International, 2015: 7,8, 26, 28, 32, 63-68, Guardian Staff and Agencies, 2017. 
16 ODL, 2015: war. 
17 Independent Staff, 2017. 
18 Dearden, 2017. 
5 
 
war’,19 a series of unwritten guidelines found throughout Greco-Roman literature, 
which often dictated how they treated certain types of captives. For the Romans, 
success in warfare was defined by culturally and legally ingrained traditions and rules. 
This is evident in the criteria that Roman generals, or later members of the Imperial 
family, had to meet before they could be awarded a triumphal procession by the 
senate.20 In theory, generals could only be awarded a triumph following the conclusion 
of a ‘just’ war and if they had defeated a specific number of the enemy in battle.21 This 
is evident in the triumphs of such Republican-era Romans as Pompey,22 but instances 
in which triumphs were not awarded are also useful for considering how different 
groups of captives were categorised in the Roman mindset. In 71 BCE, Crassus was 
instrumental in defeating Spartacus and his army during the Third Servile War (73-71 
BCE).23 Pompey was also involved in the suppression of the revolt but, whilst they 
both received honours at similar times, only Pompey was granted a triumph.24 
Pompey’s triumph was decreed by the senate for his victories over the rebel Roman 
Sertorius and an uprising in Spain, but there is no mention of his involvement in the 
servile revolt in the senate’s approval of his triumph.25 Meanwhile, Crassus was 
awarded an ovation (ovatio), a ceremony considered to be a ‘lesser triumph’, for his 
defeat of Spartacus’ army.26 Crassus’ victory had infamously involved the crucifixion 
of the 6000 rebels (the majority of whom were enslaved people) along the Via Appia 
from Rome to Capua,27 and the number of those executed was over the minimum 
‘enemy’ casualties necessary for a triumph to be awarded. Marshall suggests that 
Pompey chose not to claim victory in the Third Servile War, possibly as Pompey 
accepted Crassus’ dominant role in its suppression.28 He bases this claim on evidence 
from Pompey’s later triumph of 61 BCE in which Pompey’s victory over pirates, a 
group with similar social and legal standing to enslaved people, was celebrated. 
However, the captives’ backgrounds may have been of more concern to both Pompey 
and Crassus, as Plutarch claimed that Crassus was content with a lesser triumph as it 
was thought ‘ignoble’ to celebrate even an ovation over enslaved people.29  
 
19 The ‘rules of war’ are discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. 
20 Beard, 2007: 296-297, cf. pp. 186-188. 
21 Beard, 2007: 199-214. For a detailed overview of the scholarship surrounding this debate, cf. 
Lundgreen, 2014: 17-32. 
22 Beard, 2007: 7-41. 
23 N.B. As this thesis often discusses the treatment ‘slaves’ were subjected to in the Roman 
world, I attempt where possible to use the term ‘enslaved person’ rather than ‘slave’ in line with 
recent scholarship on slavery. For the sake of brevity, I use ‘slave trade’ and ‘slave supply’, 
rather than ‘the trade/supply in enslaved people’ but I hope the human cost of such trade has 
been appropriately conveyed throughout this thesis. Where I have been unable to use ‘enslaved 
person’, I have explained my use of alternative terms in the footnotes. For further reading on 
the language of slavery, cf. Foreman, 2019, Dugan, 2019: 62-87. 
24 Vell. Pat. 2.30.1, Plut. Vit. Crass. 11.8, Vit. Pomp. 31.5. 
25 Vell. Pat. 2.30.1. 
26 Plut. Vit. Crass. 11.8. 
27 App. B Civ. 1.120. 
28 Marshall, 1972: 671. 
29 Plut. Vit. Crass. 11.8. 
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This shows how the Romans distinguished and categorised their captive enemies and 
links closely with our understanding and the legalities of captive-taking today. Like the 
USA’s stance on Guantanamo detainees, the Romans acknowledged captives as 
enemies if they belonged to a recognisable nation, e.g. one of the Gallic or Germanic 
nations. Therefore, enslaved people and pirates were not considered in the same way 
as captives belonging to identifiable groups. This is similar to the differences between 
officially recognised PoWs, and captives taken by terrorist groups who have little legal 
protection as they are not covered by International Law. Undeniably, individuals 
captured by terrorist groups are taken by force. However, their captors do not belong 
to a group recognised by the international community, nor does the group recognise 
conventions which dictate treatment of prisoners in conflict. Therefore, International 
Law cannot be applied to either the captives or the captors. As the Romans only 
recognised some of their captives as ‘enemies’, their idealised expectations of captive-
taking and of their captives’ behaviour only applied if the captives were recognised as 
legitimate adversaries.  
iv. Language and Methodology 
The Greeks and Romans both had specific terminology for those they took captive. The 
Greeks used the term αἰχμάλωτος, -ov (aikhmálōtos), which translates as ‘taken by the 
spear, captive, prisoner’.30 The term has the root αἰχμ (aikhm-), meaning ‘point of a 
spear’, which evidently has connotations of violence.31 The Romans used the terms 
captivus, -i. and captivus, -a, -um,32 both of which derive from the verb capto which has 
associations with violent capture by seizing or taking.33 The terms are used to describe 
comparable incidents in history or those described in parallel works, and do not 
appear to be merely restricted to the historical genre.34 Rather, both terms appear in 
historical and literary writings from across the Greco-Roman period.35 The 1st century 
CE Greek author Dio Chrysostom discusses the use and meaning of αἰχμάλωτος. In his 
discourses, addressed to the people of Alexandria, Chrysostom uses the traditional 
understanding of the word, essentially physical captivity leading to enslavement, to 
argue a city could also be taken ‘captive’ by vice and excess.36 Both terms refer to men, 
women and children (although these groups are often not differentiated) who were 
taken during or following a military campaign. Furthermore, all the aforementioned 
terms can be applied to people, places, spoils, and the capture of animals during 
hunting. This implies, in line with Dio Chrysostom’s use of αἰχμάλωτος in relation to a 
city, that captives were effectively seen as a commodity or had a status akin to that of 
an animal. Hostages are referred to using different terms, namely obses and ὅμηρος 
 
30 LSJ, 45: αἰχμαλ-ωτος, ον. 
31 LSJ, 45: αἰχμ-n. 
32 OLD, 273: captiuus, -a, -um. 
33 OLD, 273: capto. 
34 For Greek literary examples, cf. Aesch. Ag. 1440, Eur. Tro. 35, 678, Men. Asp. Fr. 112, Plut. Mor. 
183E. For Latin examples, cf. Hor. Carm. 2.4.5-10, 3.3.61-68, Sat. 1.3.83-89, Ov. Her. 1.51-56, Apul. 
Met. 9.42. 
35 LSJ: 45: αἰχμαλ-ωτος, ον, OLD: 273: captiuus, -a, -um. 
36 Dio Chrys. Or. 32.89-90. 
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(homeros).37 The term obses can be translated as either ‘hostage’ or ‘surety pledge’. The 
latter definition is in line with Allen’s discussion of hostages, as he claims that the use 
of the English word ‘hostage’ is inappropriate in translations of ancient texts, 
considering its modern implications of violence which were not always present in 
Roman society.38 Allen uses the term ‘hostage’ throughout his work and, in line with 
Allen, I have chosen to use ‘hostage’ as it is a term applied to people, in contrast to the 
more dehumanising ‘surety pledge’. 
In addition to captives being described using these specific terms, there are others who 
are often referred to as being captured using verbs. In Latin, this includes capio, capto, 
rapio, and rapto. The capture of women especially is often referred to using rapio, which 
is not dissimilar to ‘plunder’ or ‘snatch’,39 as in the case of the Sabine Women.40 In 
Greek, captives are often referred to using ἀπάγω (apágo), meaning to ‘lead off or carry 
away’,41 or αἱρέω (hairéō) meaning ‘to catch or seize’.42 To return to the case of the 
Sabine Women and similar examples, the women are not technically called ‘captives’ 
but the way in which they were acquired by the Romans suggests that the women had 
been taken prisoner against their will, and possibly through using violent means. There 
does not seem to be a set way in which the aforementioned terminology was used, for 
instance captivus does not directly translate as ‘Prisoner of War’, as we would 
understand the term. This is because individuals who were not recognised as 
‘legitimate enemies’, as we have seen in the example of Crassus’ triumph, are also 
referred to using terms like captivus.43 As a result of these minor complications, I have 
taken a pragmatic approach in searching for captives, e.g., by searching for words in 
translation. 
If an individual was taken captives by the Romans, or was subsequently physically 
controlled by the Romans, using violence or the threat of it, in my view, they are 
‘captives’. I have therefore limited my research to those who were taken captive and 
either immediately killed, as in the cases outlined in the massacre chapter of this thesis 
or held by the Romans for a significant period. Some people taken captive were 
subsequently freed, but their experiences are outside the scope of this thesis. People 
who were freed following siege warfare could presumably return to their lives,44 albeit 
under Roman rule, others were freed after a period of enslavement. In the case of the 
former, we have limited information about the experiences of those who were 
immediately freed, and those who were freed after being enslaved have been studied 
at length elsewhere.45 
 
37 OLD, 1222: obses, LSJ, 1221: ὃμερος. 
38 Allen, 2006: 16-17. For further discussion of the definition of hostages, cf. pp. 130-134.  
39 OLD, 1574. Raptum, rapti as a noun can be translated as ‘plunder’ or ‘prey’, or ‘hurriedly, 
suddenly’ in its adverb form. 
40 Livy 1.11.2-3, cf. pp. 66-73, 84-89. 
41 LSJ, 174: ἀπάγω. 
42 LSJ, 66: ἁλίσκσμαι. 
43 Cic. Verr. 5.156. 
44 Cf. pp. 109-112.  
45 Cf. Mouritsen, 2011. 
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As a result of this definition, my research has often entailed carrying out a search for 
the words ‘prisoner’, ‘hostage’, and ‘captive’ in translation, in addition to the 
aforementioned terms in the original language. This is because translators have often 
used such terms when translating verbs, as outlined above, which equate to ‘captured’, 
‘snatched’, or ‘taken’. Furthermore, as a result of complications arising from the 
language, I use ‘captive’ as an umbrella term for all those taken prisoner by the 
Romans using violent means, or the threat of violence. However, there are differences 
between certain types of captives, which I will outline in detail throughout this thesis, 
beginning with the first chapter on the ‘rules of war’. Nevertheless, the existence of 
specific terminology to refer to captives and captive-taking demonstrates how 
ingrained the practice was in Greco-Roman culture. 
v. Plautus’ Captivi 
Captive-taking was assumed to be commonplace in ancient warfare, and the practice 
appears to be universally understood and employed across the ancient Mediterranean 
world.46 References to captives are prevalent throughout Greco-Roman literature and 
art. Monuments, including the Colosseum, Trajan’s Column [Figure 1], and the Arch of 
Septimius Severus in Rome [Figure 2], were built with the proceeds from the sale of, or 
graphically depict the humiliation and enslavement of, individuals the Romans 
subjugated.47 We shall explore the Romans’ understanding in more detail in Chapter 
One, but one play with close links to both Greece and Rome provides a basis for 
understanding the expectations and uses of male captives in the Roman world. The 
play in question, Plautus’ Captivi, is one of the earliest extant Roman sources focussing 
on captives and provides evidence of shared cultural norms between Greece and 
Rome. These shared practices are significant in understanding the Romans’ treatment 
of captives as the Romans often adopted and adapted Greek traditions, and many 
writers referenced throughout this thesis originated from the Greek speaking world. In 
addition, as a piece intended for performance, it also highlights the use of captives 
within Roman culture outside of warfare. 
Captivi follows two captives, Philocrates and his enslaved attendant Tyndarus, who are 
taken during a fictional conflict between the Greek cities of Elis and Aetolia.48 Plautus’ 
play is an adaptation of a Greek original but its plot would only have been relevant to 
Roman audiences if it reflected a Roman understanding of how captives were used.49 
The play, produced in the early 2nd century BCE, is especially useful in not only 
conveying shared cultural values between Greece and Rome,50 but in exposing early 
Roman Republican attitudes to captives and captive-taking. Republican concerns are of 
 
46 For Greek captive-taking, cf. Sternberg, 2006. 
47 The Colosseum was built using proceeds from an unspecified war, possibly the First Jewish 
Revolt, cf. Millar, 2005: 103, 118. Trajan’s Column and the Arch of Septimius Severus graphically 
depict the subjugation of captive men, women and children on their reliefs. 
48 Franko, 1995: 155-156. Franko argues that, considering the hostility at the time between Rome 
and Aetolia, Plautus’ presentation of Aetolians embodying traditional Roman values would not 
have been lost on the audience. 
49 Moore, 1998: 50-52, Gruen, 2001: 84, Richlin, 2018: 213-240. 
50 Moore, 1998: 50-66. 
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note, as not only is Plautus’ play a contemporary example of the attitudes towards 
captives’ treatment, but the values it conveys also inform later discussion of the 
Republican nostalgia frequently evoked during the late Republic and early Empire. 
Captivi centres on Hegio, a noble Aetolian man who buys Elean captives taken during 
conflict between the two Greek states. This detail is included in an explanation during 
the prologue in which Hegio’s motivations are justified, namely that he hopes to buy 
enough captives (sold into slavery following the war) to exchange for his son, 
Philopolemus, a captive under Elean control. It is implicit that Hegio is a person of 
some social standing, not only because he has sufficient funds to purchase multiple 
captives,51 but because he assumes that his son is worth the equivalent of more than 
one captive.52 Even as mutes, as they first appear, the captives are utilised on stage as 
their presence during the prologue is used to assist the audience in understanding the 
complicated plot.53 Richlin argues that the audience were accustomed to warfare as 
soldiers and former PoWs, either Romans or those enslaved by them, formed part of 
the audience.54 In addition, given the recent capture of Roman soldiers during the 
Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE and the senate’s refusal to pay the ransom, the treatment 
of PoWs was likely to be a concern for the public at large.55 Moreover, Plautus indicates 
that captive-taking in war and captives’ subsequent enslavement was commonplace 
and the two central captives are not the only ones Hegio purchased.56 Indeed, the plot 
relies on the Roman audience’s acceptance that defeated peoples could be sold into 
slavery.57  
The captives in question, one of which transpires to be Hegio’s long lost son 
(Tyndarus), are treated with respect, as Hegio wishes to ensure his son is treated in a 
similar way. After ascertaining through questioning that one of the captives belongs to 
a noble family,58 Hegio sends the other captive, whom he believes to be the nobleman’s 
enslaved attendant, to the enemy state with a message offering the exchange of 
Philopolemus for the captives he has purchased. The slave’s messenger role suggests 
there was a level of trust within the captive-captor relationship, as the enslaved person 
in question was bound to Hegio by the slave-master relationship.59 The enslaved 
person’s master had also made a guarantee that the slave would return. Furthermore, 
Hegio is aware of the captive’s pre-capture status as a free man of Greek heritage, a 
background similar to his own. In this respect, there does appear to be differing 
 
51 Plaut. Capt. 126-128. 
52 Plaut. Capt. 26-35, 95-100. 
53 Plaut. Capt. 1-4, 26-35, 110-117, cf. Lowe, 1991: 29. 
54 Richlin, 2018: 213-217.  
55 Richlin, 2018: 226-226, Cosgrave (forthcoming). The ransom of the soldiers at Cannae 
continued to be a point of contention until the 1st century BCE, with Cicero claiming that Greek 
philosophers still discussed the incident, cf. Cicero, De Or. 3.109. 
56 Plaut. Capt. 23-24, 126-128. 
57 Richlin, 2018: 214. 
58 Plaut. Capt. 251-450. 
59 Throughout this section, I resort to using ‘slave’ and ‘master’ as these simply connote the 
relationship between enslaved person and their captors as the Romans would have understood 
it in these circumstances, in line with the language Plautus uses in the play. 
10 
 
treatment between the enslaved person and the nobleman, despite the fact that they 
now have the same standing as they are both captives enslaved by Hegio, a situation 
they both recognise and address. 
By this point, Tyndarus and Philocrates, the slave and the master respectively, have 
secretly exchanged places so Philocrates can return home without his family locating 
and returning Hegio’s son to him, or risk Philocrates being detained for a long period 
with the enemy. Both the master and the slave are technically, as captives, on equal 
footing, but the ways in which Plautus depicts their relationship tells us about the 
differences between the statuses of the formerly freeborn and enslaved captives. As we 
shall see in the following chapter, it appears the Romans considered that all 
individuals upon their capture automatically acquired a status akin to an enslaved 
person.60 However, captives were not all treated as enslaved people by the Romans, 
and it can be argued this was because of their pre-capture status. Social class and 
wealth, which equated to power, were crucial in the Roman world. Thereby captives 
from wealthy, powerful families had more value in Roman minds than those from 
lower class backgrounds. This is evident in Hegio’s decision to send the enslaved 
person to negotiate the exchange as the socially superior master was of more value in 
terms of negotiating and was also a social equal of his son. 
Further evidence can be found in Hegio’s decision, upon learning of the deceit, to 
punish the enslaved person by sending Tyndarus to carry out hard labour in the 
quarries.61 By this stage in the play, Hegio has seemingly assumed that any chance of 
negotiating his son’s return has vanished, having lost his bargaining power with 
Philocrates’ departure. Tyndarus is only ordered back from the quarries once 
Philocrates returns with Hegio’s son, by which time Tyndarus’ identity, as Hegio’s lost 
son and a person of noble birth, is revealed.62 In this way, captives of different social 
classes had various values to their captors and were treated accordingly. Furthermore, 
Hegio’s initially respectful treatment of the captives and then his harsh response to the 
deceit is also a means by which Plautus enables the audience to reflect on Hegio’s 
character, and also allows the temporary blocking character, i.e. one who presents a 
obstacle which the protagonists have to overcome, to have an anagnorisis.  
Plautus’ Captivi was written before the time period of focus for this thesis. However, 
the play provides us with details of some of the ways in which the Romans utilised 
their captives, what the expectations of treatment were, or how captive treatment could 
be represented. Approaching this discussion with an overview of a literary example of 
captive treatment provides a footing for a comment on the nature of the sources used 
and how they can contribute to my consideration of captives in the Roman world. As I 
shall relay throughout this discussion, there are issues with historical sources not only 
because they often lack correct citing of their original sources, but also because writers 
 
60 As we have seen, this was a recurring theme throughout Greco-Roman literature, and is also 
present in Dio Chrysostom’s discussion of a city captured or enslaved by vice, cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 
32.89-90.  
61 Plaut. Capt. 723-6. 
62 Plaut. Capt. 955-976. 
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may have invented details as they simply did not have access to the information. To 
quote Mark Twain: ‘never let the truth get in the way of a good story,’63 and this is 
nowhere more evident than in Greco-Roman writings describing the events of early 
Roman history.64 This is even more true when the stories, and they should be initially 
approached as such, in question were often created or embellished with political or 
ideological undertones or with a view to self-promotion. However, the sources in 
question portray the Romans’ attitude towards their captives, and this informs the 
reasons behind their depicted treatment which may be indicative of actual events. This 
thesis attempts to outline the treatment captives received in actuality, and the uses of 
representations of captive-taking within Roman culture. 
vi. Sources 
Source material relating to captive-taking is disparate and can be found in various 
mediums. This thesis considers a wide range of sources, which enables a discussion of 
elite and non-elite perspectives of captive-taking. The majority of literary evidence, as 
is typical of the ancient world, is written from an elite male perspective. The writers in 
question were Romans, such as Caesar or Tacitus, who were most certainly actively 
involved in captive-taking during military service. Alternatively, Greek authors like 
Plutarch or Cassius Dio were either heavily influenced by Roman culture or had been 
brought up in cities under Roman rule. Whilst numerous authors place themselves in 
the position of captives, occasionally writing from the perspective of a captive, few are 
able to give a true to life depiction of the captive experience.65 Even individuals who 
were writing after enduring Roman captivity, such as the 2nd century BCE Greek writer 
Polybius and 1st century CE Judaean writer Josephus, were not in the position to be 
critical of the Roman regime as they owed their continued success and safety to Roman 
leaders.66 Furthermore, both writers were of elite status and could only offer a 
privileged view of captivity in relative comfort, compared to their non-elite 
counterparts. As a result, the history of the Roman world is largely written by the 
victors of wars, or those who were not in any position to challenge Roman authority. 
For the period this thesis considers, we do not have any independent first-hand captive 
testimony, and the sources which we encounter are representations of a captive’s 
experience from the captor’s point of view. Therefore, there is a divergence between 
the treatment that captives received in reality, and the treatment as it was presented to 
the Roman elite and people through the works of, or histories pertaining to, the 
political classes. For this thesis, it is essential to consider how various aspects of 
captive-taking were presented by the elite in order to establish the realities of captive-
taking, or how concerns for representation affected the treatment of captives. 
This thesis also relies upon material culture in understanding how captives were 
treated. The majority of artistic sources were commissioned by the political elite, and 
many of the surviving examples were displayed in a public, or pseudo-public setting, 
 
63 No one is sure if Twain said this, but why let the truth get in the way of a good quotation? 
64 Cf. Saïd, 2007: 76-88. 
65 Beard, 2007: 112-114. 
66 For Polybius cf. Allen, 2006: 216-219, and for Josephus, cf. Cotton, Eck, 2005: 37-53. 
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such as the forum or public-facing areas of the domus.67 Warfare was essential to the 
development of art and iconography, not only because art and the artists were often 
imported through military activities, but war related objects formed a part of artistic 
display.68 For instance, as Blagg argues, the spoils of war were the most commonly 
exhibited form of art until the 2nd century BCE.69 The success of elite art and 
iconography relied upon the subject matter being recognisable and the usually 
promotional message being understood by a variety of people from across Roman 
society. As a result, we often see images on art commissioned by the elite being 
adopted in non-elite material culture across the Roman empire. Depictions of captives 
in art are key to our understanding of captive-taking as a process as they would only 
have been effective for elite self-promotion if art imitated the realities of captive-taking.  
However, there are limitations to art and iconography, particularly as they are 
primarily intended to be celebrations of elite achievements which do not fully reflect a 
captive’s journey, as this thesis outlines. Material culture is utilised in conjunction with 
literary sources but with the understanding that it reflects more on the elite individuals 
who commissioned the pieces, rather than the captives themselves. The experience of 
captives is more evident in archaeological evidence, as we encounter the physical 
remains of captives themselves.70 However, whilst archaeological evidence, 
particularly human remains, provide a more human picture of the ancient world, we 
are limited in understanding the full experience of individuals who lived during this 
time period. As a result, it is essential that all forms of evidence are used in conjunction 
and their limitations are acknowledged throughout the thesis where appropriate. 
vii. Time Period 
The 1st century BCE and the early Principate (until c.100 CE) was a politically and 
socially turbulent time in the Roman world, with warfare and political violence 
prominent within its culture. The period was dominated by a series of wars and the 
individuals who rose triumphantly from them. In brief, the 1st century BCE began with 
Rome’s continued expansion into western Europe, whilst the Roman senate monitored 
and interfered with the eastern nations. Simultaneously, political tension between 
Rome and her Italic allies, which ultimately resulted in the Social Wars, was building. 
The Social Wars (91-88 BCE) were significant as they began as a war between Rome 
and other Italian cities, some of whom had been in treaty alliances with Rome, but 
resulted in the inclusion, in terms of enfranchisement, of these former enemies. As we 
shall see, the Social Wars were filled with examples of aggression and massacre, 
depictions of which became problematic given the change to the former enemies’ 
status. The Social Wars were followed almost immediately by the First Mithridatic War 
(89-85 BCE), between Mithridates V of Pontus and Rome, which began a series of wars 
which finally concluded in 64 BCE with Mithridates’ death by suicide. During this 
 
67 Blagg, 1987: 723-5. 
68 Blagg, 1987: 717-42. 
69 Blagg, 1987: 723. 
70 As evident in the remains of individuals who suffered a violent death, cf. pp. 55-59, or whose 
remains were found in chains, cf. Thompson, 1993: 57-168. 
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period, the rivalry between Sulla and Marius brought violence to the heart of Rome.71 
Sulla’s actions, both during foreign warfare and at Rome during his dictatorship (c. 
82/81 BCE), set a precedent for the later actions of Pompey and Caesar.72  
The 1st century also saw the rise of piracy and the Third Servile War (73-71 BCE), which 
were ultimately quashed by figures who became prominent in politics, including 
Crassus and Pompey. With the rise of these individuals, further violent expansion was 
undertaken in Spain, Gaul, and Asia Minor between 79-44 BCE, primarily by Pompey 
and Caesar.73 The hostile nature of expansion into these areas provided the 
opportunity for individuals to wield power over vast areas of land, and large parts of 
the Roman army.74 This was significant because, during this period, the individual 
moved to the centre of political life and military prowess became paramount to 
political success. This factor was largely the result of the memory of the heavy losses 
suffered by Rome during the 2nd century BCE because of military incompetence.75 In 
turn, the profits made from military campaigning were used in benefactions made by 
individuals to the city of Rome.76 The meteoric rise of Pompey and Caesar led to the 
Civil War (49-45 BCE) between them and their supporters, ultimately resulting in their 
assassinations in 48 and 44 BCE respectively. Further conflict between Caesar’s 
supporters, led by his heir Octavian and Marcus Antonius, and Caesar’s assassins 
continued until 36 BCE, when Pompey’s son was defeated in battle. Despite the marital 
allegiance between Octavian and Antonius, tensions between them continued to build 
until Antonius and his ally-partner Cleopatra were defeated at the Battle of Actium in 
31 BCE. Octavian, soon to be honoured with the title of Augustus in 27 BCE, was the 
most prominent survivor of the Civil Wars. Augustus went on to establish himself as 
the sole ruler of Rome whilst keeping up the pretence of supporting an independent 
senate and Republican values.  
The following eight decades were dominated by Augustus’ heirs, now known as the 
Julio-Claudian dynasty, and warfare continued to be conducted on the fringes of the 
Empire. Augustus’ stepsons, the future Emperor Tiberius and his brother Germanicus, 
campaigned in Germania, Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Raetia, during Augustus and 
Tiberius’ reigns (27 BCE – 14 CE and 14 CE – 37 CE, respectively). Claudius began an 
invasion of Britain in 43 BCE, and Boudica’s revolt in 60 CE took place during the reign 
of Claudius’ successor Nero. Following a period of civil unrest after Nero’s fall from 
power in 68 BCE, the Flavian dynasty held power until 96 CE. The first two Flavian 
emperors Vespasian and Titus led campaigns in Judaea and northern Europe, 
including Britain, Gaul, and Germania.  
The examples of captive-taking found in this thesis range from across this period, 
although not all leaders and campaigns are considered in detail given the scope of the 
 
71 Patterson, 2006: 356. 
72 Lintott, 2013: 10. 
73 Richardson, 1976: 18-22, Lintott, 2013: 10. 
74 Richardson, 1976: 20-21, Erdkamp, 2006: 282. 
75 Erdkamp, 2006: 291. 
76 Erdkamp, 2006: 285-6, Patterson, 2006: 345-364. 
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thesis and complexities related to the campaigns. For instance, The First Jewish Revolt 
(66–73 CE) involved captive-taking and is discussed at various points in this thesis. 
However, the majority of evidence we have comes from Josephus, a Jewish man who 
was taken captive during the course of the First Jewish Revolt. Although Josephus was 
writing from a pro-Roman perspective, Jewish traditions and religious teachings 
should be taken into consideration in more detail when studying captive-taking in this 
campaign. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address these issues in 
depth.77 
viii. Literature Review 
Captives are often overlooked or simply dismissed as enslaved people in scholarship. 
To the best of my knowledge, archaeologist Cameron is alone in centring her research 
on captives, covering captive-taking from across world cultures and history.78 Cameron 
considers Roman captives briefly in her research and primarily focusses on how 
captives furthered the transmission of cultural practices.79 Her approach is similar to 
my own in that she does not limit her focus to our modern understanding of captives, 
namely as ‘PoWs’ or ‘hostages’. Instead, Cameron recognises that captives could (and 
can) have a variety of roles which may not have specific terms attached to them,80 
especially when they were forced to integrate within the captors’ society. Furthermore, 
as we have seen, studies in the field of Modern History, particularly pertaining to the 
First and Second World Wars, have also studied captives but mainly those recognised 
as PoWs.81 
However, within the fields of Classics and Ancient History, there has been little 
consideration of the role captives in a broader sense played within Roman society, 
particularly the process of captive-taking. This results from a tendency within 
scholarship to focus on certain groups of captives, usually hostages belonging to elite 
society, or to assume that all captives taken during Roman conquest were enslaved. To 
some extent, this links with both sources and scholarship’s failure to outline, both in 
terms of linguistic and contextual considerations, the differences and similarities 
between those the Romans took ‘captive’ and those they took ‘hostage’.82 In this thesis, 
I have applied Cameron’s use of captives as an umbrella term to the Roman world 
which has enabled me to show how captives of all types, regardless of socio-economic 
status, were part of a process of captive-taking which was designed to impact upon all 
levels of an enemy’s society. 
Within research on the Roman world, captive-taking is discussed in numerous areas of 
research, including: warfare, slavery, hostage-taking, triumphal processions, 
 
77 The works of Reeder and Millar address captive-taking in some detail, although I believe 
there is scope for a fuller examination of this topic, cf. Millar, 2005, Reeder, 2017. 
78 Cameron, 2016, 2011, 2009.  
79 Cameron, 2016: 39-40, 66-67, 152-153, 159, 2011: 180, 196-198, 2009: 173-188.  
80 Cameron, 2016: 9-11. Cameron focusses on how the terms ‘slave’ and ‘captive’ are often 
interchangeable.  
81 Cf. pp. 3-7. 
82 Cf. p. 7. 
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ethnography, and art and numismatics. Captives are referenced but, as captive-taking 
is not the primary concern of researchers working in these areas, discussions are brief. 
Generally, previous scholarship has tended to remain within its own ‘research area’, 
whereas this thesis takes a cross-disciplinary approach to consider captive-taking as a 
practice and within elite self-promotion. In the following section, I have outlined 
trends within research, and I have also commented on the limitations of such 
scholarship when addressing captive-taking.  
a. Warfare and Imperialism 
The majority of Rome’s captives were taken during the course of or immediately after 
military campaigns. As captive-taking in warfare was common practice, there are 
references to captives within studies on the structure and organisation of the Roman 
army. The works in question are general overviews of Roman warfare, usually 
concerning its role within society, and only briefly address PoWs.83 Of note is Austin 
and Rankov’s work on military intelligence which discusses the usefulness of captive-
taking in the Roman world as a means of acquiring information about an enemy’s 
tactics or position.84 The works in question focus on the historical realities of warfare 
and the army’s organisation. In this thesis, I use examples of elite self-promotion to 
consider the implicit expectations, shared by the Roman elite, of captive-taking 
practices, which inform later discussions in the thesis. I have therefore been able to 
outline a fuller picture of the treatment of captives and how the elite presented their 
own captive-taking behaviour in line with the expectations shared by their 
contemporaries. For instance, in Chapter One, I argue that captives taken during war 
were used for more purposes than military intelligence, including as combatants and to 
strike terror into enemy forces. I suggest that descriptions of captive informers and the 
Roman commander’s interaction with them were used to convey a commander’s 
personal qualities, particularly their intellect and military prowess. Such qualities 
could be stressed in elite self-promotion, as evident throughout Caesar’s Gallic Wars.  
Furthermore, the majority of research in this area focusses on the capture of male 
military figures and does not address the role of women or children in warfare. The 
exception to this is research into sexual violence as it disproportionately affected (and 
continues to affect) women and children. However, discussion of wartime sexual 
violence has been limited in the field of Classics and often focusses on examples from 
ancient Greece. Ziolkowski, Antela-Bernárdez, and Gaca’s research has used literary 
and historical writings to consider the role of sexual violence in siege warfare, arguing 
that the ancient Greeks and Romans considered it to be a necessary act which made its 
victims more compliant and easier to enslave.85 Unlike the aforementioned scholars, I 
consider sexual violence outside of siege warfare, including its use in massacres. In 
Chapter Three: Sexual Violence, I consider Roman sexual violence and its uses in 
 
83 Examples can be found in: Garlan, 1975: 67-73, Campbell, 2002: 72-74.  
84 Austin, Rankov, 1995: 67-73. Their consideration of Roman torture as a means to extract 
information about an enemy’s plans may link to a captive’s ‘slave’ status.  




destroying a community and enslaving women and children, which had implications 
on wider society. I also discuss the Roman elite’s unwillingness to reference sexual 
violence explicitly, despite a clear acknowledgement that sexual violence was a 
common occurrence in warfare. Similarly, I have considered instances of sexual 
violence outside of siege warfare and have therefore found examples which have not 
previously been discussed, including examples from Caesar’s Gallic Wars. Therefore, 
by looking at the intersection between historical reality and elite self-representation, I 
have been able to acknowledge that the Romans exhibited some discomfort when 
discussing sexual violence, despite often hypocritically permitting or encouraging it in 
warfare. 
With regards to sexual violence, I have made the decision in this thesis to omit the 
works of scholars who have been charged with or accused of acts of sexual violence, or 
who condone forms of sexual violence using precedents and attitudes from the ancient 
world.86 I am aware that an argument can be made for the inclusion of such 
individuals’ academic works,87 as their research does not necessarily reflect their 
personal lives or actions.88 However, Rabinowitz argues that scholarship is always 
personal on some level, stating that her own research is only possible because she 
studies women in Greek tragedy from the perspective of a woman who identifies as a 
feminist and who has an interest in social justice.89 In my opinion, the works of the 
individuals referenced in footnote 87 cannot be isolated from their behaviour or 
advocacy in relation to sexual violence. A clear connection can be made between 
Parker and Hubbard’s behaviour and advocacy and their research, but Harris’ 
scholarship does not explicitly refer to sexual violence. However, Harris’ esteemed 
position gave him the opportunity to allegedly continue harassing his victim. Harris’ 
position was one of power and privilege which he supposedly abused, a common 
 
86 The use of citation policy in academic work appears to be uncommon in Classics and Ancient 
History, but is found within other fields, including Gender Studies and Geography, cf. Ahmed, 
2017: 15-16, Mott, Cockayne, 2017: 954-973. 
87 The three individuals in question are: W.V. Harris, a Greco-Roman historian who wrote 
extensively on Roman Imperialism. Harris was sued by one of his former students at Columbia 
University for alleged sexual harassment, and had subsequently used his well-respected 
position to penalise the student for rejecting his advances. The case was settled out of court, and 
Harris forced to retire, cf. Wang, 2017a, 2017b. H. Parker, a Classicist who worked on sexuality 
in the Greco-Roman world. In 2016, Parker pled guilty to charges of possession of child 
pornography, and was sentenced in 2017 to four years in prison, cf. WKRC, 2016, WCPO Staff, 
2017. T.K. Hubbard continues to work within Classics, focussing on ancient sexuality. Hubbard 
has associations with NAMBLA (North American Man-Boy Love Association), ‘a visible 
advocate of pedophilia’ (cf. Vice, 2016), and also advocated in support of men who carry out so-
called ‘campus rape’, claiming the consent laws focus on a woman’s pleasure rather than the 
attacker’s, cf. Futo Kennedy, 2018. 
88 The arguments are made by Johnson, 2016, Hortensia, 2017, Scullin, 2017, Kennedy Futo, 
2018. However, with the exception of Scullin who argues that further discussion is needed, all 
stress that they will not be citing or recommending scholarship written by the aforementioned 
scholars. 
89 Rabinowitz, 2001: 191-210. 
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theme in discussions of sexual violence.90 Therefore, in my opinion,91 by referencing the 
individuals in question, we are contributing towards a culture which continues to 
ignore the behaviour of and reward individuals who deliberately marginalise and 
victimise others. I address sexual violence throughout this thesis and use scholarship 
which details accounts of ancient and modern sexual violence, including those written 
by survivors. Given these factors, I cannot in good conscience use the works of 
individuals charged with, accused of, or who advocate any form of sexual violence.92 
Beyond research on sexual violence, little attention has been paid to the role of women 
and children (primarily teenagers) as military figures.93 Women such as Arsinoë IV of 
Egypt, Cleopatra VII of Egypt and Zenobia of Palmyra are likely to have acted as 
military commanders,94 yet are rarely discussed in military history. These women and 
their role in warfare are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six: Triumphs where I 
explore the difficulty for Roman generals displaying women, despite their military 
capability, in the stead of expected male figures. In the same chapter, I also discuss the 
relationship between the Roman elite presenting their enemy as ‘worthy’ and showing 
how their status was akin to that of an enslaved person. The presence of notable 
individuals in triumphs contradicts scholarship’s assumption that enslavement was the 
only possible outcome for captives, in a similar line to key arguments within research 
on slavery. 
b. Slavery 
Volkmann’s Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner eroberter Städte in der hellenistisch-
römischen Zeit is the most detailed study of the process of enslavement, focussing on 
captive-taking following the siege of a city in Greek and Roman history. Volkmann 
considers how captives from different regions were treated and devotes a chapter to 
theory and practice of mass enslavement.95 However, Volkmann does not address 
gendered dimensions to captivity and focusses solely on those who were defined as 
enslaved, including those who were subsequently freed which is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Harper’s Slavery in the Late Roman World focusses on different aspects of the 
slave trade and its development, including legal and socio-economic considerations, 
including the influence of Christianity. Harper focusses on the institution of the slavery 
within Roman society, rather than the process by which captives were taken.96 Both 
Volkmann and Harper consider the process of captive taking to discuss the institution 
of slavery and its role within ancient Greco-Roman society. 
 
90 For examples with academia, cf. Ahmed, 2017: 139-42. 
91 I would stress that citation policy should be a matter of personal choice.  
92 As of 2019, my bibliography is, to the best of my knowledge, free of perpetrators or advocates 
of sexual violence. My apologies if there are any individuals whom I have inadvertently 
overlooked.  
93 Hallett, 2015: 247-253.  
94 For Arsinoë, cf. pp. 204-210. For Zenobia, cf. SHA, Aurel. 22.1-2, 26.3-7.  
95 Volkmann, 1990: 71-90. 
96 Harper, 2011: 33-65. 
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Similarly, Bradley’s Slavery and Society at Rome and his research into depictions of 
captives under the Principate provide useful but brief introductions to the process of 
captive-taking in the Roman world. Bradley’s consideration of captives is situated 
within a chapter on the Roman slave supply and how enslaved wartime captives 
maintained the enslaved population,97 a source of constant and irresolvable debate 
amongst scholars with an interest in this area. Scheidel discusses the two main 
concerns with scholarship on the Roman slave supply, the first being an attempt to 
ascertain the number of enslaved people involved and, secondly, what area of the 
Roman slave supply system produced the majority of enslaved people.98 With regards 
to the latter, some scholars consider natural reproduction to be of more import, whilst 
others argue that warfare was the greatest contributor.99 Wickham in his PhD thesis 
entitled The Enslavement of War Captives by the Romans to 146 BC similarly focusses on 
the origins of enslaved people during the early and middle Republic. Wickham argues 
that warfare was not the main source of enslaved people in the Republic, and continues 
to discuss the reasons for this, including the economic, social and political problems 
with enslaving individuals and using them as forced labour in Italy. 
Bradley’s research raises a variety of issues, including the conditions of captive 
transportation from the provinces to Italy.100 However, Bradley does not, with the 
exception of mentioning mass suicide and the likely agricultural slavery captives were 
forced into, address the treatments other captives received, including that of the 
captive elite. For example, Bradley argues agricultural labour was the fate of most 
captives but there are instances in which enslaved former enemy soldiers were utilised 
as combatants for both the Roman army and in performative roles, including the 
triumph. In Chapters One and Six, dealing with the rules of war and triumphs 
respectively, I discuss how common this practice was and if there was a preference in 
choosing former soldiers for these roles. This will allow us to better understand the 
options available to the Roman elite when they took captives, what factors influenced 
their decisions, and how these were subsequently presented.  
In a similar way, Bradley does not mention the display of captives in triumphs, other 
than to argue that warfare continued throughout the Principate. He suggests warfare 
was the main contributor to the slave supply, with supplementary enslaved people 
acquired from child abandonment, reproduction of enslaved persons, and piracy. In 
Bradley’s later journal article,101 he considers artistic depictions of captives. He 
reiterates his argument that, contrary to orthodox views on the slave supply, warfare 
continued to be a major source for new enslaved people during the Empire and uses 
Imperial iconography as evidence.102 His focus rests on monumental art or objects 
 
97 Bradley, 1994. 32-48.  
98 Scheidel, 2011: 287. cf. Scheidel, 1997: 156-169. 
99 Cf. Alföldy, 1975: 11-12, Bradley, 1994: 32-48, Madden, 1996: 109-128, Morley, 2011: 265-286, 
Scheidel, 2011: 287-310, Thompson, 2003: 20. 
100 Bradley, 1989: 20-5. 
101 Bradley, 2004: 298-318. 
102 Bradley, 2004: 298-306, cf. Bradley, 2011: 241-265. 
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which likely circulated around the Imperial court, both of which were funded by the 
political elite. Bradley automatically assumes the captives depicted were destined for 
slavery. Granted, the chained captive groups depicted on such monuments as the 
Forum Arch of Septimius Severus can, with reasonable doubt, be assumed to be 
destined for slave markets.103 However, there are images of captives on the lower 
registers of such works as the Gemma Augustea [Figure 3] and the Grand Cameo of 
France (both dating from the 1st century CE), which cannot be so easily identified as 
enslaved people.104 These include personifications of captured nations, execution 
scenes, or captives kneeling in submission before a victorious general. I address the 
symbolism of elite art and iconography, including the Gemma Augustea, in Chapter 
Four: Enslavement. I argue that images which Bradley suggests show enslavement 
often convey the various stages of captive-taking, and do not necessarily always 
indicate enslavement. 
Another key work on the Roman slave trade, Hopkins’ Conquerors and Slaves,105 makes 
no reference to enslaved people acquired as a result of warfare, but rather focusses on 
slavery as an institution within Roman society. Within this area of research there is a 
tendency to focus purely on the origins of enslaved people and to consider all captives 
as enslaved, rather than discussing the captive-taking process. It is likely, considering 
the primary references to the numbers taken during battle,106 that the majority of 
captives did indeed become enslaved. However, this was not the only outcome for 
those who were taken captive, and this has not been addressed by scholars working 
within this area. Nor has the possibility of differing treatment, according to the socio-
political or ethnic background of the captives, been addressed. Furthermore, discussion 
of the capture of enemy groups following a battle is useful in considering Roman 
Imperialism, as not all groups were enslaved: some were immediately executed, and 
others possibly allowed to return home. In this thesis, I outline in detail the 
aforementioned captive-taking practices, but argue that captives, regardless of their 
background or ultimate role in Roman society, could be utilised by the Roman elite for 
less tangible reasons than simply as enslaved workers. Rather, I suggest that the 
Roman elite and their audiences, elite and non-elite alike, recognised the realities of 
taking and managing captives, but used various aspects of the practice for political 
purposes, primarily to further the agenda of an individual or to further the Romans’ 
Imperialist and militaristic ideologies.  
c. Hostages 
The role of hostages in Roman foreign relations has been widely considered in recent 
years, especially in Allen’s work on the subject which looks at various hostage 
 
103 Bradley, 2004: 298. 
104 Dornseiff, 1944: 285-286. Dornseiff rather optimistically suggests Thusnelda makes an 
appearance on the Great Cameo of France.  
105 Hopkins, 1978.  
106 Thompson provides a detailed overview of the numbers taken by the Romans during 
warfare, cf. Thompson, 2003: 20-26 (300 BCE – 14 CE), 35-36 (the Roman Empire). Figures are 
usually unspecified or in the thousands. Cf. Scheidel, 2011: 287-289.  
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relationships, such as ‘conqueror-trophy’, ‘creditor-collateral’ and ‘host-guest’.107 His 
focus is on elite captives who were bound by treaties,108 i.e. who were legally 
recognised and described in the literary sources as ‘hostages’.109 Allen does not 
consider the similarities between hostages and other types of captives, particularly 
individuals who were displayed in the same triumph position as their hostage 
counterparts, which I address in Chapters Five and Six. Furthermore, my discussion is 
not limited to those who are explicitly labelled as ‘hostages’, but rather considers the 
nature of the relationship between ‘hostages’ and Roman elite figures. For instance, 
individuals such as Dumnorix, a Gallic leader who supposedly betrayed Caesar during 
the Gallic Wars, was kept and used by Caesar in a manner which can only be described 
as akin to a hostage without ever being labelled as such. Therefore, my research 
considers the use of hostage-taking in both war, its immediate aftermath, and peace, 
the former an area which has not been fully explored in past scholarship. 
Following a similar line to Allen’s research, Mattern recognises the significant position 
held by elite hostages in the tactics of the Imperial regime. This is a view discussed in 
Braund’s research on the Romans’ relationship with client-kings.110 However, Mattern 
and Allen’s views, which stress the significance of hostages in Roman diplomacy, 
contradict those of Braund’s, especially with regards to the education of hostages at 
Rome. Braund argues the children of foreign rulers were sent to Rome by their fathers 
and were useless as hostages as they had been dismissed from their native court. This 
links to Noy who briefly addresses the relatively comfortable position of elite hostages 
in Roman society.111 However, both Braund and Allen later admit that relationships 
between Rome and her hostages were not always so cordial, but this is a factor they do 
not fully investigate. In Chapter Five: Hostage-taking, I examine how successful 
hostage-taking was in both war and peace, suggesting that hostage-taking was a 
flawed practice but one which the Romans could use and manipulate to their 
advantage in elite self-promotion.  
However, whilst the aforementioned authors’ research considers those referred to as 
hostages, using the terminology obses or ὅμερος, their focus does not extend to those 
who were ransomed back to their families. Such individuals may not have been in the 
position to be used as diplomatic ‘pawns’ as the words obses or homeros (ὃμερος) 
imply.112 Nevertheless, there are examples of individuals from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds who were ransomed for monetary rather than political purposes.113 The 
 
107 Allen, 2006. 
108 The treaties in question were usually following a foreign power’s defeat at Roman hands, cf. 
Allen, 2006: 4-5, 12-14. 
109 Allen, 2006: 16-17. Allen considers the terms obses and ὅμερος. He limits his research to only 
considering individuals who were referred to using such terms. However, there were 
individuals who were taken in hostage-like situations who were not called the aforementioned 
terms, cf. 130-169.  
110 Braund, 1984: 9-13. 
111 Mattern, 2002: 107-108, Noy, 2000: 67, 81, 106.  
112 OLD, 1222: obses. LSJ, 1221: ὃμερος. Cf. Allen, 2006: 18. 
113 Cf. 8-11. 
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focus on those ransomed has been on Roman citizens, as discussed by Levy and 
Connolly.114 Levy’s research concerns the legality of ransoming and the return of 
citizens to Roman society from foreign captivity. Chiefly, his research considers the 
point at which a captive’s pre-capture status was legally returned through the process 
of postliminium.115 Levy and Connolly’s research is of note for this thesis as it addresses 
how captive-taking was practised by cultures the Romans encountered. However, as I 
focus on Roman captive-taking of non-Roman individuals, their research is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
d. Triumphs 
One of the features of Roman triumphs was the display of captive enemy troops, 
hostages, leaders and high-profile figures. Research on triumphs has been widespread 
over the past few decades beginning with Versnel’s book on the subject, published in 
1970.116 Typically, previous research has focussed on the triumphant general and,117 in 
recent years, the concept of the triumph has been researched as a movement, especially 
in monumental art featuring processions.118 The triumph route and procession order 
are addressed in Chapter Six: Triumphs as they were used to convey the status of a 
captive, particularly in relation to the triumphator’s chariot, and therefore discuss the 
treatment they were subjected to. 
Beard and Östenberg in their research on the triumph have consistently addressed how 
captives were presented and treated during the procession. However, as a result of the 
nature of the primary evidence, there are limitations in studying captives through the 
ritual of the triumph. From the late Republic onwards, it is difficult to ascertain how 
many captives were displayed in triumphs and, possibly as a result, the ancient 
authors’ focus shifts to prominent individuals. As Östenberg argues, the display of 
royalty was most highly praised, than that of their closest relatives by blood or 
marriage, followed by their military advisors.119 Research prior to Beard and 
Östenberg’s has pursued this line of inquiry, in keeping with the interests of the 
primary sources,120 on royal captives who were displayed in triumphs.121 Beard’s The 
Roman Triumph, building on her earlier Pegasus article, discusses captives in detail, 
 
114 Levy, 1943: 159-176, Connolly, 2006: 115-131. 
115 Postliminium refers to the rule that a Roman citizen, after being released from captivity, could 
regain the same status as before they were captured. There is much discussion as to who could 
begin the process, including the senate, wealthy senators, or family members of a captive, and 
at what point the former captives regained their status, cf. Levy, 1943: 159-60, Watson, 1961: 243-
259, Garlan, 1975: 73.  
116 Versnel, 1970.  
117 Versnel, 1970, Lange, 2016.  
118 Favro, 2014: 85-102, Östenberg, 2015: 13-22, Leander Touati, 2015: 203-206, Popkin, 2016. 
119 Östenberg, 2009: 132-135. 
120 Östenberg, 2009: 134-135.  
121 The majority of scholarship on the triumph is concerned with its significance in Roman 
culture and largely ignores captives. Cf. Versnel, 1970, Favro, 2014: 85-102, Havener, 2014: 165-
180, Gambash, 2015: 124-126, Lange, 2016, Popkin, 2016, Goldbeck, 2017: 103-124, Itgenshorst, 
2017: 59-82, Meister, 2017: 83-102. 
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considering non-elites, women and children.122 In certain cases, for instance the 
Germanic noblewoman Thusnelda and her son who were displayed in Germanicus’ 
triumph of 15 CE, Beard takes into consideration the way in which they were captured 
and what little we know of their fate following the triumphal procession. However, 
there is no comparison between the treatment of either Thusnelda and her son, and 
other women and children in a similar position at all stages of their capture. In this 
thesis, I consider Thusnelda alongside female military leaders, such as Arsinoë and 
Cleopatra, and address how aspects of their presentation in the triumph link closely to 
the treatment of other captives, e.g. women as symbols of a nation and as bearers of 
legitimate offspring. 
Another aspect of the triumph which has not been fully addressed in scholarship on 
this aspect of Roman culture is the method of execution used for captives at the end of 
the triumph. Versnel does not address execution, and Beard and Östenberg do not 
explore the methods of or motivations for execution as part of the triumph. It has 
generally been assumed that the few captives who were executed were strangled to 
death, an assumption which has not been challenged in previous scholarship. 
However, in this thesis, I explore the possible reasons for the assumption of 
strangulation, arguing that beheading or starvation were also methods of execution 
used in the triumph. I further discuss the reasons why strangulation or beheading, 
which is also referenced as a method of execution, were chosen by triumphators and 
the impact of this decision on the treatment and presentation of captives and the 
nations they represented. In addition, I also consider how the location of the execution, 
arguably in a prison setting, was used to stress the status of the individual and the 
severity of their actions against Rome. The example of executions in triumphs is a clear 
example of how the Roman elite’s concern for representation informed their treatment 
of captives. 
Triumphs are significant in literary sources as they are one of the only times when we 
learn the names of individual captives. Otherwise, captives largely belong to an 
abstract group. Many of the captives depicted on monumental arches and columns 
were arguably creations of the sculptor's imagination, with the 'barbarian' existing as a 
generalised figure in Roman thought. Differences could be distinguished but only 
through elaborate costumes which assisted in the creation of stereotypes.123 As such, 
research on triumphs is one area which directly deals with how the Romans viewed 
and treated captives. However, little attention has been paid to the treatment captives 
received before their appearance in the triumph, and how this links to the elite’s 
presentation of captives within the procession. As I have examined different types of 
treatment throughout captive-taking, I have therefore shown that the triumph was 
often represented by the elite as the final humiliation for elite captives.  
 
122 Beard, 2005: 24-34. 
123 Wells, 1999: 187-189. 
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e. Classical Art and Numismatics 
The ways in which captives were presented in triumphs links closely with how they 
were depicted artistically. Research on Classical Art is the main area where captives are 
discussed. The majority of scholarship concerns the Imperial elite and monumental 
artwork, including depictions of captives on monuments, cameos and sarcophagi. 
Wade’s short article discusses the presence of male ‘prisoners of war’ on coinage, 
without considering the different types of captives who were also depicted on 
coinage.124 The development of the captive as a visual trope is discussed by De Souza 
who considers the relationship between Greek representations of the captive, namely 
male warrior figures, and the later Roman depictions which include female and child 
captives.125 Uzzi views the presence of and focus on female and child captives in 
official state art as a means of stressing the destruction of the non-Roman family at the 
hands of the Roman state which is typically represented by male military figures and 
their families, particularly during the Imperial period.126 Male and female figures are 
usually separated in art with the women (or occasionally male figures) holding or 
sitting beside a solitary child. This is another way in which contrast between the 
Imperial family and the captive 'barbarians' is created, particularly with implications of 
the Imperial family’s fertility, surrounded by their children, and the captives’ 
‘barrenness’, holding their only child.127  
The focus of the aforementioned works tends to be on the symbolic and artistic merits 
of monumental art pieces. Depictions of captives in artwork are useful in considering 
how other ethnic groups were represented, especially in terms of personified nations. 
Symbolism, such as the personifications of nations, was the most important factor in 
ensuring the message could be widely understood. However, there are instances in 
which we can argue the depictions of captives on monumental works indicate genuine 
forms of treatment captives received. For instance, whilst arguments concerning the 
symbolism of captive mothers separated from their male counterparts are relevant,128 
depictions of captive treatment on such scenes, such as on Trajan’s column, are often 
not considered to be depictions of actual treatment. Indeed, where art is taken at ‘face 
value’, it has been used to argue that Rome maintained its enslaved population 
through warfare.129 In recent scholarship, there does not appear to be a balance 
between viewing captive depictions as purely symbolic motifs and viewing the 
captives as representative of actual enslaved people. Not all captives were enslaved as 
slavery was merely one outcome of captivity, and this is something which is largely 
ignored.130 My research outlines the different options elite Romans had when deciding 
 
124 Wade, 1973: 230. 
125 De Souza, 2011: 31-37. 
126 Uzzi, 2007: 70-76. 
127 Ferris, 2000: 38-39, Uzzi, 2007: 61-81. 
128 Uzzi, 2007: 61-81. 
129 Bradley, 2004: 298-318. De Souza, 2011: 31-62. 
130 I have found one article which considers literal depictions of monumental art in a different 
research area to slavery. Dornseiff suggests the Grand Cameo of France features a captive 
Thusnelda and her child which, whilst lacking evidence from primary sources, shows an 
attempt to view the object without focussing purely on symbolism, cf. Dornseiff, 1944: 285-286.  
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on how to treat their captives, and how various forms of treatment were presented to 
their contemporaries. Throughout this thesis, I argue that artistic depictions were 
based on the actual treatment of captives which included mass execution, sexual 
violence, enslavement, hostage-taking, and performative events like the triumph. I 
analyse elite self-representation found in artistic and numismatic sources with an 
awareness of the variety of elite behaviours towards captives. 
ix. Structure and approach 
Captives are commonplace in Roman literature, history and art. However, the 
literature review shows how the process of captive-taking has not been considered in 
detail in a cross-disciplinary format. In modern scholarship, captives have largely been 
dismissed as enslaved people, yet their role was more complex, and the treatment they 
were subjected to was by no means uniform but depended upon their social status and 
gender, and the Roman elite’s concern for how their treatment of captives would be 
subsequently represented. This thesis explores the Romans’ captive-taking process 
which was designed to humiliate and subdue an enemy. I have used examples of elite 
self-promotion to identify less tangible aspects of the captive-taking process. 
Underpinning the captive-taking system was an ideology of Roman superiority and 
the treatment of captives enabled the Romans to continue to solidify power and justify 
Imperialism, thus continuing the process of captive-taking throughout Roman culture. 
In this thesis, I use a chronological structure which aims to follow a captive’s journey 
from when they initially fell under Roman control to the point at which they were 
executed, enslaved, displayed in a triumph, or entered elite Roman society as hostages. 
I begin in Chapter One by outlining the so-called ‘Rules of War’ which, in theory, 
dictated the treatment of captives. Chapter One also considers how captives could be 
used within warfare, including as messengers, envoys, for military intelligence, and as 
combatants with the Roman army. I continue to address wartime treatment of captives, 
including massacre, sexual violence and enslavement, (Chapters Two to Four 
respectively) before looking at hostage-taking (Chapter Five) and the treatment of 
captives in the Roman triumph (Chapter Six). The thesis can be divided roughly into 
two halves. The first deals with wartime treatment, and includes non-elite individuals 
who were killed or enslaved by the Romans, and the latter half primarily concerns elite 
persons who had political and diplomatic value to the Roman elite in their dealings 
with foreign nations.  
I have taken the novel approach of primarily looking at the treatment of captives in 
wartime and soon after a nation’s defeat, arguing that there was a recognised process 
by which captives were taken. By following a captive’s journey from the point at which 
they were taken captive by the Romans, I consider stages of captive-taking which have 
not been explored in detail in previous scholarship, including considering gendered 
violence and treatment. I have therefore been able to consider how the treatment of 
captives, including massacre, sexual violence, and initial enslavement, was decided 
upon by the Roman elite, and carried out by the army. I have also taken into 
consideration how the Roman elite’s concern for representation could have impacted 
their treatment of captives. This is an original approach as little attention within 
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scholarship had been paid to captives of all types as a group, the early stages of 






























Chapter One - The Rules of War and Captives’ Military Value 
 
1.1. The Rules of War 
In the Introduction, we have seen how important the legal classifications within 
warfare are for captives in recent history. The Romans’ understanding and application 
of the ‘rules of war’ are significant in any study of captive-taking, as they dictate the 
treatment captives could have received and provide a benchmark by which we can, 
and the Roman audience could, compare the treatment of different captives. It should 
be noted that the ‘rules of war’ in the Roman world are related only to the field of 
conflict. Ergo, unless the captives were designated a ‘legatus’ (envoy) or war was 
ongoing, the rules do not extend to the treatment of prisoners following their capture, 
as they immediately passed into the jurisdiction of their captors, and were legally 
considered to be enslaved.131 In Roman thought, it was a ‘right of war’ to kill any 
enemy whom they defeated in battle,132 a prerogative akin to that of a enslaver’s.133 
However, as we shall see throughout this thesis, the ‘legalities’ reflect the attitude 
towards captives, but not necessarily the treatment they received in actuality. This 
chapter concerns how the ‘rules of war’ were applied in conflict and focusses on how 
captives could be used as tools within warfare, and in elite writings as a means of 
illuminating the characteristics of a Roman leader, or an enemy commander or nation 
which could be used to later justify Roman aggression. The Roman’s manipulation of 
their treatment of captives in line with the rules of war sets the scene for the rest of the 
thesis, where we see how expectations played out in reality and how a concern for 
representation influenced the Roman elite’s treatment of captives.  
The Romans ‘rules of war’ were unwritten and largely based on custom and primarily 
protected suppliants, oath-takers, and delegates.134 Following conflict, the plunder of 
cities and destruction of crops and property was permitted, with soldiers usually 
acting on a general's orders or by a mutual understanding, as we shall see in the 
following two chapters on massacre and sexual violence.135 The male Roman elite, at 
whom the works of literature we shall encounter throughout this thesis were primarily 
aimed, would have been educated in military affairs, including appropriate military 
conduct through the use of exempla.136 Furthermore, it is likely that an ‘honour code’ 
which dictated behaviour in warfare, pervaded through mythology and tradition to 
non-elite soldiers and the Roman public at large.137 Therefore, the ‘rules of war’ were 
understood by most of in Roman society. 
 
131 Just. Cod. Iust. 1.5.4.2, 1.5.5.1. The terms applied unless a previous agreement was still in 
force. 
132 Caes. B. Gall. 7.41. 
133 Wiedemann, 1981: 9-10, 15-35. 
134 Larson, Hornblower, 2003: 823, 1618, Mikalson, 2003: 1057. 
135 Cf. on page 52, on page 66.   
136 For the significance of exempla for elite males in furthering mos maiorum, cf. Nifong, 2000: 
1081-1082, exempla in education in general, cf. Bloomer, 2015: 350-352, and in society generally, 
cf. Roller, 2018. 
137 Levithan, 2013: 35. 
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1.2. Exempla and the Battle of Cannae 
Many supposed standards of treatment were disseminated through exempla, rather 
than through codified law, and illuminate how the Romans believed members of their 
own community should be treated and behave should they be captured in warfare. 
There are two exempla which clearly illuminate expectations of warfare. The first 
concerns Marcus Atilius Regulus, a Roman consul and general who was captured by 
Carthaginian forces in 255 BCE,138 along with 500 of his men,139 Some months later, 
Regulus was sent to Rome to negotiate a peace treaty or the exchange of prisoners.140 
Appearing before the senate, Regulus advised his fellow Romans to reject the terms 
offered by the Carthaginians, even though suing for peace would secure his freedom. 
Dio emphasises the change in Regulus’ standing and position, claiming Regulus 
admitted that he was ‘not a Roman’ after being captured by the Carthaginians.141 The 
change in his appearance is also noted, with claims that he appeared in the guise of a 
Carthaginian,142 a costume change which links to representations of captives as a 
certain ‘ethnicity’.143 This exemplum conveys idealistic expectations, namely that those 
taken prisoner had their status reduced to that of human chattel, and were no longer 
‘Roman’, as the two statuses were incompatible. Furthermore, in being taken captive in 
the first place, Roman captives had forfeited their right to be Roman in that they had 
‘voluntarily’, through their ‘cowardice’,144 reduced their status to that of an enslaved 
person, rather than die for Rome.  
However, in the case of Regulus, he atoned for his non-Roman actions on the 
battlefield, i.e. his ‘cowardice’ in being taken prisoner, by sacrificing himself for Rome 
after his capture.145 Regulus returned to the Carthaginians empty-handed, keeping his 
promise to return to them, but his failure to secure peace with Rome resulted in him 
being subsequently tortured to death by the means of sleep deprivation.146 Seemingly, 
in contrast to the understanding the Romans had of the obedience of enslaved 
people,147 they praised Regulus despite the fact that he had broken the oath he had 
sworn to his new ‘masters’. Mix argues the First Punic War prompted the awakening 
of pride in being a ‘Roman’, with individuals like Regulus embodying typically Roman 
qualities. 148 Furthermore, it appears the Romans used the story of Regulus 
pragmatically, largely in order to emphasise ‘Roman’ qualities,149 rather than drawing 
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139 Polyb. 1.34.9-12. 
140 App. 5.2.1, Cic. Off. 3.21-30, Dio 11 = Zonaras 8,15. 
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upon the ‘cowardice’ of his capture. This suggests that Regulus’ status as a captive was 
largely dismissed in such debate as it was more serviceable for Roman writers to depict 
him as an honourable Roman, as opposed to a captive who disobeyed the orders of his 
enslavers. This would explain why, when Regulus was punished for his actions against 
the Carthaginians, the Romans sought revenge for his death. Learning of Regulus’ 
execution, the Romans presented his family with Carthaginian captives and they too 
were killed by sleep deprivation. If Regulus had been seen only as a disobedient 
captive, the retribution would have been criticised, as Regulus’ punishment as an 
enslaved person would have been just.  
The character of Regulus, which was heavily embellished by later authors, embodies 
Romanitas, namely the ‘set of traditionally esteemed moral standards (mores)’.150 
Despite the Romans claiming that captivity and Romanitas were incompatible, as 
symbolised by Regulus’ costume change to that of a Carthaginian,151 his captive status 
does not diminish his ability to demonstrate his innate Romanitas. Therefore, despite 
the shame surrounding his defeat and captive status, Regulus redeemed himself from 
his diminished position by displaying his Romanitas in his oath-keeping to the 
Carthaginians and care for the Roman state over his own well-being. This also appears 
to be the case for representations of Rome’s enemies, in which an innate set of values is 
evident in some elite individuals. The Romans had to ensure that they were presenting 
their enemies as inherently ‘noble’, despite their defeat and the degraded status this 
signified. This enabled the Romans to demonstrate the extent and potency of Rome’s 
power over enemies who could potentially challenge Roman dominion, whilst 
ultimately being defeated.152 
However, it appears that such representations were reliant upon the social position of 
the individual in question. A corresponding case to Regulus is that of Roman soldiers 
captured at the Battle of Cannae by the Carthaginians in 216 BCE,153 which we have 
briefly addressed in the introduction.154 To summarise: after the capture of thousands 
of Roman soldiers, the Roman senate bought enslaved people and enlisted them into 
the army, promising them freedom after two years of service.155 The cost of these 
people was so prohibitive that, when Hannibal offered to ransom the Roman 
captives,156 the senate refused pay for the return of the captured Roman soldiers, citing 
the captives’ supposed cowardice and the expense of the enlisted enslaved people as 
the reasons for their refusal.157 Hannibal’s offer was delivered to the senate by a 
number of captives who, like Regulus, were bound by oath to return to their 
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Carthaginian captors.158 After receiving the senate’s refusal, at least one of the 
messengers attempted to return home, thus breaking the oaths they had sworn to their 
new masters.159 The senate ordered the messengers’ return to the Carthaginians, not 
wishing for the Romans to appear as oath-breakers.160 In the case of the Cannae 
captives, the non-elite soldiers who were sent as envoys were not presented as 
embodying the same Romanitas as Regulus, as they refused to return to their captors. 
This is the case for non-elite captives in Roman wars who are simply dismissed as 
being enslaved people,161 rather than a discussion of their worthy attributes being 
stressed as this would not have served the best interests of the Roman elite in their 
representation of captives. 
1.3. Justifying Rule-breaking 
Exempla like that of Regulus, whilst highly literary or philosophical in nature, are borne 
of the society in which they were written,162 thus they are indirectly indicative of the 
pragmatic way in which captives could be viewed and therefor treated, a feature which 
is evident throughout this thesis. As such, the ‘rules of war’ were idealised and we 
have evidence that suggests they were frequently disregarded, or manipulated to serve 
the Romans’ or an individuals’ agenda. This had a significant impact on the treatment 
captives received. One example of the ‘rules’ in action during warfare can be found in 
Caesar’s commentaries on the Gallic Wars (58-50 BCE), and relates to captured legati.163  
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to briefly outline the significance of Caesar’s 
Gallic Wars as it is referred to throughout this thesis and is important for considering 
the process of captive-taking and how the elite presented the practice to their peers. 
Caesar’s Gallic Wars is thought to be a revised version of despatches sent to the senate 
by Caesar from the frontline, and which were later published as a commentary.164 The 
commentaries are the only surviving text written by a Roman general during the 
course of a war, and are evidence of wartime practices regarding captive-taking. The 
Gallic Wars is also a piece of self-promotion as Caesar was writing to his peers in the 
senate through the despatches and later to a wider audience in the form of published 
commentaries. As a piece of self-promotion, the commentaries are useful for 
reconstructing the universally understood but often implicit expectations of wartime 
conduct, and how the Roman elite presented their behaviour in relation to such 
expectations. 
To return to the account in question, one of the supposedly universally understood 
practices was the protection and freedom of movement of deputies sent between 
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camps to discuss terms.165 It appears to be accepted that the sending of deputies meant 
that warfare would not continue whilst talks were underway.166 Caesar suggests it was 
unacceptable not only to abuse the deputies, but to turn them away when they were 
attempting to negotiate peace. Caesar draws the reader’s attention to the recovery of 
the two translators, and Roman citizens, Gaius Valerius Procillus and Marcus 
Mettius.167 They were both detained by the Germanic tribes whilst acting as Caesar’s 
deputies which, in Roman thought, was a clear violation of the ‘rules of war’.168 The 
insult was further compounded by Caesar’s claim that not only had the deputies been 
illegally captured, but the Germans planned to execute Procillus by burning him at the 
stake.169 The death itself was not only horrific but associated in Roman culture with 
those who had committed crimes against the state, therefore it was not a death suitable 
for a Roman ally.170 In contrast to the idealistic example of Regulus, there is no 
reference to the capture of these Roman citizens reflecting shamefully on them. This 
may be because the so-called ‘rules’ had been broken, and this ultimately gave Caesar a 
reason for attacking the Germanic tribes. 
However, Caesar was also guilty of breaking these ‘rules’. This is evident when Caesar 
detained Germanic nobles who sued for peace, despite the fact that they had 
approached Caesar for diplomatic discussions.171 Caesar manages to divert criticism of 
his misuse of the ‘rules of war’ through his use of language. It is entirely a matter of 
semantics, as Caesar refers to Procillus and Metius as ‘legati’,172 whereas the Germans 
who intended to sue for peace, and were subsequently taken prisoner, are not granted 
any such title. In this instance, Powell argues that Caesar undermines his attempts at 
moral superiority,173 yet Caesar justifies his actions by claiming that the Germans had 
sent deputies as a distraction, rather than a legitimate attempt at suing for peace.174 
Furthermore, presumably as he knew his actions would attract criticism, Caesar goes to 
great lengths to justify his decision not to accept deputations from the Germanic tribes 
after a series of attacks, one of which resulted in the death of a Roman ally, Piso of 
Aquitania.175 Cicero, from the contemporary perspective of Caesar’s peers, suggests 
that there was no mutual understanding in terms of legalities or rights which were 
shared between the Romans and Gauls and Germans.176 However, Caesar presents the 
Gauls, Germans and Britons as playing by a set of rules of war which were universally 
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understood and agreed upon.177 Whether they did or not is negligible, as Caesar 
depicted them as doing so in order to appeal to his intended audience’s cultural values, 
thus enabling him to justify military aggression when tribes did not abide by these 
rules. Therefore, the so-called ‘rules of war’ were only applicable when Caesar 
considered them to be so. Here, it is important to recognise that Caesar was highly 
pragmatic in his use of these rules and in his portrayal of the supposedly ‘gentle’ 
treatment captives received. 
1.4. Rule-breaking as an Indicator of Character 
In the historical context, captives in warfare could be used as a warning of the 
punishment which the enemy would face should they be captured. However, the way 
Romans and their enemies were presented as treating captives is essential to how an 
individual or nation’s character or qualities were conveyed to the audience. We have 
seen how Caesar’s behaviour in relation to the German envoys was carefully 
represented to avoid any implication of Caesar’s wrongdoing. On the other hand, 
Greco-Roman authors could also stress the inappropriate conduct of an enemy. This 
justified Roman conduct as it was cast as retaliation for the enemy’s abuse of the ‘rules 
of war’.  
For instance, the use of terrorisation was commonplace in warfare, although 
supposedly primarily practised by Rome’s enemies. Mithridates ordered the mass 
killing of Roman citizens in Asia, outside the context of battle, and later left the bodies 
of Roman soldiers unburied in 62 BCE.178 Mithridates is cast as a cruel figure who 
abused expectations of warfare, thus enabling pro-Pompeian historians like Cassius 
Dio and Plutarch to contrast Mithridates’ savagery with Pompey’s comparatively mild 
treatment of his captives.179 Such a contrast was also created by individuals directly 
involved in their own self-promotion, as another example can be found in Caesar’s 
Gallic Wars. In the winter of 54/53 BCE messengers, sent by Quintus Tullius Cicero, 
Marcus Cicero’s brother, to Caesar during a siege, were captured and tortured by the 
besieging Gauls.180 According to Caesar, the torture was conducted within view of 
Cicero’s soldiers, and was evidently intended to terrify the onlooking Roman troops. 
There may be an element of exaggeration in Caesar’s account, especially as he was not 
a first-hand witness to the events in question. However, considering that members of 
his forces were able to report back to Rome, including Quintus Cicero, the claims had 
to include an element of the truth. This ‘display’ of a kind was carried out with 
consideration of the impact it would have on the audience, as the treatment of captives 
was presented as being unusually cruel. As such, during warfare the impact that the 
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display of captives had on the enemy could be exploited. However, it also acted as a 
means of attacking the character of the Gauls and justifying further military action.  
In historical reality, prisoner ‘abuse’ in the Roman world during conflict was more 
commonplace than the ideology would suggest. This links closely to Wallace’s article 
on the causes of prisoner abuse in modern warfare,181 in which he outlines the 
scenarios in which the likelihood of abuse increases.182 Wallace’s arguments are based 
on examples from recent history, and what we would consider ‘abuse’ is not in line 
with Roman thinking. Nevertheless, Wallace’s study can be retroactively applied as a 
number of factors he considers appear to be present within Roman warfare and its 
customs. One factor concerns the increased chance of abuse if the laws of war have not 
been ratified, which is certainly the case for warfare in the Mediterranean world where 
there was no concept of international law.183 Secondly, Wallace also argues that abuse 
is more likely if the adversary is considered to be fundamentally ‘beyond the pale of 
Civilization’, an assessment which is often based on race or religious background. 
These two factors are important in considering the Romans’ captive-taking, as they 
were operating within a world in which different societies had different rules of 
warfare. Burton argues that the subtleties within the understanding of surrender 
(deditio) show that there was some form of international law, universally understood 
by some of those the Romans encountered, including the Greeks and Israelites.184 
Furthermore, as Garcia Riazia discusses,185 Spanish and Gallic societies certainly had 
diplomatic procedures which were not completely alien to their Roman counterparts. 
Typically, official surrender was the only time in which some leniency was shown.186 
Should an enemy choose to fight until the bitter end, they would be entirely at the 
mercy of the conqueror. As such, it was universally understood that, once a nation was 
defeated, they were subject to the discretion of the victor.187  
Nevertheless, in situations when the Romans invoked legalities, they were applying 
their own legal or cultural practices to situations which are likely to have been viewed 
differently by outsiders.188 A clear example of this is the Romans’ staging of ‘surrender 
scenes’. Part of the conclusion of victory was the ritual of surrender which was carried 
out by the defeated enemy. Caesar refers to surrender enacted by deputies which 
occurred during active military campaigns, and included the envoys lying prostate 
before him,189 after which the enemy surrendered their arms, hostages, and returned 
any deserters.190 Another form of surrender was passing defeated soldiers ‘under the 
yoke’ (passum sub iugum) which was used to indicate complete subjugation of an 
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enemy.191 It is debatable as to how ritualistic this form of surrender was, i.e. if there 
really was a yoke involved or if it was merely a symbolic reference to an enemy’s 
defeat. As we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter Six, the yoke was typically used to 
harness oxen in agricultural practices. Therefore, soldiers passing under the yoke were 
cast as docile animals, thus indicating a change in their status from free to enslaved 
person under the authority of the enemy.192 The surrender scene, whether it involved 
yokes or lying prostrate, was designed to humiliate the enemy in Roman thought.193 
For instance, the Samnites used the yoke against the Romans after the Battle of the 
Caudine Forks in 321 BCE, which was remembered as a shameful defeat in the 
centuries that followed.194 If indeed the defeated Roman soldiers did actually pass 
under the yoke, as opposed to later authors referring to the ritual for symbolism, the 
Samnites used their knowledge of Roman customs and understandings to further 
damage the reputation of their enemy.195 Therefore, the example of Caudine Forks may 
indicate a universal understanding of surrender scenes and symbolism. However, the 
Samnites lived on the Italian peninsula and would have had access to information 
about the Romans. Furthermore, the ‘surrender scene’ trope appears in the histories of 
Rome’s wars across the Mediterranean, and it is unlikely that from people from such 
diverse backgrounds as Gaul, Numidia, and Pontus would surrender in the exact same 
sequence. The common denominator in all the surrender scenes was the Romans who 
orchestrated the scene and exploited its symbolism with their victorious narratives and 
commemorations. Overall, the Romans’ understanding of surrender was partly based 
on their understanding of their own laws, as other nations would not have subscribed 
to the same legalities, and the representations present within their literature. 
By claiming that all nations they encountered obeyed the same rules of conflict, the 
Romans, as victors writing their own history, were able to manipulate the presentation 
of the enemy’s use, or misuse, of the rules in order to emphasise the enemy’s negative 
characteristics, or justify the Romans’ treatment of the enemy which included the 
taking of captives. 
1.5. Military Intelligence 
Within warfare, the primary use of captives was as a means of gathering military 
intelligence, as they were active participants in warfare.196 No formal espionage 
organisation existed in this time period,197 and the majority of evidence was gathered 
from captives taken during warfare, from occasional reconnaissance missions, and 
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from allies who acted as ‘early warning systems’ for the Romans.198 Our major sources 
on military intelligence are Caesar and Hirtius, the supposed writer of the eighth book 
of Caesar’s Gallic Wars,199 although similar examples are found across Greco-Roman 
writing pertaining to this period. In contrast to Caesar, Hirtius supplies specific details 
on what was asked of captives. The information which Hirtius, a soldier actively 
involved in Caesar’s campaigns, provides can be used as a paradigm for intelligence-
gathering in this period. 200 This was the case for Bellovacian soldiers who had been 
sent to spy on the Roman army, and who were subsequently captured by their 
quarry.201 Hirtius claims that they revealed, under questioning, the following details: 
who the enemies’ allies were, where they were camped, who was in charge, what their 
plans were, and how many troops the enemy had. 202 The information was then verified 
by checking with multiple prisoners or deserters.203 Hirtius does not state that these 
were the questions which were asked, but the inclusion of such details in his account 
suggests that this was standard practice, and is supported by examples throughout 
Caesar’s works. Other encounters with prisoners narrated by Caesar corroborate 
Hirtius’ series of questions, as the details are invariably the same as those the Bellovaci 
supplied.204 The intelligence provided by captives can be placed into three categories: 
information pertaining to strategic or topographical information, ethnographical and 
cultural concerns, and politics and internal rivalries. The application of the intelligence 
depended upon the type of war, or the context in which it was gathered.  
There is little doubt that the use of military intelligence was practised by all sides and 
was an important aspect of the Romans’ success in warfare.205 Strategic and 
topographical information was provided by captives, of all levels of authority,206 which 
no doubt informed the Romans’ military decisions. However, references to captive 
intelligence enabled Greco-Roman writers to illuminate aspects of an enemy’s culture, 
and the Roman commander’s characteristics. For instance, the use of captive testimony 
after the fact, as apparent in Caesar’s works,207 enabled Roman commanders to not 
only further boast of their achievements, but also demonstrates their attempt at 
creating a sense of objectivity within their works, or later authors’ presentations of 
their deeds. For Caesar, in addition to his use of the third person, the inclusion of a 
captive voice enabled him to include a non-Roman perspective, stress communication 
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problems within the region,208 and boast of the prowess and power of his forces.209 The 
presentation of captive intelligence is evident in the depictions of enemy captives 
providing false information. In actuality, there is little doubt that some of the 
information provided was inaccurate, and such ‘treachery’ displayed by the enemy 
was an important characteristic to emphasise for a Roman commander. 
This closely links, as we shall see in the discussion on triumphs, with how generals or 
Greco-Roman writers chose to present the enemy to maximise support for their 
agenda. Put simply: the enemy needed to be both worthy of Rome’s greatest generals, 
whilst lacking the civilised characteristics which may have prompted the Romans to 
question the force they used against other nations, even ones considered inferior. The 
more powerful the enemy, the higher the victorious commander’s prestige was 
amongst the people of Rome. As Clark argues, it was important for Romans to include 
references to their own defeat within their narratives, as it enabled them to emphasise a 
sense of triumph in contrast to the defeat, or commemorate fallen Roman soldiers.210 I 
would add that, by including discussion of defeat, ancient authors were able to create 
an opportunity to justify the actions of Roman generals past and present, as we shall 
see shortly. Such justification ensured that Roman defeat was never portrayed as being 
a direct result of a Roman mistake, and this is possibly why the Romans went to great 
lengths to stress the treachery of their enemies. 
1.6. Deceitful Captives 
The inclusion of treacherous behaviour in relation to the captive enemy may have been 
the result of a Roman general generating excuses for his campaign failures, possibly in 
communication to the senate. The ‘treacherous captive’ is a common trope found 
across Greco-Roman literature. A particularly pertinent example is found in Caesar’s 
Gallic Wars, and relates to Caesar’s dealings with Ambiorix, the Eburones’ chief. The 
Roman lieutenant-general Titurius was killed after going to parlay with Ambiorix, who 
had promised his protection.211 Ambiorix’s men further showed their deceptive and 
treacherous nature when they were captured and pretended that Ambiorix was just 
out of sight, despite their knowledge of his exact whereabouts.212 This loyalty to their 
leader enabled Ambiorix to escape.213 He was never caught, but in a final attempt to 
capture him many of his allies were killed and devastation caused.214 However, as 
Hirtius appears to argue, it was not a wasted effort for the Roman troops.215 Thus, in a 
way, it was not dishonourable for the Romans to have let one of their enemies go, 
despite his improper actions in warfare. In this respect, the reference to foreign 
treachery could be used as an excuse for Roman generals who made mistakes. It was 
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not about the commander’s actions, but the enemy breaking the rules of war which, in 
turn, could justify excessive force such as massacre.216 
1.7. The ‘Inferior’ Enemy 
It was necessary for Roman generals to justify their often aggressive and extensive 
military campaigns, which involved excessive force even by Roman standards.217 
Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul, Britain and Germany between 58 and 51 BCE are a case in 
point, and his commentaries highlight how important it was to emphasise multiple 
reasons for military action, particularly in the initial period of Caesar’s campaigns 
which were closely associated with his controversial consulship of 59 BCE.218 Despite 
the focus on their warrior culture, the ‘inferior’ character of Caesar’s enemies is 
emphasised throughout his commentaries. This serves to denigrate them further in the 
eyes of the Roman audience, with their cultural practices being presented as irrational 
and savage. For instance, after Ariovistus, the leader of the Germanic Suebi, avoided 
attacking Roman troops, the prisoners explained to Caesar how the matrons had 
consulted the omens and advised Ariovistus to delay an attack until after the full 
moon.219 Caesar exploited this information, and set out to provoke an offensive.220 
Caesar may have included this detail for dramatic effect, heightening the tragedy, as 
Ariovistus later attacked the Romans, ignoring the women’s divine advice, and was 
routed. Later authors are less interested in how Caesar came about this information, 
including Plutarch, who just says Caesar learned of this, rather than from whom.221 Dio 
does not suggest that Caesar was aware of the prophecy, instead focussing on 
Ariovistus’ role in his own downfall.222 Furthermore, given that Caesar tells us of the 
social and religious hierarchy of Gallic culture, we are aware that the druids, who 
could be women, were the most respected members of society. Ariovistus is presented 
as going against the women’s religious advice, thus committing hubris. Caesar appears 
to present himself as well versed in Gallic culture,223 and further used this knowledge 
to manipulate the situation on the ground, and present explanations for his military 
tactics and those of his enemy.224 In addition, given the Romans’ disdain for other 
religious practices, it is likely that Caesar used the prisoners’ information as a means of 
emphasising the Gauls’ superstitions, a feature of their culture which the Romans were 
disdainful of, thus stressing the ‘otherness’ of the enemy. Ultimately, the inclusion of 
such details enabled Caesar to practise careful self-representation, which was clearly 
successful, given Dio and Plutarch’s later comments. 
The contrast between Caesar and later authors’ references to his captive-taking outlines 
the different uses of captives. On face value, Caesar shows that he could use captives to 
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acquire intelligence, and that he understood the power of cultural issues in dictating an 
enemy’s actions. Furthermore, this example demonstrates that Caesar was aware of the 
use of captives to further his political agenda. He was directly involved in his own 
political self-representation and was using captives specifically to promote himself and 
his campaign to the Roman political classes. On this note, Caesar presents throughout 
his commentaries as a protector of Roman interests. This was crucial, both in military 
and political terms. Firstly, by waging war on foreign enemies, he was overstepping 
his jurisdiction as he had no legal right to act without the authority of the senate. 
Despite his attempts, later authors writing of the Gallic Wars were not fooled, as 
Cassius Dio suggests when he writes of the soldiers’ malcontent during the war with 
Ariovistus.225 Therefore, in order to continue his command, Caesar needed to stress 
that he was acting solely for Rome’s interests, despite such acts enriching himself 
financially, politically and militarily. It was also imperative for Caesar to ensure his 
command continued, as he risked legal ramifications for his consulship if he lost 
military and political power. It was necessary for Caesar to justify both his acts of 
aggression and the times when he refrained from military action, especially when 
facing an enemy who had made violent overtures to Rome. 
However, later authors are less interested in Caesar’s political promotion, thus they 
appear to be less inclined to consider the role of captives in political discourse. This 
may account for how Dio used the prophecies to show how Ariovistus was hubristic in 
failing to take the advice given to him by the gods. Dio’s description may have been 
linked to the numerous warnings, including through divinations, Caesar received, yet 
ignored, before his death.226 Later authors may have used hindsight to allude to certain 
aspects of Caesar’s life and religious habits, by using Caesar’s own writings. The 
information that was supposedly provided by captives relating to culture is significant 
as it fleshes out the enemy for the Roman audience who would have had limited 
exposure to the Gauls. Caesar effectively introduced different types of lands and 
peoples to the Roman people through his writings, with Cicero complaining that it was 
hard to keep track of Caesar’s travels.227 The Romans’ ignorance of foreign peoples 
could be exploited for the advantage of the Roman commander. Caesar harnessed the 
Romans’ fear of the Gauls, who were considered to be belligerent and savage.228 It is 
evident from Caesar’s description of the Gauls’ cultural habits in Book Six of the Gallic 
Wars that he had studied their behaviour and traditions,229 yet he emphasises 
characteristics which presented the Gauls as a threat to civilisation as the Romans 
knew it. Osgood argues that Caesar’s Gallic Wars do not bear the hallmarks of the ‘us 
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vs. them’ descriptions typical of Greco-Roman ethnography.230 However, Caesar 
emphasises the Gauls’ supposed savage qualities throughout his works, building upon 
a tradition found in Posidonius (via Strabo),231 and also attributed similar traits to the 
British and Germanic tribes he encountered.232 Thus, Caesar not only utilised the 
Romans’ understanding of the northern peoples, but was partly responsible for 
shaping and perpetuating the tradition.233 Caesar was then able to harness this 
tradition to further his political agenda, particularly in light of his controversial 
consulship and insecure command, which enabled him to further raise his own profile. 
Caesar is not unique in exploiting the Romans’ prejudice against foreign nations, yet 
his commentaries are the only first-hand account of a Roman general engaged in a 
foreign war which survive, and they demonstrate how personal promotion, aimed at a 
Roman audience, could begin on campaign. This is significant when considering how 
Roman commanders utilised intelligence pertaining to political rivalries within an 
enemy culture. Sulla, Pompey and Caesar are all presented by ancient historians, and 
by Caesar himself, as understanding and using their enemies’ internal political 
divisions for Rome’s benefit.234 A general’s understanding of the internal politics of the 
region in which he was embroiled were used to present him as a knowledgeable 
commander, capable of employing his troops, foreign peoples, and the terrain for his 
(thus Rome’s) advantage. All these factors enabled the commander to be presented as a 
resourceful and militarily competent, or the opposite in critical works.  
Furthermore, the information provided is also telling of the Romans’ concerns outside 
of battle, namely what they hoped to acquire from the lands which they occupied. For 
instance, intelligence provided could help determine where non-combatants were 
located, as with the women, children and elderly of the Nervii during Caesar’s Gallic 
Wars.235 Evidently, the Nervii were aware of the risks posed to their non-combatants, 
including execution or enslavement, as those unable to fight were hidden in areas 
protected by marshes.236 The very fact that Caesar records such details suggests that 
Caesar wanted to present himself as being a resourceful and knowledgeable leader 
who knew where valuable human chattel was located. Furthermore, Marcus Antonius 
was supposedly disappointed to have taken only 30 captives during his Parthian Wars 
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(40-33 BCE).237 It is likely that this figure derived from hostile sources, yet Plutarch’s 
interest in recording such details shows that the Greco-Roman authors expected that 
successful military campaigns should result in large-scale captive-taking.238 The Greco-
Roman authors would not have reported such details unless they were concerned 
about the capture of enemies, whether or not the enemy was actively involved in 
warfare. This has implications on claims that the Romans were reluctant Imperialists, 
acting only to defend their territory.239 Caesar’s inclusion of such details alludes to his 
plan in taking captives, without directly stating that it was his intention. The Romans 
were seemingly uncomfortable with an assumption of victory which prioritised 
captive-taking, as it was a sign of hubris. This was the case during Marcus Antonius’s 
father’s attack on the Cretans in 67 BCE, in which he (supposedly) transported more 
chains than weapons. His fleet was pushed back by the Cretans, and his captured 
soldiers’ bodies were hung as a display of Cretan victory.240 In this instance, the 
soldiers’ bodies acted as physical symbols of Rome’s defeat, and of Antonius’ hubris in 
assuming his victory was a foregone conclusion. However, the Cretans are depicted in 
other sources as breaking agreements with Rome,241 and their horrific use of Roman 
citizens’ bodies casts a greater shadow on their reputation than Antonius’ arrogance 
did on his. 
1.8. Captives as Combatants 
There are instances in which captives were used as active participants in warfare on the 
captors’ side, including the use of captives to supplement military forces.242 By the 1st 
century BCE, the practice appears to have died out in Roman warfare, probably 
because expansion enabled the army to recruit greater numbers, which was pivotal to 
the Romans’ reliance on manpower for success.243 However, it appears that other 
nations continued to utilise captives within their armies, and there are cases in which 
Romans were offered their lives in exchange for joining the enemy side. For instance, 
the Italians supposedly enrolled captive Romans (αἰχμάλωτος) into the military during 
the siege of Nola in 90 BCE.244 The majority agreed, although there were others who 
were starved to death because they refused to capitulate to their captors. This was an 
exceptional circumstance and was not practised by the Romans but by their enemies at 
the time. This incident enabled the Romans to paint their former enemies as breaking 
the ‘rules of war’, heading a partly enslaved army, and abusing captives who practised 
integrity. The inclusion of captured combatants within warfare was probably useful, 
although explicit references to such practice were used to indicate political or civil 
unrest, such as the Social Wars which were fought on the Italian peninsula, or in later 
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history, the enrolment of ‘savage’ tribesmen into the army during the turbulent 3rd 
century CE.245 However, using captives as combatants may have posed problems in 
terms of revolts from within Roman organisations and society.246 
Furthermore, captives could be used in warfare to strike terror into the enemy or test 
their loyalties. We have seen evidence of the Gallic torture of Roman prisoners, yet 
high-profile captives could also be displayed to discourage continued warfare. The 
captives in question were technically held hostage, although they were not referred to 
using hostage-specific terms,247 as they were being used to force others to behave in a 
certain way. For instance, during the Social Wars, one of the Italian allies captured the 
Roman-held Oxynta, the son of Jugurtha, and showed the Romans’ Numidian allies the 
captive prince.248 A sense of ‘exhibition’ is present within this example as the Italians 
displayed Oxynta on the city walls and dressed him in purple, the colour closely 
associated with royalty and the senatorial elite in Rome. Here, we see how a sense of 
display could be utilised as a weapon within war. In this case, it was successful, as the 
Numidians refused to continue attacking Nola during the siege and were sent home.249 
1.9. Chapter Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, individuals taken during warfare were certainly useful to the 
Romans as a means of gaining intelligence, or as combatants. However, their treatment 
was of less concern to Greco-Roman authors than their use in self-representation. 
Greco-Roman authors presented elite Roman individuals as using rivalries between 
foreign parties to both further the Roman expansionist agenda and promote generals’ 
qualities, which could be negative and positive. These two factors are evident in the 
Romans’ use of captives, the manipulation of diplomatic practices, and subsequent 
representations of captive-taking in elite self-promotion. The use of captives and the 
ways in which the captives, rather than the Romans, are presented as behaving on the 
battlefield perpetuated and cemented the concerns the Roman audience would have 
held regarding foreign parties. The disdainful attitude towards enemies, primarily 
stemming from Roman views on their ethnic background and their non-Roman status, 
ultimately dictated their treatment rather than the ‘rules of war’. On this note, ‘the 
rules’ were used pragmatically, and usually when they were beneficial, or even 
damaging, to the Roman commander’s image depending upon the author’s agenda. 
Gruen argues that an enemy’s poor treatment of Roman captives and their allies 
allowed Greco-Roman writers to create a contrast,250 which cast Roman generals in a 
positive light or else stressed the need for military action against a cruel enemy 
commander. Caesar’s works demonstrate how this contrast was a feature which could 
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be harnessed for the self-promotion of Roman generals, and Roman Imperialism 
generally.251 The emphasis on the contrast enabled Greco-Roman writers to justify both 
violent reactions during warfare, and the expense which prolonged campaigns could 
entail. For instance, Pompey’s involvement in the Mithridatic War, which was vastly 
expensive, and Caesar’s extensive campaigns in Gaul, which saw a million people 
killed or enslaved, could be justified to the Roman people through the emphasis on the 
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Chapter Two – Massacre 
2.1. Introduction 
Following the defeat of an enemy city or camp, Roman commanders could decide to 
kill the inhabitants, sexually assault and enslave them, or allow them to go free. 
Usually, this is the only information we can glean, as the Roman authors did not 
usually relate the aftermath of war in detail.252 This chapter is concerned with massacre 
whilst the following two chapters address sexual violence and enslavement. It is 
necessary to consider why the choice to carry out mass executions was made, the way 
in which such violent events were presented in elite self-promotion, and how this 
affects our understanding of Roman captive-taking. Firstly, it is important to outline 
why massacre is even considered in this project. Those who were killed by the Romans 
in semi-orchestrated massacres, both on the battlefield and in siege warfare, were 
captives of a kind. Granted, they may not have been referred to as captives and their 
time in Roman custody may only have been for a short duration. However, they were 
in Roman power in these circumstances, and had the potential to be captives if Roman 
commanders chose to keep them alive.  
There is little doubt that massacre took place in the Roman world, despite the lack of 
detailed references made to it within literary sources. We have corroborating literary 
and archaeological evidence, primarily from Caesar’s campaigns in northern Europe, 
which supports the fact that massacre, possibly at times bordering on genocide,253 was 
commonplace in Roman warfare. As outlined in the previous chapter, Caesar’s work is 
the only evidence written first-hand by a Roman general on campaign. Given the 
heavy self-promotional aspect of his commentaries, his writings and how he presents 
his actions must be considered, given the lack of other first-hand accounts, as in 
keeping with Roman military practices at large. Therefore, they are invaluable to this 
study, particularly captive-taking during military campaigns. As we shall see, the 
circumstances in which captives were taken partly dictated their treatment, and we 
should consider the difference between the two main contexts: open and siege warfare. 
2.2. Open and Siege Warfare 
Captives could be taken following open combat or during siege warfare. As ancient 
warfare was typically conducted by male combatants, battles usually entailed the 
capture of males, whereas siege warfare enabled the Romans to take the elderly, 
women, and children.254 Levithan stresses the Romans’ attitudes towards, and 
difference between, open combat and siege warfare.255 Ideally, open combat was 
preferable to siege warfare both in terms of morality and strategy, as the enemy had 
the advantage of defences during a siege. The key issues at stake are embodied within 
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Cicero’s De Officiis, in which he discusses the morality of war and addresses the correct 
behaviour of the military following the siege of a city.256  
As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that nothing 
be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness.  
And it is a great man’s duty in troublesome times to single out the guilty for punishment, to 
spare the many, and in every turn of fortune to hold to a true and honourable course.257 
De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, 
ne quid crudeliter.  
Idque est magni viri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni 
fortuna recta atque honesta retinere. 
We should remember here that Cicero did not claim to excel in military affairs, and he 
is certainly not remembered today for his guile in battle. Granted, Cicero underwent 
basic military training and had presumably carried out raids during his time as 
governor in Cilicia, judging by his acquisition of captives from the region.258 However, 
he was certainly not accustomed to long-term military campaigns. As such he speaks of 
military matters at a distance, and with philosophy at the forefront of his mind. On this 
matter, Kries argues that Cicero’s De Officiis is a philosophical text, intended to 
encourage and hone young members of the elite in Republican ideology following 
Caesar’s assassination.259 Therefore, Cicero’s presentation of warfare is highly idealised 
and, as we shall see throughout this thesis, does not reflect common military practices 
which were bloody, cruel, and devoid of philosophical premeditation. The contrast 
between ideals and reality is demonstrated in Plutarch’s comparison of Sulla and 
Lysander, in which Plutarch praised Sulla for having taken Athens by force, resulting 
in multiple enemy casualties, as opposed to Lysander’s lengthy siege.260 In reality, as 
long as the enemy suffered a shameful defeat, any successful battle was celebrated.261 
The Romans considered siege warfare justified, as the city had effectively refused to 
fight by closing its gates and not meeting the Romans in open conflict.262 This enabled 
the Romans to rationalize a violent attack on a city, which usually involved massacre, 
followed by the sexual assault and enslavement of a city’s inhabitants, and the 
plundering of its treasures.263 
There are numerous examples of the Romans sacking cities, which are primarily found 
in Livy.264 However, the most detailed descriptions of the sacking of a city relate to 
sieges of Roman cities by Roman forces during civil war contexts, presumably because 
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the authors were more interested in the lives of Roman citizens. One of the most 
detailed examples can be found in Tacitus, and concerns the sacking of Cremona in 69 
CE,265 an act which was carried out by the troops of Vespasian’s general, M. Antonius 
Primus. Tacitus’ contempt for the troops’ excessive violence suggests that the sacking 
of the city did not mirror the idealised norms indicated by Cicero’s work. Therefore, 
Tacitus may have been using the example to warn his contemporaries, particularly 
following the Emperor Domitian’s turbulent and tyrannical reign, of the dangers of 
unrestrained brutality both in warfare and in the political arena. However, Tacitus’ 
source was an eye-witness to the event, L. Vipstanus Messalla, which suggests there 
was some element of truth in Tacitus’ account.266 Tacitus’ description is the most 
detailed account we have concerning the sack of a city, and its key features are 
supported by Livy’s descriptions of attacks in earlier Roman history. Ziolkowski and 
Gaca’s research shows that the sacking of cities was a literary trope which was 
understood to involve set events.267 Given how central literature was to the education 
of elite, male Romans,268 it is likely that this trope became central to the understanding, 
and teaching, of military conduct. The trope, which was based on earlier practices, was 
influential on generals and soldiers of the 1st century CE. 
Aged men and women near the end of life, though despised as booty, were dragged off to be the 
soldiers’ sport. Whenever a young woman or a handsome youth fell into their hands, they were 
torn to pieces by the violent struggles of those who tried to secure them, and this in the end 
drove the despoilers to kill one another. Individuals tried to carry off for themselves money or 
the masses of gold dedicated in the temples, but they were assailed and slain by others stronger 
than themselves. Some, scorning the booty before their eyes, flogged and tortured the owners to 
discover hidden wealth and dug up buried treasure. They carried firebrands in their hands, and 
when they had secured their loot, in utter wantonness they threw these into the vacant houses 
and empty temples. In this army there were many passions corresponding to the variety of 
speech and customs, for it was made up of citizens, allies, and foreigners; no two held the same 
thing sacred and there was no crime which was held unlawful. For four days did Cremona 
supply food for destruction. When everything sacred and profane sank into the flames, there 
stood solitary outside the walls the temple of Mefitis, protected by either its position or its 
deity.269 
Grandaevos senes, exacta aetate feminas, vilis ad praedam, in ludibrium trahebant: ubi 
adulta virgo aut quis forma conspicuus incidisset, vi manibusque rapientium divulsus 
ipsos postremo direptores in mutuam perniciem agebat. Dum pecuniam vel gravia 
auro templorum dona sibi quisque trahunt, maiore aliorum vi truncabantur. Quidam 
obvia aspernati verberibus tormentisque dominorum abdita scrutari, defossa eruere: 
faces in manibus, quas, ubi praedam egesserant, in vacuas domos et inania templa per 
lasciviam iaculabantur; utque exercitu vario linguis moribus, cui cives socii externi 
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interessent, diversae cupidines et aliud cuique fas nec quicquam inlicitum. Per 
quadriduum Cremona suffecit. Cum omnia sacra profanaque in ignem considerent, 
solum Mefitis templum stetit ante moenia, loco seu numine defensum. 
Ziolkowski argues that Tacitus leaves nothing to ‘common knowledge’ in his 
description of Cremona, and that this is because military knowledge of siege warfare 
was not widely understood during the pax Augusta.270 However, Bradley demonstrates 
that warfare continued despite Augustan self-fashioning of peace,271 although Imperial 
promotion stressed peace in a domestic setting rather than a foreign one.272 Therefore, 
it is unlikely that Tacitus’ readers would have been unaware of the characteristics of 
siege warfare. Rather, Tacitus’ highly detailed account of Cremona may be explained 
by the fact that the atrocities were carried out against the citizens of a Roman colony, 
rather than foreign enemies or even allies. Tacitus’ description, which acts as a climatic 
event in his Histories and has associations with Roman epic,273 stresses the horror of the 
siege, thus enabling Tacitus to critique the inappropriate conduct of the troops, whilst 
creating pathos for the defeated Roman citizens.274 
Importantly for this study, Tacitus’ account reveals Roman attitudes towards siege 
warfare and massacre during civil wars which, as we shall see later in this chapter, 
emphasises the horror of civil discord for the Roman citizens of Cremona.275 
Ziolkowski further suggests that the attack on Cremona was unusually savage,276 
although this perhaps demonstrates an overreliance on Tacitus’ assessment of events as 
previous civil conflict resulted in similar atrocities.277 Tacitus appears to imply that the 
army was at fault as it was a mass of different peoples who had different priorities in 
warfare. As we have seen in the previous chapter,278 there were similar expectations of 
warfare in cultures across the ancient world, so this may have been a convenient 
justification as Tacitus was writing under the heirs of Vespasian, the commander 
ultimately responsible for the fall of Cremona. However, Bauman argues that whilst 
Roman historians were more inclined to ‘soften’ parts of history, Roman armies were 
perceived, in the wider Mediterranean world,279 to carry out more aggressive assaults 
than their Hellenic counterparts, more frequently killing enemy males and enslaving 
the remaining population.280 As such, it is likely that Tacitus’ account is an extreme 
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example of conduct during the sack of the city, but that similar practices would have 
taken place throughout Roman history. 
2.3. Military Control 
As we have seen in the case of Cremona, who was responsible for the massacre and 
maltreatment of Roman citizens is central to Tacitus’ presentation of the violent event. 
It is important to note how Roman generals are presented as controlling their soldiers, 
as this informs discussions of how massacres and sexual violence were carried out. 
Namely, to what extent can we ascertain if massacres were ordered by generals, in an 
orchestrated attack of which massacre was the goal, or if mass-slaughter took place in 
the ‘heat of battle’, entirely at the soldiers’ own volition. The cases which follow are not 
necessarily in the context of massacre but concern military obedience in general, which 
will inform our discussion of massacre in historical reality and how it was represented 
in elite literature. 
Firstly, let us consider attacks which were orchestrated by the higher echelons of 
Roman command. There were instances in which conduct following the conclusion of a 
battle was presented as being monitored by the military commanders. Such examples 
include Lucullus ordering his troops to kill but not plunder Mithridates’ army after 
routing the Pontic king in 72 BCE.281 Lucullus appears to have wished to protect 
Mithridates’ treasure, and there is the implication that Mithridates escaped because 
Lucullus’ men disobeyed orders as they were greedy for the gold Mithridates was 
travelling with. This may have been the excuse Lucullus used when explaining 
Mithridates’ escape, but there may be a suggestion here that Lucullus was not a 
competent commander as he could not keep his troops under control when faced with 
the temptations of material wealth. The desire for material goods was criticised heavily 
in Roman elite society,282 and was a common accusation levied by ancient authors, and 
possibly by Lucullus’ contemporaries, at generals and soldiers alike. That Mithridates 
was an Eastern king, with lavish ‘Eastern’ tastes, is significant as the soldiers are 
presented as coveting such plunder over loyalty to their commander, as we shall see in 
the chapter on enslavement. Another example concerns Pompey’s campaigns in Sicily 
against the Marian faction in c. 82-1 BCE. Following the siege of Himera and Pompey’s 
talks with the city’s leader, Pompey prevented his soldiers from killing by placing a 
seal over their swords, and threatening them with punishment should they disobey his 
orders.283 This incident is significant as it was apparently expected that soldiers would 
kill during the siege of a city, and Pompey’s leniency for the citizens of Himera, 
apparently motivated by his respect for the city’s leader, was unusual and further fed 
into the image of Pompey as a ‘good’ general. The men obeyed Pompey’s commands 
without the promise of any reward for their restraint. We should therefore consider 
how the army was controlled. 
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Polybius describes, and later Roman authors allude to, the fact that the Roman army 
was motivated by fear of punishment,284 the promise of rewards,285 or supposedly a 
love of their leaders.286 Both the use of punishment and rewards had their respective 
critics, with Cicero claiming that decimation of Roman soldiers, the most extreme of 
corporal punishments, was the sign of an ineffective general.287 For instance, Caesar 
presents his troops, accused of mutiny, as asking for punishment, rather than Caesar 
carrying it out at his direction.288 Given that Caesar was acutely aware of his image, he 
seemingly (and shamelessly) went to great, and apparently fantastical, lengths to 
ensure his harsh punishment was justified. As for rewards, there were concerns within 
elite Roman culture about the desire to go to war for the sake of material rewards, and 
this can be applied in the case of soldiers who were motivated purely by plunder. As 
we have seen in the case of Lucullus, it was considered poor form for a general to lose 
control of his troops, especially if it was for material goods. The desire to wage war for 
goods is criticised heavily by Cicero, with the ideal soldier being motivated by a desire 
to serve Rome.289 
Nevertheless, despite the criticism levied at the use of plunder as motivation, material 
rewards were an essential part of military control.290 It was traditional for soldiers to be 
given prizes for impressive conduct, including symbolic honours, such as the corona 
muralis, which was awarded to the first soldier to go over the wall of a besieged city.291 
Rewards could also be in the form of human chattel, and the use of reward plunder 
could be financially profitable for Roman generals and soldiers alike, in addition to 
acting as useful symbolic currency for the political elite. We shall discuss this aspect 
throughout the course of this thesis, with consideration to the display of plunder in 
triumphs, but for now it is important to consider the practicalities of plunder for 
Roman troops and generals alike. Plunder was important for non-elite soldiers as they 
were able to supplement their relatively modest income with additional funds.292 As a 
result, it is unsurprising that plunder was widely used to encourage the troops in 
battle, and keep up morale throughout a war.293 The most commonly referenced form 
of plunder is the taking of an enemy’s armour after battle.294 This was seemingly 
common practice, either by camp followers or by members of the Roman army. The 
reasons for this are multiple but are not explicitly referred to, even in the military 
writings of Caesar. For instance, during Caesar’s Gallic Wars, following an attack on 
Galba’s men by the Veragri and the Seduni, the victorious Romans removed the 
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enemies’ armour from the battlefield.295 This may have been as trophies, as loot to sell 
later, to prevent other prospective attackers from using the dead’s weapons, or else to 
ensure the Roman armoury was stocked (particularly with the missiles and air assault 
weapons which the tribes had initially used). Other examples of plunder include the 
distribution of wealth, precious metals, or captives by generals from their own share of 
the plunder.296  
Overall, elite Roman sources suggest generals were reluctant to use punishment, or at 
least reference its use, as the threat of terror undermined a general's supposed ability to 
inspire loyalty through non-mercenary means. Similarly, the presentation of soldiers as 
motivated purely by material rewards was also problematic, as it undermined a 
general’s authority and the loyalty he should inspire in his troops, both to himself as a 
leader and to Rome. However, the way by which an army was presented as being 
motivated, no doubt using punishments and rewards, ultimately reflected on their 
leader and his qualities. Therefore, a general’s control over his troops is closely linked 
to how massacre is presented, including who was responsible for it, the supposed 
reason it was carried out, and the impact it had on Rome’s enemies. 
2.4. Responsibility for Massacre 
In addition to a general’s ‘orchestration’ or willingness to accept that bloodshed was 
part of siege warfare, massacres could be carried out during the ‘heat of battle’. Such 
cases were presented by our sources as being motivated by the soldiers’ bloodlust, 
greed, or desire for revenge. Ziolkowski argues that there are only eight cases, 
including that of Cremona, in which Roman soldiers are presented as carrying out 
massacres without the consent of their commanders,297 suggesting such cases were in 
the minority. However, the nature of the army changed during the 1st century BCE, in 
line with socio-political issues which included the move towards individuals 
dominating politics.298 This led to the rise of the ‘client-army’ which began with 
Sulla.299 The soldiers of such armies had a greater role to play in the political success of 
their leaders. In certain cases, the soldiers were allowed by generals to carry out acts of 
violence without the risk of punishment. This is evident when Sulla’s soldiers killed an 
Italian legate, who should have been protected by the rules of war, but the troops were 
not punished for doing so.300 The lack of punishment suggests that Sulla condoned 
their actions, thus breaking the rules of war,301 which may have been used by Plutarch 
to further denigrate Sulla’s character. Nevertheless, as Levick argues,302 this instance 
shows that Sulla allowed the soldiers to do as they pleased, ensuring that he had 
secured their continued loyalty. We do not know what Sulla’s soldiers’ motivation was 
for this attack. Whilst this example concerns the killing of an individual, it shows how 
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soldiers could commit atrocities without the express consent of their commander. 
Other cases show that massacres were motivated by emotional factors, including 
revenge, as we shall see, and this demonstrates that there was a sense of agreement 
between the soldiers during battle, and possibly supported by the general, that 
massacre was an acceptable outcome of conflict. The fact that massacres were carried 
out in the ‘heat of battle’, either in open conflict or in siege warfare, should not suggest 
that they were not motivated by pre-existing factors, or even agreed upon by the 
soldiers either before the massacre or through a collective commitment to violence 
against a loathed enemy.  
Ziolkowski argues that we cannot be sure who was responsible for massacres.303 
However, in most cases, the blame for failed military campaigns is placed on the 
general,304 given that they usually gave orders but were less directly involved in the 
conflict than their soldiers.305 Therefore, the responsibility for massacres would also 
have been on the Roman general, regardless of whether the general had expressly 
commanded it. Following Welch’s argument,306 massacre (and the immediate events 
which followed it), were conducted through a mixture of orders from higher ranks, 
and the soldiers’ own volition. Throughout this chapter, we shall encounter Caesar’s 
writings, which show that generals were acutely aware that their orders effectively 
made siege warfare a ‘stage’ for a performance of leadership.307 Cremona was a case in 
point and the troops’ disobedience was attributed by Tacitus to the soldiers being of 
non-Roman extraction, thus not displaying the obedient nature of truly ‘Roman’ 
soldiers, given that they had supposedly different interests and understanding of 
warfare. Motivation for massacre was also important in reflecting on a general, and the 
act could be carried out as a form of retribution, revenge, or as a warning. In all cases, 
massacres were usually justified because of some perceived breaking of the ‘rules of 
war’ by Roman enemies. 
This is the case with Pompey’s dealings with the Albanians in 65 BCE. In the first of 
two battles, the Romans slaughtered the Albanian army, before forcing a truce which 
allowed the Roman army freedom of movement across Albanian lands.308 However, 
the truce was soon broken when the Albanians raised an army of 40,000 against 
Pompey’s troops. Pompey was then justified in carrying out a second massacre on the 
battlefield,309 which led to a more decisive victory, as the Albanian king was killed.310 
Despite the frequency with which massacre occurred, the Greco-Roman writers 
presented themselves as being uncomfortable with the concept. This is evident in their 
justification of the massacres. In the case of the Albanians, not only had they broken a 
truce with Rome, but they were thought to be savage and alien in the Greco-Roman 
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mindset, as suggested by references to Amazonian women involved in the battles.311 
Regardless of whether flesh-and-blood women were actually involved in battle or not, 
the Albanians’ association with these fearsome warrior women, who transgressed 
gender norms,312 only served to stress their sense of untameable wildness.313 
Furthermore, considering this confrontation was the first time Rome had encountered 
the Albanians, Pompey was able to exploit the Romans’ ignorance of their culture to 
justify his actions,314 and promote his agenda, namely his image as a generalissimo.315 
Overall, the Roman elite audience would have understood the necessity for a massacre 
to take place, both as retribution for the enemy breaking the rules of war, and as a 
warning to others of what could happen precisely because these rules were broken.316 
2.5. Roman Criticism of Massacre 
In addition to justification, it is evident within overt criticism that the Romans were not 
completely comfortable with massacre, although they considered it necessary within 
warfare. This is apparent in Pliny’s assessment of Caesar’s casualty record. According 
to Pliny, Caesar was responsible for the deaths of more than 1,192,000 people.317 
He also fought fifty pitched battles, and alone beat the record of Marcus Marcellus who fought 
thirty-nine—for I would not myself count it to his glory that in addition to conquering his 
fellow-citizens he killed in his battles 1,192,000 human beings, a prodigious even if unavoidable 
wrong inflicted on the human race, as he himself confessed it to be by not publishing the 
casualties of the civil wars.318 
idem signis conlatis quinquagiens dimicavit, solus M. Marcellum transgressus, qui 
undequadragiens dimicavit—nam praeter civiles victorias undeciens centena et 
nonaginta duo milia hominum occisa proeliis ab eo non equidem in gloria posuerim, 
tantam etiamsi1 coactam humani generis iniuriam, quod ita esse confessus est ipse 
bellorum civilium stragem non prodendo. 
This figure includes those estimated to have been killed during the Civil War, but the 
majority were from Gallic, Germanic, or British nations. Whether or not Pliny’s figure 
can be trusted, it is likely that the numbers of those killed by Caesar’s troops during the 
Gallic Wars were in the hundreds of thousands. As we have seen in Chapter One, it 
was considered a ‘right of war’ to kill any enemy who fell under Roman power,319 yet 
even Pliny thought the deaths were an atrocious crime.320 Whilst Caesar’s justification 
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of the massacre was evidently successful as far as Caesar’s intended audience was 
concerned, with Pliny’s assertion that they were ‘unavoidable’,321 presentations of 
massacre under Caesar’s orders vary amongst authors. For instance, Plutarch regularly 
concludes his description of each part of the Gallic Wars by referencing a massacre of 
the enemy forces and their non-combatants.322 Plutarch’s account of massacres occurs 
in biography, so he ensured the narrative is curtailed and the section on the Gallic 
Wars relatively short-winded. Despite the brevity of Plutarch’s account, he stressed the 
massacres involved in the Gallic Wars which suggests that he considered them 
important to the narrative and as an indicator of Caesar’s character and achievements. 
Caesar also alters his description of massacre, as we shall see in the following few 
sections, depending upon the circumstance in which it took place. On this note, there 
appear to be two ways in which Caesar presents massacre: either as being carried out 
in the heat of battle, often prompted by a desire for vengeance, or as a strategic attack 
ordered by Caesar himself.  
2.6. Massacre and Revenge 
Beyond the abuse of the ‘rules of war’, there are instances in which the Romans carried 
out massacres which were motivated by more personal concerns, including national 
and personal revenge. One example of this takes place during Caesar’s Gallic Wars, 
when the Carnutes attacked and killed Roman traders, including one of Caesar’s men, 
at Cenabum (thought to be modern-day Orléans).323 As a result of the Gallic massacre, 
a whole tribe of captured Gauls at Avaricum were slaughtered by Roman troops in 
revenge for the Cenabum massacre.324  
In such fashion the troops, maddened by the massacre at Cenabum and the toil of the siege-work, 
spared not aged men, nor women, nor children.325 
Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non 
infantibus pepercerunt.  
This incident is significant not only because Caesar explicitly states the troops’ 
motivation, suggesting avenging wrongs against Rome was acceptable in warfare. In 
addition, the example highlights how Caesar could use the ethnicity and the Romans’ 
understanding of ‘The Other’ to create an enemy’s identity.326 Recognising your enemy 
is a factor which has continued to be important throughout warfare, as discussed by 
Van Creveld.327 The people of Avaricum were not members of the same tribe as the 
Gallic figurehead Vercingetorix, the Arverni, nor did they have any power in Cenabum 
which was the home of the Carnutes tribe. Ergo, the slaughtered Gauls had little if 
anything to do with the killing of Roman citizens some 100 kilometres away.328 
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Nevertheless, whilst we can see from Caesar’s work that different nations and 
connections between them were understood, here this was not a factor as the Roman 
army’s victims were simply ‘Gauls’. This sweeping ascription enabled the Roman 
troops to view their captives as representatives of the enemy who had attacked 
members of their own ‘tribe’. The Romans’ understanding of different nations and 
their ethnicities was deliberately ignored, or ignorance on the subject exploited by 
Caesar in his representation of Gallic ethnicity. Caesar is not unique in this, as 
Bittarello, writing on Etruscan ethnicity, argues that ‘varying cultural needs produce 
diverging representations’ within Greco-Roman literature.329 As such, representations 
of other ethnicities within literary sources varied depending upon the agenda of the 
writer. However, such stereotypes were usually negative in comparison to the Romans’ 
supposed achievements, which enabled Greco-Roman authors and Roman generals to 
justify brutality and vengeance, and show that the Romans always overcame their 
‘barbarian’ foes. 
In a similar way to massacre as a form of revenge, Caesar claims that the massacre of 
the Tigurini in 58 BCE was motivated by more than blood-lust or necessity.330 Rather it 
was a matter of national and personal significance,331 a theme which is found 
throughout the Gallics Wars and other writings of Caesar.332 The tribe of the Tigurini 
had been responsible for the death of Lucius Piso, a Roman citizen and Caesar’s father-
in-law’s grandfather. Here, Caesar offers yet another justification for ordering a 
massacre, namely that he was an avenger for Rome, as well as honouring his extended 
family. Despite his personal desire for revenge, Caesar attributes the blame for the 
wholesale massacre of the Tigurini to one of his lieutenants, placing himself at a 
distance from the slaughter.333 This justification enabled Caesar to emphasise his 
honour and his connections to past military and political leaders, whilst not directly 
involving himself in the unsavoury act of massacre. However, Appian’s fragmentary 
Gallic History attributes the tribe’s downfall to Caesar himself.334 Appian appears to 
consider Caesar’s lieutenants’ involvement simply as a division of labour, with Caesar 
dealing with the Helvetii, whilst his underling moved against the Tigurini. However, 
responsibility was presented as being ultimately Caesar’s. 
We shall discuss the motivations for the Romans’ massacre of the Tigurini later in the 
chapter, but the destruction of the Helvetii and Tigurini demonstrates the vast number 
of casualties involved in Caesar’s campaigns. The Helvetii and their allies, which 
included the Tigurini, supposedly numbered 368,000.335 After their defeat, Caesar 
supposedly spared 110,000 people, whilst the remaining 258,000 were likely killed or 
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possibly enslaved. Interestingly, when referring to these figures, it appears that Caesar 
boasts about the number he killed, not those he took captive. Granted, Caesar’s figures 
are highly exaggerated. However, as we have seen, exaggerations presumably had to 
be within a sensible margin of error. Evidently, the numbers of those killed during 
Caesar’s campaigns were vast, although we will never be able to ascertain actual 
numbers with any degree of certainty.  
Despite the acknowledged issues with Caesar’s numbers, Caesar’s campaigns in 
northern Europe were undoubtedly bloodthirsty, a feature which is attested to in 
recent archaeological finds.336 In 2015, the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam discovered 
human remains and material objects, such as belt hooks, that have been linked to 
Caesar’s massacre of the Tencteri and Usipetes in 55 BCE.337 The massacre was one of 
the largest Caesar carried out during his Gallic Wars,338 and yet another which Caesar 
relates with little embellishment.339  
In the [Tencteri and Usipetes’] camp those who were able speedily to take up arms resisted the 
Romans for a while, and fought among the carts and baggage-wagons; the remainder, a crowd of 
women and children (for the Germans had left home and crossed the Rhine with all their 
belongings), began to flee in all directions, and Caesar despatched the cavalry in pursuit.340   
Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter 
carros impedimentaque proelium commiserunt: at reliqua multitudo puerorum 
mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenumque transierant) 
passim fugere coepit; ad quos consectandos Caesar equitatum misit. 
The remains, found by Roymans’ team after dredging a riverbed, are those of at least 
70 men, women and children,341 and can be dated from the Iron Age to the 14th century. 
Of the bones which have been dated by Roymans to roughly the time and location of 
Caesar’s massacre of the Tencteri and Usipetes,342 a large proportion show signs of 
blunt force trauma [Figures 4 and 5]. For instance, Figure 5 shows the skull of an adult 
female between 40 and 60 with a wound which may have resulted from an arrow, 
gladius or pilum, typical Roman military equipment.343 Furthermore, Caesar relates that 
it was the cavalry which completed the massacre close to the river. Given that most of 
the injuries can be found on the skulls, it is likely that the archaeological evidence 
supports Caesar’s narrative, given that skulls would be the most obvious and 
accessible targets for those on horseback.  
Caesar’s accounts and the remains found in connection to his campaigns in northern 
Europe clearly show that Roman warfare was bloody and often ruthless. The nature of 
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warfare was not disguised or avoided, but Caesar went to great lengths to stress that 
the Tencteri and Usipetes had defied his orders and had attacked the Roman army 
first. Lee suggests that there was a truce existing between Caesar and the Tencteri and 
Usipetes, and the massacre Caesar ordered undermined his carefully cultivated 
clement image by attacking the tribes without sufficient justification.344 This links 
closely to the Romans’ representation of treachery, and how Caesar presented the 
Tencteri and Usipetes as supposedly deserving of such a fate because they had refused 
to treat with Rome or withdraw from the territory.345 
2.7. Treachery 
Treachery, as we have seen in relation to military intelligence, could also be punished 
through the execution of prisoners. After Caesar defeated the town of Vellaunodunum 
in 52 BCE, peace terms supposedly included the delivery of 600 hostages.346 That night, 
apparently before the hostages had been delivered, the townsfolk rose up against the 
Romans. They were brutally quashed, and the whole town destroyed. It is not specified 
what happened to the townsfolk, but enslavement or mass execution seem likely. This 
links closely with Caesar’s massacre of the Aduatuci in 57 BCE following their 
attempted nocturnal attack after agreeing peace terms.347 Not only do these instances 
reinforce Caesar’s justification for his aggressive course of action, but he presents 
himself as a general who is not easily tricked, thus emphasising his military prowess. 
In turn, this further stresses the Gauls’ supposedly inherent treachery, and the Romans’ 
superiority over them. The enemy’s treachery was recurring theme throughout 
Caesar’s work, climaxing with the treachery of the Aedui, Rome’s long-term allies, 
plotting with Vercingetorix and killing or enslaving Roman citizens.348 Whilst this 
betrayal may have been an acceptable act in warfare, Caesar claims that the Aeduan 
deputies who came to visit him advised that only individuals within their tribe, not the 
governing body, were involved with Rome’s enemies.349 Despite this double betrayal, 
Caesar claimed that he was clement with the Aedui and preserved their people after 
the Battle of Alesia.350 It is uncertain how clement Caesar was in actuality, but that he 
presented himself as such enables us to consider the impact of his leniency on a non-
Roman audience. Presumably, through the news of his actions spreading around the 
neighbouring territories and Rome itself, Caesar was able to demonstrate his clemency 
whilst clearly showing the consequences of revolting against Rome. Here, we see yet 
another example of Caesar using the expectations of wartime conduct pragmatically, 
whilst simultaneously indulging in self-promotion by emphasising his clementia. 
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2.8. Massacre and Theatrics  
There are instances which show that massacres were not carried out without an 
awareness of their impact on the audience, both Roman and non-Roman, who may 
have witnessed or heard reports of slaughter. We shall deal with the executions which 
took place in Rome at the end of the triumph and in spectacles in the final chapter. 
However, one mass execution, presented by the ancient authors as an horrific 
massacre, links closely to the impact massacre could have on its intended audience. A 
sense of staging is evident in Sulla’s captive-taking, particularly his execution of 6000 
Samnite soldiers in the Campus Martius.351 It is uncertain why Sulla transported the 
captives to Rome. The male captives may have been intended for slavery, but the 
presentation of Sulla’s carefully staged mass slaughter would suggest that the captives 
were intended for some form of display. Given the hostility towards Sulla by later 
authors, the Samnites may have been executed by Sulla as a means of appealing to the 
Roman public, akin to a form of early ‘fatal charade’.352 The Samnites had long been a 
problem for the Roman people, and Sulla’s decision to execute them en masse, in a 
situation akin to massacre in warfare, may have been Sulla’s attempt to demonstrate 
Roman dominance over their once troublesome enemy. Furthermore, the fact that the 
captives were Samnites is noteworthy as the earliest gladiators were supposed to have 
been Samnite prisoners of war.353 As such, the massacre which took place may have 
been a form of entertainment which was manipulated by later Roman authors to 
highlight Sulla’s tyranny. This is supported by Bauman, who argues that the captives 
were killed simply because they were foreign, and their demise would have elicited 
few complaints.354  
However, Sulla is presented as ordering the senators to assemble in the nearby Temple 
of Bellona, which ensured that they could hear the cries of the dying soldiers as they 
were slaughtered in the Campus Martius. Arguably, this may have been an example of 
rule established through terror, which is universally condemned by ancient authors 
and, as a result, may have been highly fictionalised. However, Sulla’s careful staging of 
the massacre is unpleasantly impressive. Considering the acoustics of a temple during 
this time, the high colonnades and inner sanctum would have amplified the sound, 
and forced the senators to imagine the horrors taking place outside. It was unnecessary 
for the senators to witness the massacre; the sound of the horrors alone would have 
been sufficient stimulation for the imagination. For the senators, the implication would 
have been clear: obey Sulla or face the same fate as the Samnites. 
Sulla’s actions are heavily criticised by later authors and his behaviour in this instance 
was unacceptable as it threatened his fellow Romans, and merged war and politics 
with theatrics. Sulla’s links to the theatrical and the stage are well-recorded,355 
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especially by Plutarch, and the massacre is relayed by Sallust, Dio, and Plutarch.356 
However, it was likely to have been an exaggeration as associations with infames had 
ruined many a Roman aristocrat's reputation.357 Furthermore, the sites in question were 
outside the then-pomerium, the sacred boundary of the city, and the Temple of Bellona 
had frequently been used as a meeting place for the senate and generals who had yet to 
relinquish control of their armies.358 The sites were therefore outside the sacred 
boundary of Rome, where warfare and massacre were expected given Rome’s 
expansionist agenda. Nevertheless, the setting of this story is close to the centre of 
Rome, and the terror generated through this story, whether fictitious or otherwise, 
emphasises Sulla’s lack of regard for the conventions of Roman society, as he had 
brought war to the gates of his own city. This incident took place during Sulla’s second 
occupation of Rome in 82 BCE and appears to set the scene for Sulla’s later treatment of 
his fellow Romans. Throughout descriptions of Sulla’s treatment of his Roman 
enemies, there are numerous instances in which the proscription victims are compared 
to prisoners of war,359 which is used to highlight his poor treatment of both respectable 
Roman citizens and his abuse of the expectations of warfare. 
2.9. Chapter Conclusion 
Archaeological evidence supports Greco-Roman literary accounts of the massacres 
which were frequently carried out throughout Roman history, and it is evident during 
this period with Caesar’s actions during his Gallic Wars. The historical realities are 
certain, yet the way in which the Romans represented massacre indicates that they 
were not entirely at ease with their overly aggressive military actions, even against 
those they de-humanised as being ‘the other’ in elite self-promotion. This unease 
enabled the ancient authors to depict generals, essentially those who were ultimately 
responsible for massacre, in either a positive or negative light. In cases where we find 
elite individuals positively presented, we find attempts to justify massacre, and these 
narratives are carefully constructed to implicate the victims in their own demise, as 
evident in cases of massacre as a form of revenge for the enemy’s supposed ‘treachery’. 
We can see this clearly with Caesar’s writings, as he had to create careful narratives 
surrounding his actions which then justified his prolonged, and presumably expensive, 
actions in northern Europe. The opposite applies to those the Romans deemed as 
distasteful characters, including the likes of Sulla who supposedly engaged in the 
theatrical executions of captives to threaten the senatorial elite, the mainstay of the 
Roman political establishment, thus the Roman population at large. Ultimately, the 
Romans had little interest in the welfare of those they captured and massacre was an 
acceptable outcome for the defeated, provided they were ‘the other’. 
 
356 Sall. Hist. 1.50, 1.49, Dio fr. 109.1-9., Plut. Vit. Sull, 2.3-4. 
357 A concern for the elite’s involvement with theatrical and gladiatorial performances led to the 
creation of legislation banning elite individuals from taking part, cf. Levick, 1983: 99, Garland, 
2006: 11.  
358 The Temple of Bellona was also closely linked to Roman victory over the Samnites, having 
been built with spoils taken from Rome’s war with the Samnites in the 3rd century BCE. 
359 Dio fr. 109.11, Sall. Hist. 1.49.1-20, 3.15.1-6, 19-20, cf. pp. 93-96. 
57 
 
Chapter Three – Sexual Violence 
3.1 Introduction 
The World Health Organisation defines sexual violence as ‘any sexual act, attempt to 
obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or 
otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any person 
regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not limited to 
home and work.’360 Today, we are constantly debating issues surrounding consent, 
cultural attitudes, and legalities relating to sexual violence both in domestic and 
conflict settings. For the most part, there is a growing awareness of sexual violence 
against women within the international community, with the United Nations declaring 
in 2014 that sexual violence in conflict should be treated as a war crime.361 In turn, 
scholarship on recent conflict has focussed on the role of sexual violence,362 whilst such 
violence in ancient warfare and as a part of the process of captive-taking continues to 
be an underexamined topic.363 
Before we continue to consider how sexual violence was used in Roman captive-taking 
and its subsequent representations, we need to acknowledge the problems we face 
when considering sexual violence in the ancient world. A key problem with studying 
sexual violence in the Roman context is that there is no word to denote rape,364 nor did 
art explicitly show scenes of sexual violence,365 although it was certainly implied, as we 
shall see shortly. Furthermore, as our attitudes towards sexual violence develop, when 
faced with sexual violence in a Greco-Roman context, we are forced to consider the 
most horrific and ‘intimate’ of crimes from a perspective which is alien to our own. 
Certainly, the World Health Organisation’s description of sexual violence would not 
have been recognised by the Romans, and sexual violence within the context of ancient 
warfare tends to relate to penetrative sexual assault, rather than the numerous types of 
violence the WHO’s description outlines. Furthermore, in Greco-Roman writings, there 
are limited references to sexual violence and scholarship has primarily focussed on 
literary and metaphorical examples.366 Despite the ‘silence’ in Greco-Roman writings, 
which is also found in all world cultures, 367 there can be little doubt that sexual 
violence frequently took place in the Roman world and was used as a weapon of 
war,368 as it continues to be used in conflict today. 
The lack of explicit references to sexual assault in the Roman world may be because 
sexual violence was a crime of an intimate nature which, in Roman times, was rarely 
 
360 Krug et al, 2002: 149.  
361 United Nations, 2017. 
362 Card, 1996: 5. However, there is a universal acknowledgement of the ancient origins of 
sexual violence. 
363 Except for such works as: Gaca, 2013, 2014, Van Wees, 1992: 183-5, Whittaker, 2009: 234-235. 
364 Nguyen, 2006: 76. 
365 Dillon, 2006: 259-260. 
366 Cf. Reeder, 2017: 363-5. 
367 This ‘silence’ continues in relation to recent conflict, cf. Tomaselli, 1986: 2-3, Levithan, 2013: 
47-79. For the Greco-Roman context, cf. Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 308. 
368 Gaca, 2013: 73-75. 
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recognised as rape.369 In Britain, we need only look at our recent history to find 
instances in which rape was legally permitted, namely the 1990 decision to abolish the 
law that ‘a husband cannot be convicted of raping his wife.’370 Unfortunately, as also 
evident in society today, there is little doubt that sexual violence was endemic in the 
Roman world, with enslaved people being subject to whatever treatment the enslavers 
deemed fit, and most women having little legal say in their marriages.371 In Rome itself, 
sexual aggression against women was problematic enough to prompt the creation of 
laws against it,372 although no law directly pertaining to ‘rape’ as we would recognise it 
existed.373 Furthermore, it is likely that free women did not report assaults to the 
authorities, but that their male guardian privately prosecuted the assailant.374 The 
sexual integrity of Roman citizens was the main concern, and those who were most 
vulnerable to assault, or rather their male relatives, were anxious about the possibility 
of a sexual assault damaging their social standing, as evident in the creation of laws 
which punish rape.375  
Within Roman society, it is highly likely that enslaved people, many of whom were 
former captives,376 were the most common victims of sexual violence.377 Sexual violence 
against enslaved people was permitted in Roman law,378 with the only legal violation 
pertaining to property law. This meant that the perpetrator of sexual violence against 
an enslaved person had violated an enslaver’s ‘property’.379 This was also the case for 
free Roman women who were under the lawful dominion of men.380 As such, sexual 
assault against enslaved people was a property crime, rather than an act of violence 
which could be prosecuted. The ‘degraded standing’ of enslaved people meant that 
otherwise unacceptable sexual relations were more tolerable in the Roman mindset 
when perpetrated against those without rights.381 As we shall see in the following 
chapter, captives were without rights at the point at which they fell under Roman 
dominion, e.g. following the defeat of a city. As enslaved people, sexual violence could 
be perpetrated against them by Roman soldiers with impunity, unless generals 
moderated their behaviour in line with the rules of war.  
This is significant as, despite the acceptance and prevalence of violence within Roman 
society, rape was understood to be a violent act. However, Gibson argues that violence 
 
369 There is some evidence pertaining to domestic violence, cf. Seifert, 2011: 147-162. 
370 Law Commission, 1992: 1. 
371 For a full overview of ‘rape laws’ in the Roman world, cf. Nguyen, 2006: 75-112. 
372 Gardner, 1986: 117-8. 
373 Nguyen, 2006: 83-4. 
374 Gardner, 1986: 119-121. The lex Iulia de vi, introduced during Caesar’s dictatorship, may have 
permitted a woman to bring charges for rape sui iuris, but it is likely that social mores prevented 
women from appearing in court, cf. Nguyen, 2006: 88-89. 
375 Perry, 2015: 55-6. 
376 As we shall discuss in the following chapter, cf. pp. 63-108. 
377 Seifert, 2011: 147. 
378 Dig. 25.7.1.1, cf. Gardner, 1986: 117-121. 
379 Seifert, 2011: 154. 
380 Evans, 1991: 7-11, cf. Askin, 2013: 21. 
381 Perry, 2015: 57.  
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was integral to Roman culture and would not have been disapproved of as it is 
today,382 whilst Gale and Scourfield state that ‘violence could be claimed for good’ 
within the Roman world.383 The contradictory attitudes towards violence, and sexual 
violence in particular, as we shall see, enabled Greco-Roman authors to present sexual 
violence in way which conveyed a political and symbolic agenda beyond the historical 
context. Whilst Roman attitudes towards sexual violence and how it was defined 
would vary greatly from our own, rape continues to be used as a weapon of war by 
many armies and militant groups around the world. Similarly, on a domestic level, 
sexual violence is used as a means of threatening and attacking women, with some 
members of (usually right wing) movements advocating the use of rape as a weapon to 
punish and humiliate women.384 Considering the continuation of sexual violence in 
modern conflict, whilst attitudes may vary, there is still much to be gained from 
looking at scholarship which relates to recent conflicts to illuminate aspects of Roman 
practice as the behaviours and motivations are similar. 
It has therefore been necessary throughout this chapter to refer to research on the 
subjects of sexual violence in recent conflict, sex trafficking, and trauma caused by 
violence in captivity and coercive relationships. With regards to sex trafficking, there 
are a number of differences between ways the Romans took captives and how criminal 
organisations today coerce victims into trafficking. Victims of modern trafficking, 
usually women and girls, are vulnerable because they often have experience of 
domestic violence/abuse and poverty. The victims are coerced into ‘escaping’ from 
their lives and ‘making a fresh start’ somewhere else.385 The victims of Roman slavery 
were enslaved through violence and not through coercive methods. Nevertheless, the 
techniques used by the Romans and modern criminal enterprises in controlling their 
victims are similar. After being taken captive, ancient and modern victims of 
trafficking alike, were transported to foreign countries where they lack knowledge of 
the language, are isolated and fearful of seeking help or are unable to do so because of 
cultural mores (this is the case for the Romans in particular given the legality of 
slavery), and are under constant threat of violence, sexual assault, debt, and fear. 
Where pertinent, I have outlined how modern scholarship speaks to the unwritten 
motivations behind the Romans’ behaviour in relation to sexual violence and 
enslavement. 
As a result of the aforementioned reasons, there has not been a comprehensive study of 
how the Romans used sexual violence in warfare and its subsequent representations. 
Furthermore, there is little research into how sexual violence was part of the process 
and management of captive-taking, and I hope this thesis contributes to a greater 
understanding of such violence in Roman culture. There is much evidence which has 
yet to be explored and I have discussed such examples throughout this chapter, taking 
 
382 Gibson, 2018: 269-10. 
383 Gale, Scourfield, 2018: 1-3. 
384 Classics, as Zuckerberg details, is utilised by such groups/individuals to justify their ‘pro-
rape’ arguments, cf. Zuckerberg, 2018: 143-184. 
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an interdisciplinary approach where necessary. As this thesis concerns the process and 
management of captive-taking and its representations, there is not scope here to 
conduct a full study, but sexual violence in Roman warfare deserves more 
consideration, particularly as the topic’s neglect presents only a male-centric view of 
war, essentially ignoring the role of women and children in warfare. That said, my 
research conveys how sexual violence was used by the Romans and that it was 
employed as a method of subduing and degrading their enemies, with far reaching 
implications.   
3.2 Survivors and Victims of Sexual Violence 
Scholarship on recent warfare has shown that where there is conflict, there is also 
sexual violence.386 Women and children are the primary targets for sexual violence, as 
they are not directly involved in combat and are often unable to defend themselves 
when faced with trained male soldiers.387 As a result, this chapter primarily concerns 
the female victims and survivors of sexual violence in Roman warfare.388 Before 
continuing further, we should acknowledge that boys and men were certainly 
subjected to sexual violence in Roman culture, but this is not reflected in Greco-Roman 
representations of their actions in a wartime context.389 The reasons for this may be 
found in research on recent conflicts where we encounter numerous instances where 
men and boys are also victims of sexual violence in warfare.390 Cultures which practise 
sexual violence against males are usually intent on depriving their victim of his 
‘masculinity’. This is significant in the Roman context as the Romans were primarily 
concerned with who penetrated whom. Those who were penetrated, with or without 
consent, were typically associated with ‘servility, femininity, and social inferiority.’391 
As we have seen and will discuss in more detail throughout this thesis, the Romans 
wanted to portray themselves as having conquered fearsome peoples. It was therefore 
not in the Romans’ best interests to present their enemies as ‘feminized’, given the 
Romans’ understanding of the dynamics of power in sexual violence. Furthermore, in 
recent conflicts, males who were subjected to sexual violence were often identified as 
being ‘the other’, even within their own society.392 As sexual violence is usually 
perpetrated against women, who are often legally and politically marginalised with 
their societies,393 it is significant that men are sexually assaulted as a means of 
‘othering’, a concept we shall discuss shortly, in that they are forced to experience 
punishment ‘traditionally’ exacted on women. We shall see references to sexual 
 
386 Askin, 2013: 19. 
387 Hermann, Palmieri, 2010: 19-30. Card has also shown that women who are trained in self-
defence are less likely to be the victims of sexual violence, cf. Card, 1996: 12-13. 
388 Throughout this chapter, I have used the terms ‘victim’ and ‘survivor’ to denote those who 
were subjected to sexual violence. For clarity, ‘victim’ refers to those who were killed as a result 
of or shortly after being assaulted, ‘survivor’ refers to those who survived the assault.  
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violence against men and boys throughout this chapter but such examples are rare and 
references are usually in relation to extreme situations where the author incorporates 
such detail to highlight poor conduct in warfare or an enemy’s barbarism.394 Therefore, 
whilst it is acknowledged that men and boys were subjected to sexual violence, 
violence committed against women and girls in warfare was focussed on more by 
Greco-Roman authors as it was expected and more acceptable conduct in war.  
Whilst women and girls were the most common victims/survivors of sexual violence, 
women involved or affected by warfare were not entirely without agency.395 Whilst 
captive women are typically depicted as submissive within Roman literature and 
iconography, there are a few instances in which non-combatant women were actively 
involved in warfare.396 The circumstances in which they become involved were 
desperate, and are indicative of the position of women within Roman society and how 
Greco-Roman authors viewed women. The emphasis on women in these instances also 
shows how it was expected that women and children would be targeted during 
warfare, and that sexual violence was an omnipresent threat in such circumstances. 
Women and children defending their besieged cities appears to be a trope found 
within warfare. For instance, the women and children of the Tunisian city of Vaga took 
up arms to help massacre Roman soldiers on the orders of Jugurtha in 109 BCE.397 In 
this case, the women and children were assisting their (usually male) defenders in the 
massacre, thus showing that the whole population was actively involved in the 
downfall of the Romans. This indicates that, in Roman thought, ‘the enemy’ comprised 
the entire population of male combatants, women and children.  
Another example concerns how the women of Rome, when faced with Sulla’s 
approaching army in 88 BCE, used the roof tiles from their city’s buildings to attack the 
soldiers.398 As Barry outlines, tiles were useful weapons in that they simply rested on a 
roof, so could easily be pulled off, and were light enough to be thrown, two-handed, 
whilst causing sufficient damage to the troops below.399 The tiles are symbolic of the 
domus, the ‘female’ sphere and centre of Roman family life. They were also expensive 
commodities which, should the city be recovered, would be costly to replace.400 As 
such, their actions not only signify their desperation, but that, should the women be 
captured, the household would essentially be destroyed as it was considered to be the 
female sphere.401 Similarly, during Rome’s wars with Spain in the 2nd century BCE, 
Appian claimed that some women from Hispanic tribes bore arms to defend their 
 
394 Cf. Dio. Sic. 13.58.1-2, Cic. Phil. 3.12. 
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399 Barry, 1996: 60-64. 
400 Barry, 1996: 60. 
401 Nguyen, 2006: 76-77. 
62 
 
cities.402 Like the women of Rome, their defence was against the Romans’ attack on 
their domestic domain, and was also used to stress the ‘warlike’ nature of the Hispanic 
people.403 In such cases, whether based on actual events or simply invented by authors, 
the examples show that the women would destroy their homes to ensure the protection 
of their family.404 This is significant given that, as we shall see throughout this thesis,405 
it was the people and not the material objects which enabled the Romans to declare 
that they (or their enemies) had subjugated a nation. In Greco-Roman thought, men 
were supposed to be the protectors of their female relatives and sexual violence was 
therefore indicative of the failure of men in doing their duty.406As a result, the defeat of 
an enemy was not complete without the subjugation of women and children. 
Furthermore, as we shall see, symbolism of defeat is often signified by the female form 
as it is often cast as ‘fertile land’.407 The consequences of sexual violence transcend the 
act itself,408 and in the Greco-Roman context link to elite self-representations. 
3.3. Motivations for Sexual Violence in Warfare 
The consequences in question link to the motivations for sexual violence, and modern 
scholarship is illuminating given that ancient authors do not expressly state the 
purpose of such violence. There are a number of different motivations for sexual 
violence in warfare, and I shall discuss these in turn. It is important to point out that 
there could be multiple motivations for the use of sexual violence in one instance and 
some motivations had short term, reactive implications whilst others had long-term, 
strategic motivations. The primary motivations for the use of sexual violence in 
warfare were and are: the desire to display dominance, an indirect attack on male 
combatants, a form of revenge, humiliation and punishment, genetic Imperialism, a 
symbol of power changes, and the destruction of a community. As we shall see 
throughout this chapter, the aforementioned motivations enabled the Romans to take 
captives more easily as the whole of enemy society was physically and psychologically 
damaged through the use of sexual violence.  
Firstly, we need to overturn the notion that sexual violence is primarily about the 
physical act of sex. Contrary to how Livy paints the ‘lusty’ actions of the Carthaginians 
during their assault of Saguntum (Sagunto in modern-day Spain) in 218 BCE,409 sexual 
violence is not conducted as a means of gratifying soldiers’ sexual desires or as a 
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means of ‘release’ after engaging in heated conflict.410 Sexual gratification of the 
perpetrators is only a by-product of sexual violence. Rather, given the connections 
between the socio-political position of women in ‘rape-prone’ societies,411 as Rome was, 
sexual violence is an expression of a social ideology of male dominance.412 This 
ideology was prevalent in the Greco-Roman world, given free women’s inferior 
position within society.413 Sexual violence is intended to make an impact on the 
‘audience’ before or to which it is conducted. Therefore, sexual violence in war is ‘part 
of a calculated strategy to terrorize, demoralize, and destroy victims, families and 
communities or associated groups.’414 Women are attacked in warfare in intimate ways 
because women are essential to the social structure of a community.415 
Such a concept is significant when addressing the motivations for sexual violence in 
the Roman world, particularly as women may have been understood to ‘belong’ to 
enemy combatants, thus were an extension of the Romans’ enemies and their 
property.416 Contrary to Whittaker’s claims,417 sexual violence in the Roman world was 
systemic, as it was understood within ideological thought that Roman males or those 
under their authority were ‘impenetrable penetrators’, a term which refers to the 
Romans’ sexual norms, specifically that Roman males could penetrate their sexual 
partner, but could never be the submissive, penetrated partner. Therefore, the ability to 
prevent an assault on one’s person was a signifier of ‘manliness’ (virtus) as the Romans 
understood it.418 Given the prevalence of this thought within Roman ideology, the 
counter argument can be applied to sexual violence in war. As Roman societal 
conventions and law dictated, women were under the care and authority of their male 
relatives.419 As such, an assault on a female was, by extension, an attack on their 
menfolk.420 Thus, the women, girls and boys who were subjected to sexual violence 
were socially denigrated in the eyes of their attackers, as they were violated, and their 
menfolk were shown to be powerless. This had both short- and long-term implications 
which shall be addressed throughout this chapter. 
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In the short-term, the attacks on women and children, as extensions of their male 
relatives, enabled the Romans to enact a form of revenge, humiliation, or punishment 
on the whole of an enemy’s society. Revenge, humiliation, and punishment are closely 
intertwined and are present in the ancient and modern examples. Despite their close 
connections, revenge is often viewed as a primary motivation for sexual violence in 
modern warfare, and there are countless examples from across history, including 
perhaps most famously the Allied assault of German women (and some men) at the 
end of the Second World War.421 Soviet propaganda encouraged soldiers to take 
revenge on not just enemy soldiers, but the German people more generally.422Although 
evidence is limited, it is thought that the mass rape of German women was revenge for 
the abuses German soldiers had carried out against women on the Eastern front, 
including the detention of women in military brothels.423 Generals throughout the 
Soviet army and the Soviet leader Stalin were aware of the attacks but did little to 
discourage sexual violence.424 Sexual violence is therefore closely connected to 
punishment and humiliation, particularly when carried out against an enemy people. 
These examples from the Second World War highlight that sexual violence could be 
used at different stages of conflict but for similar motivations. The Germans utilised 
sexual violence as a means of consolidating their control on the eastern front, whilst the 
Russian troops used sexual violence as a form of revenge and to further humiliate the 
defeated German people. Ultimately, sexual violence could be used to humiliate a 
people, particularly in patriarchal cultures where women were seen as the property of 
their male relatives. The repercussions of sexual violence, primarily the trauma and 
potential impregnation of the survivors, had long-term effects on the whole of 
society.425 
In the context of warfare, sexual violence is also an act which can be considered akin to 
genocide, as its purpose is to destroy a group’s identity by decimating cultural and 
social bonds.426 Part of this is by ensuring that the offspring resulting from rape were 
illegitimate, as concern for legitimacy of offspring was at the heart of Greco-Roman 
family ‘law’ and social mores.427  Furthermore, Card, in her discussion of rape in recent 
history, argues that this ‘productive’ element of rape was a form of ‘genetic 
Imperialism’ which was used to impregnate women who would then be ‘persuaded’ to 
change loyalties, 428 presumably for the sake of their child or because their spirit was 
broken by the horrors they had endured, and destruction of their identity.  
On this note, research on victims of violence in captivity has shown that the 
relationship between the victim and their attacker (or attackers) is one of coercive 
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control.429 The victim is psychologically dominated in that all aspects of their life, 
including their physical autonomy are controlled by their captor or captors. This 
psychological domination is designed to not only destroy a person’s autonomy, but to 
make them grateful for being allowed to continue living. To survive, the victim has 
little choice but to follow the orders of their captor or captors, and they are encouraged 
to feel grateful, after suffering prolonged abuse, to their captors for being allowed to 
continue to live. This links closely to how the Romans justified slavery, as we shall 
discuss later, with enslaved people allegedly called servi because generals chose to 
preserve (servare) their captives.430 Although the concept of psychology was not 
understood by the Romans, there can be little doubt that the use of sexual violence, and 
its continued perpetration once a captive was enslaved, was designed to create a sense 
of dependence, with the victim relying on their captor for survival. This sense of 
dependence was more acute given that the victims, then often enslaved, were isolated 
from their own societies and language,431 having been sold into slavery in different 
regions around the Mediterranean.432 
The isolation of individuals from their families and culture creates a sense of ‘othering’ 
which enables sexual assaults to be justified because the female victims are ‘the 
enemy’, therefore ‘the other’, a position which dehumanizes them in the eyes of their 
assailants.433 As we shall discuss in more detail throughout this chapter, research on 
victims of sex trafficking (a form of modern-day slavery which primarily affects girls 
and women) has shown that repeated sexual assaults are used by perpetrators of 
trafficking to wear down the victim’s ability to resist and seek help.434 It has been 
reported that, despite the obvious distress of trafficked girls and women who are 
forced into prostitution, buyers rarely show concern for the women’s well-being.435 
This has been attributed to the sense of the victims’ ‘otherness’, as they are often 
trafficked to foreign countries and do not have knowledge of the primary language 
used. There are clearly differences between Roman and modern-day slavery, but the 
use of sexual violence to destroy a person’s agency, create a sense of ‘otherness’, and 
prevent them from seeking help or escape are common factors which shall be explored 
in more depth throughout this chapter. 
Another motivation for using sexual violence, which had long-term consequences for 
the victims, was the use of such violence as a means of enslaving people. As suggested 
in visual depictions, which we shall discuss shortly, sexual violence was viewed as a 
part of the transition from free person to captive to enslaved person. Given references 
to the legal protection of Roman women only in exceptional circumstances, it is highly 
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likely that wartime sexual violence took place with more regularity than the primary 
sources would suggest. Furthermore, it also seems that sexual violence in warfare was 
not only permitted but recognised as part of a captive’s journey and a practice which 
enabled individuals to be more easily enslaved.436 The role of sexual violence in the 
process of enslavement is rarely acknowledged by ancient authors, with the exception 
of a passage in Diodorus Siculus, a Greek author writing during the 1st century CE. The 
incident refers to Greek allies of the Carthaginians who attacked the Selinuntians in 409 
BCE, and the use of sexual violence by the Carthaginians as a means of terrorizing 
women and children, making it easier for them to be enslaved. Here, we see a 
discussion of the role of sexual violence in reality, rather than as a metaphor. 
The Greeks serving as allies of the Carthaginians, as they contemplated the reversal in the lives 
of the hapless Selinuntians, felt pity at their lot. The women, deprived now of the pampered life 
they had enjoyed, spent the nights in the very midst of the enemies’ lasciviousness, enduring 
terrible indignities, and some were obliged to see their daughters of marriageable age suffering 
treatment improper for their years. For the savagery of the barbarians spared neither free-born 
youths nor maidens, but exposed these unfortunates to dreadful disasters. Consequently, as the 
women reflected upon the slavery that would be their lot in Libya, as they saw themselves 
together with their children in a condition in which they possessed no legal rights and were 
subject to insolent treatment and thus compelled to obey masters, and as they noted that these 
masters used an unintelligible speech and had a bestial character, they mourned for their living 
children as dead, and receiving into their souls as a piercing wound each and every outrage 
committed against them, they became frantic with suffering and vehemently deplored their own 
fate; while as for their fathers and brothers who had died fighting for their country, them they 
counted blessed, since they had not witnessed any sight unworthy of their own valour.437 
Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολὴν οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες συμμαχοῦντες 
ἠλέουν τὴν τῶν ἀκληρούντων τύχην. αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἐστερημέναι τῆς συνήθους 
τρυφῆς1 ἐν πολεμίων ὕβρει διενυκτέρευον, ὑπομένουσαι δεινὰς ταλαιπωρίας· ὧν ἔνιαι 
θυγατέρας ἐπιγάμους ὁρᾶν ἠναγκάζοντο πασχούσας οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς ἡλικίας. ἡ γὰρ 
βαρβάρων ὠμότης οὔτε παίδων ἐλευθέρων οὔτε παρθένων φειδομένη δεινὰς τοῖς 
ἠτυχηκόσι παρίστα συμφοράς. διόπερ αἱ γυναῖκες ἀναλογιζόμεναι μὲν τὴν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ 
μέλλουσαν αὑταῖς ἔσεσθαι δουλείαν, θεωροῦσαι δ᾿ αὑτὰς ἅμα τοῖς τέκνοις ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ καὶ 
προπηλακισμῷ δεσποτῶν ἀναγκαζομένας ὑπακούειν, τούτους δ᾿ ὁρῶσαι ἀσύνετον μὲν 
τὴν φωνήν, θηριώδη δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντας, τὰ μὲν ζῶντα τῶν τέκνων ἐπένθουν, καὶ 
καθ᾿ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰς ταῦτα παρανομημάτων οἱονεὶ νυγμοὺς εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν 
λαμβάνουσαι περιπαθεῖς ἐγίνοντο καὶ πολλὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν τύχην κατωδύροντο· τοὺς δὲ 
πατέρας, ἔτι δὲ ἀδελφούς, οἳ διαγωνιζόμενοι περὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐτετελευτήκεισαν, 
ἐμακάριζον, οὐθὲν ἀνάξιον ἑωρακότας τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς. οἱ δὲ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν 
διαφυγόντες Σελινούντιοι, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες ἑξακόσιοι πρὸς τοῖς δισχιλίοις, 
διεσώθησαν εἰς Ἀκράγαντα καὶ πάντων ἔτυχον τῶν φιλανθρώπων. 
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Within Diodorus’ account, there is clearly an understanding of the role sexual violence 
played in warfare and enslavement and an attempt to empathise with the women in 
question, albeit in order to stress Carthaginian barbarity. The women, like victims of 
modern sex trafficking, are removed from their homes and placed entirely in the power 
of the Carthaginians. They and their children are subjected to sexual violence and 
understand through this treatment their position has drastically changed. Again, like 
victims of sex trafficking today, the women are unable to communicate with their 
captors which not only conveys their lack of agency but dehumanises them further in 
the eyes of their captors. The women lack control of their lives and their bodies which 
signifies that they are enslaved and their former status within their communities now 
holds no bearing. Through the treatment they experience, they are gradually degraded 
and become increasingly distressed as a result. Unlike modern sex trafficking victims, 
who become reliant upon their captors to protect their well-being, the women 
described by Diodorus wish for death as a release from slavery. 
However, as we shall see throughout in this chapter, there are issues with 
representation as Diodorus emphasises the brutality of the Carthaginians through their 
treatment of the women. Diodorus is sympathetic to the plight of the women because 
he is reflecting upon the folly of the Greeks in allying themselves with the 
Carthaginians and enabling (perhaps unintentionally) the Carthaginians to attack and 
enslave Greek women. Unlike some of the examples we shall discuss, the women are 
humanised, and this is telling of how Greco-Roman authors could use sexual violence 
as a means of emphasising supposed characteristics of a people or commander. As we 
shall see, sexual violence was usually presented as being a violent but necessary part of 
warfare. Writers could therefore choose to stress excessive sexual violence to denigrate 
or praise an individual or people, praise an individual for refraining from participating 
in excessive forms of such violence, or allude to sexual violence as a fact of war.  
The presentation of sexual violence therefore enabled writers to emphasise certain 
aspects of a commander or an army’s character or reflect political upheaval. As 
Whittaker and Arieti argue,438 sexual violence was politically charged and was used 
within Roman exempla, in such cases as the Sabine women, Lucretia and Verginia, as an 
indication of political unrest and change.439 Sexual transgression or behaviour was a 
way by which the Romans could denigrate an opponent, essentially acting as a form of 
effective slander. Given the concern within ancient sources for the sexual conduct of 
their leaders, it is unsurprising that the sexual misconduct of disliked individuals in 
politics and history could be used as a mark against their character. Similarly, given the 
importance of family within Roman society, the behaviour of their female relatives was 
also used as an indicator of character. A typical example of alleged sexual misconduct 
within elite Roman society pertains to Clodius and his sister, Clodia, who together 
 
438 Whittaker, 2004: 130, Arieti, 1997: 209-230. 
439 Arieti, 1997: 209-230. 
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faced accusations of cross-dressing, incest, and voyeurism.440 We have seen how sexual 
violence was endemic in Roman society, yet criticism of sexual transgression and 
violence was largely pragmatic, being based on circumstances and politicians’ desire to 
besmirch their opponents’ characters. Similarly, criticism of sexual violence against free 
persons was mercurial, and often hypocritical, given that it was expected in warfare 
and domestic slavery. Despite this hypocrisy within Roman culture and society, 
descriptions of sexual violence against captives could be utilised by authors and 
politicians as a means of indicating an individual’s character.  
In addition to showing how sexual violence could be used as a method of enslavement, 
Diodorus’ aforementioned account shows that sexual violence acted as a means by 
which a power change could be indicated. Sexual violence was also central to Roman 
mythology, with violence perpetrated against the Sabine Women acting as symbolic of 
political and constitutional change.441 Arieti argues that rape was an ‘action 
representative of Rome’, and this is significant as the expectation that conquest 
involved rape, as suggested by the case of the Sabine women, acts as an indication that 
there was an institutionalized element to sexual violence.442 In the case of captives, this 
was a form of transition from their free status to that of enslaved captive without a 
home or identity. 
The example of the Sabine Women demonstrates the careful construction of a narrative 
surrounding the issue of rape in martial affairs. In the case of the Sabine Women, they 
were taken against their will, as stressed by Livy’s use of the word rapio (snatch, grab, 
carry off, abduct).443 Given what follows in relation to representations of rape in an 
historical context, it is likely that rape was implicit in the taking of the Sabine 
Women.444 However, it is the way in which the act of sexual violence is transformed 
from being something unacceptable, as the early Romans had effectively violated the 
religious games which the Sabines and surrounding tribes had been invited to, into a 
necessary and ‘productive’ act. As Dougherty argues, the taking of the Sabine women 
can be viewed as a 'war crime', transformed into the ‘civilised act’ of marriage.445 Such 
an understanding allowed Greco-Roman writers to reference sexual violence but 
primarily use it to promote a secondary discussion, as we shall see later in this chapter. 
This is also important for representations of sexual violence, as it entirely depends 
upon the perspective of the narrator and their agenda, as we can see with Aeneas’ 
account of the fall of Troy in the Aeneid.446  
 
440 Cenerini, 2012: 99-111. As Cenerini argues, Clodia like Fulvia transgressed the conventional 
gender norms of the late Republican period, becoming politically active, and their sexuality was 
the focus of criticism for their contemporaries, cf. Cic. Cael. 13-14, 21-22. 
441 Arieti, 1997: 218-9, cf. Chaplin, 2010: 60-61. 
442 Arieti, 1997: 218-219. 
443 Livy 1.1.10. 
444 Livy’s telling of the rape, and it is widely understood to be just that, of the Sabine Women 
has been widely researched, cf. Bryson, 1986: 152-173, Brown, 1995: 291-319, Arieti, 1997: 209-
229, Dougherty, 1998: 267-84, Beard, 1999: 1-10. 
445 Dougherty, 1998: 268-9. 
446 Vir. Aen. 2.486-505. 
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3.4. Virgil’s Aeneid 
The concerns outlined above are seemingly present in one passage of the Aeneid, in 
which Aeneas details the sack of Troy.447 This example is timely, given that the Aeneid 
was written in the latter half of the 1st century BCE, and was a form of cultural 
promotion which was actively encouraged and supported by Augustus and his close 
circle, including by Virgil’s patron, Maecenas.448 As such, it is evident in this literary 
example that sexual violence could be used to promote a character, or a mythical or 
historical figure’s agenda. Aeneas is relaying the events to Dido, the Queen of 
Carthage, and it is appropriate for Aeneas to present himself as a sympathetic 
character given his ‘refugee’ status, whilst also explaining how he managed to escape 
suffering the same fate of his Trojan countrymen.449 In turn, there is a sense of 
justification for Rome’s Imperialist activities, particularly given reference to the 
colonisation of Troy’s enemies (Greek states) by Anchises in Book 6.450 As such, the 
narrator’s viewpoint is essential for understanding the Romans’ attitude towards and 
representations of sexual violence.  
But within, amid shrieks and woeful uproar, the house is in confusion, and at its heart the 
vaulted halls ring with women’s wails; the din strikes the golden stars. Then through the vast 
dwelling trembling matrons roam, clinging fast to the doors and imprinting kisses on them. On 
presses Pyrrhus with his father’s might; no bars, no warders even, can stay his course. The gate 
totters under the ram’s many blows and the doors, wrenched from their sockets, fall forward. 
Force finds a way; the Greeks, pouring in, burst a passage, slaughter the foremost, and fill the 
wide space with soldiery. Not with such fury, when a foaming river, bursting its barriers, has 
overflowed and with its torrent overwhelmed the resisting banks, does it rush furiously upon 
the fields in a mass and over all the plains sweep herds and folds. I myself saw on the threshold 
Neoptolemus, mad with slaughter, and both the sons of Atreus; I saw Hecuba and her hundred 
daughters-in-law, and amid the altars Priam, polluting with his blood the fires he himself had 
hallowed. The famous fifty chambers, the rich promise of offspring, the doors proud with the 
spoils of barbaric gold, fall low; where the fire fails, the Greeks hold sway.451 
At domus interior gemitu miseroque tumult 
miscetur, penitusque cavae plangoribus aedes 
femineis ululant; ferit aurea sidera clamor. 
tum pavidae tectis matres ingentibus errant 
amplexaeque tenent postis atque oscula figunt. 
instat vi patria Pyrrhus: nec claustra nec ipsi 
custodes sufferre valent; labat ariete crebro 
ianua et emoti procumbunt cardine postes. 
fit via vi; rumpunt aditus primosque trucidant 
immissi Danai et late loca milite complent. 
 
447 Vir. Aen. 2.486-505. 
448 Therefore, the poem is reflective of the time in which it was composed, cf. discussion of 
Parry’s ‘two-voices theory’ in Harrison, 1990: 5-6. 
449 Powell, 2011: 184-202. 
450 Vir. Aen. 6.836-2, cf. Reed, 2010: 68. 
451 Virg. Aen. 2.486-505. Translation by Fairclough, 1999 with minor amendments. 
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non sic, aggeribus ruptis cum spumeus amnis 
exiit oppositasque evicit gurgite moles, 
fertur in arva furens cumulo camposque per omnis 
cum stabulis armenta trahit. vidi ipse furentem 
caede Neoptolemum geminosque in limine Atrida 
vidi Hecubam centumque nurus Priamumque per aras 
sanguine foedantem quos ipse sacraverat ignis. 
quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum, 
barbarico postes auro spoliisque superbi 
procubuere; tenent Danai, qua deficit ignis. 
The extract is useful as it provides a literary example of expectations of conduct 
following the destruction of captured cities, which evoked traditions present in Roman 
history and in Greek epic poetry. Firstly, the execution of the elderly and infirm was 
commonplace during the siege of a city, as evident in Pyrrhus’ execution of Priam.452 
As Horsfall notes, Priam was a symbol of ‘Troy’s venerable majesty’,453 and should 
have been treated with respect, given that he was an esteemed leader who was 
attempting to fight Pyrrhus, thus defending his family. It is interesting that, in contrast 
to the fragments from the Epic cycle,454 Priam is dragged to the altar of Zeus by Pyrrhus 
at lines 549-550, rather than away from it with Priam in supplication at the altar, as also 
suggested in Greek vase paintings [Figures 6 and 7]. Thus, Priam is cast as a protector of 
his family and home, whilst Pyrrhus is an abuser of it who breaks religious norms by 
dragging Priam’s body to the altar through the blood of his son, Polites. The death of 
Polites is yet another example of how Pyrrhus killed the male defenders of the city 
before turning his attention to the women.455 Here, we should remember that Pyrrhus 
is the Trojans’ enemy, and the emphasis is placed on his misdeeds, a technique used by 
Virgil’s Aeneas to appeal to the sympathies of his audience, Dido. As such, this would 
suggest that, in the norms of war, the protectors and the elderly are dealt with first 
before attention is turned towards the women. Gaca has shown that in an historical 
context the elderly and male combatants were killed before the women and children 
were raped and subsequently enslaved.456   
Whittaker has outlined that gender is central to the description of the sack of Troy.457 
Whittaker’s comments are supported by Keith who argues that within epic poetry, a 
medium written by and intended to be consumed by men, a gender contrast is present 
throughout and was presumably one of the key ways by which virtus was established 
within elite culture.458 In the sack of Troy, Virgil makes a point of contrast between the 
attacking male Greeks, and the remaining Trojans within the city’s walls: the women 
 
452 Vir. Aen. 506-560. 
453 Horsfall, 2008: 371-2. 
454 Little Iliad, 25-6, Sack of llion, 2. 
455 Vir. Aen. 526-533. 
456 Askin, 2013: 19, cf. Hirschauer, 2014: 64-6 
457 Whittaker, 2009: 234-235. 
458 Keith, 2000: 19. For sexuality and heroism in the Aeneid, cf. Putnam, 1995: 27-49. 
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trapped within the domestic setting of the domus.459 Horsfall suggests that Virgil’s use 
of domus is ‘entirely appropriate’ for the palace setting.460 However, that regia (palace, 
court, residence),461 a word which would indicate the grandeur of the Trojan court, was 
not used is indicative of Virgil’s allusion to domus as the female domain, and to the 
centre of domestic, family life.462 As such it is evident that the Greeks’ attack is not 
merely on the male combatants, but on the whole Trojan population, through the 
attacks on women and children.  
Language with connotations of sex and violence is implicit throughout the description 
of the sack of Troy. Horsfall does not refer to the sexual connotations within this 
passage in the use of the battering ram.463 However, given that sex and military affairs 
were intertwined, which was reflected in the language the Romans used,464 it is likely 
that the use of such language implies sexual violence within Virgil’s retelling of the 
sack of Troy. As Whittaker outlines, militia can be used to refer to love-making or 
impotence, thus acting as a synonym for ‘sexual intercourse’ or genitalia.465 Much like 
the sexual associations of swords, the equipment used by the Romans to breach the 
walls of an enemy’s domus, the battering ram, may also have had sexual 
connotations.466 Further emphasis is placed on the breach of Troy’s gates, which is 
depicted as an act of rape perpetuated against the personification of the palace, with 
the women’s cries echoing literally and metaphorically around the halls of Troy.467 This 
is supported by Virgil’s immediate use of the river metaphor to describe the Greeks’ 
entry into the palace. Given that women’s bodies were described using terms 
associated with landscape and agriculture, and were used to personify lands or 
nations,468 it is likely that there was a further implication of sexual assault. The women, 
as the landscape, were ultimately overcome and possibly even ‘fertilised’ by the 
Greeks, depicted as the river. As we shall discuss shortly, this concept of fertilisation 
links closely with Card’s discussion of ‘genetic imperialism’, with the Greeks 
destroying the Trojan ‘race’ by impregnating Trojan women with illegitimate offspring. 
It also reinforces the idea that sexual assault in the Roman world primarily concerned 
penetrative sexual assault.   
Virgil used language of a sexual nature in his description of the assault on Priam’s 
palace to ‘hint at sexual assault while writing of warfare’.469 He may also have 
inadvertently acknowledged one goal of martial rape which was to prevent the 
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conquered peoples from continuing their familial line. Virgil may have alluded to this 
aspect of sexual violence in warfare in the following lines: 
The famous fifty chambers, the rich promise of offspring, the doors proud with the spoils of 
barbaric gold, fall low; where the fire fails, the Greeks hold sway.470 
quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum, 
barbarico postes auro spoliisque superbi 
procubuere; tenent Danai, qua deficit ignis. 
Here, Virgil may be suggesting that ‘the rich promise of offspring’ is dashed by the 
Greeks as,471 through their use of sexual violence, they ensured that the Trojans could 
not produce legitimate offspring.472 This would certainly accord with Card’s research 
on the reproductive aspect of rape,473 but also links closely with the symbolic nature of 
sexual violence, in that by violating the women, the future of the Trojan people was 
destroyed because the women carried the future of society, both literally and 
metaphorically.474 Virgil’s readers would have been aware of the fate of Troy’s 
legitimate heir and many of the women of Troy, including Hector’s wife, Andromache. 
Astyanax, Hector and Andromache’s son, Troy’s legitimate heir, was thrown from the 
walls of Troy [Figures 6 and 7]. The walls, which acted as the symbolic and literal 
protector of the Trojan people, became the weapon by which the Greeks destroy the 
symbol of Troy’s future. As for Andromache, much like other members of her family 
including Cassandra and Hecuba, she was taken captive and subjected to sexual 
assault, resulting in her bearing Pyrrhus’ son, Molossus.475 Virgil conveys this aspect of 
mythical warfare in the Aeneid Book 3, when Andromache details her life following the 
fall of Troy. In short: Andromache had been taken captive by Pyrrhus, Achilles’ son, 
and was impregnated before being handed over to a male Trojan captive, Helenus, 
whom she lived with in Epirus when Aeneas encounters her. Andromache’s situation 
is indicative of the position of women following their capture. Virgil’s Aeneas uses the 
word conubia, meaning marriage or wedlock,476 to suggest a form of marriage between 
Andromache and Pyrrhus, yet Andromache’s reply is telling of her status. 
Andromache is not a wife, but a ‘captive’ (captiva) forced to share Pyrrhus’ bed 
(cubile).477 Furthermore, even when she is placed under the protection of Helenus, a 
Trojan, Andromache has little agency and has effectively been given to another captive, 
as indicated by Virgil’s use of the verb habeo (to have) in relation to Helenus’ 
possession of Andromache.  
 
470 Virg. Aen. 2.503-5. Translation by Fairclough, 1999. 
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472 Whittaker, 2009: 242. 
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474 Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 308-9. 
475 The child is unnamed in the Aeneid but is referenced briefly in the Odyssey, cf. Hom. Od. 
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In Roman thought, ‘sexual intercourse was a powerful, corruptive force that possessed 
the potential to damage an individual both physically and morally.’478 Such an 
implication initially appears problematic for the Romans, given that they claimed 
descent from the Trojans. This is interesting in the case of Andromache who continues 
to be treated with respect by Aeneas and Helenus, becoming queen of new Greek cities 
in Albania. Despite Andromache’s reduction in status whilst a captive, she continued 
to be held in high regard. Significantly, Virgil refers to her as the ‘wife’ of Pyrrhus, 
when she was his captive, and that she later married ‘a husband of her own race’.  
Helenus, is reigning over Greek cities, having won the wife and kingdom of Pyrrhus, son of 
Achilles, and that Andromache has again passed to a husband of her own race.479 
Helenum Graias regnare per urbes, 
coniugio Aeacidae Pyrrhi sceptrisque potitum, 
et patrio Andromachen iterum cessisse marito. 
In this respect, Andromache’s status was raised by the suggestion that her marriage to 
Pyrrhus was semi-legitimate, although she makes it clear that she remained a captive 
before being given to another captive, Helenus. Her assault is not alluded to in detail, 
other than through a ‘union’ or ‘marriage’. This tells us not only that Virgil wanted to 
avoid the suggestion of sexual assault in direct relation to Andromache, as it would 
sully her reputation for his readers, but that it was unnecessary for sexual violence to 
be outlined as, if readers chose to read more closely, it was implicit in the language 
outlined in Andromache’s description of her captivity. The Romans could clearly hold 
contrasting attitudes to women who were subjected to and survived sexual violence; as 
degrading as sexual violence was to women and their extended family and society 
(particularly menfolk), women could continue to be respected, depending upon who 
was telling the tale of the assault and their agenda. This is not dissimilar to how the 
treatment of Marcus Regulus or the characters in Plautus’ Captivi were portrayed; they 
could continue to exhibit noble, ‘Roman’ qualities whilst still captive.  
However, such presentation depended largely on the woman in question, how she was 
presented by ancient authors and the context in which she was attacked. In the case of 
Andromache, it was more important for Virgil to create sympathy for her character, 
given Helenus’ usefulness to Virgil’s hero Aeneas, than to denigrate her for having 
been assaulted and enslaved by the Greeks Virgil had been careful to categorise as 
barbaric. As we have seen with the case of Diodorus Siculus and will continue to look 
at in more detail, sexual violence was only explicitly referenced when the author 
wanted to identify the barbarity of an enemy. Aeneas and Helenus, as Andromache’s 
kinsmen, are unlikely to criticise her for being attacked when the attack was an 
extension of their defeat. The emphasis on sexual violence as evidence of enemy 
barbarity is the case in literature and, as we shall see later, descriptions of sexual 
violence in historical conflict.  
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Furthermore, Virgil’s Andromache does not mention her illegitimate child Molossus 
which further suggests a desire for Virgil to downplay the long-term effects of the 
sexual violence the Trojan women were subjected to. Andromache was not a direct 
ancestor of the Romans, given her position in city states in Albania, many miles away 
from where Aeneas finally settled. Virgil could therefore discuss Andromache’s assault 
and impregnation without suggesting that the Romans were descended from the 
illegitimate children of Trojan women and Greek rapists. This may explain why Roman 
tradition held that the surviving Trojan women were left at Eryx in Sicily,480 so Virgil’s 
description of the fall of Troy in Book 2 is used to highlight the savagery of the Greeks 
in their excessive cruelty, rather than imply that the Romans’ ancestors were 
illegitimate.481 The removal of the Trojan women (and any potential illegitimate 
offspring) from the narrative enables the Trojans to avoid any suggestion that their 
offspring, and the Romans’ ancestors, were the progenies of Greeks who had raped the 
Trojan women during the sack of Troy. Furthermore, the associations of illegitimacy 
are further underplayed by Virgil in Book 5, where he stresses the male ancestry in the 
funeral games.482 The concept of excessive cruelty is significant as it was often an 
indicator of barbarity, and as Sallust warns in his history of the Jugurthine War, the 
downfall of a nation often resulted from their excessive cruelty in victory.483 Here, the 
Trojans are cast as the victims of sexual assault, and the Greeks’ cruelty foreshadows 
their downfall at the hands of Troy’s heirs, the Romans. Virgil’s description of the fall 
of Troy in the Aeneid is one of the ways sexual violence was presented within Greco-
Roman writings. Indeed, it is the only possible way by which victims of sexual violence 
were presented, given that there is a reluctance within Greco-Roman writings to 
present respected Roman leaders as instigating violence of this kind. As a result, this 
was a way by which unpleasant characteristics of individuals or groups could be 
stressed for literary and political purposes.   
3.5. Scipio and New Carthage 
As we have established that the Romans carried out sexual violence in warfare, we 
should focus on idealised expectations of generals’ and soldiers’ conduct in relation to 
women and children in warfare. These examples were used by ancient authors to 
highlight certain characteristics of the generals in question. Such examples present the 
highly idealised expectations of the Roman elite, and need to be treated with 
scepticism given the promotional agenda evident within Greco-Roman literature. The 
following details an exemplum which is dated before the period in question, yet it 
provides useful background and evidence of the socio-political uses of representations 
of sexual violence. Our main source for this incident, which involves Scipio Africanus, 
is Polybius. Polybius was not without his own agenda, given that he was a treaty-
hostage who was taken to Rome in 167 BCE, and had close connections with the Scipio 
family, primarily Scipio Africanus’ grandson-by-adoption, Scipio Aemilianus. Polybius 
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women of the Latini after their victory in Book 12. 
482 Virg. Aen. 5.70-285. 
483 Sall. Iug. 42.4-5. 
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does not fail to acknowledge Rome’s violence,484 but this exemplum is significant as it 
demonstrates a careful consideration of the general’s representation. In this instance, 
Polybius used the treatment of captives as a means of highlighting characteristics of the 
Roman elite. 
Scipio Africanus captured New Carthage from the Carthaginians in 209 BCE. Upon 
discovering the Iberian hostages (ὅμηροι, homêroi) who had been taken by the 
Carthaginians, Scipio decided to release them as soon as their families could arrange 
emissaries to collect them.485 The hostages included women and children, and Scipio’s 
dealings with the women provide the basis for our understanding of the treatment 
captured women could expect during warfare.486 According to Polybius and Livy, 
Scipio was petitioned by an older female hostage who was acting as the younger 
women’s guardian, and it is implicit in her exchange with Scipio that she is concerned 
for the women’s welfare. Initially Scipio assumes that she is concerned for the women’s 
supplies, yet, in Polybius’ telling of the story, she clarifies her position by stating:  
“General, you do not take me rightly if you think that our present petition is about our 
stomachs.”487 
“Οὐκ ὀρθῶς” ἔφη “στρατηγέ, τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἐκδέχῃ λόγους, εἰ νομίζεις ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῆς 
γαστρὸς δεῖσθαί σου νῦν”. 
This clarification indicates that sexual violence was heavily implied by the speaker. 
Livy, writing a history of Rome centuries later, echoes Polybius’ description,488 but 
more explicitly refers to sexual violence, using the term iniuria (offense, abuse, sexual 
assault).489 Given Scipio’s promise to the guardian that he will ensure the women are 
protected, treating them as if they were relatives, it is evident that Polybius chose to 
represent Scipio as applying the Romans’ laws to their allies, with Scipio taking on the 
role of κύριος (kyrios), the head of the metaphorical household. In turn, this presented 
him as being moderate and loyal, qualities which were presumably those Polybius’ 
patrons wished to be associated with. The identity of the women is significant as they 
were not enemies of Rome, being members of allied Iberian tribes, but they were also 
not Roman and so were not protected by Roman law. As such, they were hostages 
taken by the Carthaginians, Rome’s enemy, who were themselves captured following 
Rome’s siege of New Carthage. Despite their status as hostages, they appear to be 
threatened by the prospect of sexual violence, which implies that they were effectively 
under the Romans’ jurisdiction and therefore subject to whatever treatment they 
deemed fit. 
 
484 Groves, 2017: 1-13. 
485 Polyb. 10.18, Livy 26.49.12-.16 
486 This example is further discussed in the chapter on hostages, cf. pp. 134-135. 
487 Polyb. 10.18.11-12. Adapted from the translation by Paton, 2011. 
488 Livy 26.49.12-.14. 
489 OLD, 914: iniuria. 
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As we shall see later in this thesis,490 hostages did not have the same status as captives. 
However, within the description of Scipio at New Carthage, there is another example 
which outlines how captive, rather than hostage, women could be considered as a form 
of booty in warfare. This echoes examples found in the Iliad, in which women are 
considered as a reward for successful soldiers, with the commanders being rewarded 
with noble female captives, i.e. Achilles with Briseis.491 Scipio, supposedly a renowned 
womanizer, was presented with a beautiful captive (αἰχμάλωτον, aikhmálōton) by some 
of his soldiers.492 Here, it appears that the woman is brought before Scipio as a gift, 
presumably to use as his personal enslaved attendant which, given the emphasis on 
the woman’s physical appearance,493 and her virginity,494 suggests that this ‘present’ 
would be for sexual purposes. This also contradicts claims that sexual violence in 
warfare is solely opportunistic.  
In this instance, the involvement of multiple individuals in perpetrating an act of 
sexual violence links to the gang-rape phenomenon observed in recent conflict. 
Granted, the young woman does not appear to have been gang-raped, but the 
involvement of multiple individuals in perpetrating sexual violence is important and 
addresses similar issues, including male dominance and systemic sexual violence in 
war. As Alison argues, ‘gang-rape performs a bonding function for groups of men and 
that it accounts for a high proportion of wartime sexual violence.’495 Gang-rapes are 
used to bond, and ‘cement a sense of loyalty’ which rests upon an awareness of shared 
responsibility for the act.496 In this case, the fact that the men thought it appropriate to 
offer the woman to Scipio suggests that sexual violence was acceptable and that the 
practice was widespread across all hierarchical levels of the Roman army. 
Furthermore, a clear sense of hierarchy and respect for their superiors is conveyed with 
the men preserving the ‘best’ prizes for their commanders, recognising that sexual 
violence was practised by all levels of the army. 
There may also have been a performative element to the soldiers bringing the woman 
to Scipio. As Goldstein outlines in relation to sexual violence in recent conflict, sexual 
violence may act as a means by which soldiers can demonstrate their ‘masculinity’ to 
their superiors.497 Masculinity in the Roman world was determined by the body, 
primarily how the body was presented in contract to the feminine,498 and how one’s 
bodily autonomy was preserved. 499 Essentially masculinity rested on the ability to 
protect one’s body from invasive, penetrative assaults,500 thus dominating the feminine 
 
490 Cf. pp. 130-134. 
491 Vikman, 2005: 25.  
492 Polyb. 10.19, cf. Plut. Mor. Quaest. Rom. 196b. 
493 The woman is described as εὐπρεπής (‘well-looking’, according to the LSJ) in Plut. Mor. 
Quaest. Rom. 196b. Dio also relates the story, cf. Dio 16 = Zonaras 9.8.42-43. 
494 Polybius stresses that she is παρθένος, which translates as chaste or virginal.  
495 Alison, 2007: 77. 
496 Alison, 2007: 77. 
497 Goldstein, 2001: 253-300. 
498 This could include physical appearance and clothing, cf. Olson, 2014: 82-205. 
499 Wilson, 2015: 50-52. 
500 Wilson, 2015: 50-52. 
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when the masculine body carried out invasive attacks on others. Therefore, by 
demonstrating their ability and willingness to enable Scipio to perform an invasive act 
against a woman, essentially supporting Scipio in emphasising his own masculinity, 
the young soldiers were stressing their difference from the feminine, thus also 
asserting their masculinity to their general. This is significant as masculinity, in a 
modern and ancient context, is associated with dominance. Goldstein’s argument 
therefore is applicable to the Roman world in that by facilitating acts of sexual 
violence, the soldiers were engaging in a form of ‘militarized masculinity’. Therefore, 
as we shall see with Scipio’s subsequent rejection of the woman, the offer of the 
soldiers was performative in nature, and may indicate that sexual violence in warfare 
was, similarly to its use in cementing loyalty, used as a means of conveying societal 
concerns, including stressing the masculinity of its perpetrators. This performative 
aspect of masculinity is found in contexts outside of war, with Judith Butler arguing 
that gender is something which needs to be expressed rather than being something 
which is innate.501 Butler’s argument supports the idea that the soldiers were using 
their involvement in sexual violence to strengthen their perceived masculinity. 
To return to the story: Scipio rejected the offer of the ‘present’, primarily because he 
had to set an example as a general. Scipio announced that if he were a private citizen, 
he would not reject the offer, and this indicates that the sexual assault of captives, 
especially women, was acceptable in warfare, but that he had to set an example to his 
men as a moderate general. Polybius stresses that the Roman soldiers who brought the 
woman forward were ‘young’ (νεανίσκος, neānískos).502 Polybius may have intended 
to create a contrast between Scipio and his fellow soldiers, and there may be the 
implication here that their actions were the result of youthful inexperience. Therefore, 
Scipio’s rejection of the offer appears not to be grounded in his concern for the young 
woman or the perpetuation of sexual violence, but rather for his appearance as a 
respected statesman who does not succumb to physical pleasures. Scipio was therefore 
‘performing’ the role of a good statesman, capable of separating his personal desires 
from his public persona. This was a common trope in Greco-Roman literature, and 
Polybius may have been alluding to this, setting Scipio up as an example of a ‘self-
controlled’ general.503 Presenting a leader as being self-controlled, particularly in 
contrast to others, was a common trope in Polybius’ writing, with Eckstein arguing 
that Polybius considered ‘the role of the statesman lay in manipulating and restraining 
the emotions of the populace.’504 It is uncertain whether Scipio was so restrained, or 
indeed if the instance ever happened, but it is significant that Polybius outlines the 
example in detail and evidently wished to illuminate these characteristics. In turn, this 
shows that during the 2nd century BCE, commanders wanted to portray themselves 
and their ancestors, which in turn reflected on their family honour, as being moderate 
yet successful conquerors.  
 
501 For more on gender as performance, cf. Butler, 1988: 519-531. 
502 LSJ, 1164: νεανισκάριον. 
503 Antela-Bernárdez, 2008: 312. 
504 Eckstein, 1990: 197-198. 
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Furthermore, Scipio’s rejection of the young woman may reflect how, as we shall see in 
more detail in the chapter on slavery, captured peoples were categorised by their 
usefulness to Rome and the conquering general. In this instance, the young woman is 
returned to her family after Scipio promises that she has not been harmed.505 Unlike the 
female hostages, the Roman rape of whom is implied, the woman was of elite status 
and was useful in the community Scipio was trying to subjugate to Rome. i.e. the 
people of New Carthage and their neighbours. The hostages may have been elite in 
their own societies, but they were not immediately useful to Scipio, other than as a 
means of political performance. However, the woman was elite in the society of New 
Carthage and therefore useful as a means of conveying his honourable behaviour and 
in creating ties with the existing elite of New Carthage. The exchange of people as 
hostages or as freed captives was essential in creating new alliances between the 
Romans and those they had conquered, and ensuring continued Roman authority in an 
area, as we shall see in greater detail in the chapter on hostages.506 
Polybius stresses that the reasons for Scipio’s decision to protect the girl are a result of 
Scipio’s honourable nature.507 However, Livy and Dio’s accounts, whilst clearly based 
on Polybius’, are more elaborate and present Scipio as using the encounter to win 
favour with the elites of New Carthage. Livy’s retelling closely follows Polybius’ but 
embellishes heavily on certain points, including creating a speech for Scipio about this 
encounter.  
Your betrothed has been in my camp with the same regard for modesty as in the house of your 
parents-in-law, her own parents. She has been kept for you, so that she could be given you as a 
gift, unharmed and worthy of you and of me. This is the only price that I stipulate in return for 
that gift: be a friend to the Roman people, and if you believe me to be a good man, such as these 
tribes formerly came to know in my father and uncle, be assured that in the Roman state there 
are many like us, and that no people in the world can be named to-day which you would be less 
desirous of having as an enemy to you and yours, or more desirous of having as a friend.” The 
young man, overcome by embarrassment and at the same time by joy, holding Scipio’s right 
hand, called upon all the gods to compensate him on his own behalf, since he was far from 
having sufficient means to do so in accordance with his own feeling and with what the general 
had done for him.508   
Fuit sponsa tua apud me eadem qua apud soceros tuos parentisque suos verecundia; 
servata tibi est, ut inviolatum et dignum me teque dari tibi donum posset. Hanc 
mercedem unam pro eo munere paciscor: amicus populo Romano sis et, si me virum 
bonum credis esse, qualis patrem patruumque meum iam ante hae gentes norant, scias 
multos nostri similes in civitate Romana esse, nec ullum in terris hodie populum dici 
posse quem minus tibi hostem tuisque esse velis aut amicum malis.” Cum adulescens 
simul pudore et gaudio perfusus, dextram Scipionis tenens, deos omnis invocaret ad 
 
505 Polyb. 10.19, cf. Plut. Mor. Quaest. Rom. 196b, Livy 26.50.1-14. 
506 Cf. pp. 142-171. 
507 Polyb. 10.19. 
508 Livy 26.50.1-14. Translated by Moore, 1943. 
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gratiam illi pro se referendam, quoniam sibi nequaquam satis facultatis pro suo animo 
atque illius erga se merito esset, 
Livy’s writing would suggest that it was more acceptable to stress the political gain 
which could be made from a situation which was symbolically about the family and 
legitimacy. Similarly, the encounter gives more character to Scipio who is presented as 
being clement with his enemies in order to create alliances. As we shall see in the 
chapter on hostages, by the time Livy was writing, imagery associated with creating 
alliances, albeit with allies presented in positions of subjugation, was commonplace in 
iconography and was, therefore, something to be celebrated.509 The threat of sexual 
violence over women, particularly elite women, could be used to the advantage of the 
Romans in creating alliances. 
In the case of Scipio, who was regarded as one of Rome’s greatest heroes, we see that 
sexual violence in warfare was not only perpetrated by the Romans but considered 
socially acceptable in the context of war. Today, as we have discussed previously, there 
is much debate about whether sexual violence in warfare is opportunistic or systemic. 
However, it has long been established that sexual violence is not perpetrated to satisfy 
the assailants’ sexual desires, and is therefore not entirely opportunistic but a systemic 
assertion of power, whether ordered by leaders or carried out by individuals within 
armies.510 The Romans clearly did not question that sexual violence against their 
enemies was acceptable, as shown in the case of Scipio’s exceptional rejection of the 
captive, and this shows that rape was institutionalized, and perpetrated in all levels of 
the Roman army.511 
3.6. Chiomara 
In the example of Scipio that we discussed earlier, the female young captive released 
by Scipio is evidence of how sexual violence, or rather refraining from it, could be used 
as a means of conveying a Roman leader’s self-restraint, respect, and willingness to 
create alliances. However, it is likely that the young captive’s treatment was the 
exception rather than the rule. Another example highlights how, like the hostages in 
New Carthage, women of status could be subjected to sexual violence. The exemplum of 
Chiomara, a survivor of sexual violence, is important in conveying how sexual violence 
was an accepted part of warfare, and how references to it were used to stress the 
character of the individuals involved.   
In 189 BCE, Rome was at war with the Galatian Gauls who lived in Asia Minor. 
Following the Galatian Gauls’ defeat, the Roman general Gnaeus Manlius Vulso took a 
number of enemy women captive.512 One of these women was Chiomara, the wife of 
Ortiagon, the leader of the Tectosagi. Chiomara and the other captive women were 
 
509 Cf. pp. 158-160, 164-166. 
510 Fogelman, 2012: 20: 'rape is not an aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual 
manifestation [of aggression]'. 
511 Other examples of sexual violence carried out at the orders of Roman commanders can be 
found at Livy 29.17.15-16, Tac. Hist. 4.14,  
512 Livy, 38.24, Plut, De mul. vir. 22, Polyb. 21.38, Val. Max. 6.1, ext 2. 
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given to the Roman soldiers, possibly as a reward for the soldiers’ performance during 
the course of the war. Chiomara was handed over to a centurion, and his high rank 
within the army may have meant that Chiomara was allocated to him as she was an 
elite woman in her own community. As we shall see in the chapter on enslavement, 
communities were separated and groups were categorised by the role they had played 
within society, e.g. if they were elite or workers. The fact that Chiomara was allocated 
to a centurion, as opposed to a rank and file soldier, suggests that a similar 
categorisation took place and, similarly to the female captives we find in the Iliad, elite 
captives were presented to high ranking soldiers as rewards.513 Virgins in particular 
were considered appropriate prizes for commanders, as we have seen with the 
example of Scipio.514 
The centurion proceeded to rape Chiomara. Chiomara’s family discovered that she was 
in captivity and arranged for Chiomara to be ransomed. At the exchange, Chiomara’s 
relatives killed the soldiers and Chiomara returned to her husband with the centurion’s 
severed head, which she presented to him. Her husband praised her for her fidelity 
and Polybius, Livy, Plutarch and Valerius Maximus all stress that she lived out the 
remainder of her life as an honourable woman. Like Lucretia, Chiomara used the 
evidence of violence, in the form of the rapist’s severed head, as a means of retaining 
her honour after being subjected to sexual violence. Unlike Lucretia, Chiomara’s 
relatives used violence against the rapist in order to restore Chiomara and their 
family’s honour, as opposed to Lucretia’s death by suicide which was designed to 
protect the reputation of her husband and wider family. Similarly to the example of 
Marcus Regulus and Andromache, Chiomara’s actions are held up as an example of 
Roman moral virtues. It is not pertinent in this thesis to discuss these virtues in detail 
as they are secondary to the discussion on what Chiomara’s example tells us in relation 
to captive-taking and the processes involved.  
In contrast to the example of Scipio at New Carthage, this example was designed to 
convey the poor behaviour of the army, with the centurion described as an ignorant, 
greedy man who lacked self-control. Ratti has suggested that the inclusion of this 
anecdote within histories, particularly that of Livy, was intended to convey the 
mismanagement of the Roman army by Vulso, and the Eastern influences on the army 
as they fought in the region. Ratti claims that it is too easy for historians to see 
Chiomara’s treatment as standard practice.515 This may be true if we are considering 
Chiomara’s case as a standalone incident. However, as I have shown, sexual violence 
following a nation’s defeat was commonplace in the Roman world, as it is in conflict 
today. Chiomara’s case may be exceptional in that she was of elite status and, whilst 
historians were clearly trying to convey the army’s excesses in contrast to her noble 
virtues, it is clear there were other factors at play in the subsequent representations of 
 
513 Polybius’ writings indicate that there was a categorisation of different forms of captives 
following the sack of a city, and highly prized women may have been kept, as in the Iliad, for 
the commanders during this ‘inventory’ period, cf. 110-118. 
514 Cf. Joseph. Vit. 414, Polyb. 10.19.3-7. 
515 Ratti, 1996: 101. 
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Chiomara’s assault. In turn, these representations can tell us about the practice and 
process of captive-taking in the Roman world. 
Chiomara’s case highlights a number of key issues. Firstly, as Chiomara had been 
given to the centurion, it is likely that sexual violence was understood to be a factor in 
slavery and that sexual violence could be used as a form of reward for soldiers’ good 
conduct in battle.516 Given Chiomara’s high status, it may have been assumed that the 
centurion could also acquire a large reward for her if she was sold into slavery or 
ransomed back to her family.517 This is an important point and one which is not 
discussed by Roman authors, presumably as it links too closely with direct 
involvement in slave-trading which was frowned upon in elite Roman society.518 The 
high status of Chiomara may also have made her more valuable on the slave market 
where, as we shall see in the chapter on enslavement, elite and well-educated captives 
were highly prized by the Roman elite. 
Secondly, her case shows that despite Chiomara’s high status, it was not unacceptable 
for her to be subjected to sexual assault. Ratti argues that Livy is keen to stress that the 
soldier is breaking the rules by sexual assaulting Chiomara,519 claiming that Chiomara 
should have had the right to refuse her captor’s advances,520 but in reality, Chiomara 
had no rights as a captive. This is another example of how the so-called ‘rules of war’, 
including those which dictated the management of captives, could be manipulated by 
ancient authors if they had an alternative agenda. Thirdly, we know that sexual 
violence is used to issue a final humiliation on a defeated people. As the wife of a 
leader, Chiomara’s sexual assault in particular may therefore have been intended to 
convey this, in addition to acting as a reward for the soldiers involved. Like Scipio at 
New Carthage, Chiomara is an exemplum and the narrative around her assault is more 
developed than other examples we find in histories. However, whilst historical 
examples are less explicit, they are alluded to and demonstrate the Romans’ use of 
sexual violence. The motivations for conducting sexual violence may have been 
presented differently, but the act itself was ultimately a means of subduing women, 
their wider society, and signifying complete defeat which enabled the Romans to exert 
their will over a people.  
3.7. Perusia 
We have seen Polybius using Scipio’s restraint in sexual matters as a means of 
flattering the Scipio family. The following examples concern instances during Roman 
Civil Wars: those of Sulla (88-80 BCE), and the unrest following Caesar’s assassination 
in 44 BCE. This Civil War context is significant as the victims of sexual violence were 
Roman citizens and, unlike foreign captives, should have been protected under Roman 
law. That they were not emphasises how generals, who were ultimately responsible for 
their troops’ behaviour, were presented as abusing not only the ‘rules of war’, but 
 
516 There are examples of this from siege warfare across history, cf. Mitchell, 2004: 10. 
517 As evident in the references to ransoming in Plautus’ Captivi, cf. pp. 8-11. 
518 Reference to slavery chapter – Vespasian. 
519 Ratti, 1996: 104-105. 
520 Livy, 38.24. 
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Roman laws. Essentially, references to sexual violence in Civil Wars are frequently 
found in relation to individuals whose memory was besmirched after their deaths. For 
instance, authors hostile to Sulla claimed that he allowed his troops to assault Roman 
women and children during his takeover of Rome.521 As we have seen in relation to his 
massacre of the Samnite warriors, this was yet another way by which the ancient 
authors could paint Sulla as a bloodthirsty tyrant. As such, the cases we encounter with 
relation to sexual violence mostly pertain to instances where authors wanted to present 
figures as being either noble, as we have seen in the case of Scipio Africanus, or 
deliberately neglectful or vindictive. Essentially, the latter shows that the Greco-Roman 
authors were concerned only when sexual violence was perpetrated against those who 
were Roman citizens. As such, sexual violence was not actively condoned by the 
Romans, but it was an unchallenged expectation which was used as an indicator of 
character or as a means of symbolising power and an enemy’s defeat. 
An account which contrasts with Scipio, and relates directly to the period in question, 
can be found in Cicero’s Philippics. Alongside Cremona,522 the description of the attack 
of Perusia is the most explicit allusion to sexual violence in war in Roman literature.523 
The Philippics were produced in 44-43 BCE and created with the sole aim of attacking 
Marcus Antonius. As such, the examples alluded to are likely to be highly exaggerated. 
In this example, Cicero turns his attentions from Antony’s behaviour to that of his 
brother, Lucius Antonius.524 Lucius, on his way to meet with his brother stationed in 
Gaul for his proconsulship, allowed his army to rape and pillage Perusia, an Italian city 
(now Perugia), before setting up a base there. Cicero does not criticise Lucius for losing 
control of his troops, but for giving them inappropriate victims to assault, including 
mothers, virgins and freeborn boys. Cicero’s use of the verb trado (hand over, deliver, 
bequeath) suggests that Lucius had been actively involved in his soldiers’ plunder and 
assault.525 Here, we see that Cicero’s concern is not with the fact that sexual assault is 
carried out, as implied by the fact that the women and children are non-combatants 
and are the most vulnerable to assault, but with the status of the victims themselves.526 
Cicero’s reference to the ‘freeborn’ (ingenui) boys is particularly telling of this concern, 
as sexual assault was acceptable if the victims were enslaved and not Roman citizens. 
In contrast to the Scipio example, both Perusia and Cremona were besieged, and their 
populations destroyed, during civil wars. As such, both Cicero and Tacitus are critical 
of the soldiers’ conduct, but primarily because they enacted sexual violence against 
Roman citizens in Italy.527 As a result, there is no question that sexual assault was an 
expected part of Roman warfare, but who it was perpetrated against was more 
significant than the act itself.  
 
521 Dio 33.109.10-17. 
522 Cf. 42-46, 111-113. 
523 Whittaker, 2004: 131-2. 
524 Cic. Phil. 3.12. 
525 Cic. Phil. 3.12. 
526 Nguyen, 2006: 76-112. 
527 Whittaker, 2004: 131-2. 
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From the siege of Perusia, we have material evidence which complements the literary 
sources and supports the fact that sexual violence was used as a form of taunting the 
enemy, especially within civil war contexts. Several lead slingshot bullets (glandes) 
have been found around Perusia, which are engraved with sexually explicit 
messages.528 The glandes can be dated to Octavian’s siege of the city in the winter of 41-
40 BCE, which ultimately forced Lucius Antonius and Fulvia to surrender. The 
messages, evidently written by the soldiers, were aimed at Octavian, Lucius and 
Fulvia, Marcus Antonius’ wife, and include threats of anal, vaginal and oral sexual 
assault [Figure 8]. Weaponry is generally viewed as sexual,529 and there is a strong 
suggestion that the slingshots were viewed as phallic implements which were used to 
breach a besieged city’s walls.530 Both sides participated in sending obscene messages 
using glandes, presumably responding to one side’s opening gambit. However, Hallett 
states that there are no other cases in which glandes were inscribed with sexually 
explicit language.531  
This may result from the rarity of Romans besieging Roman cities, or from Fulvia’s 
involvement in the conflict, as it was unusual for a woman to act as a commander, and 
she is frequently cast as a masculine figure, presumably acting as a ‘sexual 
transgressor’.532 As the conflict was between Romans, Fulvia is the outlying factor as a 
powerful female. Therefore, like Antonius’ future partner Cleopatra, Fulvia was an 
easy target for the Romans to attack when faced with troubling civil conflict. 
Nevertheless, the glandes speak to the close association between sexual violence and the 
Roman military as soldiers included such messages during civil conflict. That is, the 
soldiers deliberately used sexual references because they were sending messages 
aimed at their fellow Romans who would understand the shameful implications of 
sexual assault.  
3.8. Caesar’s Gallic Wars 
The aforementioned examples concern explicit references to sexual violence in conflict, 
usually during siege warfare, and they mostly relate to instances where the primary 
objective of the author was to stress the poor behaviour of an enemy. The following 
section will address examples of sexual violence in conflict where the references are 
less explicit and the motivations behind the assaults, in historical reality and in later 
representations, relate more closely to revenge, punishment, the use of such violence in 
the process of captive-taking, and imperialist expansion than it does to the character of 
those conducting the violence. The following sections concern sexual violence during 
the initial conquest or in later rebellions of areas on the edges of the Roman empire, 
 
528 Hallett, 1977: 151-171. 
529 Whittaker, 2004: 117. 
530 Hallett, 1977: 151-171. 
531 The word glandes has been translated as ‘bullets’, but it can also mean fruit of certain trees, 
e.g. acorn from the oak tree which has sexual connotations and links to fertility, cf. OLD, 765-6: 
glans. 
532 Hallett, 2015: 247-253. 
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primarily using evidence from Caesar’s Gallic Wars and Tacitus’ accounts of violence in 
the revolts in Britain in the 1st century CE.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Caesar’s commentaries on the Gallic Wars are 
an important source for us in that they are the only evidence we have of a general 
writing about an ongoing conflict in which he was actively involved.533 Caesar’s 
commentaries are therefore significant in conveying how sexual violence was used in 
conflict and contemporaneously reported. As we have seen throughout this chapter, 
sexual violence was only ever presented as being conducted by an enemy or someone 
the writer wished to denigrate. As a result, there are very few references in Caesar’s 
commentaries to sexual violence and such assaults are only ever implicit within 
Caesar’s works. I have only been able to find four examples from Caesar’s writings, all 
from the Gallic Wars, which speak to the use of sexual violence in conflict during the 1st 
century BCE.534 Despite the limited references, we know that sexual violence was 
utilised by the Romans, as the previous examples have outlined, but writers were 
careful when constructing narratives around sexual assaults. The carefulness with 
which such violence was represented is particularly evident in Caesar’s works, but the 
fact that it was alluded to at all speaks to its inclusion in Roman warfare, and its use as 
a weapon of war. 
As we shall see in more detail later in this chapter and in the following chapter on 
enslavement,535 there was clearly a concern amongst Rome’s enemies about the Roman 
army’s treatment of women and children should they be taken captive. In two 
instances, one concerning Germanic and the other Belgae tribes, the women and 
children are presented as those who will primarily suffer from enslavement. The 
Belgae hide the women and children in marshy areas which are harder to reach,536 
whilst the Germanic women plead with their menfolk marching to meet the Roman 
army, to protect them from slavery.537 As we know that sexual violence was not only a 
common experience for enslaved people in the ancient world, but was also a part of 
captive-taking, it is likely that the Germanic and Belgae tribes recognised that the 
women would be subjected to sexual violence should they be captured. Given the 
evidence we have considered throughout this chapter, it is clear that Caesar’s Roman 
audience would also have understood that captured female enemies could be subjected 
to sexual violence. Caesar was careful not to directly refer to sexual violence but if such 
violence was widely understood to be a part of enslavement and slavery, an explicit 
discussion was not necessary. This also enabled Caesar to distance himself from sexual 
violence which was, as we have seen, always presented as being perpetrated by those 
Greco-Roman authors wished to denigrate. 
 
533 Cf. pp. 29-31. 
534 As we shall see, these are the attacks on the Belgae tribes (Caes. BGall. 2.16), the Germanic 
tribes (Caes. BGall 1.51) Eburones (Caes. BGall. 6.34) and the Aduatuci (Caes. BGall. 2.33). 
535 Cf. pp. 106-113. 
536 Caes. BGall. 2.16. 
537 Caes. BGall. 1.51, cf. pp. 108-110. 
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An often-overlooked example of sexual violence connected primarily to revenge can be 
found in Caesar’s Gallic Wars, in which it is implicit that Caesar used massacre and 
sexual assault as a form of revenge, as evident in his decision to destroy the Eburones 
in 53 BCE. The previous year, the Eburones had massacred Caesar’s lieutenants 
Sabinius and Cotta,538 whilst they and their troops were stationed in the Eburones’ 
territory. It is clear from Caesar’s account that his troops wanted to move against the 
tribe in revenge, yet Caesar claims to have checked their anger by focussing on the 
practical aspects of attacking the Eburones in unknown territory. Instead, Caesar 
ordered his Gallic and Germanic allies to ‘destroy the stock and name of the tribe in 
requital for its horrid crime’, claiming that native tribes would be better equipped with 
the knowledge of the land to make an attack.539 Thus, Caesar was able to present 
himself as a highly competent and tactical commander. 
Considering these particular difficulties, all precaution that carefulness could take was taken; 
and Caesar preferred to forgo some chance of doing harm, although the spirit of every man was 
burning for vengeance, rather than to do harm with some damage to the troops. He sent 
messengers round to the neighbouring states and invited them all, in the hope of booty, to join 
him in pillaging the Eburones, so that he might hazard the lives of the Gauls among the woods 
rather than the soldiers of the legions, and at the same time, by surrounding it with a large host, 
destroy the stock and name of the tribe in requital for its horrid crime.540 
Vt in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut 
potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum 
ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. Dimittit ad finitimas 
civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut 
potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna 
multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur. Magnus 
undique numerus celeriter convenit. 
Sexual violence is implicit within Caesar’s description of the events. The use of the 
term praeda (booty taken in war, loot, plunder),541 of which women and children were a 
part,542 suggests that rewards in the form of captives were a key motivation for the 
allies in carrying out Caesar’s orders. The emphasis on the term praeda enabled Caesar 
to motivate his allies, but also depict them as being driven by a need for material 
possessions, a characteristic which was criticised by Caesar’s contemporaries, as we 
have seen in the section on military control. In this instance, the Eburones were 
scattered throughout the land and had few possessions, which indicates that their 
belongings were of little financial value to the attackers. It is therefore likely that the 
women and children were a part of this promised praeda. Caesar also uses the term 
 
538 Cf. pp. 45-49, 98-98. 
539 Caes. BGall. 6.34. 
540 Caes. BGall. 6.34. Translation by Edwards, 1917. 
541 OLD, 1427: praeda. 
542 Cf. Plaut. Capt. 33-4, 116, Caes. BGall. 7.89-90, Cic. Att. 4.16.7, Livy 22.56.3, 23.37.10-13, 
24.16.3-7, 30.9.10-12, 32.26.6. For scholarship on the issues, cf. Shatzman, 1972: 177-205, Antela-
Bernárdez, 2008: 315-7. 
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diripio (to tear apart, plunder, seize),543 which Ziolkowski has shown implies massacre 
and sexual violence in the context of a besieged city.544  
Caesar’s promise of some form of reward for the attackers corresponds closely to the 
way by which some modern military leaders utilise sexual violence to reward their 
troops, as outlined by the United Nations.545 In addition, given that we know sexual 
violence is a means of ‘ethnic Imperialism’, it may be argued that Caesar ensured the 
destruction of the Eburone ‘race’ (stirps) by ordering his allies to kill the males, and to 
sexually assault the women before either capturing or killing them too.546 Here, we 
may be encountering conduct which can only be referred to as ‘genocide’, as Caesar 
intended to completely destroy the enemy race, and the attacks were carried out on his 
explicit orders. In more recent conflict, we find examples where sexual violence was 
closely connected to massacre and mass execution. In December 1937, Japanese troops 
raped and executed between 8 and 32% of the civilian women living in the Chinese city 
of Nanjing (alternatively spelt as Nanking). The systematic nature of the mass rape of a 
large number of Nanjing’s women was clearly intended as one final act of degradation 
before the women were killed which signalled the ultimate defeat of the city and its 
people. The atrocities that occurred at Nanjing also show how an event which initially 
impacted upon inhabitants in a small area, ultimately became a symbol of Japanese 
aggression in China during the first half of the twentieth century.547  
It is noteworthy that the sexual violence in question was committed not by the 
Romans, but by those who were allied with Rome, albeit at Caesar’s invitation. As 
Caesar relays that he ordered the allies to attack and may have recognised that sexual 
violence would be used, he was seemingly unconcerned for the possible damage to his 
reputation. However, more significant was that the final blow was dealt to the 
Eburones by Germanic tribes as they attempted to cross the Rhine.548 Caesar’s use of an 
allied tribe and one which was culturally similar to the Eburones links closely to the 
creation of ethnic and national divisions within a region. We have previously seen how 
the Gallic and Germanic tribes had close connections with each other and met to 
discuss their fight against the Romans. Caesar’s request for the Germanic tribes to 
make the attack was part of a divide and conquer strategy. Such a strategy is evident in 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), where sexual violence became more 
prevalent because of the divisions created along ethnic lines.549 
Furthermore, as the example from Diodorus Siculus earlier in this chapter would 
suggest, it was not uncommon for generals and later writers to present the use of 
sexual violence as being perpetrated by allied forces, rather than their own. The 
‘outsourcing’ of rape can be found throughout history, especially in relation to 
 
543 OLD, 548: diripio. 
544 Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91. 
545 United Nations, 2017: 6.  
546 Caes. BGall. 6.34. 
547 Yoshida, 2006: 5 
548 Caes. BGall. 6.35. 
549 Cf. Peres, 2011: 119-126. 
87 
 
mercenaries and colonial army units.550 For example, during the Spanish Civil War, the 
Nationalist general Queipo de Llano broadcast on the radio encouragement to 
Moroccan troops fighting for the Fascists to ‘show the ‘reds’, particularly their wives, 
what real masculinity meant.’551 Here, rape is implicit. Whilst sexual violence was 
carried out on a large scale by Franco’s forces, de Llano did not openly encourage the 
whole Fascist army to attack women, but rather the Moroccan troops. Thus, by not 
referring directly to sexual violence and by calling upon Moroccan rather than Spanish 
fighters to do the deed, de Llana was able to distance himself and the Nationalist side 
from sexual violence, at least whilst he was speaking in the public domain. The use of 
Moroccan troops to conduct sexual violence also enabled, as it had in other conflicts 
throughout history,552 to perpetuate the idea of the colonial ‘savagery’ which 
contrasted against the conduct of the main armies with whom the colonial troops were 
attached.553 In Caesar’s case, he could distance himself from sexual violence whilst 
stressing the barbarity of the Gallic and Germanic tribes which his Roman audience 
were also pre-disposed to believe.  
As we have seen, sexual violence was considered to be an unpleasant but necessary 
part of war for a variety of reasons. Therefore, it was in the best interests of those 
participating in warfare to distance themselves from conducting direct attacks of 
sexual violence. Subsequent histories, often written from the perspective of the victor, 
followed suit. Therefore, as we have seen throughout this chapter, it was common for 
military commanders and later writers to convey sexual violence as something done by 
either the opposing side of a war, or by allies who were not acting under their explicit 
orders. Caesar’s use of the allies in the case of the Eburones are an example of this 
conduct as it enabled Caesar to further distance himself and Roman troops from 
massacre and sexual violence, whilst implying that he had a strong network of loyal 
supporters in the region. In this case, we can see that the Romans did not want to 
admit their direct involvement in sexual violence, and that there were ways by which 
extremely violent acts could be justified. For Caesar, who wished to present himself as 
a competent military commander, it was essential to show that his troops were under 
control, and that the Gallic and Germanic tribes, despite being his allies, were barbaric. 
In turn, this factor may have enabled the justification of Roman expansion in the 
region. 
Furthermore, this incident acted as a form of ‘punishment’ and, as we have seen with 
massacre, this enabled Caesar to justify his use of excessive violence in warfare to the 
Roman people and senate. Such ‘punishment’ may have also enabled Caesar to caution 
 
550 Examples from the Middle Ages show that mercenaries were often associated with extreme 
conduct in warfare, including rape, as they were, as members of a different society, immune 
from punishment, cf. Janin, Carlson, 2014: 25, 31. 
551 Storm, Al Tuma, 2015: 3-4. 
552 For other examples of sexual violence carried out by colonial troops or mercenaries, cf.  
Mitchell, 2004, and Gerschovich, 2015: 82-85 whose work offers a comparable example of 
alleged atrocities carried out by Moroccan troops attached to the French army during the 
Second World War. 
553 Storm, Al Tuma, 2015: 3-4. 
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would-be enemies of Rome of the outcome should they rebel against Rome. The 
probable mass rape and execution of the Eburones would have acted as a warning to 
non-allied tribes, who may have been informed by rumour. Furthermore, the incident 
may have acted as a warning for the allied tribes who had carried out Caesar’s orders 
as they would have witnessed the consequences first-hand and this would have 
encouraged them to remain loyal to Rome. Once again this shows a reluctance on the 
part of the Roman elite to admit the use of sexual violence by Roman soldiers. 
However, Caesar was clearly complicit in the attack and this suggests an acceptance of 
sexual violence as a weapon in a wartime context. 
Granted, in this instance the attacks were carried out by Caesar’s allies. However, 
Caesar was aware that sexual assault could be committed during the takeover of a city 
by Roman soldiers. In 57 BCE, the besieged Aduatuci surrendered and allowed Caesar 
and his men entry into their city in north-western Gaul. Caesar claimed to have 
prevented sexual violence by ordering his men from the Aduatuci’s stronghold at 
nightfall, so that no iniuria, meaning offense, abuse, sexual assault,554 could be carried 
out against the Aduatuci.555 The word iniuria links to the Romans’ understanding of 
rape, as this was one of the ways by which sexual violence could be prosecuted under 
Roman law.556 Thus, Caesar’s audience would have understood that sexual violence 
was implicit in this description.  Shortly after, the Aduatuci betrayed Caesar by 
attempting an attack under the cover of darkness. Caesar ordered a revenge attack, and 
the city fell to his men. Given that Caesar had previously informed us that the troops 
had been kept from the town to avoid iniuria, we can only suppose that the surviving 
female inhabitants were subjected to sexual violence before being enslaved, a form of 
punishment which had an impact on the whole tribe.  
As sexual violence was implicit throughout the description of the Eburones’ massacre 
and in the Aduatuci’s fall, it is evident that it was part of the punishment. Sexual 
violence could be used as a form of discipline when perpetrated against enslaved 
people in a domestic setting,557 and had associations with beatings given that invasive 
punishments were thought to be appropriate for those of lower status as ‘social status 
was characterized on the basis of perceived bodily integrity and freedom’.558 
Punishment seemingly had different motivations than revenge, and may have been 
intended to discourage those who witnessed or heard reports of the sexual violence 
and massacre from rising up against Rome. Granted, we cannot know the cultural 
attitudes of the nations which the Romans defeated, but sexual assault is a violent 
action which is universally understood to be abhorrent. As a result, we cannot 
underestimate the Romans’ use of sexual violence as a symbolic act which stressed the 
subjugation, humiliation, and absolute defeat of an enemy nation.  
 
554 OLD, 914: iniuria. 
555 Caes. BGall. 2.33. 
556 Nguyen, 2006: 83-84. 
557 Catull. 56. 
558 Walters, 1997: 30, 39-41. 
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3.9. Tacitus’ Calgacus 
As we have seen in the examples from Caesar’s Gallic Wars, sexual violence was 
conducted to signify the ultimate defeat of a people. However, there are examples 
where we see sexual violence being conducted during the Roman occupation of a 
province and to further Rome’s control. In such cases, particularly those found in 
narratives concerning uprisings in Britain, Rome had occupied the regions for mere 
decades by the time the uprisings began but the catalyst for revolts was partly 
attributed to the Romans’ use of sexual violence.559 As Reeder has correctly pointed 
out, where soldiers were present in a region, sexual violence was prevalent and could 
continue after an initial conquest had concluded.560 The association with rebellion and 
sexual violence can be found in Greco-Roman accounts of uprisings, and it was a 
common trope for speeches by the leaders of rebellious provinces to highlight atrocities 
committed against women and children. As we shall see in the chapter on 
enslavement, women and children were often hidden in remote locations to make their 
capture, potential sexual assault, and subsequent enslavement more difficult for the 
Romans.561  
Within the speeches by Roman enemies, imagined entirely by Greco-Roman authors 
and with an alternative agenda, there are frequent references to sexual violence. In 
direct contrast to Caesar’s representation of sexual violence, Tacitus in particular 
alludes to such violence committed by Roman soldiers against British tribes in 
speeches found in his Annals and Agricola. The differing presentations between Caesar 
and Tacitus’ accounts of sexual violence can be attributed to the respective 
involvement of the authors in conducting such violence. Tacitus’ agenda, which we 
shall address shortly, enabled him to allude directly to sexual violence and the impact 
it had on the enemy population, whereas Caesar needed to distance himself from 
sexual violence for the reasons detailed in the above section. The examples of such 
violence are comparative in that they are carried out in northern Europe and during 
conquest or reconsolidation of a region. Therefore, whilst Caesar was unwilling to 
address sexual violence directly and Tacitus has other concerns, we can establish that 
such violence was commonplace but only referenced when it was pertinent for the 
author and their agenda.  
By using these speeches, Tacitus is able to reflect on the nature of empire and how to 
rule well. The character of Roman rule is a common theme throughout Tacitus’ work 
and, particularly in his Agricola, he is able to contrast the poor behaviour of some 
provincial administrators with the superior behaviour of others, including his father-
in-law, Agricola. Furthermore, by adding in these speeches, Tacitus was able to present 
Rome’s enemies as fighting for noble causes: their homes and families are being 
attacked, and they are being highly taxed by unpleasant and self-serving individuals 
abusing the power Rome has bestowed on them. In turn, those who defeat them, in the 
 
559 The Roman conquest of Britain began in earnest in 43 CE and was still ongoing at the time of 
Boudica’s revolt in 63/4 CE, as Agricola’s campaign in Caledonia attests to (80-83 CE). 
560 Reeder, 2017: 371-2. 
561 Tac. Agr. 27, cf. pp. 108-113. 
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following examples Suetonius Paulinus and Agricola,562 are presented as being even 
more impressive in contrast to these noble, proud people. They are also shown to be 
magnanimous in that they restore order in the provinces to what it should always have 
been without the abuses of Roman power by middlemen involved in provincial 
government. Tacitus also uses his writings to discuss contemporary politics in Rome 
with foreign leaders being utilised to indirectly critique the actions of senators who are 
under the command of the notoriously ‘bad’ Emperor Domitian.563 Furthermore, it is 
likely that the inclusion of a non-Roman perspective in the form of a speech was 
intended to create a sense of drama within an historical text. This is significant when 
one considers the emotive language and imagery Tacitus employed, particularly that 
associated with slavery and libertas. 
One of the speeches found in Agricola is spoken by Tacitus’ Calgacus, a British leader, 
shortly before the battle at Mons Graupius (an unknown location in modern-day 
Scotland) which took place in 83/4 CE. Agricola plans to complete the conquest of 
Britain, and Calgacus addresses his people and other British nations in an impassioned 
speech which stresses that they should remain free and fight in the face of Roman 
‘slavery’: 
To plunder, butcher, steal, these things they [the Romans] misname empire: they make a 
desolation and they call it peace. Children and kin are by the law of nature each man’s dearest 
possessions; they are swept away from us by conscription to be slaves in other lands: our wives 
and sisters, even when they escape a soldier’s lust, are debauched by self-styled friends and 
guests: our goods and chattels go for tribute; our lands and harvests in requisitions of grain; life 
and limb themselves are worn out in making roads through marsh and forest to the 
accompaniment of gibes and blows. Slaves born to slavery are sold once for all and are fed by 
their masters free of cost; but Britain pays a daily price for her own enslavement, and feeds the 
slavers; and as in the slave-gang the new-comer is a mockery even to his fellow-slaves, so in this 
world-wide, age-old slave-gang, we, the new hands, worth least, are marked out to be made 
away with: we have no lands or mines or harbours for the working of which we might be set 
aside.564 
auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, 
pacem appellant. Liberos cuique ac propinquos suos natura carissimos esse voluit: hi 
per dilectus alibi servituri auferuntur: coniuges sororesque etiam si hostilem libidinem 
effugerunt, nomine amicorum atque hospitum polluuntur. bona fortunaeque in 
tributum, ager atque annus in frumentum, corpora ipsa ac manus silvis ac paludibus 
emuniendis inter verbera ac contumelias conteruntur. nata servituti mancipia semel 
veneunt, atque ultro a dominis aluntur: Britannia servitutem suam cotidie emit, cotidie 
pascit. ac sicut in familia recentissimus quisque servorum etiam conservis ludibrio est, 
 
562 Scott suggests that Tacitus probably learned details of Boudica’s revolt from his father-in-law 
Agricola, and therefore paints a favourably prejudicial view of Paulinus, cf. Scott, 1967: 12-14. 
563 Lavan, 2013: 136-137, 144-6. 
564 Tac. Agr. 29-31. Translated by Hutton, Peterson, 1914. 
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sic in hoc orbis terrarum vetere famulatu novi nos et viles in excidium petimur; neque 
enim arva nobis aut metalla aut portus sunt, quibus exercendis reservemur. 
A key element in speeches like Calgacus’ is the metaphor of slavery. As Lavan 
discusses, there is a difference between actual enslavement and the use of such 
language to discuss of Roman occupation and its empire, although Tacitus frequently 
‘blurs the line’ between the two.565 Sexual violence was closely associated with 
enslavement given that, as we have seen with such violence in Rome’s domestic 
setting, enslaved people could be subjected to whatever treatment enslavers deemed 
fit. In Calgacus’ speech, a link is drawn between sexual violence and subsequent 
enslavement, with the women being treated like enslaved people by soldiers or Roman 
officials. It is noteworthy that in such speeches, the attacks on women and children are 
often listed alongside other offences, including the destruction and/or confiscation of 
property, and the enslavement of people in the provinces. Calgacus’ speech is the most 
explicit in describing women and children as their male relatives’ possessions and 
using attacks on family to discuss problems with Roman imperialism, of which sexual 
violence was just one issue. Calgacus’ speech emphasises Rome’s power and Roman 
control over the British tribes.  
Beyond these literary techniques and Tacitus’ agenda, such speeches provide further 
evidence that sexual violence was carried out by the Romans during warfare and 
occupation. Furthermore, even in times of relative peace, sexual violence was clearly a 
concern for those living in the provinces and could be used as a weapon of terror, 
primarily as a means of humiliating a people and exerting Roman dominion. The use 
of sexual violence during a power’s occupation of a region is not exclusive to Roman 
imperialism. Examples of sexual violence during British occupation and colonisation of 
Burma and India attest to the prevalence of such violence against the country’s 
inhabitants, and recruitment drives for colonial armies often stressed the sexual 
availability of native women.566 Women were, as we have seen throughout this chapter, 
considered akin to victor’s spoils and were therefore seen as available for sex 
(consensual or otherwise).  
3.10. Boudica’s Revolt 
A key example of sexual violence as a weapon of terror and as a catalyst for rebellion is 
found within the histories surrounding Boudica’s revolt.567 The story of Boudica’s 
revolt is well known to many, but I shall outline it briefly here.568 In 60/61 CE, 
Prasutagus, the King of the Iceni, died. In his will, he stipulated that his property be 
divided between his two daughters and the emperor Nero. According to Tacitus, this 
 
565 Lavan, 2013: 136-148. 
566 This was often part of the fetishization of the black body, cf. Lister, 2020: 75-76, but links 
closely to the element of sexual misconduct and lack of prosecution against occupying soldiers 
within colonial rule, cf. Pheng, 2004: 209, Sarkar, 2020: 177-200. 
567 Other examples include the Caledonian revolt (see the discussion of Calgacus’ speech above) 
and the Batavian revolt of 69-70 CE, cf. Tac. Hist. 4.14. 
568 Boudica’s rebellion is recorded by Tacitus and by Cassius Dio, cf. Tac. Ann. 14.31-7, Tac. Agr. 
16.1-2, Dio 62.1-12. 
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was done with the hopes that his kingdom would remain intact after his death, and as 
a means of protecting his daughters. However, his plan failed as his land was pillaged 
by Roman centurions and his household by people whom he had enslaved. 
Prasutagus’ wife Boudica was publicly whipped, a punishment usually reserved for 
enslaved people,569 and her two daughters were raped. In addition to the attacks on 
Boudica’s household, Tacitus claims that the Roman colonists settled at Camulodunum 
(modern-day Colchester) treated British people as though they were captives. Led by 
Boudica, the Iceni and a number of other British nations rebelled against Rome and 
focused their attacks on Roman veterans and their families. Camulodunum was 
attacked and destroyed, and Roman women sexually assaulted and subsequently 
murdered. The rebellion ended when the Roman governor Gaius Suetonius Paulinus, 
who had been campaigning in Mona (Anglesey), returned and defeated the rebels at 
the Battle of Watling Street. Boudica died either by suicide or by illness, and the 
rebellion was quashed.  
 
The revolt is recorded by Tacitus and Cassius Dio and details of sexual violence are 
included in both accounts, but they suppose that such violence was carried out by and 
against different groups. In Tacitus’ Annals, sexual violence is utilised as a weapon of 
terror by both the Romans and by the British rebels.  
 
The Icenian king Prasutagus, celebrated for his long prosperity, had named the emperor his heir, 
together with his two daughters; an act of deference which he thought would place his kingdom 
and household beyond the risk of injury. The result was contrary—so much so that his kingdom 
was pillaged by centurions, his household by slaves; as though they had been prizes of war. As a 
beginning, his wife Boudicca was subjected to the lash and his daughters violated: all the chief 
men of the Icenians were stripped of their family estates, and the relatives of the king were 
treated as slaves. 
 
Rex Icenorum Prasutagus, longa opulentia clarus, Caesarem heredem duasque filias 
scripserat, tali obsequio ratus regnumque et domum suam procul iniuria fore. Quod 
contra vertit, adeo ut regnum per centuriones, domus per servos velut capta 
vastarentur. Iam primum uxor eius Boudicca verberibus adfecta et filiae stupro 
violatae sunt: praecipui quique Icenorum, avitis bonis exuuntur, et propinqui regis 
inter mancipia habebantur. 
 
It is unclear in Tacitus’ writings if the attacks on Boudica and her daughters were 
carried out by the enslaved people living in Prasutagus’ household or by Romans.570 
However, as the subsequent revolt was against the Romans, it is likely that they were 
actively involved in sexual violence against the Iceni. This is also supported by Tacitus’ 
claims that Roman veterans in Camulodunum treated the British people ‘like captives’. 
Captivity is also referenced in Tacitus’ account of the attacks on Boudica and her 
family, thus suggesting, in addition to the language used (iniuria), that they were 
 
569 Cf. Lavan, 2013: 125, 149. 
570 Tac. Ann. 14.31. 
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subjected to sexual assault and were treated in a manner akin to enslaved people. 
Throughout this chapter, we have also established that sexual violence was prevalent 
in wars throughout Roman (and modern) history. A key element of sexual violence in 
conflict was the humiliation of a people after they were defeated, often with a view of 
enslaving them. In the case of Boudica, the attack on her family was immediately after 
her husband’s death and was clearly calculated to strip Boudica and her daughters of 
their autonomy and stress their lack of protection following the death of their male 
relative.  
 
The attack may have also been carried out as a final insult, as we have seen in examples 
of siege warfare, to the women’s dead male relative. Tacitus records that Prasutagus 
had created the will in order to protect his family from harm, and by attacking the 
daughters, the Romans were signifying that Prasutagus could no longer protect them. 
The act was intended to signify the humiliation of Prasutagus, even in death, through 
the attacks on his children. It also acted as a warning against hubris, with Rome having 
supreme power and the British client kings (and their families) essentially being under 
their ultimate control. We have also seen that genetic imperialism is a motivation for 
sexual violence. In the Roman world, the continuation of a legitimate line was of 
paramount importance which was why women’s bodies were policed so heavily. By 
attacking Prasutagus’ daughters, the Romans were signifying how Prasutagus’ line, 
thus his rule, was over with any offspring his daughters had, as a possible result of 
their rape, being illegitimate. The attack was therefore a symbol of and declaration of 
imperial annexation which served to indicate to the Iceni that Rome had taken control 
over the royal family who in turn acted as representatives and symbols of the Iceni 
state. 
 
Previous scholars have primarily considered the attacks on Boudica and her children 
through comparison to Roman exempla, and the historical realities of sexual violence in 
the rebellion and in warfare generally have been overlooked. As an exemplum, 
Boudica’s household was emblematic of wider Iceni society with her and daughters’ 
treatment acting as a powerful symbolic reminder of ‘the pointlessness of resisting 
Roman orders’ and their subordinate status during Roman occupation.571 The sexual 
assault of Boudica’s daughters certainly had a symbolic impact which would have 
been understood by the Romans and the British alike, particularly as the women, 
without the protection of their father or husband, were left vulnerable to attack. The 
Romans would have understood from Tacitus’ writings that the surviving male 
protectors had been removed from power and subjugated by the Romans as they were 
treated ‘like captives’. Therefore, the attack on Boudica and her daughters was used to 
signify Rome’s ultimate control over the region.  
 
In historical reality, the attacks construed a form of punishment for the Iceni’s attempt 
to defy Roman powers in the region. The attacks on Boudica’s daughters and on 
 
571 Steyn, 2019: 1-2. 
94 
 
Boudica herself were designed as attacks of terror. This would have been understood 
by Tacitus’ Roman audience and the Iceni alike, as the attack on noble women 
indicated that no member of the Iceni tribe was safe from harm if they continued to 
defy Roman rule. The punishment of the Iceni noblewoman also acted, as we have seen 
with Caesar, as a possible warning of the potential treatment of women and children 
which was clearly feared by those under threat of Roman rule, as evident in Calgacus’ 
speech. Furthermore, the attack also had a practical purpose in ensuring that Boudica 
and the Iceni, whom Boudica represented as their queen, felt utterly defeated by the 
Romans. Tacitus’ writings convey that the Romans’ actions in assaulting Boudica and 
her daughters were symbolic of Roman misrule in the region. The Romans’ actions 
backfired and became, in addition to other offences, the catalyst for rebellion. 
 
Roman offences may account for why Dio omits details of the attack on Boudica and 
her family. Writing in the 3rd century CE, Dio was a provincial governor who was 
heavily invested in the idea of Rome as a ‘world-wide polis’ run by an all-powerful 
emperor. He did not have Tacitus’ qualms with the political structure he was working 
within and was therefore highly critical of those who challenged imperial rule.572 
Instead, Dio’s focus is on the British mutilation of Roman women at Camulodunum. In 
Dio’s account, there is a sexual element to the mutilation, with his focus resting on the 
murdered women’s bodies. According to Dio, the British forces supposedly cut off the 
women’s breasts, sewed them to their mouths, and impaled their bodies on spikes.573 In 
Tacitus’ account, atrocities are committed by the British rebels, including implying 
sexual violence was used,574 but he does not explicitly discuss women’s treatment and 
states that the whole population was executed.575 Tacitus acknowledges that women 
and children bore the brunt of the attacks in both Camulodunum and Verulamium 
(modern-day St. Albans), another Roman town which was attacked by the British 
forces.576 This was partly because Suetonius Paulinus had recruited the able bodied 
men to fight. Both Tacitus and Dio convey that excessive cruelty took place in the 
British attacks, particularly as mass executions took place, but Dio’s account is far more 
detailed in the treatment the women and children were possibly subjected to. As we 
have seen, it was usual for the treatment of captives, including those who fell (however 
briefly) into Roman power during siege warfare, to be used as indicators of a 
commander, army or people’s character and references to British barbarity are no 
exception.577 
 
Tacitus was using the behaviour of the Romans and British tribes as a means of 
discussing Roman imperialism and contemporary politics. As a result, in contrast to 
 
572 De Blois, 1998: 267-281. 
573 Dio 62.7. 
574 Tacitus uses the term direpta to describe the sacking of a town which has associations with 
sexual assault, cf. Ziolkowski, 1993: 69-91. 
575 Tacitus records that mass executions included the gibbet, arson and the cross, cf. Tac. Ann. 
14.33. 
576 Tac. Ann. 14.33. 
577 Cf. pp. 31-33, 45-56. 
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Dio,578 Tacitus is able to present a more nuanced view of the rebellion and convey the 
concerns of Boudica and the rebelling tribes rather than exclusively focusing of British 
misconduct.579 Tacitus uses his description of Boudica heading into battle and her 
speech to her troops to convey that the sexual violence her daughters were subjected to 
was just one atrocity in a litter of abuses the Romans had carried out against the Iceni. 
In Boudica’s speech to her assembled army, she clearly conveys how vengeance was 
needed as a result of the Romans’ attack on her and the rape of her daughters.  
 
It was customary, she [Boudica] knew, with Britons to fight under female captaincy; but now 
she was avenging, not, as a queen of glorious ancestry, her ravished realm and power, but, as a 
woman of the people, her liberty lost, her body tortured by the lash, the tarnished honour of her 
daughters.580 
 
solitum quidem Britannis feminarum ductu bellare testabatur, sed tunc non ut tantis 
maioribus ortam regnum et opes, verum ut unam e vulgo libertatem amissam, 
confectum verberibus corpus, contrectatam filiarum pudicitiam ulcisci. 
  
Boudica’s speech is significant as, whilst there are clearly abuses concerning Roman 
officials, Boudica casts her rebellion as being motivated by the need to avenge (ulcisci) 
her daughters. The daughters, who accompany their mother into battle on her chariot, 
become living symbols of Britain itself. Like the region and its people, the daughters 
have been stripped of their autonomy and were, without their father’s protection, 
powerless against Roman rule. Boudica takes on a masculine role as the avenger of her 
daughters whose honour, in Roman culture, would typically be defended by their 
nearest male relative. On this note, Whittaker suggests that the masculine elements of 
Boudica’s speech highlight how ‘barbarity and sexual license’ existed beyond the 
frontiers, with women leaders used to ‘perpetuate the stereotyped image of barbarian 
disorder and danger, often tinged with overt sexual references.’581 However, the sexual 
violence present in the speeches of rebel leaders is not exclusively referenced by female 
commanders, as we have seen in the case of Calgacus. 
 
Gillespie describes the way Tacitus conveys the rebellion as ultimately driven by ‘a 
mother’s desire for revenge’ which was ‘a model of feminine virtues fighting against 
the lustful tyrant of Rome.’582 The sexual assault of women in Roman exempla, 
particularly that of Lucretia, was used to signify wider political and societal concerns 
whilst inherently being about the violation of a woman’s body. As Adler argues, the 
inclusion of reference to sexual assault as a catalyst for rebellion enabled Tacitus to 
‘present a justification for the rebellion somewhat akin to Rome’s expulsion of a 
 
578 Dio 62.7. 
579 It should also be noted that Tacitus’ account is extant, unlike Dio’s. On the problematic 
nature of Dio’s account of Boudica’s rebellion, particularly concerning the lack of geographical 
detail, cf. Overbeck, 1969: 129-145. 
580 Tac. Ann. 14.35.  
581 Whittaker, 2004: 120.  
582 Gillespie, 2015: 430. 
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‘foreign monarchy’’, as evident in the case of Lucretia.583 Like Calgacus’ speech, Tacitus 
was also using Boudica’s speech to reflect on elements of contemporary Roman rule he 
disapproved of, and how sexual violence could be a trigger for political change. 
Gillespie shows how Tacitus’ account of Boudica, particularly her speech to the army, 
highlights how Tacitus draws connections between Boudica and exemplary Roman 
women, whilst creating a contrast with the women in Nero’s Imperial household of 
whom Tacitus disapproved.584  
 
Scholarship has primarily looked to Boudica’s speech for Tacitus’ socio-political 
commentary on contemporary Roman politics. However, like Calgacus’ speech, we 
need to acknowledge that the figurative language used by these ‘characters’ is only 
successful because it has some basis in truth and historical reality. Sexual violence 
against women during war and conquest was used as a weapon of terror and 
humiliation, as we can see in the assault of Boudica’s household immediately after 
Prasutagus’ death. Beyond the impact it had on the individual, the assault of high-
status women was also intended to convey the power Rome had over Britain, and how 
Prasutagus’ desire to protect his female relatives could so easily be ignored following 
his death. If elite women were not safe from Roman attacks, then non-elite women 
were also at risk. The attack on Boudica and her daughters was clearly calculated to 
have a wider, symbolic impact which stressed the humiliation and ultimate defeat of a 
people. 
 
3.11. Sexual Violence in Art and Iconography 
We have seen how sexual violence was presented in literature, so we should now 
address the allusions to sexual violence in art and iconography. The Romans’ 
discomfort with sexual violence is evident in that such acts were implicit within 
literature. Like literature, Roman art celebrated the brutality of war, yet there appears 
to be a reluctance to explicitly show sexual assault. Granted, sexual violence is a subject 
which is not only problematic to depict, but it was behaviour which the Romans did 
not wish to emphasise or associate with their leaders, particularly if, as in the case of 
Cremona, sexual violence was perpetrated against Roman citizens. Another issue is 
that mortal women were not commonly displayed in Roman art or iconography prior 
to Augustus,585 particularly that which commemorated victory.586 It is possible to argue 
that women are not usually a part of conflict given the nature of Mediterranean 
warfare. However, we have seen from literary evidence that women were involved in 
war, although they were rarely discussed in detail. Relating to this is the fact that 
captives were considered to be akin to enslaved people. Enslaved people, particularly 
women, did not frequently appear in artistic depictions, given the Romans’ universal 
understanding that slavery was a fact of life, and that sexual violence against enslaved 
 
583 Adler, 2008: 181, cf. Lavan, 2013: 150-1. 
584 Gillespie, 2015: 418-420. 
585 Kampen, 1991: 218-9.  
586 From Augustus onwards, Roman women became more prominent figures in Imperial 
iconography, cf. Ramsby, Severy-Hoven, 2007: 43-71. 
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people was only a crime if it constituted ‘property damage’.587 This may account for the 
rarity of depictions of female captives as spoils of war on surviving Roman art, given 
that their capture, sexual assault and enslavement was an accepted part of Roman 
warfare.588 
However, representations of victory were more essential to Roman iconography than 
depictions of enslavement, which was understood to be one part of victory. As such, 
defeated male warriors are depicted more frequently than their female counterparts, 
who were certainly taken in the same, if not greater, numbers.589 Essentially, this 
demonstrated that the Romans had defeated ‘worthy enemies’ who had fought well in 
battle, but were ultimately overcome by the Romans’ superior strength and tactics. 
Furthermore, given that the defeat of male warriors ultimately resulted in the capture 
and ‘enslavement’ of women and children, it is likely that depicting males was an 
efficient way of signifying the defeat of an entire nation.  
As a result, there are few examples to consider, yet that they exist at all speaks to the 
prevalence and acceptance of sexual violence in Roman society. However, like literary 
sources, depictions of violence of this nature are implicit within art and iconography, 
and there are visual motifs which were used to signify rape. In Greek and Roman art, 
there were standard depictions of sexual violence, as evident in images of mythological 
rape.590 The most common examples of this can be found in Greek art, particularly vase 
paintings. Although these vases were created centuries before the 1st century BCE, 
Hölscher argues that the Romans adapted Greek artistic tropes,591 and De Souza has 
shown this was the case for Roman triumphal iconography which featured captives.592 
Therefore, it is possible to consider the influence of Greek depictions of sexual violence 
on Roman art and argue that the standardised tropes transcended the Greco-Roman 
‘cultural boundaries’. 
Sexual violence is implicit in Greek art with mythical scenes relating to warfare 
showing the victim in a state of undress,593 her hair unbound, turning her head away 
from the attacker.594 The attacker is usually shown either physically carrying the 
woman away, or else threatening her with a spear, which can be viewed as a phallic 
symbol.595 The victim is not usually completely naked,596 unless depicted in a wartime 
 
587 Seifert, 2011: 154. 
588 Uzzi, 2007: 62-3. 
589 De Souza, 2011: 31. 
590 Sourvinou-Inwood, 1991: 59-98. 
591 Hölscher, 2004: 1-4, cf. Zanker, 2010: 1-39. 
592 De Souza, 2011: 31-62. 
593 Lee, 2013: 188-9. 
594 Sourvinou-Inwood, 1991: 59-98. 
595 Sourvinou-Inwood, 1987: 131-153, Whittaker, 2004: 117. 
596 Stewart, 1997: 169. 
98 
 
context,597 but even in a non-martial setting, the attacker is often nude or semi-nude,598 
another way by which sexual violence is implied through art. In a wartime context, it is 
typical for the victim’s body to be facing the viewer, which gives the artist opportunity 
to show the victim’s breasts, essentially emphasising the vulnerability of the victim and 
how her body will be violated by her attacker. For instance, Figure 6 depicts scenes 
from the fall of Troy, and it is possible to see Cassandra, her hair unbound, and breasts 
exposed, being dragged away from her father by the Lesser Ajax who wields a spear. 
Her gaze is not directed at her attacker, but at her father who lies prostrate at the altar. 
The position of the victim’s head is significant as her gaze is averted from her attacker. 
This is evident in ‘pursuit scenes’ in which heroes, gods or non-divine males are 
depicted chasing after mortal women usually with often unwanted sexual intent,599 the 
woman always faces away from her attacker. As a result, an averted gaze is indicative 
of a reluctance to depict sexual assault within art and iconography. 
Depictions of mythological rape are often framed in such a way, and we can safely 
assume that sexual violence was represented as such in both wartime and, more rarely, 
domestic contexts. This would suggest that, much like literary representations of 
sexual violence, rape was a behaviour which was not only acceptable, if perpetrated 
against mythical or enslaved women, but one which could be used within art. There 
are several examples which depict women in similar styles to mythological 
representations of sexual violence found in Greek art. A frieze from the Basilica 
Aemilia in Rome, dating from circa 14 BCE,600 shows the Sabine Women being carried 
by their Roman captors [Figure 9]. Like the Greek vase paintings which depict mythical 
rape, the women’s heads are turned away from their captors, but their bodies are in 
their captors’ hands, a visual image which reflects the women’s literal and 
metaphorical situation. The Sabine Women are significant, as we have seen earlier in 
this chapter, as they became the first wives of Rome and were the supposed ancestors 
of Rome’s most prominent families. As such, it seems incongruous that the Roman elite 
would have wanted to depict their ancestors in a position which was considered as 
shameful. However, as we have seen in literary evidence, the rape was ‘neutralised’ 
and the women were transformed from foreign rape victims into the wives of Rome.  
The aforementioned examples are mythical or depict non-citizen women, and this is 
important not only as mortal women do not often appear in Roman art, but because it 
shows how the Romans were unwilling to depict, or discuss, sexual violence carried 
out against mortal women in warfare. That is not to suggest sexual violence in such a 
context was not depicted. The Gemma Augustea [Figure 3], a cameo probably dating 
from the latter years of Augustus’ reign,601 reveals how the Roman elite harnessed 
 
597 Stewart suggests that Cassandra is the only example of a naked individual in such a pursuit 
scene, although Amazonian women, also present in wartime contexts, are usually presented 
with their breasts bared, cf. Stewart, 1997: 169-170.  
598 Stewart, 1997: 169.  
599 Stewart, 1997: 166-9. 
600 Ramage, Ramage, 1991: 96. 
601 Hölscher, 2004: 41,  
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images found in Greek art to allude to sexual violence in warfare. The cameo, an 
engraved gem, appears to be a part of the Imperial family’s self-promotion, in that it 
may have been used and circulated within the Imperial court. It is also likely that 
engraved gems were created by the same artisans who carved the dies for coins.602 This 
may explain why much of the imagery evident on carved gems is similar to that found 
on coinage.603 There is some debate as to what extent the artisans had their own 
creative license. However, it is likely that the elite, who commissioned the coin dies 
and other forms of art, had a strong influence on the final design. As such, it is 
reasonable to assume that the cameo, like the coins we shall discuss shortly, were a 
part of political promotion.  
The Gemma Augustea perfectly incapsulates Roman Imperialism, and the image which 
the Imperial family wished to convey to those within their inner circle. The gem was 
designed as a means of flattering the Imperial family, and this is evident in the 
hierarchy the cameo presents. The conquerors and the conquered are shown 
separately, with the Imperial family depicted in the upper register, alongside the 
gods.604 In the lower register, the Roman soldiers are below the Imperial family, but 
remain above the foreign captives who are seated in positions of subjugation and 
defeat at the soldiers’ feet. The image which is most pertinent for this debate can be 
found on the lower right-hand side of the Gemma Augustea. Here, we can see a female 
form in a state of undress, being dragged by the hair by a Roman soldier. The hair 
pulling was a common motif in artwork,605 and the action enabled the artist to reflect 
the woman’s position in the hierarchy, as below her attacker. As with the Greek vase 
paintings and the Sabine Women frieze, the woman’s chest is exposed, and her face is 
turned away from the soldier. The most striking part of the image is the way in which 
the woman is clearly clutching at her clothes and is visibly distressed. Given the 
importance of clothing in the Greco-Roman world,606 the removal of the woman’s 
clothing diminishes her status as her material possessions are no longer present to 
indicate her social standing. 
The example found on the Gemma Augustea is tame in comparison to later depictions of 
sexual violence, including reliefs from the Sebasteion from Aphrodisias in Roman 
Asia-Minor (modern-day Turkey). Unlike the privately displayed Gemma Augustea, the 
reliefs were commissioned by the provincial elite in a Greek city. Smith suggests that, 
for the Julio-Claudian period, the reliefs from the Sebasteion are the ‘provincial 
counterparts’ of the ‘Imperial narrative’ at Rome.607 The original images from Rome 
have not survived, but Smith argues that literary evidence attests to the presence of 
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ethne images, created during the reign of Augustus.608 Furthermore, Aphrodisias owed 
its prosperity to its connection with the Julio-Claudian family, given its association 
with Aphrodite, the deity the family claimed as their divine ancestor.609 As such, it was 
in the wealthy population’s best interests to continue emphasising their connection to 
the Imperial family. This included emulating the art and iconography found in Rome, 
including images which are suggestive of sexual violence.  
One relief from the Sebasteion shows a naked, idealised Claudius standing over a 
female figure whose clothing has been displaced and one of her breasts revealed. The 
position of the woman’s head, pulled back by Claudius, demonstrates her absolute 
defeat, whilst also linking the scene with conflict scenes commonly found on Greek 
friezes.610 As Hölscher argues, the Greco-Romans displayed the defeated 
sympathetically, enabling the audience to feel pathos for the fallen,611 whilst 
recognising the superiority of the victor in comparison. Interestingly, the female figure 
has been identified as Britannia and her bare breast has been attributed to the 
sculptor’s modelling of the figure on the Amazons,612 figures who are often shown with 
breasts exposed but in full armour.613 However, Greek vase painters often depicted 
Amazons as being fully clothed with their breasts exposed, but in a state of composure, 
prepared for battle.614 Furthermore, given the depictions of sexual violence we have 
seen previously, it is likely that the figure in question was supposed to be 
representative of Claudius metaphorically penetrating and violating Britain, of whose 
land and people Britannia was symbolic [Figures 10 and 11]. As a result, whether 
Amazon or not, a sense of violent defeat, with the suggestion of sexual assault, is 
evident in this relief. Indeed, as Whittaker argues, the metaphor of ‘conquest by rape’ 
is evident within this depiction of sexual violence and is supported by the Romans’ 
understanding of invasion of foreign lands as a form of ‘penetration’.615  
Given that the Romans recognised that sexual violence and enslavement were a part of 
warfare, and warfare was discussed in gendered terms, it is likely that the figure of a 
foreign female in art was viewed as being representative of a typical female from a 
nation, thus acting as a symbol of the female population at large. However, whilst 
personifications are representative, they do not show a specific example of a captive. 
As such, the women we have encountered throughout this section remain as mythical 
or metaphorical entities, thus enabling the Roman audience to distance themselves 
from the realities of war. This contrasts with literary depictions of sexual violence 
which we have seen throughout this chapter. With the exception of Virgil, all the 
literary sources concern historical events and women who were in actuality affected by 
sexual violence. Artistic sources focus on metaphorical women which speaks to the 
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difficulties of presenting the realities of sexual violence within artistic elite self-
promotion. However, the images would only have been successful in conveying 
Roman dominion to the viewer if the implied sexual violence were not based on a 
universal understanding that such violence was omnipresent in Roman warfare and 
could be used as a weapon of war.  
3.12. Conclusion 
In conclusion, there can be little doubt that the Romans used sexual violence as a 
weapon of war, with many of the same motivations we find in rape in more recent 
conflict. The motivations for sexual violence could include humiliation, revenge, and a 
desire to ‘other’ the victims or survivors. Sexual violence had a long-term and 
widespread impact given that women could suffer physically and psychologically and 
have unwanted pregnancies. In addition, sexual violence was a calculated act which 
was used to damage women, their relatives and wider society, as, in the ancient 
world’s heavily patriarchal societies, the preservation of a woman’s body and chastity, 
and the legitimacy of children, were central to societal structures and culture. As men 
were traditionally viewed, in Greco-Roman and other ancient cultures, as being 
protectors and warriors, their inability to protect their female relatives from rape was 
used as an indication of their weakness and impotency in the face of Roman power. 
The destruction of society through sexual violence and genetic imperialism, and 
women’s lack of autonomy over their own bodies, resulted in (as it does today) women 
to be more easily enslaved and trafficked, as we shall see in greater detail in the 
chapter on enslavement.  
In terms of representation, whilst sexual violence was present in Roman warfare, it is 
never explicitly referred to by Greco-Roman authors as being conducted by Romans 
unless it serves an agenda. Rather, as we have seen in Caesar’s writings, it is inferred 
through the Romans’ use of language and shared understandings of conduct in 
warfare. The Romans utilised sexual violence as a weapon in war, and Greco-Roman 
authors recognised that rape and other forms of sexual assault were regularly 
employed. However, the authors were careful to select when sexual violence was 
implicated in relation to Roman culture at large, especially in connection to high-
profile figures within Roman political and military culture. As a result, authors 
primarily used sexual violence as a means of praising, should a figure abstain from 
such acts, or criticising figures, should violence be perpetrated against Roman citizens 
or their allies. Such careful literary representation contrasts with artistic 
representations which utilise sexual violence, implicit within the female figures’ state 
of undress, as a means of showing Roman dominion over all members and levels of an 
enemy society, in addition to the role of female figures acting as personifications of a 




Chapter Four – Enslavement 
4.1. Introduction 
Slavery was one of Roman society’s prominent social institutions, and there can be 
little doubt that captive-taking was a contributing factor to the Roman slave trade. 
Thousands of captives were enslaved during Rome’s campaigns,616 and Bradley has 
suggested that Roman expansion into the East and Gaul in the 1st century BCE caused 
the rapid acceleration of slavery across the empire and its allied territories.617 However, 
as we have seen throughout this thesis, the outcome of captive-taking was not always 
enslavement, but the Romans and the nations they encountered assumed it would be, 
or that a captive’s status was akin to that of a slave. An understanding of this concept 
is essential as it enables us to recognise the connections between massacre, sexual 
violence and enslavement. As we shall see, in warfare, slavery was only possible if a 
person’s status had been reduced through violent means, and such forceful treatment 
was only justifiable after the fact if a captive was considered to have the same status as 
an enslaved person.  
Patterson, whose research focusses on slavery in world history from antiquity to the 
present day, argues that slavery is a form of ‘social death’, and that its ‘three principal 
constituent elements’ are ‘violent compulsion, natal alienation and generalized 
dishonouring of slaves.’618 The significance of Patterson’s ‘social death’ argument and 
its constituent parts is that the Romans followed the same model in their enslavement 
of captives. In terms of ‘violent compulsion’, we have seen in previous chapters how 
captives were often taken by force, possibly after witnessing or surviving massacres 
and sexual assaults against members of their community. ‘Natal alienation’ is a term 
coined by Patterson, who uses it to describe the removal of captives from their native 
communities, language and landscapes. As Patterson’s assessment is based on world 
slavery, we should acknowledge the difference here between Roman slavery and the 
Transatlantic slavery of the 16th-19th centuries. Children taken by Romans were not 
usually separated from their mothers,619 unlike the practices of the Transatlantic slave 
trade.620 As such, in the Roman context, ‘natal alienation’ refers to the removal of 
captives from their familiar cultural surroundings. With regards to the third of 
Patterson’s terms, the ‘generalized dishonouring of slaves’, the Romans utilised 
massacre, sexual violence and the dehumanising language associated with 
enslavement to ensure the initial and continued humiliation of the captives from their 
capture to their enslavement. Much like massacre and sexual violence, the enslavement 
of enemy captives was an accepted part of war and the results of such actions, and 
their subsequent representations, were commonplace in Roman society. However, as 
we have seen with massacre and sexual violence, the Roman elite had to be careful 
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617 Bradley, 1994: 32, 2011: 241-265. 
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about how they represented their behaviour in connection to less wholesome activities 
in both war and peace.  
As we know, massacre and sexual violence were used within the historical reality, and 
subsequently represented by the Roman elite in literature and art to reinforce their 
various agendas. Massacre affects males and females, whilst sexual violence is mostly 
perpetrated against women and children of both sexes after their male ‘protectors’ 
have been executed. However, within warfare, men, women and children were 
enslaved by the Romans both in siege warfare and in smaller raids conducted through 
minor military excursions in occupied areas, and beyond the frontiers. This chapter 
concerns all those captured by the Romans, in any form of warfare, who were 
subsequently enslaved. However, we should acknowledge that the three types of 
treatment (massacre, sexual violence, and enslavement) are interlinked, and we cannot 
underestimate the emotional and physical toll capture could take on individuals. 
Scholarship on slavery tends to focus on the origin of enslaved people and attempts to 
reconstruct the numbers of enslaved people across the Roman empire.621 Despite such 
attempts, there are limits to the conclusions we can draw, primarily because there is 
little focus on the enslavement of captives within Greco-Roman writings. This is 
possibly because it was assumed knowledge that the most likely outcome of captivity 
in warfare was enslavement, and because slavery was so entrenched within Roman 
society that it did not need to be commented upon in any detail. As such, particulars 
concerning the demand and supply model, and what drove the Romans to develop the 
slave trade, cannot be established. Undoubtedly, there was a high demand for slaves, 
with Bradley estimating that between 65-30 BCE, 100,000 new enslaved people were 
needed in Italy alone, based on the numbers necessary to maintain industries, 
agriculture and domestic labour.622 Such a demand was met by enslaving large 
numbers of people, a feat which the Roman elite boasted of in relation to warfare.623 
However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to attempt to estimate the numbers of 
enslaved people who were directly acquired through warfare, or the other sources of 
enslaved people: piracy, reproduction, and child abandonment.624 There can be little 
doubt that warfare did contribute to the slave trade and that it was widely considered 
to be a ‘benefit’ of war from the perspective of the Roman elite. Furthermore, Bradley 
suggests that captive-taking in warfare was thought to be the principal way by which 
new enslaved people could be acquired, and captive-taking continued throughout the 
Empire’s so-called pax Romana.625 As a case in point, Bradley shows that in Augustan 
iconography, which we shall address later in this chapter, enslavement continued to be 
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a key feature.626 His research would suggest that captive-taking continued to be 
commonplace, that dominion over provinces and new territories was represented as 
enslavement, and, crucially, that enslaved people were assumed to be foreign captives 
taken in conflict, or ultimately descended from captives. As a result, Roman thought 
reflected realistic practices, specifically that many of the captives taken during foreign 
conflicts were enslaved following the defeat of their nation. Attitudes towards slavery 
are evident in the language used in relation to civil conflict. 
4.2. The Language of Slavery 
The language associated with captivity and slavery is indicative of how the Roman 
elite understood and represented their relationships with their enemies, in both foreign 
and civil war contexts. Within the historical context, there can be little doubt that 
captives were taken in vast numbers, but it was apparent that Greco-Roman writers 
also thought that enslaved people were more commonly taken following warfare, 
despite alternative means of acquiring enslaved people, as Fitzgerald outlines in 
Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination.627 This assumption is evident in Roman law, 
and the jurist Florentinus, writing in the 2nd century CE, claimed that generals have a 
custom of selling their prisoners and thereby preserving rather than killing them: and 
indeed, they are said to be manicipia,628 because they are captives in the hand (manus) of 
their enemies’.629  
In the same passage, Florentinus states that enslaved people were called servi because 
generals chose to preserve (servare) the captives taken during warfare, rather than, as 
we have seen in the chapter on massacre, execute their enemies en masse.630 Florentinus 
‘appealed to the etymology of the term to rationalize the institution [of slavery]’631, 
utilising terms which are not etymologically sound but indicate how the Romans 
thought of and justified enslavement resulting from foreign warfare. Such justification 
is important given that Florentinus also claimed that slavery was ‘unnatural’ in that 
‘someone is against nature made subject to the ownership of another.’632 In relation to 
this passage, Baumgold argues that ‘the point of emphasizing capture in war was to 
give slavery the coloration of a benefit.’633 Hence, as slavery was one key outcome of 
warfare, it was therefore beneficial for such people to be enslaved as it ensured the 
 
626 Bradley, 2015: 298-318, cf. Scheidel, 2011: 287-310. 
627 Fitzgerald, 2007: 89-90. 
628 There are etymological issues with manicipia, as mancipia is more commonly used. Cf. OLD, 
1070-1: mancipium, Baumgold, 2010: 415, Watson, 1987: 8. In his Etymological Lexicon, Maltby 
does not address the issues with Florentinus’ etymology, but rather suggests that it is merely a 
variant of mancipium, cf. Maltby, 1991: 363. The word mancipium is derived from manus (hand) 
and ceps (wholesaler, dealer), cf. OLD, 1070-1: mancipium. The use of the word mancipium in 
relation to enslaved people is evident at Caes. B Civ. 3.6.1, where Caesar consoles his soldiers, 
arriving at Brundisium from Rome, on the safety of their animo mancipia, referring to their 
enslaved attendants and domestic animals in Italy.  
629 Just. Dig. 1.5.4.2. 
630 Just. Dig. 1.5.4.2. 
631 Baumgold, 2010: 415. 
632 Just. Dig. 1.5.4.1, cf. Garnsey, 1996: 14. 
633 Baumgold, 2010: 415, cf. Garnsey, 1996: 48. 
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continuation of their lives, despite the treatment they could be subjected to. In addition 
to Florentinus, there are other examples which support the prevalence of warfare as 
being the main source of slavery in Roman thought.634 For instance, Watson argues that 
in the early Empire, former captives reproducing was the primary source of enslaved 
people,635 supporting the idea that warfare ceased during the pax Romana, which we 
know not to be the case. Overall, it appears that the origins of enslaved people were 
thought to have been captivity, regardless of whether they were the first or following 
generations of enslaved captives. 
Lavan has conducted a close analysis of the language used for literary, figurative or 
political purposes in Slaves to Rome,636 and he argues that slavery was central to the 
Roman understanding of power and their relationships with their enemies and allies 
alike.637 In a civil war context, it is possible to see how the Roman elite associated 
defeat in warfare with enslavement, which further indicates the social position of 
enslaved people within Roman society. In the following instances, the authors have 
used metaphorical references to enslavement deliberately to emphasise how civil 
conflict was abhorrent, with Romans ‘enslaving’ their fellow Romans, an act which was 
not legal within Roman law.638 For instance, the literary representations of Sulla’s 
Roman captives and wartime foreign captives are comparable, particularly in literature 
written in the decades following Sulla’s dictatorship, including in the fragmentary 
histories of Sallust.639 This is not only helpful in discussing expectations of captive-
taking in warfare, specifically that it was thought to result in enslavement, but it also 
highlights how captive-taking could be used as a means of illuminating 
representations of an historical figure, as we have also seen in relation to massacre and 
sexual violence.  
In a speech attributed to the consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus in 78 BCE, Sallust 
suggests that the Romans who were carrying out crimes against their fellow citizens 
were acting as the ‘slaves’ (servi) of Sulla.640 This comparison further emphasises their 
anti-Roman behaviour by claiming that they were forced, through their servile status, 
to behave as if they had been seized (rapta) by foreigners. In turn, the Romans 
persecuted by Sulla and his allies were cast as captives (capta) reduced to slavery 
(servilis) who were forced to protect their spoils (spolia) from Sulla’s men.641 Sumi 
argues that Sallust’s use of language with links to pax and concordia in this speech was 
an allusion to Sulla’s use of language in political rhetoric.642 As such, the contrast 
 
634 Lavan, 2013: 133-5. 
635 Just. Dig. 1.5.5.1, cf. Watson, 1987: 8. 
636 Lavan, 2013: 73-123. 
637 Lavan, 2013: 78. 
638 Levy, 1943: 159. 
639 Sall. Hist. 1.49.1-20. 
640 Sall. Hist. 1.49.1-20, echoed at Hist. 3. 
15.1-6, 19-20. In this speech, attributed to the Tribune Macer in 73 BCE, a prison metaphor is 
used interchangeably with that of slavery. 
641 Sall. Hist. 1.49.1-20. 
642 Sumi, 2002: 428-430. 
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between Sulla’s language with its positive connotations and the reality of his rule is 
striking. Here, we see that the treatment of the Roman citizens may have been the same 
as that of foreign captives, as they were cruelly reduced by such treatment, and their 
citizenship ignored by the deeds inspired by Sulla or carried out on his orders. The 
sense of terror throughout Sulla’s proscriptions is evident from the descriptions which 
frequently reference captive-taking, and the allusions to captives further illuminates 
the lawlessness and inversion of Roman norms which Sulla was promoting.643 It was 
an established Roman trope for unjust rule or an abuse of power to be associated with 
captive-taking.644 For instance, Cicero, who was writing before Sallust but about events 
after Sulla, claiming that Antony had held the senate and the city of Rome in 
captivity.645 In both cases, captive-taking is cast as a part of warfare, and Sulla and 
Antony presented as bringing war into the heart of Rome. In such instances, we see 
that the Roman elite inverted the expectations around captive-taking and enslavement 
to characterise certain Romans with negative qualities. As such, whilst the Romans 
were certainly not enslaved by the likes of Sulla, the hyperbolic language used in later 
accounts emphasises the negative qualities of specific individuals, and this 
demonstrates an inversion of the norms of warfare. Romans were not supposed to be 
enslaved, as it went against the natural order of things. 
4.3. Inevitable Enslavement? 
The previous examples have dealt with the use of enslavement as a metaphor in 
writings concerning Roman civil unrest. However, it appears to be widely recognised 
throughout ancient cultures that enslavement was the understood fate of Rome’s 
enemies, should they be taken captive. We can turn to Caesar to find that this practice 
was supposedly understood by the northern European tribes, or at least that Caesar 
chose to represent his enemies as being aware of this fate should they be captured. This 
essentially placed the motivation for the enemies’ actions on their fear of 
‘enslavement’, rather than Caesar’s own provocative actions. Caesar emphasised the 
horror of massacre or slavery for effect, as we shall see shortly, presumably to stress his 
role as a conqueror who contributed towards the economy of Roman slavery. The 
threat of enslavement to Rome’s enemies is implicit throughout Caesar’s writings, and 
he frequently emphasises his enemies’ acknowledgement of their fate should they lose 
in battle. This includes women, belonging to the Germanic tribes of the Harudes, 
Marcomanni, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, and Suebi pleading with their 
male counterparts to save them from Roman slavery as they awaited battle.646  
Then at last, compelled by necessity, the Germans led their own forces out of camp and posted 
them at equal intervals according to their tribes, Harudes, Marcomani, Triboces, Vangiones, 
Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi; and their whole line they set about with wagons and carts, to leave no 
 
643 Sall. Hist. 3.15.1.6, 19-20, Cat. 5.7-8, 11.4-7, 16.4, 37.9-11,  
644 Cf. pp. 5-9. 
645 Cic. Phil. 8.11, de domo sua 108-109. Other examples include Cicero contrasting the treatment 
of Verres’ pirate captives with that of Roman citizens, cf. Cic. Verr. 2.5.156, 2.26.66, 2.63-65, 
2.27.69, 2.73, 2.30.76-77, 6.69. 
646 Caes. BGall. 1.51. 
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hope in flight. Upon these they set their women, who with tears and outstretched hands 
entreated the men, as they marched out to fight, not to deliver them into Roman slavery.647 
Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque 
constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Triboces, Vangiones, 
Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne 
qua spes in fuga relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae in proelium 
proficiscentes passis manibus flentes implorabant, ne se in servitutem Romanis 
traderent. 
Later in Caesar’s Gallic Wars, the coalition of Belgae tribes formed by the Nervii 
attempted to protect their women, children and elderly members from war and its 
possible outcomes by placing them in an area which, on account of the marshy terrain, 
would be difficult to access by an enemy force.648 This information was supplied by 
one of Caesar’s prisoners, presumably after questioning, and suggests that non-
combatants were of interest to Roman forces. We cannot ascertain what motivated the 
Romans to seek out such people for captivity, but it is likely that once captured non-
combatants may have witnessed or suffered massacre, sexual violence and finally 
enslavement. Whatever the fate of the captives, it was beneficial for Caesar to present 
himself as a commander who could completely conquer the entire population of an 
enemy nation. 
On this note, Caesar’s Gallic Wars was, as Garland argues ‘a masterpiece of 
narratological understatement and deception’.649 Caesar was able to cement the image 
he had carefully cultivated as Rome’s greatest military leader. This is evident in 
Cassius Dio, Plutarch, Pliny, and Velleius Paterculus’ later assessment of Caesar, 
comparing him to other great generals, including Pompey.650 The image of the 
successful general was created through favourable comparisons with other Romans, 
including how many battles they had been engaged in, the size of the area conquered, 
the number of cities and nations defeated, the treatment of captives, and a general’s 
generosity to his soldiers.651 Plutarch suggests that the loyalty of soldiers, also a symbol 
of a successful general, was the result of Caesar’s generosity, further claiming that he 
was not amassing wealth for himself but for his soldiers.652 Plutarch and Velleius 
Paterculus’ references to captives, including the number taken and Caesar’s 
comparative mild treatment of them,653 suggests that the taking of prisoners was of 
concern to the Roman elite. As a result, Caesar’s frequent references to captive-taking 
enable us to consider the ways by which Caesar used the practice to illuminate aspects 
of character and his military or political competencies.654  
 
647 Caes. BGall. 1.51. Translation by Edwards, 1917. 
648 Caes. BGall. 2.16, Plut. Vit. Caes. 20.4. 
649 Garland, 2003: 8. 
650 Plut. Caes. 14.1-3, 15.2-3, Pliny NH 7.25, Vel. Pat. 2.46.1. 
651 Plut. Caes. 15.2-3. 
652 Plut. Caes. 17.1. 
653 Plut. Caes. 14.1-3, 15.2-3, Vel. Pat. 2.46.1. 
654 Caes. BGall. 1.51, 2.16,  
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Arguably, the Romans’ reputation for captive-taking preceded them, as the Gallic 
people were aware of the Romans’ practices and probably communicated such 
knowledge with other Gallic, Germanic and British nations.655 Therefore, we can safely 
assume that Rome’s enemies would have been aware of their fate, should they be 
defeated. However, Caesar counteracts this by claiming, usually through direct speech 
placed in the mouths of Gallic generals, that those fighting for Gaul were doing so 
precisely because they thought Roman dominion was a form of slavery,656 rather than a 
literal form of slavery being the primary danger. As a case in point, Caesar creates a 
direct speech for Vercingetorix,657 justifying his scorched earth policy by outlining the 
dangers that the Gallic women and children faced should the Romans defeat them. 
Namely, that it was the ‘inevitable fate of the conquered’ for men to be slaughtered, 
and women and children enslaved.658 Furthermore, this would also account for 
references to suicide found throughout the Gallic Wars,659 an issue we shall discuss in 
the chapter on triumphs.660 From these examples, we can see that the Romans 
considered slavery to be a shameful state in which a person was degraded to a ‘sub-
human’ status,661 and this enabled the Romans to justify the subsequent treatment of 
their captured enemies.  
4.4. The Slave Trade: Historical Realities? 
As stated, we cannot ascertain the extent to which warfare contributed to the Roman 
slave trade. However, we can make assumptions based on the limited information we 
have from ancient authors, and briefly outline the realities of their treatment. One of 
the most detailed examples of the enslavement of captives can be found in Polybius. 
Polybius describes the organisation of the Roman army and, explains in his description 
of Scipio’s sack of New Carthage in 209 BCE the procedure by which the Roman army 
took captives and spoils.662 Polybius’ description of the organised way by which the 
Romans troops searched captured settlements suggests that there was a standardised 
process for the collection of booty and captives.663 As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, Polybius was a witness to Roman wartime practices, as he was a treaty 
hostage with close connections to the Scipio family.664 Therefore, we cannot ascertain 
the degree of accuracy within his descriptions, but his account presents an idealised 
version of the collection and distribution of loot (both animate and inanimate) in 
 
655 Caes. BGall. 4.5, 7.8, 7.16, cf. Osgood, 2009: 328-358.  
656 A concern which is repeated throughout, cf. Caes. BGall. 5.54, 7.1, 7.14. 
657 Grant how speeches ‘could not possibly have been delivered in the forms in which they were 
reported’, as writers were often not present at the speech, did not have access to notes taken 
during the speech, or were often writing in a different language, cf. Grant, 1995: 44-52.  
658 Caes. BGall. 1.11, 7.14. 
659 Caes. BGall. 6.31, 8.44. 
660 Cf. pp. 204-210. 
661 Bodel, 2016: 82-108. 
662 Polyb. 10.16-17. The account is ‘supplementary’ to Polybius’ earlier account of Roman army 
practices at 6.19-42, cf. Walbank, 1967: 216. 
663 I discuss the collection of booty here because, as we shall see throughout this chapter, there 
was a close connection between the taking of physical objects and human chattel. 
664 Cf. pp. 12-14, 75-78. 
109 
 
relation to the capture of a city.665 The process was likely to have been far more chaotic, 
but this example speaks to the significance of captives as a form of political and 
financial currency for victorious generals and soldiers alike. 
Polybius’ accounts of Roman looting of New Carthage suggest that the troops dealt 
with booty separately from the collection of slaves.666 It appears that whilst the tribunes 
were dealing with the booty, the Roman commander ordered other underlings to 
gather the prisoners. Polybius suggests that this was either concurrent with or after the 
collection of booty, and that there was an organised way, which we shall discuss in 
detail shortly, by which the Roman soldiers gathered loot and human chattel. 
However, leaving captives within their own households whilst loot was gathered 
would have posed a logistical issue as the population may have attacked the Roman 
forces.667 Inevitably, the capture of a city could not have been as organised as Polybius 
suggests. As such, it is likely that the removal of people from their households, which 
would have enabled the Romans to search the households without threat of attack, 
occurred either before or concurrently with the taking of material goods. In whichever 
order the taking of captives occurred, Polybius presents the captive-taking as being 
closely related to the collection of booty. This is significant for our discussion as the 
Romans would have understood that captives could stand in for booty, as they were a 
form of loot taken during the capture of foreign cities, and that material goods could 
also be used to represent defeated nations and people. Therefore, captives are 
inevitably intertwined with booty, despite being animate, and we need to take this into 
consideration when viewing the art and literature of the Roman elite. Furthermore, by 
this stage in Roman warfare, the captives, having endured defeat and the associated 
horrors which accompany it (as outlined in the previous two chapters), were reduced 
to a status in Roman thought which was akin to that of an object, being merely a form 
of booty. This links to Patterson’s ‘three principal constituent elements’ of slavery, as 
the reduction to objects signified a form of ‘generalized dishonouring of slaves.’668  
Following the collection of captives, Scipio separated them into groups. These groups 
were the citizens (πολῖται, polîtai), including those who were presumably engaged in 
military activity, with their wives, (γῠναῖκες, gunaîkes) children (τέκνα, tékna), and the 
working men (χειροτέχναι, cheirotéchnai), who may have included craftsmen, artisans 
and skilled slaves.669 Accordingly, Scipio released the citizens and allowed them to 
return home. This was a diplomatic coup as the citizens would have been the people 
with the most influence, and their release would have secured them as allies of Rome. 
As for the working men, they were kept as enslaved public labourers of Rome until the 
 
665 Cf. pp. 75. 
666 Polyb. 10.16-17. 
667 As we have seen, women used roof tiles to defend their homes and families during a Roman 
siege, cf. 64-66. These examples concern the period before enslavement. However, as Rome’s 
enemies understood that they would be enslaved, it is likely that they were attempting to avoid 
this fate. Nevertheless, such instances are rare and even after enslavement, revolts were 
uncommon, cf. Urbainczyk, 2008. 
668 Patterson, 1982: 1. 
669 Polyb. 10.17.6-7. For χειροτέχναι, cf. LSJ: 1985-6. 
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war against Carthage was over. Walbank argues that those identified as cheirotéchnai 
(χειροτέχναι) may have been non-elite Carthaginians, Libyans, and Iberians.670 Given 
the emphasis on the offer of freedom, it is likely that enslaved people were amongst 
this group.671 The quaestor oversaw the employment of these men, with Scipio 
personally choosing those who were the physically fittest to work on his ships.672 As 
Libourel argues, it was unusual practice for the Romans to use slave labour within the 
military.673 However, the use of the enslaved cheirotéchnai on galley ships ensured that, 
given the limited confines of the ship and the position of rowers below deck, the 
cheirotéchnai were easier for the Romans to manage. This example clearly demonstrates 
Scipio’s leniency towards his enemies, particularly those who were citizens with 
political power, as it was necessary for his future campaigns in the region to ensure 
that he won their approval.674 We address the issue of clemency throughout this 
thesis,675 but in this case it presents one way by which Roman commanders could 
demonstrate their power over their enemies, and further highlight certain 
characteristics. 
 
As said, Polybius’ description is highly problematic, and his account does not align 
with the writings of other authors, such as Livy. According to Polybius, only certain 
members of the army were involved in the collection and guarding of booty taken from 
enemy cities and camps. Furthermore, Polybius claims that it was supposedly accepted 
that all soldiers would benefit from the collected booty,676 and it was a key part of 
maintaining morale for soldiers to be promised rewards for good conduct.677 This 
supposedly also ensured that order was kept as soldiers were able to see the booty 
being divided fairly.678 However, Livy’s account of Roman wartime practices raise 
issues with Polybius’ description, as Livy suggests it was more common for soldiers to 
have loot distributed to them immediately after the battle or siege.679 Nevertheless, 
Polybius’ emphasis on the guards placed in charge of protecting the loot would 
suggest that there was a possibility of theft from within the camp itself.680 This raises 
further issues in relation to Polybius’ description of the sack of New Carthage, 
particularly with regard to women captured or in the custody of Scipio’s men. 
  
We have seen in the chapter on sexual violence that several high-born women were 
sexually assaulted by Scipio’s men,681 something which suggests that the citizens were 
not separated as neatly into groups as Polybius’ description would suggest, and that 
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681 Cf. pp. 75-78. 
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within these groups, sub-groups were exposed to abuse. For instance, whilst the whole 
collection of captives is referred to as αἰχμάλωτος (taken by the spear, captive, 
prisoner), a distinction is made between the citizens (πολῖται, polîtai) and their wives 
(γῠναῖκες, gunaîkes) and children (τέκνα, tékna), and the working men.682 The remainder 
of those taken prisoner, such as non-elite people and slaves, were effectively subject to 
whatever treatment the Romans saw fit. Essentially, this again relates to the careful 
representation of a commander in relation to their treatment of captives. In this 
instance, Polybius presents Scipio as an ideal Roman commander: capable, organised 
and fair.683 That is not to suggest that abuses did not take place, but simply that it was 
not pertinent for Polybius to emphasise such actions in relation to Scipio, Rome’s 
favoured general.  
 
In the case of Scipio and the captives taken at New Carthage, the inclusion of enslaved 
people within the Roman army was the result of desperation, and most captives were 
not explicitly promised release. In the time period we are considering, many captives 
were sold close to the battlefield, apparently to slave traders who followed the army on 
their campaigns.684 Assuming spoils obtained from the sale of human chattel were 
classed as spolia or praeda, the profits from the sale of captives were either handed over 
to the state treasury, or some were retained by the general (spoils of this kind were 
known as manubiae).685 It should be noted that foreign wars, like governorships in far 
flung lands, presented opportunities for abuse and exploitation, and a certain 
proportion of the plunder, including profits from human chattel, was disposed of at 
the general’s discretion. As we shall see, generals could order that captives be given as 
rewards to soldiers, retained as state slaves, or sold into slavery. In turn, the profits 
from the sale of slavery could also be used to emphasise a general’s pietas, potestas or 
auctoritas through euergetism in the form of public buildings and entertainment. The 
most famous example of this is the Colosseum, on which construction began in 70 CE. 
An inscription on the building states that the amphitheatre was funded by ‘the spoils 
of war’, and although the war is not specified,686 it was likely funded using the loot, 
including captives, taken during the First Jewish Revolt.687 
 
4.5. Soldiers’ Gains: The Siege of Cremona 
Polybius’ account relates that soldiers throughout the ranks were motivated by a desire 
for gain, usually in the form of loot.688 However, we have evidence from Caesar, Cicero 
and later Tacitus which suggests that it was not uncommon for soldiers to be rewarded 
with captives in exchange for their good conduct.689 As with all captives taken during 
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warfare, it depended upon the soldier’s own situation as to whether he sold the captive 
into the slave trade, retained or even killed the captive. Ultimately, the soldier had 
complete control over the captive he had acquired. We need to return to Roman civil 
conflict to fully understand the ways in which soldiers could utilise their captives 
which, in terms of how it was represented by later authors, was used as a means of 
highlighting the horrors of civil conflict, and the behaviour of certain groups of 
soldiers. We have discussed Cremona in the previous chapter, and we have seen how 
Roman women and children were subjected to sexual violence with soldiers treating 
them as if they were foreign captives. In a similar way, Tacitus’ references to 
enslavement are intended to create horror for the Roman reader, but he does not 
suggest that sexual violence or enslavement were not common practice for those the 
Romans defeated. Once again, I am using this example to illuminate an aspect of 
Roman wartime practice which was culturally ingrained, but only mentioned as 
noteworthy when it was carried out against a Roman population. 
 
The Siege of Cremona has been discussed throughout the previous two chapters as it 
illuminates aspects of Roman warfare, particularly violence conducted against Roman 
citizens or their close allies. The example includes evidence of massacre, sexual assault, 
and the ‘false enslavement’ of Roman citizens. With regards to the latter, some of the 
population were enslaved by Vespasian’s troops, operating under general M. Antonius 
Primus. However, as the inhabitants were Roman citizens, it was later ordered by 
Primus that the captives could not be sold into slavery in Italy.690 In response, the 
soldiers began to kill their captives, as they were effectively financially worthless or 
inconvenient as they needed to be fed and transported. Upon learning this news, the 
families of the captives paid the ransoms of the survivors, presumably to the 
individual soldiers, thus enabling the captives to return home. Archaeological evidence 
indicates that the destruction of Cremona was on a vast scale, with a 1.5-2 metre burnt 
rubble layer suggesting that the centre of Cremona was razed to the ground during its 
sack of 69 CE.691 However, Cremona was subsequently rebuilt by its formerly captive 
inhabitants,692 which would suggest that the inhabitants were able to continue their 
lives with little stigma, further emphasising the suggestion that they had been falsely 
enslaved.  
 
Despite relating to a Roman civil war, the fate of Cremona’s inhabitants is typical of 
those taken during Roman warfare. However, except for metaphorical allusions,693 it 
was unheard of for Roman citizens to be enslaved by fellow Romans. As such, the 
Siege of Cremona and the subsequent ‘enslavement’ of the population may have been a 
way by which Tacitus could indicate the character and actions of an individual or 
group in Roman history, essentially using past actions to comment on contemporary 
events. Tacitus emphasises the horror of the event, in that Romans were mistreating 
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Romans, by suggesting that the Flavian forces were acting as if the population were 
non-Roman, as Tacitus claims that the people were automatically enslaved and 
subjected to sale.694 It was only when objections were raised because Cremona’s 
inhabitants were Roman citizens that any action was taken to preserve them.695 
Cremona is an exceptional example of Romans enslaving fellow Romans, yet it does 
indicate that enslavement was thought to be a commonplace result of capture in 
warfare. This effectively enabled the Roman soldiers to have complete authority over 
their captives, which is further supported by the fact that there does not appear to be 
any punishment for those who chose to kill their captives. In this case, the issue of 
whether Cremona’s citizens lived or died essentially rested on their financial worth. 
Soldiers were seemingly keen to dispose of their captives by selling them to slave 
traders. Once this became impossible, the captives’ value had significantly decreased, 
and soldiers were seemingly unwilling, or unable, to keep the enslaved people for their 
personal use. This may have been because the upkeep of enslaved people was more 
than they were worth as personal attendants, or else the soldiers were not permitted to 
keep enslaved captives whilst on campaign, particularly given the Civil War context in 
which the captives were taken. Whatever the reason, the soldiers evidently considered 
the captives to be financially profitable, but they had little worth as labourers within 
military life.  
 
4.6. The Value of Enslaved People 
Enslaved people were one part of an ever-changing market, and their worth depended 
upon a variety of factors. These included economic matters such as issues with supply 
and demand, and certain aspects of such ‘commodities’, e.g. where enslaved people 
were from, their age, and their social status before their capture. In addition to the 
numbers of captives taken, another aspect the Roman elite were concerned about was 
the price of enslaved people. For instance, Cicero complains of receiving only meagre 
profits (of 30,000 denarii) from the captives he sold in the East during his proconsulship 
of Cilicia in 51 BCE.696 Cicero was selling captives acquired during military campaigns 
in his governorship, and his military excursions would have been more limited in 
scope than Caesar’s long-term war in Gaul. Therefore, it is likely that Cicero was 
selling a smaller number of captives. However, Cicero may have been exaggerating his 
horror at receiving profits which he considered to be meagre. At this time, the annual 
soldier’s salary was 225 denarii,697 so 30,000 denarii was a considerable sum for those 
under Cicero’s command. As such, whilst Cicero may have been stressing that he was 
so wealthy that he considered 30,000 denarii to be a paltry amount, it is likely that it 
simply was meagre in comparison to his wealth and the profits others had obtained in 
 
694 Wellesley, 1972: 125. 
695 Wellesley, 1972: 125. 
696 Cic. Att. 113. 
697 Watson, 1958: 117-8, Speidel, 1992: 88. 
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their provinces,698 and the profits he may have expected to receive from the sale of 
enslaved people during his governorship. 
We can see other instances in which Cicero expresses his concern for the financial 
benefits of war. In another letter to Atticus, Cicero complained that the only plunder 
from Caesar’s campaigns in Britain were captives who could be purchased 
(mancipium).699 Cicero’s main concern is with the British enslaved people being ill-
educated, which indicates the qualities which were most valued by the Roman elite, 
and further suggests that Caesar’s captives would be sold in Rome itself. For their 
attendants, like Cicero’s freedman and right-hand man Tiro, the Romans wanted 
enslaved people to be highly educated, fluent in numerous languages and possessing 
abilities which would be useful for their political careers and estate administration. 
Presumably Cicero was concerned with the enslaved people whom he encountered in 
his daily life, rather than the thousands of forced labourers who were needed to 
support Rome’s agriculture. In both of Cicero’s complaints, it is possible that Cicero’s 
concern was weighing up the effort and expense of carrying out military campaigns to 
acquire a small number of captives, as with Cicero’s actions in Cilicia, or with Caesar’s 
poorly-educated, thus useless (for the elite Romans’ needs), enslaved people from 
Britain. Whilst the demand for educated enslaved attendants was seemingly high for 
the political elite, enslaved people of little or no education were necessary for Roman 
agriculture and other industries.700 Furthermore, Cicero’s account is likely to have been 
a deliberate attack on Caesar’s actions in Britain, which he deemed unwarranted given 
the rewards which could be gained were ‘sub-standard’.  
In addition to Cicero’s concern for the poorly educated British enslaved people 
entering the market, there is some evidence to suggest that there was an interest in the 
origins of enslaved people, particularly those taken during warfare. Such evidence can 
be found in Egyptian papyri from a slightly later period.701 Papyri from Roman Egypt 
are particularly significant considering that the region was thought to be less reliant on 
enslaved labour than other parts of the Empire.702 Despite the large amount of papyri 
available to us from Egypt, and the smaller number of enslaved people in the same 
area, the few references we have on papyri to captives taken in war is sufficient enough 
evidence to state that enslaved people who originated in warfare were a concern to 
purchasers. For instance, one papyrus originating from Thebais in Upper Egypt, and 
dated to 125 CE, details the sale of two enslaved people taken during in warfare 
(δουλικὰ σώματα δύο δορατόκτητα).703 The papyrus relates to a private sale, given that 
 
698 Cicero frequently complains about his stint in the provinces, as Cilicia was not as rich in 
resources or individuals to exploit as other provinces, cf. Cic. Att. 6.2.5, 6.1.15, QFr. 1.1.25, Flac. 
9.20.  
699 Cic. Att. 89.7. 
700 Cf. Hopkins, 1978: 1-98. 
701 Biezunska-Malowist, 1977: 81-85. 
702 Biezunska-Malowist, 1977: 81-85, cf. P.Oxy. 42.3053. 
703 P.Hamb.1.63.9. δορατόκτητος translates to ‘taken by the spear’, a hapax which only occurs in 




other goods, including domestic animals, are referenced, rather than the wholesale of 
human chattel to a dealer in enslaved people. We cannot ascertain the origins of the 
enslaved captives,704 nor can we know how long the two people were enslaved for 
before their capture. However, as many papyri mention enslaved people, but few 
mention their origins, it is likely that the people in question were recently enslaved and 
were therefore in need of more attention, as they could be considered in danger of 
disobeying their captor’s orders or running away. From this source, we can also see 
that a trade in recently captured and enslaved people existed on the frontier of the 
Roman empire,705 and that enslaved captives taken during conflicts from across the 
empire were omnipresent within Roman society.  
Caesar’s captives from his northern European campaigns, which far outnumbered 
those taken by any other Roman in any war, were present in markets in Italy, as 
indicated by Cicero’s complaints concerning Caesar’s British captives. However, as 
Caesar had taken vast numbers of captives during the Gallic Wars, there may have 
been a danger in flooding the market with captives, as Caesar’s gold had in Italy 
following the Gallic Wars,706 which would have decreased the value of enslaved 
captives. As we have seen, the slave market extended far beyond Rome and an increase 
in the availability of captives, despite their being in vast numbers, would not have 
drastically affected the price. Nevertheless, with Caesar ensuring that he had 
thousands of enslaved people to sell, even if they had been sold at a lower price, either 
in Rome or on the frontier, they would have ensured he profited substantially. This is 
particularly important when considering Caesar’s previous appointments in the 
provinces, primarily his quaestorship in Spain in 69 BCE. Caesar’s position in Spain 
was not profitable, with Suetonius recording that Caesar had to borrow from his 
friends to pay his debts.707 In addition to the financial assistance of Crassus,708 Caesar’s 
monetary problems were partly solved by his governorship in Hispania Ulterior in 61 
BCE, which involved the conquering of antagonistic nations.709 We have little evidence 
concerning his activities in Hispania, yet it seems likely that the defeated nations were 
subjected to massacre, sexual violence, and enslavement. The latter in particular 
presented the most opportunity for profit. Therefore, Caesar’s actions in Hispania may 
have set a precedent for his behaviour in Gaul, as he benefitted from the profits 
available from the sale of captives. As follows, Caesar’s excessive taking of captives 
during the Gallic Wars was possibly intended to ensure he had the financial resources, 
in addition to plunder, to use upon his return to Rome.  
 
704 Madden, 1996: 114. Madden suggests this but does not refer to any specific papyri, 
presumably he is discussing P.Hamb.1.63.9 given the limited references to enslaved people 
taken captive during warfare within papyri. 
705 As suggested by Bradley, 1994: 33. 
706 Suet. Vit. Iul. 54. Suetonius suggests that the money was raised through the looting of sacred 
sites and the plunder of towns and cities for the sake of acquiring material goods. 
707 Suet. Vit. Iul. 51.1. Cf. Frederiksen, 1966: 128-141. 
708 Plut. Caes. 11-12. 
709 Plut. Caes. 11-12, Suet. Vit. Iul. 18.1. 
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The limited financial gains from the selling of captives may account for Caesar’s 
decision to reward his troops with people, rather than monetary rewards. At the 
conclusion of the Gallic Wars, Caesar supposedly gave each soldier a captive each.710 
As Levithan comments, it was unusual for Caesar to mention rewards for his troops, 
given that he usually presented them as being motivated by loyalty.711 However, it was 
commonplace for generals to reward their soldiers with material goods. This is 
suggested by Livy who, in his description of the capture and subsequent enslavement 
of 10,000 Veians in the 4th century BCE, claimed that the soldiers were perturbed when 
they did not receive a cut of the profits from the sale of captives.712 That being said, it 
may have been unusual for generals, including Caesar, to reward their soldiers with 
captives, as we have seen when Cicero complained about the price he received for the 
captives.713 However, Cicero’s decision to sell the captives, much like Caesar’s to use 
human chattel as rewards, was probably calculated to ensure that they achieved the 
maximum profit. For instance, Caesar took thousands of captives during the Gallic 
Wars which would have flooded the Northern European and Italian market with 
‘product’. Presumably, this would have driven down the price of Gallic captives. As 
there was an abundance of captives, it was more profitable for Caesar to retain the 
material plunder,714 which may have been limited in comparison to more eastern 
nations,715 and to reward his soldiers with the captives. Furthermore, we know troops 
should not ideally be motivated by plunder. Therefore, rewarding the troops with a 
captive each was a means by which Caesar could present his soldiers with an indirect 
form of monetary reward, as it seems likely, given the logistics of keeping a captive, 
that the men sold the captives close to the battlefield.716 Granted, this is speculative, yet 
Caesar’s actions are in line with the Romans’ concerns with the logistics and financial 
benefits of captive-taking found elsewhere. 
4.7. The Trade in Enslaved People 
Captive-taking on the battlefield or in siege warfare was just the beginning of the long 
journey captives were forced to endure, as part of a large-scale trading operation which 
extended throughout the Mediterranean and beyond. There was a supply chain which 
saw captives passed along a series of traders and trading routes. As Bodel, in his article 
on Roman slave traders, outlines: the market was fuelled by Roman demand and, as 
we have seen with evidence pertaining to battlefield slave-trading,717 the supply was 
partly filled by Roman military activity, in addition to piracy.718 According to Strabo, 
writing of the Greek port of Delos in the late 1st century BCE and early 1st century CE, 
 
710 Suet. Vit. Iul. 26.3, Caes. BGall. 7.89-90, 8.89. Caesar also gave cattle and captives belonging to 
the revolting Nervii to his soldiers in 53 BCE, cf. Caes. BGall. 6.3. 
711 Levithan, 2013: 30-32. 
712 Livy 5.22.1-4. 
713 Cic. Att. 113.5. 
714 Cf. fn. 706. 
715 For instance, Pontus had been fabulously wealthy before Mithridates’ defeat by Pompey, cf. 
Mayor, 2010: 52-53. 
716 Bradley, 1992: 35. As we have seen in the case of Cremona, cf. pp. 102-104. 
717 Bodel, 2005: 181-2. 
718 Strabo 14.5.2. 
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the operation was smooth and efficient. Delos was a major slave-trading hub, and even 
prompted the creation of a proverb associated with the city: ‘Merchant, sail in, unload 
your ship, everything has been sold’ (ἔμπορε, κατάπλευσον, ἐξελοῦ, πάντα πέπραται).719 
In addition to considering epigraphic evidence, Bodel suggests that Strabo’s writings 
indicate that there were four stages of the trade in enslaved people, and each had its 
own specialists: acquisition, transport to market, preparation for sale, and the final sale. 
Bodel sees this as an on-going, standardised process which ran smoothly and 
efficiently, no doubt because slavery was heavily ingrained in Mediterranean society. 
However, Bodel does not address the process which began before the capture of the 
enslaved people, which would have inevitably had psychological ramifications on the 
captives and made an impact on their subsequent enslavement. There is evidence to 
suggest that, by the time captives were taken to slave markets, they were already 
wholly defeated psychologically. Silver, in his discussion of the architecture of slave 
markets, claims that there is no evidence of provision to lock up violent, former 
combatant captives.720 Silver uses such evidence to suggest that people from eastern 
nations voluntarily sold themselves into slavery in order to reach Rome. However, his 
argument fails to acknowledge that captives may have been kept in wooden 
enclosures, a material which only survives from antiquity in exceptional 
circumstances.721 Nevertheless, beyond the allegedly missing architectural features, we 
need only look at the Transatlantic slave trade,722 including details from the 
autobiography of Olaudah Equiano, a former enslaved person describing the 
conditions of a Caribbean slave market, to see that captives did not attempt to violently 
elude their captors at this stage of their enslavement.723 By the time the captives 
reached trading posts in the Caribbean, they had already endured great hardships, 
including being forcibly displaced from their homes, subjected to violence and 
transported for many months in cramped, unsanitary and inhumane conditions. They 
were physically and emotionally weakened by their ordeal, and it should come as little 
surprise that they were unable or unwilling to resist their captors. Despite the 
differences between the ‘closed’ model of the Transatlantic slave trade, and the ‘open’ 
nature of Roman slavery, in which former enslaved people and their descendants 
could be integrated into free society,724 it is likely that the reaction of the enslaved in 
the ancient world was like that of the captives transplanted from African nations over a 
millennium later. As such, the treatment of captives before their sale ensured that they 
were compliant, particularly if there was the possibility of punishment or even the 
chance of freedom, no matter how slim. After all, what other choice did they have? As 
 
719 Strabo 14.5.2. 
720 Silver, 2016: 184-202. 
721 For instance, at Herculaneum and within anaerobic layers. 
722 Webster, 2008: 103–123. Webster outlines the importance of using comparative methods in 
the study of slavery, particularly with relation to the Transatlantic slave trade. For further 
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723 Equiano, 1789. Available from: 
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a result, whilst massacre and sexual violence have been dealt with separately in this 
thesis, the impact of individuals witnessing such violence cannot be dismissed and it 
can ultimately be considered as one way of ensuring that those defeated by the 
Romans could transition with more ease, given their psychological distress, from a free 
to enslaved person. In turn, this may contribute to the ways in which captives are 
represented by the Roman elite: as disregarded given the acceptability of their 
treatment in warfare, or as inferior beings to their Roman conquerors.  
The way in which captives were presented in the context of slavery also links to the 
representations of slave traders in the Roman world, and how the Roman elite 
carefully presented their relationship to the slave trade. Bodel uses Strabo’s writings on 
Delos to suggest that piracy and kidnapping were the primary source of enslaved 
people supplied at Delos.725 However, Strabo does acknowledge that Roman military 
activity was key to the operation, yet relates the activities of pirates and kidnappers in 
greater detail. Bodel stresses that slave traders were thought to be distasteful 
individuals within Roman society.726 As a result, the reference to equally distasteful 
groups, namely pirates and kidnappers, in relation to slave traders would have been 
expected from the perspective of Strabo’s readers. Therefore, it is likely that Strabo 
stressed the involvement of pirates over that of Roman military forces to emphasise the 
seedy nature of the slave trade and those associated with it. This is significant in how 
the Roman elite referenced their involvement with the slave trade, and that inevitably 
impacted upon their statements relating to captive-taking. However, whilst the process 
may have been heavily ingrained within Mediterranean society at the time, it is likely 
that Roman commanders could act in the stead of parts of the slave trade, as we will 
see with Caesar moving British captives back to the continent. 
Following his invasion of Britain in 54 BCE, Caesar boasts of having taken so many 
prisoners that his fleet had to cross the Channel twice.727 We should remember that 
Caesar’s expedition was not successful in a military capacity, so Caesar may have been 
using the numbers taken to claim that the undertaking was profitable in a financial or 
social capacity. Large scale captive-taking, as with Caesar’s frequent references to the 
numbers enslaved during the Gallic Wars,728 could be used as an indicator of excellent 
military conduct. For instance, Plutarch claims that Marcus Antonius gained the favour 
of Caesar by greeting him with a large army and a great number of captives in 48 BCE 
during the Civil War.729 Antonius was presumably acutely aware of Caesar’s actions, 
and may have been attempting to emulate Caesar’s practice of captive-taking. 
Although we cannot ascertain how many prisoners were taken during the invasion, 
Caesar’s account is supported by Cicero’s letters which allude to Caesar’s intention to 
enslave the British captives.730 Furthermore, given Cicero’s brother’s involvement in 
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the Gallic Wars, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Caesar’s claims had to be 
plausibly deniable. We do not know what happened to these prisoners, but that Caesar 
went to the effort to take them to the continent suggests that they were sold on the 
slave market either in Gaul, or in Italy. Presumably, considering the limited connection 
Britain had with Rome, there was no trading infrastructure at the time to sell the 
captives on the island itself. This links to Patterson’s ‘natal alienation’ argument as the 
British captives, transported from familiar surroundings and culture, were less likely to 
escape. Here, we see Caesar taking on a role which would usually be undertaken by a 
slave trader. As such, it may explain why Caesar, and his contemporaries, were 
reluctant to describe the slave trade in detail, given that they did not want to be 
associated with the industry, thus linking themselves with the inferior social status of 
those who dealt in enslaved people. This is significant for our discussion as the elite 
had to use the slave trade for financial gain, but there is evidence to suggest that they 
attempted to distance themselves from the trade. For instance, connections with the 
slave trade are only stressed in epigraphic evidence found in the provinces, and 
commanders seemingly dealt with the logistics of slavery from a distance.731 
4.8. Captives in the Roman Home 
Despite the reluctance in the writings of the Roman elite to associate themselves closely 
with the slave trade, Rome and its provinces were reliant upon and demanded 
enslaved labour. This is not only evident in the writings of Cicero, with his discussion 
of the importance of his former enslaved attendant Tiro, but it is evident in the works 
of later writers who stress the connection between Rome and slavery.732 Cicero kept a 
relatively small number of enslaved people in his household, in comparison to the 
Imperial household, with Garland using Cicero’s writings to list the various enslaved 
roles which numbered in the dozens, rather than the hundreds, as in the case of the 
empress Livia’s household.733 Possessing dozens of enslaved people is hardly 
insignificant, which indicates that households of Rome’s very wealthiest could include 
hundreds of enslaved persons, in addition to freedmen who acted as clients for their 
former masters. 
For instance, Tacitus claims that the prefect Lucius Pedanius Secundus was murdered 
by one of his enslaved workers in 61 CE, and the whole of his household was 
sentenced to death as a result.734 The enslaved household staff supposedly numbered 
400.735 The people and members of the senate supposedly challenged the execution of 
hundreds of individuals who were innocent of the crime, and it was Nero who had the 
final say.736 According to Tacitus, Nero decided that the mass execution should take 
 
731 For instance, Caius Sornatius Barba, possibly a legate of Lucullus, built a statarion (slave-
market) and altar at Acmonia (Phrygia), MAMA 6.260, cf. Bodel, 2005: 184. 
732 The 3rd century CE writer Athenaeus claimed that the Romans kept more enslaved people as 
attendants, in contrast to the Greeks who preferred to employ enslaved people in mining or 
agricultural labour, cf. Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 6.272c-273a, Parkin, Pomeroy, 2007: 154-6. 
733 Garland, 1992: 163-172. 
734 Tac. Ann. 14.41-45. 
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place and it was carried out despite the continued protestations of the people. It is 
important to remember that Tacitus’ writings have an anti-Neronian slant and Tacitus 
may be using his decision with regards to the enslaved people to indicate Nero’s 
tyrannical qualities in his unwillingness to listen to the people and the senate.737 
As we have seen in relation to the uncertainty of the numbers the Romans claimed to 
have massacred, taken captive or enslaved, and Tacitus’ issues with Nero’s reign, we 
cannot speak to the accuracy of Tacitus’ statement with regards to the numbers of 
household slaves.738 However, Tacitus’ account, and those found in other sources,739 
support the seemingly universally understood thought that the Romans enslaved their 
enemies en masse, and that that slavery was an important and accepted part of Roman 
culture and social structure, despite the seeming reluctance to deal directly with the 
slave trade itself evident in elite sources. Furthermore, Tacitus relates how enslaved 
people could be used within Roman society as more than tools to fulfil laborious jobs. 
Enslaved people could act as a form of display, demonstrating the wealth of an 
individual or family by acting as a living embodiment of their financial prosperity. The 
way in which the enslaved people were brought forward into the forum demonstrates 
the importance of slavery in Roman society, but also indicates that there was a 
theatrical element to the inclusion of enslaved people within households, particularly 
for those in positions in which their public image was paramount to their political 
success and social status.  
The incident relayed by Tacitus is an extreme example, but enslaved people were 
utilised by wealthy Romans to demonstrate their status and financial power, effectively 
a form of conspicuous consumption. Within examples, we still encounter a degree of 
theatricality, and this is particularly evident in relation to enslaved people with 
physical disabilities who were kept as forms of entertainment. By the time of the 1st 
Century CE, ‘monster markets’ existed in Rome,740 designed to supply enslaved people 
of an unusual physical appearance,741 those who had sensory disabilities, or those with 
what we would now recognise as having learning disabilities.742 As we know that 
warfare was one origin of enslaved people, it is likely that those with disabilities or 
congenital conditions were preserved by the Roman elite after conflict with a view to 
sell them into the slave trade, particularly in the Imperial period. Unfortunately, we 
lack the evidence to speak to how frequently Roman commanders chose to preserve 
enemy individuals with disabilities. However, such a trend within Imperial society 
was one which generals and slave traders could benefit from as disabled or unusual 
 
737 Tacitus frequently cast Nero as an ‘extreme example of corruption and tyranny’, cf. Rubiés, 
1994: 37-38. 
738 Madden, 1996: 109. 
739 For epigraphic evidence, cf. Edmondson, 2011: 337-61. In literature, cf. Pet. Satyr. 37, 47, 53. 
740 Plut. Mor. 520c. 
741 Plutarch describes those on offer as having ‘people who have no calves, or three eyes, or 
arms like weasels, or heads like ostriches’, cf. Plut. Mor. 520c. 
742 Mar. Ep. 8.13, 11.38. 
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looking enslaved people were considered desirable, despite their perceived lack of 
function.  
According to Martial, Quintilian and Longinus, enslaved people with disabilities could 
fetch a higher price at market.743 Clearly, each author has his own agenda and it is 
likely that their comments were intended to demonstrate the inversion of the norm, as 
what use was an enslaved person who could not work? However, there was evidently 
an element of truth within their writings, and the high price of enslaved people with 
disabilities suggests that the elite not only wished to display the exotic, but also 
demonstrate their vast wealth by presenting these ‘useless’ enslaved people to their 
guests. For instance, Petronius’ Trimalchio and Martial’s Zoilus, who are depicted as 
extravagant, owned exotic looking enslaved people who had little to no practical 
function within the household.744 Zoilus’ enslaved attendant helps his owner, reclining 
at dinner, to urinate, a basic task Zoilus is too lazy to accomplish himself.745 Both 
Trimalchio and Zoilus are represented as ‘vulgar, upstart’ freedmen who are 
attempting to improve their social standing with the use of status symbols, including 
possessing enslaved people with disabilities or unusual physical characteristics.746 Both 
Petronius and Martial are highly critical of the two characters, suggesting that they 
both felt repugnance for such people and those who kept them. Furthermore, the 
purchase of disabled enslaved people was often seen as an extravagance. For instance, 
Seneca complained of his wife’s clown who, having become blind and confused, did 
not even serve her purpose to entertain and had thus become a financial burden.747 
Whilst disabled enslaved people were clearly a niche purpose for members of the elite, 
we can see from these examples how enslaved people within the households of Rome’s 
elite could be utilised to present their owners as being wealthy, to the point of 
wasteful, or as being curators of exotic and unusual objects and people from across the 
empire. 
With the ostentatious presentation of enslaved people in mind, the presence of former 
captives within the household was, like the display of captured weaponry in temples 
and houses,748 a means by which a former military man could demonstrate his 
successes on the battlefield, having reduced a former enemy, who had the potential to 
challenge Roman superiority, to the lowest social position a person could be demoted 
to in Roman society. Granted, there is scant evidence concerning the inclusion of 
wartime captives within a general’s household, which may result from the expectation 
that it was common for useful enslaved people to be retained by commanders and 
 
743 Mar. Ep. 8.13, 11.38, Quint. Inst. 2.5.11, Longinus, Symp. 18-19.   
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745 Mar. Ep. 3.82. 
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therefore not worth commenting on in elite writings.749 Furthermore, we know that 
prisoners of war were retained for uses outside the home, including as gladiators.750 
For instance, Caesar kept a seemingly large number of gladiators in a ludus in Capua 
and it is possible that these individuals had been taken during Caesar’s wars in Gaul.751 
Given that enslaved people, who included gladiators, were referred to as instrumentum 
vocale ‘talking hardware’,752 the position of former captives reduced to a position akin 
to that of an object links closely to the display of weaponry within the home. The 
relationship between objects and people taken during conflict is intertwined.  
Captives were seen as objects, given their enslaved status, and the objects could be 
used as substitutes for the defeated enemy. We can see the relationship between objects 
and people in religious practices from the ancient world. For instance, anatomical 
votives, dedicated in shrines, were representative of affected body parts which the 
dedicator wished divine attention to be paid to. The votives took on anthropomorphic 
qualities, becoming representative of the specific part of the person’s anatomy. 
Furthermore, in memory sanctions (also known as damnatio memoriae) carried out 
against high-profile individuals after their deaths, statues of individuals were 
deliberately damaged, and it was reported as if the statues could feel the physical hurts 
inflicted to its eyes, mouth and nose.753 As such, the Romans understood the 
connection between objects and the individuals they were intended to represent. The 
constant presence of captives within the household would have acted as a reminder, in 
the form of a submissive individual considered to be akin to an object, of the 
homeowner’s achievements in battle and his superiority, as a divinely favoured 
Roman, over people of different nations and ethnicities. As we have seen that domestic 
objects in elite households were used as a souvenir of war, former captives forced into 
slavery acted as another symbol of Roman dominion over other nations. This enabled 
the Roman elite to justify their continued aggression against foreign nations as they 
were surrounded by those they had taken prisoner, reduced them to slavery, which 
ensured that the Romans were then able to normalise the continuing attacks, massacre 
and enslavement of foreign peoples. Ultimately, captives acted as props within the 
household, as figures on art and within the physical objects which were associated 
with them, including weaponry, thus enabling the Romans to cement the culturally 
ingrained idea of their own superiority, and justify the horrors which they conducted 
against their enemies. 
 
749 The example of Scipio refusing the attractive young woman at New Carthage may have been 
an indication of this practice. We also know from Greek epic that it was acceptable for women 
to be enslaved for the purpose of sexual violence, cf. pp. 68-75. 
750 Spartacus is the most famous example of a prisoner of war turned gladiator, cf. Plut. Crass. 8, 
App. BCiv. 1.116, Flor. Epit. 2.8.8. 
751 Cic. Att. 7.14.2. The numbers were so large that Pompey, during his Civil War with Caesar, 
gave each household in Captua two gladiators. The shields were also said to number 1000, 
suggesting a large number of gladiators were in training. 
752 Varro, Rust. 1.17, cf. D'Ambra, Métraux, 2006: viii-xvii. 
753 Cf. Varner, 2004: 3 for his discussion of Pliny, Pan. 52.4-5. 
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Once enslaved, the treatment of captives depended entirely upon their owners and the 
work they were forced to carry out. There is not room in this thesis to outline the wide-
ranging treatment of slaves, but it is sufficient to say that it was generally poor.754 At its 
‘worst’, captives could be sent to carry out hard labour, in agriculture or mining,755 
which would have increased the probability of an early death. At its ‘best’, captives 
could be kept within the household of the elite and employed in a less labour-intensive 
capacity. Within this domestic setting, there was the opportunity of emancipation 
which offered the possibility of an enslaved person acquiring wealth, and their 
children rising within the Roman socio-political ranks. The patronage system ensured 
that freedmen were inextricably linked to their former masters,756 often taking their 
master’s names. However, for the ‘invisible’ majority, enslavement would have been a 
life-long position in which an enslaver had almost complete jurisdiction over their 
enslaved people. 
4.9. Enslavement and Iconography 
As we have seen in the previous chapter,757 depictions of sexual violence are often 
associated with females in positions of subjugation, sometimes alongside their defeated 
menfolk. Such depictions link closely to enslavement, possibly because the ‘enslaved 
status’ of the captive enabled sexual violence to be carried out with impunity. De 
Souza, in his review of captives in Roman Imperial iconography, claims the inclusion 
of captives, both male and female, emphasises the Romans’ interest in slavery as a 
benefit of Imperialism within elite Roman representation.758 De Souza’s argument does 
not acknowledge the importance of captives as symbols, nor does he address the 
implications of sexual violence, as we have seen in the previous chapter. However, De 
Souza’s research raises the issue of how the Romans may have recognised that 
depictions of warfare, including representations of captives, could be accurate to a 
degree. For instance, it is possible that the Roman audience may have considered the 
women displayed in art and iconography as the counterparts of the enslaved women 
they encountered within society. Furthermore, this also relates to the raising of funds 
from the sale of captives, which were used to finance public buildings which often 
utilised a captive motif to emphasise Roman Imperialism. In turn, this motif further 
justified the Romans’ capture of foreign combatants as they were depicted as inferior to 
the Romans who had commissioned the erection of such buildings and monuments.  
As we have seen in this chapter, war booty was an important source of income for 
soldiers and generals alike, and part of the booty was captives.759 Cicero’s writings 
suggest that manubiae, the portion of the loot which a general with imperium could 
dispose of as he wished, could be used to build public buildings.760 It is uncertain if it 
 
754 Alfōldy, 1975: 58. 
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758 De Souza, 2011: 31. 
759 Shatzman, 1972: 177-180. 
760 Cic. Verr. 2.1.154, Leg. Agr. 2.53, Dom. 102, 104, cf. Shatzman, 1972: 182. As we have discussed 
briefly earlier in this chapter, cf. pp. 98-102. 
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was required by law, but there are public buildings which were built using manubiae 
which were generally erected overlooking or in close proximity to the Temple of 
Jupiter Capitolinus on the Capitoline Hill.761 The tradition of using manubiae for such 
purposes supposedly dates to the reign of Tarquinius Superbus, Rome’s last king, who 
used booty from his wars with neighbouring tribes to build the foundations of the 
Temple of Jupiter.762 Given Superbus’ reputation as a tyrant, it seems incongruous for 
the Roman elite of the 1st century BCE to emulate the behaviour of such a character. 
However, as the use of manubiae for public buildings had a long history which dated 
back to before the Republic, the Roman elite wanted to emulate long established 
traditions, which had continued for generations of staunch Republican Romans. By the 
time of the 1st century BCE, the booty taken during foreign warfare would have 
included captives, or funds raised from their subsequent sale into slavery, as we have 
seen with reference to Caesar and Cicero’s captives. Bispham suggests that the temples 
acted as a ‘visual metaphor for Empire’.763 Furthermore, the use of manubiae for the 
funding of public buildings, particularly those of a religious kind, emphasised the 
significance of warfare within Roman society and linked their victory to divine favour. 
As such, the buildings financed through manubiae acted as a symbol of justification for 
Rome’s violence against foreign nations as victory was a sign of divine favour and the 
proceeds partly went to honouring the gods through the building of temples. This is 
particularly evident in the example of the Temple of Minerva Capta, located at the foot 
of the Caelian Hill, which housed a statue of Minerva taken as spoils from the Falerii in 
241 BCE.764 Given the temple itself referred to the goddess’ captive status, the Romans 
clearly had no qualms emphasising the capture of enemy goods, even if they were 
religious objects.765  
In addition, it was also a way by which the Romans’ supposed greatness could be 
emphasised, as the buildings were dedicated to the Romans’ superior gods, who had 
helped them secure victory, and the Romans would have recognised that the buildings 
had been built from the sale of captives and their possessions. Ultimately, through the 
erection of buildings, and inclusion of captive images and arms in a public sphere, the 
Roman elite were able to justify their continued violence against foreign enemies whilst 
promoting their own political agenda through generosity to the people and their piety. 
As a result, the Romans’ justification of captive-taking and violence was cemented in 
Roman culture, with each generation surrounded by evidence of the previous 
generation’s behaviour in warfare. Thus, captive-taking was culturally ingrained 
within Roman society and therefore perpetuated throughout the generations. We need 
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to consider these factors closely when discussing captive motifs apparent on public 
buildings, monuments, numismatic and other iconographic sources. 
4.10. The Roman Trophy 
As we have seen in Chapter Two on Massacre and in the opening sections of this 
chapter, praeda, manubiae and spolia were important for the Romans’ command over 
their military and their allies.766 In some cases, spoils could take the form of captive 
people, and the association between plunder and captives is perhaps the most obvious 
in depictions of tropaia (tropaeum in Latin) and bound captives. In Greek culture, a 
tropaion was a wooden stump upon which a full set of the enemy’s armour (a panoply) 
was displayed, usually on a battlefield where the battle changed in the victor’s 
favour.767 In the Roman period, a tropaeum came to stand as a symbol of victory and 
can be found on numismatic and in architectural iconography, as we shall see shortly. 
Before addressing such iconographic uses, we need to acknowledge that tropaia also 
had religious significance, as Virgil emphasises throughout Book 10 of the Aeneid in 
relation to the deaths of Pallas, Aeneas’ ally, and Mezentius, an ally of Aeneas’ enemy, 
Turnus. The stripping of an enemy’s corpse was not viewed as sacrilegious, as it was a 
given that single-combat would result in the acquisition of the defeated enemy’s 
armour. The armour could then, should the general choose, be dedicated to the gods,768 
and continued to be displayed in a temple. Alternatively, the spoils could be kept by 
the general, but this is often viewed as a sign of indifference to the gods, as in the case 
of Mezentius who presented his spoils to his son, Lausus.769 Aeneas kills Lausus 
shortly after killing his father, and Harrison suggests that the wearing of spoils was 
thought to be ‘bad luck’ in the Aeneid.770 For example, Lausus unwittingly becomes a 
‘living trophy’, signifying his father’s inversion of the religious norms associated with 
spolia opima and Aeneas’ ultimate victory over the Latins and their allies.771  
According to Harrison, the practice of taking spolia opima is likely to have lain dormant 
until 29 BCE when M. Licinius Crassus attempted to claim spolia opima for his defeat of 
King Deldo of the Bastarnae tribe (Macedonian) in single-combat, but he was thwarted 
by Octavian who denied Crassus the honours.772 In the cases of Lausus and Deldo, the 
armour appears to represent the individuals and their military prowess which, in the 
Roman world during this period, equated to power. As such, whilst spolia opima was 
the most desired prize for the victorious generals, the taking of an enemy leader’s 
armour indicates a general obsession with armour and weaponry in the Roman world, 
which was understood by all levels of society.773 This is significant as armour, in 
addition to representations of captives, was another way by which the Roman elite 
could emphasise their dominion over whole nations, with the armour standing for the 
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male, military part of the nation. As Flower argues, spolia opima developed over the 
course of time and, particularly during the late Republican and early Imperial period, 
the tradition was ‘reinvented’ to suit the tastes and concerns of Romans at the critical 
period of transition from Republic to principate.774 This is the case for Augustus’ use of 
the Parthian standards, a trope we shall address later, and we can see that the spolia 
opima transformed from being the rewards from a one-on-one battle between two 
leaders to becoming the symbol of the Roman leader’s defeat of an entire nation,775 
which evidently had implications on how captives were viewed, sometimes replacing 
the spoils most desired during the Republican period.  
As previously stated, the connection between armour, the enemy and Roman victory is 
emphasised by the Romans’ adoption of the Greek trophy (tropaion), and its use by the 
elite from the late 2nd century BCE onwards.776 In a Greek context, the tropaion was 
usually a temporary structure, but the Romans later adapted the practice by erecting a 
permanent tropaeum, or a monument with depictions of tropaea, in stone or bronze.777 
For instance, Sulla’s monument from the Battle of Chaeronea (Boeotia, Greece) in 86 
BCE supposedly featured a tropaeum inspired by the tropaion from the Battle of 
Marathon [Figure 12].778 Further connections between armour, victory and the gods 
were made by Sulla as he dedicated the trophy to Mars, Venus and Victory.779 Greek 
trophies were generally dedicated to Zeus, and Sulla’s departure from such a tradition 
demonstrates, as Picard suggests,780 the founding of the Roman trophy and the 
beginning of the elite’s use of the trophy within iconography. Given the context, Mars 
and Victory are understandable, but the reference to Venus, Sulla’s favourite deity, 
demonstrates that Sulla was not only closely associating himself with victory, but also 
utilising a formerly Greek symbol,781 one which would have been understood by the 
Boeotians,782 as a way of showing his pietas. Furthermore, Sulla’s signet ring featured 
three tropaia, thus further emphasising Sulla’s personal connection with the gods.783 As 
a result, similarly to the public buildings and monuments erected by the elite, the 
tropaeum acted as a form of political promotion.  
Another way by which the Roman elite ensured that the trophy became a Roman 
symbol, as opposed to a Greek one, was the development of tropaia from temporary to 
permanent. Camp et al argue that, in the Roman period, a permanent tropaeum was 
usually found within an architectural setting,784 and Kinnee’s research corroborates 
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this, showing that by the time of Augustus, the trophy was frequently depicted on 
monuments such as the Tropaeum Alpium at La Turbie (southern France) and 
Augustus’ victory monument at Nikopolis (province of Epirus, Greece).785 As such, the 
trophy images which appear on coins from 101 BCE onwards,786 usually accompanied 
by at least one captive, are unusual in that they represent temporary tropaea, such as 
those which would have been used during a triumph or similar celebrations of Rome’s 
victory. Alternatively, such depictions may have been representative of a permanent 
tropaeum, as Sulla and his son’s (Faustus Cornelius Sulla) coinage may have depicted 
Sulla’s trophies [Figures 13 and 14].787 This is significant in our understanding of 
representations of captives. Firstly, the physical trophies were recognisable by the 
people of Rome, given that they appeared on coinage which was spread throughout 
Italy, and were harnessed as symbols of political power by, as in the case of Faustus 
Cornelius Sulla, the descendants of those who first erected them. Similarly, Caesar’s 
captive-tropaeum coinage, which we shall discuss shortly, may have been connected to 
Caesar’s decision to reinstate Marius’ tropaeum on the Capitoline Hill in the 40s BCE,788 
in addition to the victories he won in Hispania. Ultimately, this impacts upon our 
understanding of the representations of captives because, like the trophies which 
existed in the form of monuments, they are based on real captives which were present 
within society either in the form of enslaved people or displayed in triumphal 
processions and games.  
We should note that Caesar’s use of the captive-tropaeum tableau may have served dual 
purposes, and relate more closely to his political, rather than military, promotion. 
Marius’ Capitoline tropaeum, erected shortly after Marius’ victories against the Gallic 
Cimbri and Teutones in 101 BCE, was one of the first, if not the first, to feature a bound 
captive.789 Caesar was related to Marius, who was also a great general and prominent 
statesman, and it is likely he was deliberately emulating and adapting Marius’ 
development of the tropaeum to stress their familial connection and similar qualities. 
The restoration of Marius’ tropaeum is likely to have taken place during the years of 
Caesar’s dictatorship (from 46 BCE onwards). Significantly, the trophy had initially 
been demolished by the deeply denigrated Sulla, another relative of Caesar’s who once 
forced him to go on the run.790 As such, in his own dictatorship, Caesar may have been 
referencing his connection to Marius’ career rather than Sulla’s, who was known for 
reinstating the position of dictator and for the civil conflict which marred his and 
Marius’ careers.  
4.11. The Captive-Tropaeum Motif 
The captive-tropaeum motif first appears on coinage around the turn of the C1st BCE, 
and the inclusion of captives appears to be a ‘genuine Roman invention’, possibly 
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based on the appearance of captive individuals in Roman triumphs,791 as depicted in 
iconography [Figure 15], including on the frieze from the Temple of Apollo Sosianus 
[Figure 16], and in literature in Propertius’ writings.792 The panoply is deliberately 
humanoid in form, but what is remarkable about earlier coinage featuring the captive-
tropaeum motif is that the captive often forms part of the tropaeum by sitting at the feet 
of the armour. This may have been a stylistic choice of the artist or the commissioner. 
However, presenting the captive as near the tropaeum emphasises the connection 
between the two, and leads the viewer to the conclusion that the armour once belonged 
to the male captives who were present in iconography. Similarly, the careful staging of 
the captives in relation to the tropaeum indicates the Romans’ conscious effort to create 
a scene which could be recognised by viewers across the Mediterranean world. The 
establishment of scenes featuring captives alongside tropaea, most evident in triumphal 
processions, shows that the Roman elite created an image based on a tableau which 
was utilised within art and sculpture.793 This is particularly evident on the tropaeum 
from the Tomb of Caecilia Metella [Figure 17], erected c. 25 BCE on the Via Appia, 
Rome, which includes reliefs featuring the captive-tropaeum motif. Roman armour 
forms the main body of the tropaeum, whilst the shields it holds are Gallic in nature, 
possibly linking to Caecilia’s family’s involvement in wars against Gallic nations.794 
There is some debate about whether the tomb celebrates the achievements of Caecilia’s 
husband’s family, the Licinii Crassi, or those of her own, the Caecilii Metelli.795 
However, as a result of the wars against Gaul during the 1st century BCE, Gallic was 
shorthand for ‘foreign’, so the trophy may be celebrating Caecilia’s familial connections 
to victorious generals, particularly those on her paternal side who had defeated Cretan 
forces.796 Which family was the focus of the message cannot be ascertained, and it is 
sufficient to say that the tomb had little to do with Caecilia herself as, even in death, 
she was used as a means of reflecting the qualities of her male relatives.797  
Despite the debate surrounding the familial references, the relief outlines the use of the 
captive-tropaeum motif within elite iconography. Firstly, as ‘Gallic’ was ‘short-hand’ for 
‘foreign’, this supports the understanding of the Romans’ generalisation of captives 
automatically becoming enslaved people, and the way by which they were broadly 
defined as non-Roman, despite the many different backgrounds and methods of 
capture they had experienced. In this instance, it is possible to read the armour, which 
once belonged to the now defeated Gallic captive underneath, as being of both the 
Gallic soldier and the Gallic nation from which he hailed. The stripping of armour was 
commonplace in Roman warfare, and the tropaeum may be representative of this act 
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itself. Therefore, the tropaea, as a carefully arranged pile of arms, reminded the viewer 
of this act which, in turn was symbolic of Rome having stripped the enemy of their 
defences, particularly as the most important defence, the shields, are held above the 
captives. The human element of warfare is present in the inclusion of the captives who, 
now presented under a symbol of Rome’s power, are even more vulnerable and wholly 
without protection. As a result, the tropaeum transforms into a symbol of Roman 
victory over the captive, his nation, and his power which had been taken during his 
defeat at the hands of Rome. Ultimately, such iconography, on both coinage and 
architectural monuments, reflected Rome’s dominance in contrast to the subjugation of 
the captive and his nation. 
The captive-tropaeum motif continues as such throughout Roman history, both in 
coinage and architecture.798 However, as Kinnee shows, the 1st century BCE saw the 
most development of the motif, with Sulla, Pompey and Caesar each using the trophy 
for their own personal agenda.799 Caesar further developed the motif, changing it from 
a single, male captive to two captives. In the mid-40s BCE, Caesar or his moneyers in 
Hispania produced an elaborate coinage which placed a male and female captive at the 
feet of a symmetrical tropaeum [Figure 18]. Caesar’s name is placed below the motif, 
leading the viewer to understand that Caesar was responsible for the complete defeat 
and subjugation of these individuals who represented their whole nation or nations. As 
with the singular captive-tropaeum motif, the viewer recognises that the armour once 
belonged to the male figure or his comrades. The female, who sits unbound with her 
head in her hands, is evidently in despair. The Romans would have been accustomed 
to female figures personifying nations, and the importance of body language.800 Here, 
the figure acted as both a personification of the nation, in this case Hispania, in which 
Caesar had quelled a rebellion in 46 BCE, and a literal captive from the war.  
With the dual captive motif, the realities of war and Roman conquest are more 
obviously displayed than with the motif featuring the solitary captive. As Gaca stresses 
in her discussion of rape in warfare,801 female prisoners are important in warfare as 
they are paramount to a culture’s social structure in their family centred roles.802 
Hence, the defeat of the male captive ultimately resulted in the subjugation of the 
female captive. Children do not need to be present on the coinage as the female would 
have been associated with the family at large and childrearing. As such, the two 
captives represent different aspects of an enemy culture, at least as the Romans 
understood it. The tropaeum towering over them ultimately indicates the background of 
their capture by violence. For instance, RRC 438/1 [Figure 19] suggests that the captives 
had been taken following a naval conflict, as indicated through the inclusion of anchors 
and ship prows on the tropaeum. Furthermore, the tropaeum also acts as a symbol of 
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Roman dominion over the whole nation and its people. Caesar’s name underlines the 
scene, leaving the viewer in no doubt as to who is responsible for the nation’s defeat.  
In producing this coinage with the dual captive motif, Caesar or his moneyers were 
ensuring that his reputation across the wider Mediterranean world was that of a 
conqueror of foreign nations. This built upon Caesar’s successful self-representation in 
his Gallic Wars, in which we find references to his ability to defeat enemy nations, 
including references to different parts of society, i.e. men, women and children, which 
the image on the coin also stresses. Furthermore, as we shall see in relation to 
triumphs,803 depictions of non-Roman figures may have been used to divert attention 
away from Caesar’s campaigns against his fellow Romans during the Civil War. 
Therefore, this example shows that representations of captive-taking could be used to 
illuminate key characteristics of a prominent individual which acted as a distraction 
from less reputable behaviour. 
4.12. Captive Iconography in the Provinces 
We have discussed the captive-tropaeum motif on monuments in Rome and on coinage, 
but we should now turn to address the impact of captive imagery on monuments in 
the provinces. During the 1st century BCE, we have literary evidence to suggest that 
there were monuments erected throughout the Roman provinces which had certainly 
included tropaea and may have featured captives. We have seen evidence of Sulla’s use 
of tropaea in the Roman provinces, and there is limited archaeological evidence which 
has been assumed to belong to Sulla’s trophy in Boeotia. Sulla’s use of the trophy is 
interesting as it was intended to be viewed by the provincials, rather than the 
population of Rome, as the Tomb of Caecilia Metella was certainly intended to do. 
Literary evidence attests to the erection of these monuments by the Roman elite, such 
as Pompey’s monument in the Pyrenees and Caesar’s at Zela, but later monuments are 
likely to have been commissioned by the provincial elite. Unfortunately, as with the 
case of Sulla’s Boeotian trophy, we have little archaeological evidence to support the 
literary evidence.  
However, by the early Imperial period, primarily during the reigns of Augustus and 
Tiberius, there are surviving monuments erected throughout the Roman provinces 
which show the inclusion of captives alongside armour and tropaia. As we have seen in 
the case of the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias in the previous chapter, we cannot be certain 
as to who commissioned the monuments in the provinces. The intended message of 
these pro-Roman monuments has been widely debated. Suffice it to say, it is likely that, 
if erected by the provincial elite, it was intended to show that the provinces were 
assimilating with Roman values and ideology, of which warfare was central to society. 
The inclusion of such iconography and the very fact of its survival, as provincial 
monuments were not destroyed, suggests that the provincial elite were viewing art 
from a Roman perspective, and choosing to emulate Roman stylistic choices.804 
Similarly, as Campbell argues, the presence of these monuments within the provinces 
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also acted as a warning against those who may have attempted to rebel against Rome 
and its dominion in the provinces,805 both inside the Roman province and across the 
border.806 However, such warnings were not direct, but took on a more subtle form as 
the captives who were depicted were not those from the province in which the 
monument was placed, but from elsewhere.  
For instance, the Arch of Carpentras [Figure 20], erected in southern France in 9 BCE, 
depicts Augustus’ victory over the Dalmatians and the Germans during a series of 
wars between 13-9 BCE.807 D’Ambra has identified the ethnicity of two captives, 
presented beneath a tropaeum, by considering their native costumes, as the Romans 
understood them, with the German prisoner wearing fur, and the Dalmatian wearing a 
hat with earflaps.808 Whilst there is some debate about the origin of the captives, with 
Anderson claiming that the captive with the earflaps is Parthian or Armenian, the 
point is ultimately that the captives were not Gallic in appearance.809 The provincial 
viewers, despite the widespread adoption of markers of Roman culture in the area, 
were of Gallic ethnicity. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the provincial elite, 
particularly those of Gallic descent, to erect monuments which showed Roman 
dominion over representations of Gaul. D’Ambra argues that the purpose of the 
erection of the arch was to celebrate the founding of the Colonia of Julia Meminorum 
Carpentorate, and it was intended to stress the adoption of Roman cultural markers in 
the area and demonstrate to the local population that they too could identify with the 
values of Roman dominion. As D’Ambra summarises: the ‘identification with Roman 
[values] could be acquired through loyalty and the proper course of action and that the 
distinction between Roman and non-Roman was open to question.’810 In one respect, 
such monuments acted as an opportunity for provincials to show and be actively 
involved in the display and promotion of Roman values, thus creating a sense of 
identity through the contrast between themselves, as Roman citizens, and the foreign 
captives. However, whilst creating identity and Romanization are two motivations for 
the erection of monuments with captive iconography, there may also be more sinister 
motivations. Namely, it is likely that there was an element of threat in the depictions of 
the captives, regardless of whether the captives represented identities the viewers 
could identify with. As such, the tone of such depictions was always sinister in nature, 
but it depended on how the viewer identified with the values Rome and its allies 
emphasised throughout Rome and the provinces. 
The Arch of Carpentras provides an example of depictions of other ethnicities within a 
Gallic province which was heavily influenced by Roman culture. However, we should 
note that the arch is problematic as we cannot ascertain who was responsible for its 
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construction. As such, we should address another example which features the 
iconography of enslavement. The monument which was also located in Gaul lies some 
286 kilometres from Carpentras. The Tropaeum Alpium [Figure 21], erected on the 
orders of the senate to commemorate Augustus’ campaigns in the region which took 
place throughout the 30s and 20s BCE, is in La Turbie close to the principality of 
Monaco. In contrast to the arch of Carpentras which commemorated victories over 
foreign nations, the Tropaeum Alpium refers directly to the ‘Alpine’ nations who 
would have lived within its vicinity or who shared a similar background. Erected in 
7/6 BCE,811 the tropaeum bears an inscription which may be key to our understanding 
of the intended audience and how the provincial population were intended to respond. 
Writing in the century following the tropaeum’s construction, Pliny records the full 
inscription present on the monument: 
To the Emperor Caesar, son of the late lamented 
Augustus [Julius Caesar], Supreme Pontiff, in his fourteenth year of 
office as Commander-in-chief and seventeenth year 
of Tribunitial Authority—erected by the Senate and 
People of Rome, to commemorate that under his 
leadership and auspices all the Alpine races stretching 
from the Adriatic Sea to the Mediterranean were 
brought under the dominion of the Roman people. 
Alpine races conquered—the Triumpilini, Camunni,  
Venostes, Vennonetes, Isarchi, Breuni, Genaunes, 
Focunates, four tribes of the Vindelici, the Cosuanetes, 
Rucinates, Licates, Catenates, Ambisontes, Rugusci, 
Suanetes, Calucones, Brixentes, Leponti, Uberi, Nantuates, 
Seduni, Varagri, Salassi, Acitavones, Medulli, 
Ucenni, Caturiges, Brigiani, Sobionti, Brodionti, 
Nemaloni, Edenates, Vesubiani, Veamini, Gallitae, 
Triullati, Ecdini, Vergunni, Eguituri, Nematuri, 
Oratelli, Nerusi, Velauni, Suetri.812 
Crucially, the names of the offending nations are listed. This is useful for Imperial 
representations as it enabled Augustus to demonstrate his military and political 
prowess in defeating dozes of nations, whilst not alienating the population who lived 
in the area. As we have seen in the case of the Tomb of Caecilia Metella, the Romans 
were happy to use ‘Gallic’ as an umbrella term which referred to anything foreign, 
whilst dismissing the complexities of identity with the region. There were multiple 
nations, each with their own rulers, operating in what became the Roman province of 
Gaul. In Rome itself, such intricacies were not acknowledged, yet this does not appear 
to be the case for the provinces, as Augustus carefully lists the enemy nations he 
conquered, thus demonstrating the range of the geographical area he conquered.813 By 
 
811 Pliny, NH 3.20.  
812 Pliny, NH 3.20. 
813 Turner, 2013: 299.  
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naming the nations, Augustus was able to specifically identify his enemies and ensure 
that other nations in the region did not feel attacked by his raising of a monument 
which mentioned ‘Gauls’ in general. In fact, Augustus’ naming of specific tribes may 
have been following the lead of a Gallic leader and Roman ally, Marcus Julius Cottius, 
son of King Donnus. Dating to the 9/8 BCE, the inscription on the Arch of Augustus at 
Susa (Segusio) near Turin, erected to commemorate Cottius’ renewed alliance with 
Rome, lists the nations Cottius ruled over and declares that they are allies of Rome.814 
Evidently, Cottius’ arch was intended to honour Augustus, further cementing their 
alliance, and emphasise Cottius’ own power in the region. Despite operating in a 
region close to the Tropaeum Alpium, only six of nations that Cottius listed correspond 
to those defeated by Augustus in battle: the Caturges, the Vesubianii, the Medulii, the 
Adanates, the Ecdinii, and the Veaminii.815 Here, we see that the arch gives Cottius the 
opportunity to boast of the extension of his power, through contact with Rome,816 to 
include these six tribes, whilst Augustus lists them regardless as they had, throughout 
his campaigns, been defeated by Roman forces. As a result, whilst clearly intended to 
have multiple messages, the deliberate naming of specific nations was crucial to 
ensuring that Rome’s message of dominion, which we shall discuss shortly, kept the 
local population on side by exploiting the differences between nations within the Gaul. 
The complete submission of the nations listed on the inscription is evident in the 
captive-tropaeum relief which adorned one side of the monument. The composition of 
the tableau is like the scenes on Caesar’s coinage: with a singular female figure sat 
despondently on one side of a tropaeum whilst a male captive is bound on the other. 
Unusually for depictions of captive women, the female is fully clothed and chained, 
rather than appearing with her head in her hands, as we have seen in examples like the 
Gemma Augustea.817 The female is sexualised as her breast is exposed, which has 
connections to both Amazonian images but also, as I have argued previously, to sexual 
assault.818 The female figure looks towards the male who looks to the ground, in a 
manner which conveys utter defeat. They are both of a diminutive size compared to 
the tree tropaeum which looms over them and which bears a host of oversized armour. 
Their small size suggests that they have been utterly overwhelmed by Rome’s power, 
as symbolised by the towering tropaea. Given that this relief was viewed by a provincial 
audience, it suggests that the violent nature of captive-taking and subsequent 
enslavement was widely accepted as a feature of warfare. The success of the trophy 
rested on the listing of names and the identification of the enemies in question. Despite 
the Romans’ attitude towards Gaul, the monument seemingly shows that not all Gauls 
were Rome’s enemies, thus enabling the senate to play on the ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric 
which is evident in the inscriptions on both Augustus’ tropaeum and Cottius’ arch. 
Whilst this rhetoric was evidently in place, that is not to suggest that there was no 
underlying threat within the iconography. Those who lived near the monument would 
 
814 CIL V, 7231= AE 2004 = ILS 94 
815 Roncaglia, 2013: 358-9. 
816 Cornwell, 2015: 42-43. 
817 Cf. pp. 84-89,  
818 Ramsby, Severy-Hoven, 2007: 57. 
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have been reminded on a daily basis of the consequences should they rebel against 
Roman power, thus it was safer to forge alliances with Rome, as Cottius had, for the 
benefit of the provincial community.  
The success of Roman captive iconography in the provinces is evident in depictions of 
captives which were found within non-elite households. Around 16 bound captive 
figurines have been found across Britain and Germany [Figures 22 and 23], and date 
from the 1st and 2nd centuries CE. Granted, the period they originate from it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but we need to acknowledge that Britain and large parts of 
Germany were not under Roman dominion until after the period in question, and even 
after this period large parts of both areas remained outside of Roman control. As such, 
the figurines indicate the impact of widescale warfare on the local population and the 
goods they produced. Jackson suggests the bronze figures, which were secured onto 
unknown objects, may have been used as decoration for some aspect of the slave trade 
in the regions.819 Unfortunately, we cannot ascertain their exact usage, and they do not 
bear the hallmarks of bound figurines like the so-called ‘Louvre Voodoo Doll’ which 
were used in magical practice.820 However, the fact that such figurines are clearly 
recognisable as bound figures would suggest that the symbolism we seen in the 
iconography of the Late Republic and early Principate was widespread and enduring 
enough to be adapted for non-elite slave traders, if they were intended for decorative 
use in the slave trade, and their clients. 
4.13. Chapter Conclusion 
Slavery was central to the Romans’ understanding of the power dynamics within their 
culture, be it in their language, literature, historical representations or within their 
economy and households. Captives who were enslaved acted as symbols of Rome’s 
dominance over the provinces and their right to utilise captives as they wished. This 
essentially ensured the continuation of the Roman empire, as violence could be 
justified if the Roman elite perpetuated the myth that those they captured were inferior 
to themselves. However, despite the Roman elite’s representations of captives as 
‘inferior’ beings, captives and enslaved persons were essential to the Roman economy 
and the rhetoric developed by the elite to maintain their power. This is attested to most 
pointedly within artwork and iconography commissioned by the elite, which was 
successfully adopted within non-elite material culture as evident from the series of 




819 Jackson, 2005: 143-156. 
820 Ogden, 2009: 251. 
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Chapter Five – ‘Hostages’ in War and ‘Peace’ 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous three chapters, we have encountered the Romans’ treatment of captives 
in their power, namely: massacre, sexual violence and enslavement. However, when 
faced with the prospect of these outcomes, there were several ways by which the 
Romans and the nations they interacted with could avoid further or open warfare. The 
ways to avoid conflict included: a show of force, hostage-taking in both diplomatic 
relations before or after a war, and the taking of prisoners akin to hostages outside of 
formal negotiations during warfare. To address each one in turn: military action, as we 
have seen in the previous chapters, usually involved massacre followed by looting, and 
the rape and enslavement of women and young children. Hostages could then be 
demanded during subsequent negotiations as part of Rome’s standard negotiating 
practices.821 Hostages were then used as symbols of a nation’s compliance or peace 
with Rome. However, violence and demands for hostages need not be directed at the 
enemy but could also be conducted against neighbours of Rome’s enemies, thus acting 
as a warning to other nations of the dangers of challenging Rome. Despite not being 
directly threatened with war, as asking for hostages was a form of threat, such nations 
would then be more inclined to supply Rome with hostages, as both assurances and 
symbols of peace. The hostages, as symbols of submission, further enabled the Romans 
to exert their dominance over the nations in question without having to engage in 
military conflict. This relationship between military force and subsequent negotiations 
became an unrelenting cycle which spiralled out from Rome with the expansion of the 
empire. Word of Rome’s aggression would spread,822 and Rome’s enemies would have 
the choice between treating with Rome, which may have involved the surrender of 
hostages, or risking defeat and, as we have seen, its horrific consequences.  
5.2. Defining Hostages 
Before proceeding any further, we need to redefine our understanding of ‘hostage’, 
primarily as the word has modern implications which do not reflect the use of hostages 
in the ancient world. As we saw in the introduction, in Greco-Roman writings, 
hostages are referred to using the terms obses and homeros (ὅμερος), both words which 
can be translated as either ‘hostage’ or ‘surety pledge’.823 As Allen outlines, scholarship 
has largely focussed on those referred to using the aforementioned terms, and those 
linked to treaties and negotiations,824 which means that other examples, where the 
language does not directly reflect an individual’s ‘hostage’ status, have not been 
discussed.825 As a result, there are individuals whose treatment was comparable to that 
 
821 Moscovich, 1979: 122. 
822 As we have seen in relation to the Gallic and British tribes offering warnings to one another 
of Caesar’s approach, cf. pp. 35-42, 54-59, 81-84. 
823 OLD, 1222: obses, LSJ, 1221: ὃμερος. 
824 For instance, foedus aequum, foedus iniquum, deditio, cf. Allen, 2006: 16. 
825 Allen’s monograph on hostage-taking in the Roman world is highly detailed and has proved 
invaluable to this thesis. However, Allen omits certain types of hostages, including those taken 
in warfare, e.g. Dumnorix, who we shall discuss shortly. 
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of an explicitly labelled ‘hostage’ in Greek and Latin, but may be described using 
alternative terms for a variety of reasons which shall be addressed where appropriate. 
This is evident in the language used by Augustus in his Res Gestae when discussing the 
Parthian ‘hostages’ sent to him by King Phraates IV in 10/9 BCE,826 in comparison to 
that of later authors.  
In his Res Gestae, Augustus boasts of how Phraates sent his four sons along with their 
wives and children to Rome as a way of demonstrating his friendship to Rome. 
Augustus claims that this was done ‘not because [Phraates] had been conquered in 
war, but rather seeking our friendship by means of his own children as pledges’ (non 
bello superátus, sed amicitiam nostram per (liberorum) suorum pignora petens).827 Whilst 
Gregoratti argues that ‘Imperial propaganda did not miss out on the opportunity to 
make the gesture of the Great King pass as an explicit admission of Roman 
superiority’,828 that is not to suggest that Augustus’ assessment of the situation was not 
carefully constructed and perhaps more subtly presented than in the works of later 
authors. Augustus refers to the ‘friendship’ as amicitia, a word which translates in this 
instance more closely to ‘alliance’ than ‘friendship’ in the modern sense of the word.829 
Burton demonstrates that the term was commonly used in foreign affairs throughout 
the mid-Republic to indicate that an informal treaty had been established, and this 
practice was harnessed by Augustus in his description of his relationships with other 
nations.830 Badian has suggested that the Romans used the term to allow foreign 
nations to feel as though they were on equal footing.831 However, as Lee points out, in 
this respect, nations were only equal if both parties consented to give hostages to one 
another.832 By this time in Roman history, Roman hostage-giving was an archaic 
practice, as the balance of power in the Roman-Parthian relationship was in the 
Romans’ favour. Nevertheless, as Augustus casts the relationship as a ‘friendly’ one, 
with Phraates volunteering his sons, Augustus does not use the word obses, but rather 
refers to Phraates’ four sons and their families as pignora (pignus) and translated in the 
Greek version as ἐνέχυρον. In Latin, pignus translates as ‘anything given as security for 
(a debt, bond, good conduct)’, and ‘a pledge, surety or hostage.’833 Therefore, it was 
clearly understood that they were tokens or symbols of Phraates’ cooperation with 
Augustus, and the Parthians were hostages in all but name. Furthermore, other sources 
refer to Phraates’ sons as hostages (obses and ὃμερος), rather than using the 
aforementioned terms, including two of Augustus’ close contemporaries, Strabo and 
 
826 We shall discuss Augustus’ Parthian hostages in greater detail in the latter part of the 
chapter. 
827 Aug. RG 32. 
828 Gregoratti, 2011: 732. 
829 Aug. RG 1.32. In the context of international relations but, as Burton suggests, it is likely that 
the Romans understood the word to also mean a close personal bond, cf. Burton, 2003: 333-335, 
Burton, 2011: 2-6, Snowdon, 2015: 209-12, Tiersch, 2015: 248-260. 
830 Burton, 2003: 333-335. 
831 Badian, 1958: 6-7.  
832 Lee, 1991: 366-374. 
833 OLD, 1379: pignus. In Greek, the definition is more straightforward, more commonly 
denoting a financial ‘surety’ or ‘pledge’, cf. LSJ, 565: ἐνεχυράζω. 
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Velleius Paterculus.834 This suggests that, despite Augustus’ terminology, it was widely 
understood, even during Augustus’ reign, that the sons were hostages with a status 
akin to those labelled explicitly as obses or homeros. The connections between the words 
pignora (pignus) and ἐνέχυρον, and those which translate as ‘hostage’, indicate that 
hostages were thought of differently from other captives. This essentially centred 
around the fact that hostages, even those referred to using more vague terms, were 
seen as being symbolic of peace towards Rome. Nevertheless, Augustus’ deliberate 
avoidance of obses or homeros suggests that hostage-taking was understood to be an 
action which involved the threat of force, which was certainly not in line with Phraates’ 
volunteering his sons and his ‘friendly’ alliance with Augustus.  
This example demonstrates several issues with studying hostages, and enables us to 
create a broader definition of a hostage than previous scholarship, which has focussed 
on linguistic definitions, has allowed. Firstly, as Phraates’ sons were accompanied by 
their families, hostages could be men, women and children, although males were more 
valuable given that the Romans operated within the staunchly patriarchal societies of 
the ancient Mediterranean world. Secondly, individuals had to belong to the upper 
ranks of a nation’s society, as they were more valuable to the members of the ruling 
classes and were often members of a leader’s family. Thirdly, individuals could be 
taken through non-violent means, although we shall encounter examples of violence 
throughout this chapter; that is not to suggest that a threat of violence was not present. 
Fourthly, despite the use of language within elite self-representation, individuals were 
still identifiable as hostages through the treatment they received at the hands of their 
keepers. As we have seen, Augustus was careful in his presentation of the Parthian 
‘hostages’, although his close contemporaries recognised that,835 despite Augustus’ 
own language, the Parthians were ultimately hostages. Here, we can see that the line 
between captives and hostages was blurred in the Roman world, and the position and 
treatment of hostages within society rested on their social position, whether they were 
still valued by their home nation, and what they are called in later representations. As 
such, the language I use throughout this chapter reflects the undefined nature of 
hostage-taking, and the blurred lines between captives and hostages. For instance, 
whilst I use the terms ‘hostages’, I have also acknowledged the fact that they were, 
whether presented as ‘voluntarily’ in Roman hands or not, ultimately ‘captives’ in the 
‘custody’ of Roman ‘keepers’ who had little choice in their position. That being said, as 
we shall explore throughout this chapter, the Romans’ treatment of their ‘hostages’ 
differed greatly from those deemed to be captives. 
Finally, from the example of Augustus’ Parthian hostages, we can see how hostage-
taking was generally presented by Greco-Roman authors as being mutually beneficial. 
This has led the study of hostage-taking to focus on the position of hostages in custody 
in Rome, and their subsequent use as client kings.836 The use of hostages as client kings 
 
834 Strabo, Geog. 16.1.28, Joseph. Ant. Iud. 18.42, Tac. Ann. 2.1, Vell. Pat. 2.94. 
835 Strabo, Geog. 16.1.28, Vell. Pat. 2.94. 
836 We shall discuss client kings in the latter half of the chapter, cf. Richardson, 1976: 13-15, 
Braund, 1984: 1-13, Rogan, 2011: 73-76, Mattingly, 2011: 79-85. 
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should be acknowledged before we proceed any further, as the treatment of 
individuals in Roman custody, whether labelled as hostage or otherwise, relates to the 
Romans’ plans for the future use of hostages. In theory, kings who had ‘volunteered’ 
their children were able to place their offspring close to the centre of Roman power, 
thus supposedly enabling the children to represent their parents’ interests through 
their connections to the Roman elite. In turn, the Romans also benefitted politically 
from this arrangement and in their later representations of hostage-taking, and the 
practice became a central component of their ‘puppet ruler’ or ‘client king’ model 
across the empire. Elite hostages, usually held by members of the Roman elite in Rome 
itself, were singled out to return to their nations as rulers and, as a result, were well-
educated and introduced to Roman culture and language. The indoctrination of 
hostages into Roman culture meant that the hostages acted as a means of cultural 
exchange between Rome and the hostage’s nation. As such, the cultural and linguistic 
education which hostages underwent, including their immersion in Roman values and 
ideals, ensured that the future rulers of Rome’s provinces and allied nations were loyal 
to Rome without force having to be exerted. As a result of the focus on former hostages 
who became ‘client kings’ within Greco-Roman literature, we often miss the 
opportunity to discuss what came before the ‘voluntary’ surrender of high-status 
hostages, who may have become client kings, and also how those of a less elite status 
were used. 
Following the overall structure of this work in attempting to follow a captive’s journey 
chronologically, I will consider representations of hostages by focussing on the 
circumstances in which they were apprehended. There were hostages who were taken 
in large numbers during warfare who could be used as collateral over their nations 
who had, by this stage, submitted to Rome. As we shall see in the case of Caesar’s 
hostage-taking, many of them were probably returned to their families once an alliance 
had been secured and the threat to Rome had been neutralised. Others were taken 
following the conclusion of war and were used during negotiations following a 
nation’s surrender. The latter two hostage types are discussed in the first half of this 
chapter which deals with wartime hostage-taking. The other category of hostage was 
those who, after their nations had surrendered, were taken to Rome to be ‘educated’ in 
Roman values, language and culture with the view of creating ‘pro-Roman rulers’. The 
latter half of the chapter concerns their lives and Rome’s representation of their 
treatment at the hands of their ‘keepers’. 
5.3. Hostages in Warfare: The Exemplum of Scipio Africanus at New Carthage 
Before considering the realities and representations of hostage-taking during the 1st 
century BCE, we should consider the expectations of hostage-taking in line with the 
‘rules of war’. To do this, we need to return to an exemplum we have encountered in the 
chapter of sexual violence: Scipio Africanus at New Carthage.837 To briefly recap: In 209 
BCE, Scipio took New Carthage (Cartagena in present-day Spain) and found that the 
 
837 Cf. pp. 75-78. 
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Carthaginians had taken female hostages from a number of Iberian nations.838 Scipio 
summoned the hostages’ families and protected them until they were collected, 
although it appears that one of their guards had made unwanted sexual advances 
which Scipio addressed once the issue was raised with him. This example is significant 
as it shows the unwritten honour code between hostages and their keepers, highlights 
how the treatment of hostages could ultimately be used to promote an individual’s 
characteristics, and also conveys the fluidity of a person’s status between captive and 
hostage as Polybius alternates between calling the women hostages and captives.839  
For this exemplum, the most important issue is that the hostages in question had been 
taken by Carthage, not by Rome. As such, neither Roman law, which could be used to 
prosecute sexual violence against Roman women, nor the ‘rules of war’ which 
protected hostages from harm, applied to the Iberian hostages.840 Therefore, Scipio was 
not required by propriety to protect the hostages from the unpleasant treatment 
captives could be subjected to as was the Romans’ right of war.841 The hostages were 
effectively elite prisoners of war as they had not been taken hostage by the Romans but 
by the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, the Iberian women continued to be treated like 
hostages by Scipio. It should be remembered that the terms of surrender were 
ultimately decided by the conqueror.842 Therefore, it was at Scipio’s discretion that he 
chose to preserve the status of Carthage’s hostages and treated them as he would 
hostages taken by Romans. This enables Polybius to present Scipio’s moderation and 
restraint in relation to female hostages, and the general’s magnanimity and political 
vision in deciding to return obsides.843 Furthermore, later authors could present Scipio 
as upholding honour codes relating to hostages despite not having made the 
agreement.844 Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the Romans had no legal hold 
over the hostages, given that the treaty was between Carthage and the Iberian tribes, so 
it is likely that releasing the hostages was the only way to proceed.845 However, the 
retelling of the story centred on presenting Scipio as a fair general and it is clear that 
the relationship between the captives and hostages depended entirely upon the 
general’s disposition towards those in Roman custody and the nations they 
represented. As such, the ‘rules of war’ were malleable and Roman generals were able 
to present their dealings with hostages in a way which was beneficial to their careers, 
as we shall see throughout Caesar’s writings on the subject. 
 
838 Polyb. 10.18-19. 
839 Polybius calls the Iberian women hostages (ὅμηροι) but refers to a female brought before him 
for sexual purposes as a captive (αἰχμάλωτον), despite her high status in New Carthaginian 
society, cf. Polyb. 10.18-19. For further discussion on the different categories in Polybius’ 
description, cf. Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34. 
840 Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34. 
841 Cf. pp. 75-78. 
842 Sanz, 2015: 87-105, cf. pp. 27-35. 
843 Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34. 
844 For a discussion of the protection of hostages in religion, rather than the rules of war, cf. 
Allen, 2006: 93-4. 
845 Garcia Fernández, 2015: 132-34. 
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5.4. Caesar’s Wartime Hostage-taking 
Firstly, let us address hostage-taking in warfare and consider both the symbolic and 
practical uses of hostages during their initial stint in Roman custody. Elbern argues 
that Roman leaders chose to take a small number of hostages as, after battle or siege 
warfare, it was more practical to keep track of a group of individuals who could 
influence the enemy nation and its leaders, rather than be concerned about collecting 
an enemy’s resources, including weaponry.846 This may account for why the Romans 
tended to take hostages before requesting arms as hostages were considered to be more 
of a deterrent against uprisings.847 However, that is not to suggest that hostage-taking 
in warfare was always presented as being purely practical. As we have seen 
throughout this thesis, Caesar is our most important source on Roman military conduct 
in warfare,848 and we also have evidence of other generals involved in the Gallic Wars 
following similar practices to Caesar himself.849 With reference to other accounts of 
hostage-taking,850 it is possible to argue that Caesar’s actions are typical of Roman 
warfare. Caesar claims to have taken hundreds of hostages,851 which he refers to as 
obsides in his Gallic Wars. The number of hostages is telling of the importance of 
hostage-taking in warfare and acts as another way by which Caesar could subtly boast 
of his military and diplomatic competence.852 For instance, Caesar allegedly demanded 
600 hostages from the Aedui in c. 57 BCE, yet it is unlikely that 600 elite individuals 
could have been taken without completely removing the upper echelons of Gallic 
society: those with whom Caesar could treat. It can be argued that Caesar recognised 
the importance of hostages in Roman diplomatic relations and, by using a high figure, 
he was able to convey his achievement in subjugating the Aedui’s population, as the 
most important individuals were in his custody. On this note, as Allen argues: 
‘Caesar’s commentaries with their records of the unflappable detention of hostages 
were meant to persuade the Roman at home that his grip on Gaul, and even Britain, 
was secure.’853 As a result, regardless of the realities, representations of hostage-taking 
reveal more about the person involved in the practice than the realities. 
The figures Caesar provides in relation to his hostage-taking are considerably smaller 
than the numbers he claimed to have taken as captives during the Gallic Wars.854 The 
numbers of hostages taken may be explained by hostages being closely linked to those 
 
846 Elbern, 1990: 98-100. 
847 Vervaet, Naco Del Hoyo, 2007: 21-46. 
848 Cf. pp. 45, 49-55. 
849 The supposed author of the Gallic Wars, Hirtius, references Caesar’s general Fabius securing 
hostages from several states (Caes. BGall. 8.27). 
850 For instance, Pompey’s hostage-taking during his wars in the East, cf. App. Mith. 103, 117, 
Cass. Dio. 37.2.5-7, Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.5. For an overview of other individuals and their hostage-
taking practices, cf. Allen, 2006: 10-13.  
851 Caes. BGall. 2.15, 5.4, 5.20, 7.11. He demands an unspecified but large number of hostages 
from the Morini, cf. Caes. BGall. 4.22, and from the Averni at 7.89-90. 
852 Allen, 2006: 250. 
853 Allen, 2006: 250. 
854 Cf. pp. 98-111. 
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in power.855 As such, hostages were considered more valuable, in a political or 
diplomatic sense, than other captives who could be sold into slavery,856 and there can 
be little doubt that the threat posed to such hostages would be more effective in 
curbing any possible rebellion against Rome, than the threat to many less politically 
valuable victims. Overall, it is possible that in cases where large-scale hostage-taking is 
found, the hostages were taken as part of peace treaties and subsequently released 
once an enemy’s co-operation was ensured, with only the children of the leaders being 
retained by Caesar, as we shall discuss in the section on hostages in Rome. As a case in 
point, Caesar does not refer to the release of hostages at any point during his 
commentaries on the Gallic Wars. However, we know that other generals retained only 
elite hostages and Caesar certainly did the same, as evident in his decision to keep the 
infant Juba II.857  
As we shall see in the following chapter, the triumph was intended to highlight the 
achievements of a Roman general and the procession was staged for maximum impact, 
from the triumphator’s costume to the presentation of the lands he had conquered 
which often included the use of living people as personifications. Similarly, with 
hostage-taking we can see how the character and position of a leader or a nation could 
also be stressed in the writings of Greco-Roman authors by their engagement with 
hostage-taking. This has ramifications on what we know of Caesar’s claims, and it is 
therefore sensible to assume that Caesar was exaggerating the numbers, as a mass of 
hostages would have caused logistical problems in terms of supplies and manpower, 
and this may have been a consideration for Caesar whilst he was on the move.858 Such 
financial and logistical considerations may explain why, during his campaign against 
the Belgae in 52 BCE, Caesar chose to take hostages rather than prisoners as less 
manpower would be needed to guard a smaller number of high-profile individuals, 
particularly during a crucial stage in his campaign. The importance of these hostages is 
clear as Caesar had defeated the towns of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum (Neung-
sur-Beuvron, near Orléans), which would have offered the possibility of taking 
thousands of prisoners who could be sold into slavery for financial gain.859 Caesar’s 
hostage-taking at this late stage in the war may have been motivated by his recognition 
that the Gallic alliance was losing, and that hostages would be more pertinent for the 
negotiations following the Gauls’ defeat. In addition, Caesar kept the hostages at 
Noviodunum, which was an opportunity to personally influence the hostages, which 
may have proved useful in the negotiations after the Gallic alliance’s defeat. That 
Caesar chose not to send the hostages to Rome suggests that he was concerned about 
 
855 Allen, 2006: 3-4. In contrast to the maximum figure of 600 hostages Caesar claims to have 
taken during the Gallic Wars, Caesar asserts that he captured 53,000 captives in another 
instance, cf. Caes. BGall. 2.33. 
856 Cic. Att. 5.20.5, Paus. 7.16.7-8, App. Iber. 98. 
857 As we shall discuss later in the chapter. 
858 This also appears to be the case for Crassus, as he quickly turned from attacking the Sotiates, 
to attack the Vocates and the Tarusates. Logistically, Crassus needed to travel light to be able to 
move swiftly to new targets, cf. Caes. BGall. 3.23. 
859 Caes. BGall. 7.11-7.12. 
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the influence which could be exerted over them by members of the Roman elite,860 
particularly as Caesar would have had knowledge of Clodius’ manipulation of 
Pompey’s hostage Tigranes in 66 BCE, 861 as we shall discuss shortly. However, the 
comparatively more ‘humane’ treatment of hostages, in contrast to their executed or 
enslaved counterparts, highlights how the treatment of captives could be used to 
illuminate a Roman leader’s qualities, a factor which will become apparent throughout 
this chapter.  
5.5. The Practicalities of Wartime Hostage-taking 
For the Romans, there were numerous practical advantages to hostage-taking, and 
Caesar presented hostage-taking as symbolic of a nation’s willingness to assist with his 
campaign.862 In turn, the provision of hostages acted as evidence of a nation’s goodwill 
towards Rome, which could be parlayed into friendly or favourable relationships in 
later dealings with Rome and the senate.863 Should a nation delay in presenting 
hostages, they could be threatened with or subjected to further military action.864 That 
is not to suggest that all nations gave hostages and pledged their allegiance to Caesar 
willingly, and there is an element of violence in Caesar’s hostage-taking. The danger to 
hostages is evident in an exchange between Caesar and Indutiomarus of the Treveri, a 
former enemy of Rome. Indutiomarus submitted to Caesar in 54 BCE and agreed to 
hand over 200 Treveran hostages, including his own son. Caesar is presented as using a 
thinly veiled threat against the hostages to remind Indutiomarus of his submission to 
Rome. In a dialogue in the Gallic Wars, Caesar promised that Indutiomarus’ relatives 
would be safe but immediately reminded Indutiomarus to remain loyal to Rome.865 
Whilst Caesar does not make an explicit threat, in comparison to the direct threats he 
issues to Segni and Condrusi prisoners,866 an ‘or else’ is implicit in this exchange, and 
unspoken threats must have been commonplace in Caesar’s hostage-taking.  
Such implicit threats may have enabled the Romans to ensure hostages remained in 
custody, as the hostages’ families would be less inclined to make a move if their loved 
ones were at risk. Interestingly, there are no recorded cases of individuals’ families 
breaking them out of Roman custody but, as we shall see shortly, third parties who 
wanted to use the hostages for their own agenda occasionally took hostages through 
physical or political force. The fact that no families attempted to rescue their kin 
suggests that threats such as Caesar’s were successful, as family members would not 
have wished to place their loved ones at risk even though the Romans’ past practices 
showed that hostages were not physically harmed. However, there is a first time for 
everything, and this may have factored into the families’ concerns for the hostages. 
 
860 Elbern, 1990: 111. 
861 Asc. 47, Cicero, Dom. 66. 
862 Caes. BGall. 6.6. Caesar’s lieutenant-generals also used murder of people and destruction of 
land as a way of forcing alliances, cf. Labienus and the Treveri at 6.8, and Lucterius and the 
Ruteni at 7.7.  
863 Caes. BGall. 4.36, 6.9.  
864 Caes. BGall. 4.27-30, 36, 5.1. 
865 Caes. BGall. 5.4. 
866 Caes. BGall. 6.32. 
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Nevertheless, the threat against hostages enabled Caesar to reduce the manpower and 
resources necessary to protect the vast numbers of hostages Caesar claimed to have 
taken. On this note, it is useful to address the logistics of hostage-taking, as evident 
following the capture of Noviodunum in 52 BCE. The capture of the fortified town 
appears to have been something of a turning point in Caesar’s hostage-taking, as 
Caesar decided to leave the hostages gathered throughout his Gallic campaigns (obsides 
Galliae) in the city as he moved forward.867  
So they [Eporedorix and Viridomarus] put to the sword the troops on guard at Noviodunum 
and the traders who had gathered there, and divided the money and the horses between them; 
they caused the hostages of the states to be conducted to the magistrate at Bibracte. As they 
judged that they could not hold the town they set it on fire, that it might be of no service to the 
Romans; all the corn that they could handle at once they removed in boats, the rest they spoilt 
with fire and river-water.868 
Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant 
pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt; obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum 
deducendos curaverunt; oppidum, quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset 
usui Romanis, incenderunt; frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, 
reliquum flumine atque incendio corruperunt. 
Here, we see an example of the fluidity between the treatment of captives and 
hostages, as Caesar writes of the precious resources which were also kept with the 
hostages, including: the corn, the state chest, and Caesar and the army’s baggage. As 
the hostages are presented in the same list, it is likely that the hostages were also 
guarded alongside the items, which would have resulted in a slight loss of manpower. 
However, that the hostages are listed alongside these items and were under guard 
suggests that they were viewed as valuable, but were, like their captive counterparts, 
seen as commodities which needed to be protected. As such, they were important only 
in that they could serve some use to Caesar in his campaigns and their usefulness 
could also be manipulated by Caesar’s enemies. 
As it transpired, Caesar’s decision to leave the hostages behind proved to be a mistake, 
as in the latter part of the war they were ‘freed’ by two Aeduans, Eporedorix and 
Viridomarus. The two men led a small force to Noviodunum where they killed the 
Roman guards and kept the hostages.869 Later, it appears that the hostages were used 
by the two Aeduans to gain support of the hostages’ nations, including through the use 
of torture.870 Caesar’s reference to torture may have been intended as a distraction from 
the fact that Caesar had lost the hostages by not guarding them appropriately, 
 
867 Caes. BGall. 7.55. 
868 Caes. BGall. 7.55. Translation by Edwards, 1917. 
869 Caes. BGall. 7.55. 
870 Caes. BGall. 7.63. Caesar had also criticised Vercingetorix for using torture against Roman 
soldiers. The practice was supposedly a solely foreign trait, as Caesar fails to mention any 
torture carried out by the Romans, cf. Caes. BGall. 7.20. However, we know from the chapter on 




something which could be considered a failing on his part. Whilst Caesar makes no 
mention of the conditions the hostages are in under Roman care, it is evident that he 
wants his readers to believe their situation was graver still whilst in the custody of 
Eporedorix and Viridomarus. Furthermore, unlike Scipio’s idealised actions at New 
Carthage in which he honoured the hostages’ protected status, the two Aeduans had 
broken the ‘rules of war’ by taking and physically harming hostages who had been 
‘given’ to the Romans. By interfering with the process of hostage-taking, the two 
Aeduans were guilty of manipulating hostages, thus violating the conditions agreed 
upon by Caesar and the nations from where the hostages originated. This closely links 
to one of the ways by which the representation of hostages taken by foreign enemies 
could be used by the Roman elite to promote their own agenda and justify violence 
against supposed enemy nations. 
Caesar presents hostage-taking as frequent amongst foreign nations, thus stressing that 
his actions were in keeping with the so-called ‘rules of war’ we have encountered 
throughout this thesis.871 However, it could also be the cause of resentment amongst 
foreign nations, particularly as there is the implication that the hostages were taken by 
force, or under threat of it.872 As we have seen, hostage-taking was only necessary 
because of the threat of force, and it was then maintained by such a threat. Cases of 
captive-taking between non-Roman nations, and Rome’s interference in the process, 
highlight how the treatment of captives by Rome’s enemies could be utilised to 
illuminate qualities of the enemy which could then be used to justify Roman 
aggression. Evidently, in actuality, Rome’s recovery of hostages on behalf of allied 
nations was intended to inspire loyalty and cement alliances which could be used in 
the long-term,873 both for military intelligence and assistance in battle.874 As such, the 
Roman elite hailed the recovery of hostages on behalf of their allies as a victory, and in 
this respect the hostages inadvertently acted as symbols of Rome’s authority over 
foreign nations.875 However, the refusal by Rome’s enemies to relinquish their 
hostages, including those taken from other tribes, or treat with Rome, was used as 
evidence to justify Rome’s subsequent attacks on them. This is the case for the 
Germanic leader Ariovistus of the Suebi whose invasion of Gaul and Caesar’s reaction 
to it dominates the first book of Caesar’s Gallic Wars.  
In 58 BCE, Caesar was asked by the Aedui to assist in the recovery of Aeduan hostages 
from Ariovistus, many of whom were children.876 It is unclear when the Aeduan 
 
871 Caes. BGall. 1.9, 1.31, 1.35, 2.1, 3.2, 3.23, 5.55, 6.2, 6.12, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7, 7.64. Caesar (Caes. BGall. 
4.27) claims that the Gauls offered hostages within their peace terms, suggesting that it was an 
understood practice. 
872 One example is found when Caesar assisted Ambiorix in the return of his relatives (Dio 
38.34.1-2), and the appeal from other tribes when Ambiorix took hostages of his own (Caes. 
BGall. 5.27). Caesar also assisted in recovering other hostages at: Caes. BGall. 1.31-35. 
873 Caes. BGall. 7.54 in which Caesar reminds the Aedui of their debt to him for recovering their 
hostages. 
874 For tribes supplying intelligence, see: Caes. BGall. 2.3-2.4, 4.27-30, 36, 5.1, 5.21, 6.29.  
875 Garcia Riazia, 2015: 23-24. 
876 Caes. BGall. 1.31-35. 
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hostages were taken by the Suebi, although one of Cicero’s letters from 60 BCE relates 
the defeat of the Aedui by an alliance of Germanic nations, so it is possible that the 
hostages had been in Ariovistus’ custody for at least two years by the time of Caesar’s 
intervention.877 In this case, Caesar uses Ariovistus’ hostage-taking as a means of 
justifying war against the Suebi and their Germanic allies. As Vasaly argues,878 Caesar 
goes to great lengths to emphasise his ‘reflection’ on the events at hand whilst still 
retaining his detached third person persona,879 particularly with regards to his decision 
to go to war. In his commentaries, Caesar claims that one of his primary reasons for 
going to war was the need to recover the Aeduan hostages as they were friends of 
Rome.880 Thus, Caesar cleverly suggests that Rome’s reputation was at stake should the 
hostages not be recovered, as they could not ensure that Rome’s allies were protected 
from maltreatment. Vasaly suggests that this shows Caesar was aware of how he 
presented himself to his elite audience, particularly in his defence of Rome and her 
allies from the singular tyranny of Ariovistus.881 This was all the more important 
considering that Caesar’s consulship of 59 BCE bore the hallmarks of tyranny,882 and 
Caesar wished to distance himself from the image of a tyrant by defending others 
against that which he was accused of. As such, in the face of the Roman elite’s 
discomfort with Caesar’s command during the first years of his campaigns, it was 
important for Caesar to ensure that they remained in support of his military 
manoeuvres.  
A further contrast is created by Ariovistus’ treatment of his captives, and Caesar’s 
reaction to his behaviour. Caesar’s concerns with Ariovistus’ taking of child-hostages 
appears to contradict his own hostage-taking practices,883 as Caesar certainly took 
children as hostages.884 However, Ariovistus supposedly tortured the hostages,885 and 
the Aedui’s leader further suggested that their children, who had been taken as 
hostages, would be punished if Ariovistus discovered that the Aeduans were speaking 
to Caesar.886 This provides further evidence of Ariovistus’ ‘cruel tyranny’ in contrast 
with Caesar’s comparably reasonable actions in relation to his hostages. As a result, 
representations of hostage-taking during warfare, like other practices we have seen 
throughout this thesis,887 were used to create a contrast between Rome’s enemies’ 
actions in warfare and Roman idealised behaviour in war, which had a further impact 
on representations of the character and behaviours of leading figures. 
 
877 Cic. Att. 1.19 
878 Vasaly, 2009: 250-251. 
879 Caes. BGall. 1.33. 
880 Caes. BGall. 1.33. 
881 Vasaly, 2009: 248-249. 
882 Vasaly, 2009: 248-249. 
883 Caes. BGall. 6.12. 
884 As evident in his detention of Juba II, which we discuss later in the chapter. 
885 Caes. BGall. 1.31. 
886 Caes. BGall. 1.31. 
887 Including the use of military intelligence, sexual violence and massacre and enslavement.  
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5.6. Justification for Military Action 
Aymard argues that the taking of hostages and their subsequent treatment was 
primarily used in Greco-Roman writings to highlight characteristics of an individual or 
a people, or to indicate their counterparts’ attitude towards an individual’s personal or 
political behaviour.888 For example, Caesar accepted hostages (representing a 
willingness to make peace) from the Senones and the Carnutes, despite being aware of 
their plotting against his efforts in Gaul.889 This incident is used to emphasise Caesar’s 
qualities as a tactician, and shows his acknowledgement that it was unsuitable to make 
war on two fronts: with the Treveri on one side, and with the Senone-Carnute alliance 
on the other. This may have been because the Treveri, led by Ambiorix, were an older 
and more dangerous foe,890 and Caesar focussed on concluding his business with the 
Treveri before embarking on a new war. The alliance between Rome and the Senones-
Carnutes also enabled Caesar to make use of the Senone cavalry during the campaign 
against the Treveri. This was a factor which allowed Caesar to support and preserve 
his army when facing an enemy by utilising foreign troops, thus presenting himself as 
a resourceful and long-sighted general.  
This links to how hostage-taking could be used as a means of justifying a general’s 
renewed or continued military aggression against a nation. As previously stated, a 
decision not to send the hostages requested by Rome could indicate an unwillingness 
to make peace, even though this usually entailed a nation accepting Roman military 
action against them. This is evident when only two of the British nations sent the 
requested hostages following the conclusion of Caesar’s first campaign in Britain in 55 
BCE.891 Caesar hailed the delivery of these hostages as a victory,892 yet Dio’s account 
suggests that Caesar had been forced to make peace because of the approaching winter 
and disturbances in Gaul.893 The consequences of not sending hostages are evident in 
the same book of Caesar’s Gallic Wars when the Illyrian Pirustae were threatened with 
violence if they should continue to ignore Caesar’s demands.894 This incident, related at 
the beginning of book 5 of the Commentaries, immediately follows Caesar’s description 
of only two British nations supplying hostages in book 4. Granted, the threat is in the 
following book which, at the time, may at not have been read immediately following 
given the publication of Caesar’s works as letters or instalments which were read to the 
senate or the public. Caesar does not explicitly state that his reason for returning to 
Britain was because the tribes did not send hostages. However, considering the close 
relationship both within the text itself and the period elapsing between when they 
were written, it is possible that the reader, both after the Commentaries were compiled 
and contemporaneously, would have acknowledged the link and Caesar’s concern 
with the British reluctance to send hostages. This was particularly significant for 
 
888 Aymard, 1961: 136. 
889 Caes. BGall. 6.4. Also evident at 3.2. 
890 Plut. Vit. Caes. 24.1-2. 
891 Caes. BGall. 4.36. 
892 Caes. BGall. 4.36, cf. Garland, 2003: 40. 
893 Dio 39.52.1-3. 
894 Caes. BGall. 5.1. 
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Caesar’s representation of his actions and the response from his audience. As we have 
seen, Caesar’s activities in Britain were not an overwhelming success, which was why 
he emphasised the capture of a large, but unspecified, number of captives.895 Here, we 
encounter the same issue: to distract from his failure to conquer Britain, Caesar used 
hostages to claim his campaign had been successful where ‘decisive military victory 
was not obvious.’896 
An implicit reading of Caesar’s commentaries was evidently successful as Dio, using 
Caesar’s account as a source two centuries later, states that Caesar returned to Britain 
because the British tribes had not sent hostages.897 The taking of hostages as a form of 
punishment in this instance is further supported by Plutarch and Suetonius’ 
summaries of Caesar’s activities in Britain.898 This is evident as both authors neglected 
to describe the difficulties Caesar faced when he left Britain on this occasion. The 
demand for hostages is cast by the authors as a punishment for the British nations’ 
unwillingness to treat with Caesar on his first visit. This indicates that lack of 
compliance with Rome in treaties would be met with force, and this further justified 
Caesar’s second assault on Britain in 54 BCE. Caesar justified his actions by taking both 
prisoners, possibly as a form of punishment, and hostages to secure peace. This 
encounter shows that the taking of hostages could be, in addition to the first step in the 
peace process, a means by which a peace treaty could be concluded and which ensured 
obedience after Rome had withdrawn from the region.899 As a result, despite not 
having been successful in his campaign against Britain, Caesar represented his actions 
as such and, as a representative of Rome, his writing suggested that, through the act of 
surrendering hostages, there was an ‘acceptance of Roman hegemony in the area’.900  
As a result, the importance of hostages as a form of symbolic compliance is evident 
within this example. Dio, Suetonius and Plutarch do not mention the number of 
prisoners Caesar claimed he took, which were allegedly so numerous that his navy had 
to make two sea crossings.901 Instead, they merely state that Caesar successfully 
crossed to the island twice and managed to extract hostages and tribute.902 Clearly 
hostages were, when dealing with diplomatic negotiations, more important to Roman 
readers than prisoners. Presumably, this was because hostages indicated an on-going 
relationship with the former enemy nation, rather than the humiliation of a nation 
which may have been the cause of deep resentment, thus placing Rome’s future 
relationship in peril. The on-going relationship also enabled Caesar to present his 
 
895 Caes. BGall. 5.23. 
896 A common concern for Caesar which he addressed throughout his writings, cf. Allen, 2006: 
112-3.  
897 Dio 40.1.1-3. The subtleties are ignored by Suetonius which suggests that Caesar was 
successful in taking hostages from this previously little-known land, cf. Suet. Jul. 25.2. For 
further analysis of responses to and the reception of Caesar’s British hostage-taking, cf. Allen, 
2006: 114-117.  
898 Plut. Vit. Caes. 23.3, Suet. Iul. 25. 
899 Caes. BGall. 6.3, 5.22-23, 8.38. 
900 Allen, 2006: 114-117. 
901 Caes. BGall. 5.23. 
902 Dio 40.3.1-2. 
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hostage-taking as a benefit to the Roman readership as this could have enabled the 
Romans to exercise control over the region in the long-term. Unfortunately, we do not 
know what happened to the British hostages. As Britain was not conquered by Caesar, 
it is likely that the hostage-taking was unsuccessful in curbing the aggression of British 
tribes, a fact which Caesar would not want to stress given his attempt to present his 
campaign in Britain as a success. Nevertheless, the fact that it is omitted from Caesar’s 
writings is telling of the importance of hostages, like the enslaved captives, as symbols 
of submission. We should also note that by the time the aforementioned authors were 
writing in the Imperial period, hostage-taking was more important than the financial 
rewards which could be reaped from the sale of prisoners given the scope of the 
empire and the need to maintain compliant client kings, a point we shall discuss 
shortly.  
5.7. Hostages in Rome 
As we have seen, hostage-taking was commonplace throughout the ancient world, yet 
Rome utilised the practice on a larger scale than any other contemporaneous culture.903 
Hostage-taking on both a grand and small scale was frequently practised by Rome and 
her generals throughout the late Republic and built on earlier traditions. The previous 
sections have dealt with the use of hostages in warfare, rather than their treatment 
following the conclusion of conflict. Throughout the Republican period, hostages were 
commonly housed with elite members of Roman society, although their treatment 
varied depending on a range of factors we shall discuss shortly. However, the 
inclusion of hostages in the heart of Roman society, culture and politics is most evident 
under Augustus,904 as prominent hostages, such as Juba II of Numidia and Herod 
Agrippa of Judaea, were kept within the Imperial household, growing up alongside the 
children of the Imperial family. Furthermore, by the time of the early Empire, the 
status quo of Rome’s relationship with other Mediterranean nations was in Rome’s 
favour. Indeed, by Augustus’ reign, Rome had not been forced to give hostages for at 
least a century.905 Throughout the late Republic and early Imperial period, a 
standardised form of hostage-taking was developed, although its roots can be traced 
back to Greek and Roman military and diplomatic practices. With the increased 
presence of hostages in Roman society, we encounter the importance of hostages as 
symbols, particularly in representing Rome’s power over the nations from which the 
hostages originated.906 The symbolic use of hostages began during conflict and 
continued whilst the hostages were stationed in Rome, as we can see with the 
comparable cases of Tigranes the Younger of Armenia and Dumnorix of the Aedui.  
 
903 However, as Aymard rightly states, we have no statistical evidence of this and his comments 
rest more on cultural than statistical evidence, cf. Aymard, 1961: 136. 
904 Braund suggests that Augustus’ practice built on previous hostage-taking traditions but was 
innovative because it was on such a large scale, cf. Braund, 1986: 11. 
905 Aymard, 1961: 137. 
906 Lee, 1991: 366-7.  
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5.8. Tigranes the Younger of Armenia and Dumnorix of the Aedui 
Two individuals from the foreign wars of Pompey and Caesar demonstrate how the 
taking of hostages could be practised outside of diplomatic negotiations, and also 
provide a basis for considering both the use and supposed dangers of foreign allies 
taken captive by Roman leaders. The individuals in question are Tigranes the Younger 
of Armenia whom Pompey imprisoned in 66 BCE, and Dumnorix of the Aedui whom 
Caesar took prisoner in 58 BCE.907 Both men were related to Armenian or Gallic 
nobility: Tigranes was the son of the Armenian king of the same name, and Dumnorix 
was the brother of the Aeduan chieftain, Diviciacus. Both men were taken into custody 
after disobeying the orders of their Roman allies, used to cement the alliance between 
Rome and their respective nations, and were involved in uprisings against Rome and 
her generals. The key differences lie in when their betrayals took place, and how they 
were used during their capture to appeal to different audiences. Tigranes had been an 
ally of Pompey’s, but expressed his displeasure at his father, with whom he was 
fighting alongside the Romans, being allowed by Rome to retain the Armenian 
throne.908 Plutarch suggests that Tigranes was unhappy about not being given 
Armenia, whilst Dio claims that Tigranes refused the offer of an area called Sophene, 
which was not as important as Armenia.909 This was hardly the stuff of widespread 
rebellion, yet Tigranes was still ‘placed in chains’ (πέδη, pedē) soon after.910 Similarly, 
Dumnorix was accused of sabotaging a Roman attack and stirring discontent amongst 
the Aedui,911 who were allies of Rome at the time. As such, both men were acting as 
allies to Rome in wars with their nation’s neighbours or, in Tigranes’ case, his own 
country, shortly before their detention. 
The alliances may account for why neither Tigranes nor Dumnorix are referred to 
using the terminology outlined in the introduction: obses and ὅμηρος.912 This is possibly 
because both men were of elite status and the Roman elite would not have wished to 
present themselves or important Roman figures as making alliances with those labelled 
as captivi, as they were considered to be akin to enslaved people. The language is kept 
deliberately ambiguous and may have been used to indicate Tigranes and Dumnorix’s 
changing statuses throughout their dealings with Pompey and Caesar. Throughout this 
section, my use of language also reflects the fluidity of their statuses and indicates 
situations in which they were ‘captives’ or ‘prisoners’, and when they were treated as 
‘hostages’ or ‘guests’. In descriptions of their initial captures, they are neither called 
captives nor hostages, although language is used which has connotations of captivity. 
Dumnorix was ‘placed under guard’ (Dumnorigi custodes ponit), whilst Tigranes was 
put in fetters (πέδη, pedē). In addition to their alliance, the language may reflect 
Pompey and Caesar’s supposed motivation for detaining the prisoners, and the 
 
907 I use language associated with imprisonment here to outline their initial status. As we shall 
see, their position changed throughout their dealings with Pompey and Caesar. 
908 Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. Vit. Pomp. 33.5-6. 
909 Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. Vit. Pomp. 33.5-6. 
910 Dio 36.52.2-3, Plut. Vit. Pomp. 33.5-6. 
911 Caes. BGall. 1.18-20. 
912 Cf. pp. 7-9. 
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subsequent use of these individuals. The use of language is particularly significant as 
none of Caesar’s hostages appear to have suffered negative reprisals following the 
disobedience of their nations.913 This would suggest that hostages, even those taken 
during wartime negotiations, were protected by the ‘rules of war’ which ensured that 
they were not ill-treated, as we have seen with regards to Ariovistus’ hostage-taking. 
As a result, the language is kept deliberately ambiguous, so Pompey and Caesar could 
be presented as practising wartime conventions, despite placing Tigranes and 
Dumnorix first in the position of captives then of hostages, statuses which required 
different treatment. In addition to their alliance, the language may reflect Pompey and 
Caesar’s supposed motivation for detaining the prisoners, and the subsequent use of 
these individuals. Plutarch suggests that Tigranes was imprisoned so that he could 
feature in Pompey’s triumph.914 However, there were more important issues to 
consider, particularly if we consider Pompey’s expansionist model which involved 
building alliances with client kings.915 
Tigranes was offered a kingdom by Pompey, presumably to act as a client king, but he 
refused as he wanted Armenia. Tigranes is cast as arrogant and petulant, qualities 
which would make a wholly unsuitable client king. As such, Pompey’s decision to 
refuse Tigranes the Armenian throne appears as justified, and his actions would have 
been understood by the elite Roman audience. In the Roman world, the activities of 
client kings within their own dominions were acceptable, as long as they did not 
oppose the Romans’ agenda.916 Tigranes, given as he was to rebellion on both large and 
small scales, would not be trustworthy as a client king, which would effectively have 
rendered him unsuitable as a representative of Rome and its interests.917 Furthermore, 
Pompey needed strong allies in the East who could be used during his war against 
Mithridates, who also happened to be Tigranes the Elder’s son-in-law. It was 
impractical for Pompey to hand over the throne to Tigranes the Younger, as he was 
inexperienced in ruling, and facing the prospect of possible opposition from a faction 
in favour of the deposed king.918  
Pompey’s supposed reasons for imprisoning Tigranes link closely to Caesar’s 
suggestion that he was merely keeping Dumnorix close by as an asset, given that he 
had influence (auctoritas) with the Gauls,919 as opposed to leverage over the Aedui. 
Despite Caesar’s avoidance of using the language to convey Dumnorix’s status, it is 
evident that he was a captive who was being held hostage as leverage over his nation 
and family. This is shown in Caesar’s execution of Dumnorix in 54 BCE, four years 
after his initial detention. Caesar goes to great lengths to justify the killing of 
Dumnorix. Caesar alleged that Dumnorix had continued to stir up discontent amongst 
 
913 Cf. Lee, 1991: 366-374, Noy, 2000: 107. 
914 Plut. Pomp. 33.5. 
915 Fields, 2008: 91-5. 
916 Richardson, 1979: 13, Rogan, 2011: 76. 
917 Richardson, 1979: 13. 
918 Richardson, 1979: 13-15. 
919 Caes. BGall. 5.6. 
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Rome’s Gallic allies from within Caesar’s camp, had been continually seeking his 
freedom, and had then tried to escape.920 As such, despite Dumnorix being used as a 
symbol, much like those labelled as hostages, it is clear that he was now presented by 
Caesar as essentially being a well-treated captive. Caesar’s list of complaints is 
crowned by Dumnorix’s continued belligerence even when faced with an ultimatum: 
return to camp or die. 921 According to Caesar, Dumnorix chose the latter. We should 
acknowledge that Caesar may have fabricated evidence against Dumnorix to justify his 
capture and subsequent execution. However, Dumnorix’s case demonstrates how the 
preservation of captives as hostages was not always advantageous, and that the 
position of those kept for diplomatic means could change over time. This is particularly 
true for high-profile individuals taken as a captive, with the view to use them as a 
hostage, during a war. Caesar claimed that he wanted to keep Dumnorix alive, and 
hopefully use him as an ally because of his courage and influence over the Gauls.922 
However, the qualities which made Dumnorix a useful ally also made him a dangerous 
enemy. Throughout Dumnorix’s imprisonment, his brother Diviciacus continued to 
display his loyalty towards Caesar and Rome by assisting in Caesar’s campaign against 
the Belgae.923 It is uncertain whether this loyalty was solidified by Caesar’s initial 
clemency towards Dumnorix, or the threat posed to Dumnorix’s life during his stay in 
Roman custody, or even later by his execution when he disobeyed Caesar’s orders. In 
effect, such treatments were all displays of Caesar’s power.  
Regardless of the realities of Caesar’s dealings with Dumnorix, Caesar’s treatment of 
the Aeduan was intended to encourage Rome’s allies to remain loyal until a time when 
their assistance in the Gallic Wars was no longer necessary. This is certainly the case for 
the Aedui who remained loyal to Rome until the Gallic coalition under Vercingetorix 
was established. This was after Dumnorix’s execution around 54 BCE. As such, it is 
possible to argue that Caesar’s detention of Dumnorix ensured the continued support 
of the Aedui given the threat to Dumnorix as the brother of their chief druid, 
Diviciacus. Furthermore, the encounter was used in later writings, including by Caesar 
himself, to emphasise Caesar’s qualities of clemency and military prowess to the 
political elite. As Dumnorix had abused the limited freedom given to him by Caesar 
whilst in his custody, he appears to have forfeited his rights of protection as a hostage, 
and outlived his usefulness. Dumnorix’s execution would not have been acceptable 
conduct had he been an official hostage, and by avoiding the use of such terms as 
‘hostage’, Caesar could then present his actions as an act of war, rather than one which 
interfered with diplomatic relationships. 
5.9. Hostages as Symbols of Power: Tigranes the Younger 
The use of captives as a symbol of an individual’s power is evident with Tigranes’ 
treatment after his arrival in Rome, where he continues to be called anything but a 
 
920 Caes. BGall. 5.6. 
921 Caes. BGall. 5.7. 
922 Caes. BGall. 5.6. 
923 Caes. BGall. 2.5. 
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hostage,924 despite being kept in a manner which was akin to that of other elite 
individuals labelled as hostages. After appearing in Pompey’s triumph, possibly as a 
living personification of Armenia,925 Tigranes remained in Rome as a political hostage, 
presumably intended to be used as leverage over his father and father-in-law, 
Mithridates. Tigranes was kept in the custody of L. Flavius, a Praetor in 58 BCE and 
friend of Pompey.926 It was in his custody that Tigranes’ representation as something 
akin to a ‘token’ to be fought over becomes evident.927 Clodius Pulcher, a notorious 
Republican agitator, acting in his capacity as Tribune of the People, seized Tigranes 
from Flavius’ house after visiting his house as a guest.928 This was an abuse of power 
not only politically but socially, as Clodius had been a guest in Flavius’ house while 
Tigranes, despite being called a ‘guest’, was in Flavius’ custody. As such, Clodius’ 
encounter with Tigranes was used to further denigrate Clodius’ already tarnished 
character. Cicero, writing in 57 BCE, attacked Clodius for his iniuria against Tigranes, 
casting the prince as a victim of Clodius’ abuse.929 The term iniuria which means injury 
or assault, also has connotations of sexual assault, a transgression which Clodius was 
frequently criticised for.930 In addition, Cicero’s reference to Tigranes’ position as a 
‘guest’ is significant and was another means by which he could attack Clodius for his 
behaviour in relation to Tigranes. Guests were protected in the Roman world, a 
tradition based in mythical Greek culture where guest-hospitality (xenia) was a 
religious ritual, and any maltreatment was considered, by this time, to be a serious 
breach of social convention with associations of impiety. Cicero was writing 
contemporaneously to the events in question, but Cicero’s relationship with Clodius 
was not amicable. Nevertheless, his remarks indicate that Clodius’ actions had been 
widely criticised by members of the senate and that, given the disruptions on the 
Appian Way, which we shall discuss imminently, such behaviour cannot have been 
ignored by the rest of the Roman population. 
Clodius attempted to return Tigranes to Armenia, but his ship was wrecked near 
Antium. As both Clodius and Flavius’ men set off on the Appian Way to retrieve 
Tigranes, a fight broke out and one of Pompey’s friends, Papirius, was killed.931 The 
quarrel was not truly about Tigranes, but the increasingly fraught relationship between 
Clodius and Pompey.932 This is evident as we do not know what happened to Tigranes 
after his dealings with Clodius, with Tigranes’ well-being considered to be less 
important to ancient authors than what he represented in the relationship between 
 
924 Cicero called Tigranes a captivus whilst acknowledging that he was also the son of a friendly 
king (regis amici filium), cf. Cic. Dom. 66. 
925 Dio 37.6.2-4. 
926 Asc. 47, Cicero, Dom. 66. 
927 Tatum, 1999: 170. 
928 Asc. 47, Cicero, Dom. 66. 
929 Cicero, Dom. 66. 
930 Clodius famously attended the female-only Bona Dea ceremony and was alleged to have 
sexual relations with his sister, Clodia, who was also a supposed voyeur, cf. Cic. Cael. 32, 36, 78, 
Dom. 26, 9, Sest. 16, 39, 116.  
931 Cic. Att. 3.8.3, 3.10.1, 3.13.1. 
932 Greenhalgh, 1981: 1-27. 
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Pompey and Clodius.933 As such, Tigranes was understood as a political pawn moved 
by members of the Roman elite. Greenhalgh suggests that there may have been 
financial considerations in Clodius’ taking of Tigranes in that he could be ransomed.934  
However, Greenhalgh ultimately argues that the incident with Tigranes was a way by 
which Clodius could ‘demonstrate Pompey’s weakness',935 a successful feat, as Clodius’ 
actions also caused a rift between Pompey and the consul, Gabinius.936 Clodius did so 
by parading the unchained Tigranes throughout the streets of Rome, whilst ignoring 
Pompey’s requests for the ‘guest prince’s’ return. As such, much like Pompey using 
Tigranes to highlight his clemency, Clodius’ actions in relation to Tigranes also reveal 
how political hostages could be used to highlight a Roman’s characteristics. Clodius 
was disliked by much of the Roman establishment, and the incident with Tigranes 
illustrates the increasing political violence present in politics which was harnessed by 
Clodius.937  
Clodius had used his political authority in his role as tribune to take Tigranes and had 
then used his personal authority to aid in his escape.938 Abuses of power, particularly 
in governorships overseas, were commonplace in the Roman world.939 However, as 
Cicero’s writings indicate, it was unacceptable to flagrantly use power to further one’s 
own agenda,940 as Clodius certainly had in his use of Tigranes. Furthermore, Clodius 
neglected to obey the consul Gabinius when he requested the return of Tigranes, 
indicating a blatant disregard for the Roman establishment and its power 
hierarchies.941 To summarise Tigranes’ position: he was initially a symbol of defiance 
against Rome, and a reminder to Rome’s would-be enemies of the consequences of 
challenging them. He then became symbolic of Rome’s dominion over Armenia and 
Tigranes the Elder during his appearance at Pompey’s triumph and as his hostage, 
before finally becoming another asset of Pompey’s and a symbol of his authority, a 
symbol which could be manipulated by Pompey’s enemies. Here, we encounter, once 
again, the difficulties of defining hostages separately from captives generally, and we 
see how fluid the relationship between captive and hostage statuses could be.  
In some respects, both Tigranes the Younger and Dumnorix acted as reminders of what 
happens to allies who defy Rome. They were useful until they began espousing 
unhelpful or anti-Roman ideas, in which case they could became dangerous. At this 
point, they were either executed for breaching the rules laid out by their keepers, or 
else displayed as a warning to other rulers who had dealings with Rome. As we have 
seen, the harming or execution of hostages was exceptional and this may have been the 
reason why Caesar avoids using the term obses, despite Dumnorix being used in 
 
933 Tatum, 1999: 170. 
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Caesar’s subsequent representations in a manner akin to other ‘hostages’. The implicit 
threat in the treatment of captives used as hostages taken during warfare would have 
been directly aimed at Rome’s allies who, in Pompey and Caesar’s wars, were 
necessary for Rome’s success and expansion in the area. The use of captives and 
hostages also enabled Roman generals to emphasise the qualities highly prized by the 
political elite in Rome, particularly military savvy and clemency. As such, 
representations of their treatment were threefold and intended to appeal to different 
audiences. Firstly, their treatment was a warning to nations of the dangers of 
displeasing Rome, secondly, they acted as symbols of Rome and its leaders’ power, 
and finally their treatment was used by both contemporary later authors to discuss 
characteristics of individuals.  
5.10. Hostages as Symbols in Rome 
The use of hostages as symbols is evident in artwork from the Augustan period, and is 
most evident on the Ara Pacis and one of the Boscoreale cups. By keeping hostages 
within the Imperial household, Augustus could use hostages within his self-
promotion, both in public displays and iconography. As we shall discuss shortly, 
Augustus paraded his Parthian hostages through the arena and sat them behind him 
within the Imperial box.942 These actions may have been intended to show the 
hostages’ importance to Augustus, in effect a form of ‘honour’, given the prominence 
of their position and the proximity to the Imperial family. However, this enabled 
Augustus to emphasise his superiority over the hostages and, as the hostages acted as 
symbols of Parthia, over the Parthian nation. In turn, this enabled Augustus to present 
his clemency to the Roman public, a key quality which linked Augustus to his policies 
surrounding the Pax Augusta and his position as Caesar’s heir.943 Such concerns also 
translated into iconography present on numismatic, sculptures and objets d’art. 
Previously, in the discussion on enslavement, we have seen how captives could be 
used within Imperial iconography such as the Gemma Augustea, usually in positions 
of subjugation and defeat. Hostages, however, were usually presented as children, and 
their parents as defeated warriors, offering their children to the victorious Romans.  
One example of this presentation of hostages can be found on one of two drinking cups 
from the hoard of 109 items found in a villa close to the village Boscoreale, near 
Naples. Buried during the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE, the silverware was unearthed 
in 1895 and is now housed in the Louvre.944 Stylistically significant, the two cups in 
question are thought to be a pair and are known as the Boscoreale Cups. They depict 
the exploits of Augustus and Tiberius and are thought to date from between 20 and 40 
CE.945 The ‘Augustus cup’ depicts a scene in which two Gallic leaders are kneeling in 
supplication [Figure 24], presenting their infant sons to Augustus who sits in an 
 
942 Suet. Aug. 43. 
943 Barden Dowling, 2006: 87, 102, 117, 125.  
944 Kuttner, 1995: 6-9. 
945 For a discussion of dating the Boscoreale trove, cf. Kuttner, 1995: 6-9. 
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elevated position.946 Uzzi argues that the gender of the figures on the cup is significant. 
The two Gallic fathers present their infant sons to Augustus who sits, waiting to 
receive the delegation. The father closest to Augustus is in a well-recognised position 
of subjugation, with one knee placed on the ground. The kneeling position of a 
defeated individual, who represented a whole nation, was a common trope in 
Augustan iconography, and has close connections to the Parthian standard 
iconography utilised by Augustus.947 For instance, on coinage issued under Augustus 
[Figure 25], there are examples of a Parthian handing over a standard and the figure is 
presented in a position similar to the Gallic figures on the ‘Augustus cup’. The father 
behind the first appears to be about to complete the same action, with his knees bent 
and his shoulders rounded. By contrast, their children are standing but only with the 
assistance of their fathers. Here, the children are still extensions of their parents, being 
reliant on them for support. The age of the children is significant as they are clearly 
identifiable as infants, particularly as we know that children and adults of all ages 
could be taken as hostages. 
Given that only male figures could wield political or military power in the Roman 
world, Uzzi suggests that the encounter portrayed on the cup symbolises the transfer 
of power from non-Roman men to the Roman Imperial regime, as symbolised by the 
male offspring,948 who may have been recognised as hostages. Barden Dowling also 
argues that the infant sons are representative of Gallic land, territory and their most 
precious possessions.949 Therefore, the male offspring, had the Romans not defeated the 
Gauls in battle, would have continued to possess their fathers’ powers, including 
dominion over their territories. In this scene, Augustus is presented as interfering with 
this line of succession, effectively becoming the guardian of the children in their 
fathers’ steads. Barden Dowling suggests that clementia is essential in this scene, as 
Augustus is presented as allowing the next generation of the defeated Gauls to live, 
albeit under his custody, rather than execute the leaders and their children.950 
The scene is significant as it shows that it was understood by the Roman elite, whose 
holiday villas were situated near the Bay of Naples, that hostage-taking, despite 
seemingly showing Augustus’ clemency in not executing the Gauls, was ultimately an 
act of power which signified Roman control over the region. Therefore, regardless of 
the ‘guest status’ hostages supposedly had in Roman elite society, it was widely 
recognised that they were under Roman authority. Given the position of the fathers in 
the scene, as kneeling and raising their children to Augustus, we can see that, despite 
the ‘gilded cage’ in which they were kept, hostages experienced a status which was 
effectively considered akin to other types of captives we have encountered throughout 
this thesis.  
 
946 The scene is possibly a carefully ‘stage-managed’ event which took place in either 13 or 10 
BCE during Drusus’ military campaigns in Gaul, cf. Kuttner, 1995: 117-118.   
947 Zanker, 1988: 187-8. 
948 Uzzi, 2007: 76-77. 
949 Barden Dowling, 2006: 147. 
950 Barden Dowling, 2006: 147. 
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5.11. Hostages in Iconography: The Ara Pacis 
The individuals presented on the Boscoreale ‘Augustus’ cup have been identified as 
Gallic as they bear the hallmarks of how the Romans represented Gallic ethnicity. The 
Gallic children are clearly in the process of being given as hostages to Augustus, but 
there are other examples which show hostages within their positions in the Imperial 
household. The Ara Pacis, or the Altar of Peace, was dedicated in 9 BCE to celebrate 
Augustus’ return from Hispania and Gaul. Two individuals present on the north and 
south friezes of the Ara Pacis, in the midst of a procession of Rome’s great and good,951 
have been identified as foreign hostages,952 as they are wearing non-Roman clothing.953 
Zanker suggests that they are supposed to be Trojan figures, linking Augustus to the 
founding of Rome.954 However, given that Augustan iconography relied heavily on 
personifications of defeated nations and representations of the land and sea are used 
within the same friezes, it is likely that they were linked to Augustus’ political and 
military exploits. In addition, given the presence of hostages within Augustus’ 
household, it is also likely that the two individuals on the frieze represented hostage 
figures who, in turn, were representative of the nation from which they hailed.  
On the south frieze, Agrippa is presented alongside a group of non-Roman women and 
a male child aged between 5 and 10 years old [Figure 26]. The boy holds on to 
Agrippa’s toga, whilst a non-Roman woman places her hand on his head. The boy and 
the woman have been identified as Parthian given their hairstyles and headdresses.955 
As we know Parthian hostages were within the sphere of the Imperial family, the 
figures may have been intended to represent some of the hostages, further building on 
the use of Parthian imagery within Augustan iconography. Here, unlike the male 
figures holding the standards, the figures have returned to the Classical Greek model 
of female and infant personifications.956 The dependence of the hostages on Roman 
figures is evident in the Parthian boy clutching at Agrippa’s toga, and in the stance of 
the figure on the north frieze [Figure 27], a supposedly Gallic infant. Much like the 
children on the Boscoreale cup, the infant is unable to stand without support, with one 
hand holding the hand of a Roman figure, and the other clutching a toga.  
As said, there is a great deal of debate surrounding the identity of the children on the 
Ara Pacis, largely centring on their clothing.957 Given that the altar features both 
 
951 For a concise overview of the complex issues of identification and artistic messages, cf. 
Pollini, 2012: 206-43. 
952 There is much debate about the two figures, cf. Simon, 1968: 18, 21, Kuttner, 1995: 99-101, 107-
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members of Augustus’ family and personifications of the land and sea, it is possible to 
argue that the individuals present on the altar are representative of hostages within 
Augustus’ circle, including with his closest advisor Agrippa, and, as hostages acted as 
symbols of their nations, personifications of the areas submissive to Rome. As such, for 
the Roman viewer, it was not important for individual hostages to be identified, but 
rather that the stereotypes and nations they presented, e.g. ‘the East’ and the ‘West’ as 
symbolised by the ‘Parthian’ and ‘Gallic’ children, were clearly identifiable.958 As the 
nations are represented as dependent children, another message is clear with the 
inclusion of these two figures. The other figures on the frieze are either adults or older 
children, who are dressed in togas which indicated that they belong to a ‘civilised’ 
society,959 and it is clear that the foreign children (therefore, the nations they represent) 
are dependent upon them. As Kuttner suggests,960 this shows Augustus’ attitude 
towards his hostages as a kind of foster-ward relationship which suggests an amicable, 
peaceful arrangement between Rome and the nations whose children were in the 
Imperial family’s care. As a result, the Ara Pacis includes a dynastic message, showing 
Augustus’ extended family as heirs to the ‘peaceful’ Empire he had secured.961 
However, as Pollini argues, the message was one of ‘conditional peace’,962 as Rome’s 
well-being is presented as being dependent upon the role of Augustus, his family and 
the political harmony he had created between Rome and those at the edges of the 
Empire. As such, by incorporating foreign children alongside Roman children 
belonging to Augustus’ family,963 Augustus was able to establish a model for the future 
with the younger foreign children becoming reliant upon his Roman heirs. Therefore, 
regardless of the identity of the children as hostages, the message to the Romans 
walking past the monument would been obviously conveyed through the image of the 
child: non-Roman nations and provinces were reliant on Rome to sustain and support 
them. 
The use of children also enabled Augustus to continue his campaign of ‘visual rhetoric’ 
which centred on ‘peace’ as,964 unlike in his images of defeated warriors, there is not 
the explicit suggestion of warfare on the Ara Pacis. The message is one of peaceful 
harmony, with young foreign hostages presented as playing ‘a positive role in Roman 
public life, becoming royal friends and allies of Rome and participating in Roman civic 
activities.’965 Buxton and Kleiner further argue that the children are ‘pledges of empire’ 
who were used to symbolise ‘a guarantee of Rome’s global hegemony.’966 However, 
despite the altar being dedicated to peace, the inclusion of hostage figures adds an 
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Imperialistic element to the supposedly ‘peaceful’ scene. Whether understood as 
hostages or not, the figures signified Rome’s dominion over a nation, and enabled 
Augustus to showcase a different form of power than military might, an essential 
message after the turmoil of civil unrest during the Late Republic. As Allen argues, in 
relation to the child-hostages present on the frieze, Augustus’ agenda was to convey 
that ‘[Augustus] did not fight others, but that he did not have to fight others; he 
furthered Rome’s interests by sheer intimidation.’967 As such, the child figures 
emphasised Roman power despite not directly showing the results of violence or 
military activity.  
The indication of the nation’s subordination rested on the unequal relationship Rome 
held with her allies, as Rome was always omnipotent and could set the terms of their 
relationships with other nations. This would certainly account for the expense and 
effort to which members of the Roman elite went to keep their hostages, including 
within their own households. In this regard, where military commanders or members 
of the Imperial family chose to station their hostages is indicative of the esteem felt 
towards the hostages’ hosts. For instance, Caesar chose to leave hostages from 
Germanic and Gallic tribes with other allied tribes.968 This is clearly an indication of 
Caesar’s trust, whilst also ensuring that Caesar’s retinue was not further hampered by 
additional individuals who were not pertinent to the war effort. Other examples 
include, as we have discussed, Pompey housing Tigranes with his friend Flavius,969 
and Herod of Judaea sending his children as ‘guest princes’ to Rome under the care of 
Asinius Pollio.970 In the latter case, this may also be an attempt by a foreign ruler to 
show favour to a Roman individual, or may indicate a ruler’s concern for the well-
being of his family in Rome. Feldman suggests that Herod’s decision to send his sons 
to live with Pollio concerned religious sensitivities.971 Pollio, a member of the Roman 
elite who had friendships with Jewish figures, was probably more likely to be aware of 
Jewish religious practices than other Romans, which would enable Herod’s sons to 
practise their faith.972 
5.12. The Treatment of Hostages in Rome 
The treatment of hostages once they passed into Roman hands is not recorded in detail 
by Greco-Roman writers,973 even by those who had been hostages in Roman custody. 
However, we can piece together some aspects of their lives from vague references in 
literary sources and from epigraphic evidence. Firstly, we should acknowledge that 
hostages were in Roman custody for several years, and some would spend the 
remainder of their lives in Rome, as attested in epigraphic evidence. For instance, 
Mattern records how several tombs were erected for hostages during the Imperial 
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period, including at least one which was erected before the hostage’s death.974 The 
tomb of Iulia Axse, who is described on her epitaph as an opses parthorum (Parthian 
hostage), is a case in point. The epitaph states that Iulia, along with her husband, 
whose name is lost to us, erected the epitaph for themselves, their daughter Ulpia 
Vobrane, grandchildren, enslaved attendants, and freedmen.975  
The date of the epitaph is uncertain, but it is possible that Iulia was an elite hostage 
taken by Trajan during his Parthian Wars in 115-117 CE.976 However, as Iulia had a 
Roman name, and her daughter’s Roman name likely derives from the unnamed 
husband, it is possible that Iulia, her husband and Ulpia were Roman citizens. This 
suggests that Iulia’s family may have been in Rome for a considerably longer period, 
and she may well have been the descendant of the Parthian hostages taken by 
Augustus in 10/9 BCE. As we shall see, we have evidence that the descendants of 
Phraates remained in Rome until Claudius’ reign (41-54 CE), so it is not beyond the 
realms of possibility that members of the family were still present in Roman society 
more than 60 years later. Regardless of the tombstone’s date, given that Iulia and her 
husband chose to erect the tomb before their deaths, it would suggest that Julia 
recognised that she would not be returning to her country of origin.977 It may also be 
the case that, for hostages who were not being educated with the intention to return 
and rule their native lands, they were able to build a life for themselves in Rome. 
Furthermore, given the expense of erecting epitaphs, it is likely that Iulia belonged to 
the Parthian elite. The elite social status was typical of the hostages whose tombs were 
erected in Rome, including those of Augustus’ Parthian and Thracian hostages.978  
Mattern points out that most of the people in this category who were commemorated 
in Rome were Eastern hostages and their inscriptions were in Latin.979 That is not to 
suggest that hostages from other regions were not found in other cities across the 
empire. This is certainly the case for several hostages during the emperor Caligula’s 
reign. As the infamous anecdote from Suetonius goes, whilst Caligula was travelling 
near the Rhine, he ordered that hostages stationed at a litterarius ludus, an elementary 
school where they certainly learned Latin,980 should be collected and brought to him.981 
He ordered his cavalry to hunt the hostages down as though they were wild animals or 
fleeing enemy soldiers and then requested that they be brought back in shackles, thus 
suggesting a transition from ‘hostage’ to ‘captive’, a role which was assumed to lead to 
slavery. Suetonius’ account is unlikely to be accurate, given its anti-Caligula view, but 
it does support Aymard’s suggestion that hostage-taking and its later representations 
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were used primarily as a means of demonstrating aspects of an individual’s 
character.982  However, beyond the issues with Caligula’s supposed tyranny, the 
anecdote shows that several hostages were in education in a litterarius ludus.983 We 
know very little other information about the hostages from the Rhine, but it is likely 
that they belonged to Gallic and Germanic tribes and it was more pertinent for them to 
be stationed outside of Rome whilst being introduced to Roman customs and values. 
Regardless of where hostages were held, the example of Caligula’s dealings with the 
hostages demonstrates that hostage-taking was more about how the Roman elite chose 
to represent their or others’ involvement with such individuals, than Rome’s treatment 
of the captives in reality. This largely centred around power structures, and Suetonius 
presented Caligula, in a similar way to how Clodius’ dealings with Tigranes were 
described by Cicero, as abusing his power by attacking hostages who should have been 
protected according to Roman conventions. We should bear this in mind when 
continuing this discussion, particularly with regards to how hostages are presented as 
being held, educated or manoeuvred. This leads us to discuss the purposes of hostage-
taking and their ‘education’ in Rome, which ultimately concerns Rome’s relationship 
with the puppet rulers we now refer to as ‘client kings’. 
5.13. Client Kings 
Hostage-taking arose as a direct result of Roman expansionism, particularly in 
instances where Romans encountered monarchies.984 In most cases, including that of 
Tigranes the Younger of Armenia, Rome initially engaged in military action before 
diplomatic means became more pertinent, usually following a nation’s surrender. As 
such, the relationship between Rome and the kings she encountered was not, as 
Braund argues, that of ‘conqueror and conquered’ but allegedly based on ‘friendship’ 
(amicitia).985 As previously stated, the term amicitia had more in common with ‘alliance’ 
than the close personal bond of friendship as we understand it. It was a relationship 
based on a carefully presented hierarchical structure with nations being able to show 
themselves as ‘willingly’ co-operating with Rome, despite the threat that Rome posed 
to their autonomy. As Jacobson outlines, the relationship between Rome and her client 
kings changed during the late Republic, as military figures, such as Pompey and 
Antony, became ‘king-makers’, actively involved in removing and replacing client 
kings to suit their own agenda.986 
Nevertheless, regardless of how the Romans chose to label their relationships with 
other nations,987 as Rome continued to grow in geographical size and wielded influence 
across a vast area, it became necessary for Rome to utilise alternative methods of 
 
982 Aymard, 1961: 136. 
983 Aymard, 1961: 141. 
984 Braund, 1984: 5. 
985 Braund, 1984: 5. An assessment based on Badian’s assessment of the subject, cf. Badian, 1958: 
12-13.  
986 Cf. Braund, 1988: 76, Jacobson, 2001: 22-38, Fields, 2008: 98.  
987 For an overview of scholarship on amicitia/clientela as labels for Rome’s relations with 
foreign nations, cf. Burton, 2011: 2-6. 
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control beyond military action. These factors account for the rise of the ‘client kings’ or 
‘friendly kings’,988 who were effectively puppet rulers whose family had previously 
ruled the newly formed Roman province or had connections to the area. There is some 
debate as to whether the Romans differentiated, in terms of treatment, between the 
Hellenistic kingship model or the ‘tribal chieftains’ of Northern Europe.989 For instance, 
many scholars argue that ‘kings’ were primarily found in the East or formerly 
Hellenistic nations,990 and were therefore subject to different treatment than their 
‘chieftain’ counterparts of northern European societies. However, as this thesis stresses 
that all leaders were presented as being ‘worthy’ enemies of Rome, I argue that, in 
relation to captive-taking, there is little difference in the structure and motivations for 
hostage-taking. Suffice to say, there are multiple variables with the client ‘king’ 
paradigm, which shall be illuminated as and when is pertinent in this discussion.991 
There were multiple benefits for the Romans to use client kings. Firstly, the Romans 
could exploit the client king’s connection to the area to ensure that, at face value, it 
appeared that the provincial population was ruled not by the Romans, but by one of 
their own people. Suetonius emphasises the importance of client kings in his 
description of Augustus’ treatment of them, describing them as integral parts of the 
Empire.992 Client kings were useful for maintaining Roman rule or influence in far-
flung provinces,993 as the local population were less likely to revolt if they believed 
they were ruled by someone who represented their interests rather than those of Rome. 
This was particularly important for provinces which also had a governor, as Rome 
could pass on issues to the client king to deal with, as they were likely to be more 
aware of cultural issues or traditions, rather than risking revolt if they attempted to 
interfere in politically sensitive affairs.994 In turn, this meant that fewer troops had to be 
stationed within the region.995 As with all military manoeuvrings, this would have 
used expensive resources which could be better utilised in other areas of the empire.996 
There were also benefits for client kings, as they could ensure that their rule was 
supported by a more powerful nation and, in theory, this would also ensure the region 
remained stable and peaceful, which benefitted the provincial population.997 As long as 
client kings did not interfere with Rome’s activities or agenda, they were free to rule 
their countries ‘day-to-day affairs’.998 Therefore, it was within a client king’s best 
 
988 The latter was coined by Braund in his 1984 monograph on the subject. I prefer to use ‘client 
king’ as it indicates a sense of hierarchy which, like that client-based relationship in Rome, 
illuminates the power structures in place and essentially shows that Rome remained in the 
position of power throughout their relationship. 
989 Braund, 1984: 6.  
990 cf. Richardson, 1976: 13-15, 1984: 6, Rogan, 2011: 73-75, Lintott, 2013: 24. 
991 Braund, 1984: 6. 
992 Suet. Aug. 48. 
993 Braund, 1984: 5, Suspène, 2015: 185-6. 
994 Richardson, 1976: 13-15, Jacobson, 2001: 23-24. 
995 Richardson, 1976: 13-15. 
996 Braund, 1984: 5-6. 
997 Richardson, 1976: 13-15. 
998 Richardson, 1976: 13-15, cf. Mattingly, 2011: 79-85, Rogan, 2011: 76. 
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interests to maintain their relationship with Rome, and this could be achieved by 
sending their children to receive an education in Rome itself.999 
As Braund’s study shows, this became increasingly popular from the 2nd century BCE 
onwards.1000 Essentially, this ensured that a king’s children were inducted into Roman 
culture and values, which enabled them, once they ruled, to continue their relationship 
with the Roman elite whilst understanding how the establishment worked. Evidently, 
this would have benefitted their rule by ensuring Rome’s continued support, and an 
essential part of this was through a secure, peaceful accession.1001 For instance, 
following the death of the Judaean leader Herod the Great in 4/3 BCE, Augustus chose 
to split the province of Judaea between three of his sons and his sister.1002 In Herod’s 
final days, he revised his will a number of times, including naming his son Antipas as 
sole heir,1003 before deciding to split the province. Herod’s family were notorious for 
infighting, and Herod himself had executed two of his own sons. As such, dividing the 
province would also have been beneficial for Augustus as a united Judaea under one 
leader may have presented problems for Rome, as any new ruler had the potential to 
oppose Roman rule in the area. Augustus ratified a will which was advantageous to 
Roman dominion in Judaea, but the very fact Augustus had a final say in the 
succession shows his dominion over the area. Essentially, this demonstrates that client 
kings were always under the power of Rome, but that they were forced to ‘play the 
game’ in order to retain power for themselves and their offspring. We shall now 
consider the position of a family of hostages and whether or not their close connection 
with Rome made them ‘unsuccessful’ client kings.  
5.14. Augustus’ Parthian ‘Hostages’ 
We have previously encountered Augustus’ Parthian hostages in the introduction, in 
relation to the language used to define hostages, and how such language helped to 
define a person’s status and the treatment they received as a result. Beyond this aspect, 
the Parthian hostages are an interesting case which illuminates how whole families 
could be taken hostage, build lives for themselves in Rome, but still be utilised in the 
provinces by the Roman establishment generations later. To briefly recap: in his Res 
Gestae, Augustus boasts of how the Parthian King Phraates IV sent his four sons 
alongside their wives and children to Rome (in 10/9 BCE) as a way of demonstrating 
his friendship to Rome. Augustus does not refer to the Parthians as obsides, but claims 
Phraates was exhibiting his amicitia (friendship) to Rome.1004 As we have seen in the 
case of Caesar’s use of language in relation to Dumnorix, this allowed Augustus to 
demonstrate, after discussing briefly hostage-taking, another way by which he could 
show the Roman people how his potestas (power) and auctoritas (influence) extended 
across the Empire and to Rome’s allied states. This enabled Augustus to present an 
 
999 Braund, 1984: 9-11. 
1000 Braund, 1984: 9-11. 
1001 Richardson, 1976: 13-15. 
1002 Rogan, 2011: 73-75. 
1003 Joseph. AJ. 17.146, cf. Toher, 2011: 209-228. 
1004 Aug. RG 1.32. 
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explicitly non-violent approach to securing the allegiance of belligerent nations, whilst 
still presenting his actions in accepting hostages, rather than waging war, as evidence 
of his (and Rome’s) superiority. We should note that this benefitted Phraates’ own 
agenda, as he wanted his throne to pass to his illegitimate son, rather than his 
legitimate ones, who were sent away to Rome. This was allegedly because the 
‘illegitimate’ son was the offspring of Phraates’ favourite wife, Musa, who was 
allegedly a former enslaved person who had been presented to him by Augustus.1005 
As such, Phraates was using Roman hostage-taking for his own benefit, which was 
certainly not what the Romans would have intended, as it was a process used to 
signify a nation’s inferiority. However, regardless of Phraates’ agenda, Augustus chose 
to present the ‘friendship’ with Phraates after discussing how he had expanded the 
empire and his other alliance and empire-building practices.1006 These included the 
recovery of standards, as symbols of the Rome, the development of friendships and the 
acceptance of suppliants from foreign nations. Thus, Augustus was able to claim 
Phraates’ actions as being evidence of the success of his Imperial regime.  
As Phraates’ sons had wives and children, it is likely that the four men were adults 
who were not in need of an education usually undertaken by elite hostages, although 
their children certainly would have been viable students. Furthermore, that their 
families accompanied them suggests that they intended to stay in Rome for an 
extended period. In fact, two of Phraates’ sons died whilst in Rome, as attested by their 
tombstone.1007 However, even the descendants of these hostages could still be used by 
the Roman establishment years after their families had first visited Rome. For instance, 
sometime between 6 and 8 CE, after the fall of Phraates’ ‘illegitimate’ son and his 
mother, Musa, a delegation arrived from Parthia requesting the return of one of 
Phraates’ sons.1008 The inferior position of Phraates’ offspring is evident in the Parthian 
delegation asking Augustus, rather than one of the sons themselves, if they could be 
released to return to Parthia. Here, we see the limit to which hostages had power or 
control over their own destinies. Despite them being members of the Parthian royal 
family, embassies were sent directly to Augustus, who then permitted the release of 
the eldest son, Vonones. Here, we see that the power within the relationship truly lay 
with the Romans, no matter if the hostages had been ‘volunteered’ or if they were, as in 
the case of the Parthians, viewed as ‘guest princes’.1009 
That is not to suggest that Augustus did not exploit the position of his ‘guests’, and he 
went to great lengths to ensure that their presence was acknowledged by large swathes 
of Rome’s population. As we know, Augustus displayed the Parthian hostages by 
walking them through the centre of the arena during games he had sponsored, and 
placing them behind him in the Imperial box.1010 As the Romans had not ‘defeated’ 
 
1005 Joseph. AJ. 18.4. 
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1007 CIL VI 1799 = ILS 842. 
1008 Joseph. AJ. 18.47, Suet. Tib. 16, Aug. RG 33, Tac. Ann. 2.1-3, Dio 40.15.3-4. 
1009 Gregoratti, 2011: 732. 
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Parthia before,1011 which would have provided them with an opportunity to take 
slaves, it is likely that the princes and their families were ‘exotic’ to most of the Roman 
population.1012 Suetonius described the spectacle alongside his comments on Augustus’ 
inclusion of unusual animals in games. This was cast as a positive attribute of 
Augustus, as he was generous enough to acquire exotic animals for the entertainment 
of the Roman people. Evidently, Suetonius viewed the hostages as novelties with a 
position akin to unusual animals. The fact that the hostages were, in later writings from 
the Imperial period, viewed as novelty ‘creatures’ demonstrates that there was little 
thought for the hostages as people. As such, Augustus and the elite recognised the 
symbolic value of the captives.  
5.15. Unsuccessful Hostage-taking 
The tale of the Parthian princes did not end with the restoration of Vonones to the 
Parthian throne. The area continued to be troublesome, and the hostage family in 
Rome was utilised politically for decades after Vonones’ attempted return which was 
thwarted by a rival for the throne, Artabanus. In 35 CE, more than 40 years after the 
Parthian princes were first sent to Rome, another delegation arrived in Rome.1013 
Another of the princes, Phraates, was sent by Tiberius to claim the Parthian throne. In 
his autumn years, Phraates did not survive the journey, and his grandson Tiridates 
took over the task his grandfather had been given.1014 It is likely that Tiridates had 
never visited Parthia and that his upbringing had been Roman in nature, with Roman 
cultural values deeply ingrained in his psyche. The danger of this was that, whilst 
Tiridates had ties to the geographical area, he was no longer truly Parthian in terms of 
cultural outlook. Tiridates ruled Parthia briefly between 35-36, but he was soon 
usurped and disappears from the historical record. 
Another attempt to bring Parthia under Roman control was made the following decade 
when yet another member of the same family, Meherdates (the grandson of Phraates 
IV) was sent to rule Parthia in 47 CE, during the reign of Claudius, but his claim was 
defeated by Gotarzes II.1015 Here, we see that hostage families were kept in Rome 
because their descendants made excellent figureheads when Rome wished to meddle 
in the affairs of the nations from which the hostages originally descended. The 
individuals in question were not necessarily the best suited to rule, or understood the 
issues affecting the region and its people. Inadvertently, the Romans had made some of 
their hostages unviable as rulers as they had educated them in Roman values and 
customs, thus neglecting their native ones. Such an understanding was useful in Rome 
but was often not helpful for those who returned to their native lands.  
However, as Allen outlines, Roman-educated hostages could be used for the advantage 
of their families, who were often a nation’s leaders. This is the case for Demetrius, the 
 
1011 In open conflict, although other Roman leaders had made treaties with the country 
throughout the 1st century BCE, cf. Keaveney, 1981: 195-212.  
1012 Rose, 2005: 37. 
1013 Tac. Ann. 2.31-2. 
1014 Tac. Ann. 2.32. 
1015 Tac. Ann. 12.10. 
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son of Philip V of Macedon, who was educated in Rome from an early age from 191 
BCE. Demetrius remained in Rome for less than a decade, yet this time would have 
marked his formative years. After his return to Macedon, Philip V chose to use his son 
as a messenger to negotiate with the Roman senate in 184 BCE. According to Polybius 
and Livy,1016 Demetrius was not an adept speaker, but the senate accepted his request 
as members of the senate felt affection towards the young man. However, whilst this 
relationship seems to have worked in his favour at the time of his entreaty to the 
senate, his connection with Rome was also his downfall. By 181 BCE, Demetrius was 
back in Macedon, but his elder brother Perseus arranged his execution. Livy presents 
Perseus as delivering a speech to their father, Philip, in which he claimed that 
Demetrius was more Roman than Macedonian. This cast Demetrius as a vassal of 
Rome who could be used by the Romans to usurp Macedon’s autonomy.1017  This issue 
was a common complaint about former hostages who returned as rulers to their 
‘homelands’. For instance, Tiridates’ uncle, Vonones, had also experienced this when 
he returned to Parthia and was labelled as a ‘slave to Rome’.1018 However, Livy may 
have been including such speech, his sources for which are unknown, to stress the 
barbarity of Perseus in his abuse of a Roman ally. Perseus was illegitimate and 
therefore, if Demetrius as a legitimate son lived, his position as Philip’s heir would 
continue to be uncertain. Further concerns surrounded the possibility of Rome 
installing Demetrius as a pro-Roman ruler in the area which not only threatened 
Perseus’ accession, but also Philip’s leadership. Demetrius’ life and demise highlights 
the ways by which hostages could be made into symbols or political pawns which 
could easily be removed or repositioned for the benefit of Rome, or even for the rulers 
of the nations from which they originated. Granted, there is some evidence of affection 
between Demetrius and his Roman captors. However, as Allen argues, Demetrius was 
always in a difficult position as he was neither Roman, despite having been raised and 
educated in Rome, nor Greek, despite having been born in Macedon, and whose family 
remained in the region.1019  
5.16. Successful Hostages? Juba II of Numidia 
In contrast to the tragic Demetrius, one individual with close connections to the Roman 
elite provides us with an example of a hostage who behaved appropriately from his 
capture and throughout his role as a client king: Juba II, the son of Juba I of Numidia. 
In 46 BCE, Juba I was defeated by Caesar’s generals and forced to commit suicide, 
whereupon his son was taken into Roman custody and eventually became one of 
Rome’s most successful client kings. Once again, we encounter difficulties with the 
language used to refer to Juba, as he is called a hostage by one source.1020 To expand on 
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1020 Ael. NA. 7.23. For discussion of the use of language in relation to Juba’s stint in Roman 
custody, cf. Allen, 2006: 18-19. Allen also alludes to the fluidity of language and suggests that 
Juba was essentially an ‘elite prisoner of war’. However, his treatment is so similar to that of 
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this point, Allen argues that there was no coercion in the case of Juba,1021 much like 
those labelled as hostages, given that Juba was taken captive following his father’s 
suicide and there was no one in power in Numidia to fear for Juba’s well-being. 
However, Juba was taken in warfare and his family were unable to protest Juba’s 
capture, suggesting there was the continued threat of violence. Juba was not, at this 
stage, called a hostage but rather a captive, which meant Caesar could exercise his right 
to execute Juba should he have wished.1022 Roller suggests that Caesar’s decision to 
spare Juba, then a captive, meant that he was responsible for the child’s upbringing. 
Furthermore, if Juba had been returned to his family in Numidia, this may have caused 
problems for the Romans if the adult Juba wanted to avenge his father. Juba’s 
proximity to Caesar and later to the Imperial family suggests that Juba’s importance 
was understood, and that the Roman elite wanted to keep him close to ensure his 
loyalty and to use him as a symbol within political promotion. In addition, Juba could 
not return to Numidia, which had been transformed into a province, without the 
consent of Caesar and later Augustus. As such, like others labelled as hostages, Juba 
was educated in Roman values and remained close to the Imperial family before being 
sent to rule Mauretania in 26/25 BCE. Therefore, it is clear that Juba was in the power 
of the Roman elite and was expected to carry out their demands, a position those who 
were explicitly called ‘hostages’ or understood to be client kings were forced into.  
As we have seen with Augustus’ careful use of language in relation to the Parthian 
‘hostages’, Juba being called anything but a hostage ensured that, like ‘guest princes’ 
such as Tigranes, Caesar and Augustus could stress their continued control over 
Numidia and, once he was in position as a client king of the region, Mauretania, 
without having to use force. In the case of Juba, it was Caesar who had obtained the 
boy and paraded him in his triumph, which we shall discuss in the following chapter. 
Here, we see that Juba’s initial stint in Roman custody was not dissimilar to that of 
other elite captives, and he was described using terms similar to other types of captives 
we have seen throughout this thesis.1023 However, after appearing in Caesar’s triumph, 
he quickly became used as an overtly political tool, being kept as a living symbol of 
Rome’s dominion over Numidia. Similarly, retaining Juba as a hostage provided 
Caesar and his heirs with links to a North African royal family, thus enabling the 
Roman elite to continue exerting influence over the region now under Roman rule. The 
ancient sources do not make reference to this, but it may be the case that it was 
universally understood that the Numidian ruling family would have continued to be 
concerned for the welfare of their former prince, whilst watching the transition of their 
nation into a Roman province.  
 
comparable ‘hostages’, like Demetrius, that I would stress that, regardless of the ancient 
authors’ linguistic choices, he was a hostage. 
1021 Allen, 2006: 8. 
1022 The only reference to Juba shortly after his capture was at Caesar’s triumph where Dio 
describes him as a captive (αἰχμάλωτος), cf. Dio 43.19. 
1023 In his description of Caesar’s triumph, Plutarch labels Juba as μακαριωτάτην ἁλοὺς ἅλωσιν 
(the most fortunate of the captives), cf. Plut. Vit. Caes. 55.2.  
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As said, Numidia became a Roman province after Juba I’s death, under an appointed 
Roman governor, and it is interesting that, as Juba could not return to rule his 
homeland, Caesar and Augustus chose to preserve Juba when he had no kingdom. 
Here, we encounter similarities with Juba’s future wife’s situation, Cleopatra Selene. 
The daughter of Cleopatra and Marcus Antonius, Cleopatra Selene was forced to 
appear in Octavian’s triumph of 29 BCE, which we shall discuss in the following 
chapter, and then remained in the household of his sister, Octavia. Cleopatra Selene is 
never referred to as a hostage, but her position is indicative of the ways by which 
Augustus could retain and utilise the offspring of his and Rome’s former enemies,1024 a 
precedent possibly established by Caesar’s capture of Juba.  
To return to Juba’s treatment, Juba is thought to have been less than two years of age at 
the time of Caesar’s triumph.1025 Juba did not return to North Africa for another two 
decades, meaning that he was raised within an elite Roman household. Roller suggests 
that, given Caesar’s own childless household, Juba may have been brought up in the 
house of Caesar’s niece, Atia. There is little doubt that Juba was kept as a hostage, not 
as punishment to his father who committed suicide after his defeat, but to ensure the 
loyalty of the region, and the reinstatement of a pro-Roman monarch in northern 
Africa, once Juba came of age.1026 Following Atia’s death in 44 BCE, it is likely that Juba 
passed into the household of Atia’s daughter, Octavia, where he remained with her 
large collection of politically-useful children until his posting as client king to 
Mauretania.1027 Juba was integrated into elite Roman society, becoming friends with 
notable intellectuals like Strabo.1028 Seemingly, he also received a Roman military 
education, going on tour with Augustus and his step-sons.1029 Clearly, Augustus was 
not concerned with Juba using Roman military knowledge and tactics, should he chose 
to rebel against Rome upon becoming king. As such, there was a level of trust between 
the hostage-taker and the hostage. 
Possibly at Augustus’ behest, Juba married Cleopatra Selene in c. 25 BCE.1030 Their 
marriage was hailed as a success by the Greek epigrammatist, Crinagoras of 
Mytilene.1031 
Great bordering regions of the world which the full stream of Nile separates from the black 
Aethiopians, 
 
1024 Cleopatra Selene could be cast as being the daughter of Cleopatra rather than Marcus 
Antonius given the Romans’ understanding of children following the status of their mother, not 
their father, when there was no evidence of marriage. This is particularly evident in relation to 
the status of enslaved people, cf. Patterson, 1982: 132-133. 
1025 Roller, 2003: 59. 
1026 Roller, 2003: 59. 
1027 Roller, 2003: 63-4. 
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1029 Dio 51.15.6, Strabo, Geog. 17.3.7. 
1030 For discussion of the date of Juba and Cleopatra’s marriage, cf. Roller, 2003: 85-7. 
1031 There is some debate as to the authorship, cf. Braund, 1984: 175-8. 
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ye have by marriage made your sovereigns common to both, turning Egypt and Libya into one 
country.  
May the children of these princes ever again rule with unshaken dominion over both lands. 
Ἄγχουροι μεγάλαι κόσμου χθόνες, ἃς διὰ Νεῖλος,  
πιμπλάμενος μελάνων τέμνει ἀπ᾿ Αἰθιόπων, 
ἀμφότεραι βασιλῆας ἐκοινώσασθε γάμοισιν,  
ἓν γένος Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης θέμεναι.  
ἐκ πατέρων εἴη παισὶν πάλι τοῖσιν ἀνάκτων  
ἔμπεδον ἠπείροις σκῆπτρον ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοτέραις. 
 
A Greek writer from Lesbos, Crinagoras lived in Rome during the reign of Augustus 
and would therefore have been fully aware of the political situation, and able to reflect 
upon Augustus’ use of the marriage in his self-promotion. In his poem celebrating the 
occasion, Crinagoras praises the joining of their two nations, making mention of the 
Nile which often acted as a symbol of Egypt.1032 This is significant as Crinagoras 
appears to suggest that Roman influence, as represented by Juba and Cleopatra as 
client kings, extended beyond the areas Juba and Cleopatra would rule. For instance, 
although both were connected to other areas of North Africa, neither Juba nor 
Cleopatra ruled (or could rule) over Numidia or Egypt, given that they were both 
Roman provinces. However, the very fact that Crinagoras mentions the two areas 
suggests that it was widely thought that Augustus had instigated the joining of 
previously disparate nations by relying upon two symbols of North Africa: Juba as 
Libya, a region which overlapped with Numidia, and Cleopatra Selene as Egypt. That 
said, the poem would suggest that the regions were free of Roman influence, but this 
was certainly not the case as the pair acted as client rulers under Augustus and his 
heirs. Crinagoras may have been taking artistic liberties,1033 but this would certainly be 
the message Augustus wished to send to the Roman population and those living in the 
area. Augustus chose not to engage in military campaigns to exert influence and 
control over the region, but instead used other tools at his disposal, namely two 
individuals who had been kept and raised for the purpose of acting as his instruments 
through their rule, which was further strengthened by inter-dynastic marriage.1034 
Therefore, Augustus’ power was emphasised further by his ability to control an area 
without having to engage in military activity.  
Juba and Cleopatra Selene ruled Mauretania together until Cleopatra’s death in 5 BCE. 
Juba continued to rule the region until 23 CE, further cementing his ties with the wider 
Mediterranean world and Roman influence in the area by marrying Galphyra, a 
princess of Cappadocia (modern-day Turkey) whose father, Archelaus, had been an 
ally of Rome. Once more, Juba proved himself to be the ideal client king, continuing to 
 
1032 Crinagoras, Greek Anthology 9.235. 
1033 Particularly when it goes to geographical locations, cf. Braund, 1984: 175-8. 
1034 Jacobson, 2001: 23-24. 
169 
 
build Rome’s sphere of influence in the area by connecting himself with Eastern allies 
of Rome. Augustus’ politics in building networks with his client kings may have also 
played a role in Juba’s second marriage. As Jacobson outlines, Augustus exploited the 
practice of inter-dynastic marriages, commonly found in eastern Mediterranean 
nations, to further his control over the area.1035 The offspring of these children, like 
Cleopatra and Juba’s son Ptolemy, could continue to rule the kingdom or be sent to a 
new region, as was the case for Galphyra’s son by her first husband, Alexander, son of 
Herod. Their child, Tigranes, was appointed king of Armenia by Augustus, and his 
family continued to be used as political pawns until the reign of Nero over half a 
century later. The cycle continued throughout Rome’s history, with hostages, as 
captives in golden cages, being used to further the power and influence of Rome and 
her emperors.  
5.17. Chapter Conclusion 
Hostages, much like their enslaved captive counterparts, were viewed as commodities. 
The terms the Greco-Romans employed when discussing hostages indicate that 
hostages were seen as ‘sureties’ or ‘pledges’, rather than as people. This links closely to 
the Romans’ understanding of captives who were automatically considered to be 
enslaved, therefore seen as animate objects. As such, the Romans were able to view 
their hostages as useful commodities who were taken in warfare, or under the threat of 
violence, and who could be exploited long after the conflict’s conclusion, as we have 
seen with Augustus’ Parthian hostages. The distinguishing feature between hostage 
and captive-taking was the Romans’ concern with convention as hostages were not 
supposed to be harmed, having been given in good faith. Therefore, individuals such 
as Dumnorix were initially treated like hostages in that they were politically useful, 
and their vulnerabilities could be manipulated by their keepers to place pressure or 
ensure loyalty from the hostages’ nations. However, the language Caesar used to 
describe his dealings with Dumnorix was careful to avoid any reference to obses or 
homêros (ὃμερος) which would have meant that Caesar was obliged to treat Dumnorix 
differently to those considered to be and termed captives. However, regardless of how 
Greco-Roman writers labelled the elite individuals in their custody, the individuals in 
question were ultimately captives who were kept in more salubrious surroundings 
than their enslaved counterparts. Hostages and elite captives were valued more than 
non-elite individuals because there was the opportunity to exploit hostages’ families 
and nations for political gain. However, like those labelled as captives who were 
assumed to be destined for slavery, hostages and elite captives were utilised by the 
Roman elite for their own interests, be it as symbols of Roman dominion over a nation, 
as a means of illuminating an individual’s characteristics (negative or positive), or as a 
way of securing, without overt military intervention, Rome’s control of regions 
throughout the Empire. As a result, hostages were disposable and, whilst presented as 
being ‘friends’ of Rome, were ultimately subject to whatever treatment the Roman elite 
deemed fit, as we have seen with Augustus and his heirs’ use of Phraates’ family, or 
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how such treatment could be manipulated to present a positive view of a leader, as 































Chapter Six – Captives in the Roman Triumph 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The triumph was the greatest honour a Roman general could be awarded, and the 
display of captives within this ritual demonstrates the relationship between violence, 
Imperialism, religion, performance, and political competition and elite self-promotion. 
A triumph was a military procession which involved a victorious general parading 
through the streets of Rome accompanied by their army and spoils of war, including 
captives. As we have seen in the introduction,1036 the triumph had to be granted by the 
senate and could only be awarded to those who had achieved a decisive and bloody 
victory over a foreign enemy. The specific number of triumphs is difficult to ascertain, 
but Beard estimates that throughout the Republican period, a triumph took place 
approximately every two years.1037 As such, the triumph was an undoubtedly common 
occurrence within Roman culture and, during the period in question, triumphs were 
continually within the Romans’ shared cultural memory.1038 Therefore, the ceremony 
may have been used by the Roman people and the elite, as it was by ancient authors, to 
compare triumphators in terms of the scale of the procession and its various 
components, including the presentation of captives. Concerns about presentation 
therefore had an impact on the treatment of captives. 
In this chapter, we shall begin by looking at the use of triumphal imagery in Roman 
literature as this informs us of how the Romans imagined captives to feel during the 
event, before considering aspects of the triumphal practice, including the creation of 
competition between triumphators. We will then turn to address key features of the 
triumph and representations of captives, using the best-documented example (Titus’ 
triumph of 71 CE). These aspects include selecting high-profile captives, and the use of 
paintings, platforms, chains, and effigies in the display of captives. I will then address 
executions which occasionally marked the end of the triumph, including looking in 
detail at the method of execution used. Most of the examples in the first part of the 
chapter concern men as, given that ancient Mediterranean warfare and politics was 
heavily patriarchal, the majority of notable captives in the triumph were male. As we 
shall see, this is not to suggest that female and child captives were omitted from 
triumphs, but ancient authors tended to focus on Rome’s male enemies unless in 
exceptional circumstances. Establishing how male captives were presented in triumphs 
then allows us to consider how female and child captives were displayed in contrast, 
and the various problems faced for triumphators in choosing to exhibit enemies who 
were considered to be ‘unconventional’ in contrast to male figures. 
 
1036 Cf. pp. 5-7.  
1037 Beard, 2005: 25. Beard’s assessment is based on Orosius’ Histories against the Pagans 7, 9. 8 
and the inscription known as the Fasti Consulares et Fasti Triumphales, a list of triumphs and 
ovations awarded to victorious generals found on Rome’s Capitoline Hill, cf. Degrassi, 1954. 
1038 The commemoration of famous triumphs in paintings across Rome and in iconography 
would have ensured this was the case, cf. Florus, Epit. 1.13.26-7, Varro, Lingua Lat. 7.57, 
Holliday, 2002: 30-2. 
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By considering these factors, I will demonstrate that the triumph, like the treatment 
captives had previously been subjected or witness to, was another way by which the 
Romans could further dehumanise their enemies in both historical reality and elite self-
promotion. In the context of the triumph, captives were primarily thought of as spoils 
of war, and were preserved by the Roman elite only if they could serve a subsequent 
political purpose, such as becoming hostages or being used in the promotion of an 
individual’s clemency or other characteristics. The socio-economic and political 
positions of captives displayed in the triumph marked them as being more useful to 
the Roman elite than those without prominent connections in their home countries, 
who were more commonly enslaved.1039 However, despite the differences in captives’ 
backgrounds, the triumph was designed, in reality and in later representations in 
literature and iconography, to further humiliate individuals in the eyes of the Roman 
people whilst acknowledging the captives’ former powers as leaders or high-profile 
members of their own society. This enabled the Roman elite, having degraded the 
captives from their free and often noble status to that of enslaved people, with all the 
treatment such a status permitted in Roman thought, to present Roman military 
activities as justified as they had conquered an inferior yet challenging people. The 
triumph also demonstrates that Roman Imperialism was concerned with power over 
people, as well as control of land, as we have seen throughout this thesis.1040 As a 
result, the triumph illuminates the significance of captives in the promotion of 
Imperialism by the elite, showing that captives had influence in Roman society albeit 
as pawns in elite self-promotion, and that the humiliation and degradation of captives 
had a performative aspect. 
6.2. Captives of Rome’s Imagination 
Such a performative aspect, particularly focussing on the power play between the 
triumphator and their captives, is evident in literary references to captive-taking. In the 
triumph, the contrast between enemies being presented as fearsome but sympathetic 
figures, and the representation of captives generally are particularly significant as we 
do not have access to the full historical record, and we have no evidence from the 
perspective of any captive who appeared in a triumph.1041 However, given the frequent 
references in literature, especially as metaphor in love elegy, it seems that there was a 
universal understanding that captives formed an integral part of the triumph and this 
fact could be exploited for the writer’s agenda. Roman authors often attempted to 
convey a captive’s emotions,1042 and these instances are the author imagining how they, 
from a Roman perspective, would feel in such a situation. Given what we know of the 
position of captives in Roman thought and society, and the Romans’ concern with 
appearances, the captives of Rome’s imagination were heavily influenced by the elite 
honour code, which centred on males needing to retain autonomy and display their 
power. A key way to achieve such a contrast, as we will see in relation to the use of 
 
1039 As we have seen in the chapter on enslavement, cf. pp. 96-111. 
1040 People could symbolise land, and land was only considered to be fully conquered once its 
people had submitted to Roman dominion, cf. pp. 81-89, 115-128, 152-157. 
1041 Cf. Beard, 2005: 27-28, Beard, 2007: 111-4. 
1042 Beard, 2005: 28, Beard, 2007: 111-4. 
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chained kings, was to compare Roman figures with those they deemed to be ‘The 
Other’.1043 In addition, this aspect of love elegy links to the use of militia amoris in 
Roman poetry written mostly by men, in which erotic pursuits are compared to or cast 
as forms of military conquest.1044  
The triumph was frequently evoked as ‘like a Roman victor, Cupid subjugates and 
enslaves the conquered; Roman love demeans and enslaves the lover.’1045 The 
inferiority of the imagined captive in the triumph is shown using a captive in chains as 
a figurative device. The chained captive is frequently found in Latin literature,1046 
especially in Ovid, and is often used within love poetry to reflect how a male lover was 
under the power of a ‘triumphant female’,1047 a role reversal which challenged gender 
norms.1048 Ovid occasionally presents the antithesis in order to show a female as being 
enslaved by her lover. Ovid uses his readers’ understanding of the triumph and the 
power dynamic between triumphator and captive within his poetry, thus suggesting 
that the triumph was deeply ingrained within the Roman readers’ shared cultural 
memory. Ovid uses such representations as a metaphor for both the power held by 
women over their lovers, and his desire to see a woman under his control. For instance, 
Ovid alludes to triumphal traditions, such as the calling of ‘io’ and the presentation of 
captives in chains,1049 whilst hailing his hero for his victory over a sad captive girl 
(tristis captiva).1050 
Ho! our valiant hero has been victorious over a girl!  
Let her walk before, a downcast captive with hair let loose.1051 
…”io! forti victa puella viro est!” 
ante eat effuso tristis captiva capillo 
In actuality, appearing in a triumph was shameful, as being displayed in the 
procession meant that the captive had surrendered to Rome. In Roman thought, 
surrender was a dishonourable act which involved acknowledging another’s power 
over one’s body.1052 A sense of long-lasting shame is evident in the rare cases when 
freed Roman PoWs were presented in triumphs, accompanying the triumphator. For 
instance, the freed senator Q. Terentius Culleo appeared in Scipio’s triumph. Culleo’s 
status was indicated in the triumph by his wearing of the Phrygian cap of freedom (the 
sign of a freedman).1053 Levy suggests that freed Roman PoWs may have remained tied 
 
1043 A common technique in all aspects of Roman life, cf. Gruen, 2006: 459-60. 
1044 Cf. Cahoon, 1988: 293-307, O’Rourke, 2018: 110-139. 
1045 Cahoon, 1988: 295. 
1046 Copley, 1947: 285-300. 
1047 Ovid, Am. 1.2.19-30, 1.14.45-50, 1.7.35-39, 3.8.61-64, cf. Beard, 2007: 27-28, Cahoon, 1988: 293-
307. 
1048 Consider the criticism levelled at Antony for being ‘enslaved’ by Cleopatra, cf. pp. 204-210. 
1049 For the chant of ‘io triumphe’, cf. Varro, On the Latin Language 6.86. 
1050 Ovid, Am. 1.7.38-39. 
1051 Translation by Showerman, 1914. 
1052 De Libero, 2012: 29-40, cf. pp. 66-68. 
1053 Cf. Livy 30.43.11-12, 38.55.1-4. For other examples of postliminium, cf. Wolff, 1941: 136-183, 
Lica, 2001: 496-501, Havener, 2014: 167-9. 
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to their rescuer for life, although it is unclear to what extent.1054 As a result, freed 
Roman PoWs held a relationship not dissimilar to that of a freedman which, as we 
have seen previously, was a status the Roman elite treated with derision or 
disapproval.1055 In the case of Culleo, after appearing in Scipio’s triumph, he was also 
involved in the funeral procession and the subsequent inquiry into Scipio’s alleged 
misuse of state funds. Overall, the use of triumphal imagery in literature demonstrates 
how the procession concerned the presentation of captive people, spoils and animals 
which were used to express the humiliation and degradation of enemies and their 
lands, as people acted as physical manifestations of their nations.1056 
6.3. Triumphs and Political Competition 
Before we continue to discuss specific representations of captives in triumphs, we 
should acknowledge the significance of the ritual in terms of elite self-promotion and 
how this impacted upon political competition between leading figures. As we shall see 
shortly, triumphs were elaborate affairs which could raise the profile of the 
triumphator and their achievements. As Beard suggests,1057 triumphs were prominent 
events throughout the period in question, and the adaptations of the ritual highlight 
socio-political developments, such as the rise of powerful, charismatic individuals 
during the civil wars of the 1st century BCE.1058 The development which is most 
pertinent to this discussion concerns how the triumph raised the profile of an 
individual,1059 which is clearly reflective of the heightened political competition during 
the period in question. The promotion of an individual and their personal qualities 
was, as shown throughout this thesis, often conveyed through representations of an 
individual’s treatment of their captives, and this is evident in triumphal practices, too. 
As such, given the increasingly raised stakes of the triumphs throughout the 1st century 
BCE, the heightened sense of competition would have impacted upon the captives’ 
roles and treatment in the triumph. 
The increasing focus on the individual is evident in Pompey’s demand for a triumph in 
80 BCE.1060 The triumph, which was Pompey’s first, was reluctantly granted by the 
dictator Sulla. This is significant as Sulla had to overlook the fact that Pompey was not 
a praetor or consul,1061 those who were typically awarded the honour. Not only does 
Pompey’s triumph show Sulla’s abuse of power and Roman convention,1062 but 
 
1054 Levy, 1943: 159-176. 
1055 Cf. pp. 9-12, 111-115. 
1056 Cf. pp. 37-42, 68-73, 115-128, 152-157. 
1057 Beard, 2005: 25.  
1058 Migone, 2012: 49-60. 
1059 Migone, 2012: 43-68. Migone suggests the opposite, and that the triumph reinforced 
traditional institutions and norms which ‘dampened’ the charisma of military leaders. 
However, Migone appears to undermine her own argument as she acknowledges the role Late 
Republican triumphs played in the making of individual’s careers but denies that they were 
crucial.  
1060 The date of Pompey’s triumph is disputed as either 80 BCE or 79 BCE, cf. Badian, 1955: 107-
118. 
1061 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 14.1-2. 
1062 Keaveney, 1982: 161-163. 
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Pompey’s use of the triumph is significant as it indicated a change from the way in 
which triumphs were used by the elite up until that point. Previous triumphs were 
awarded to generals who had climbed to the top of the military and political ladder. 
References to triumphs were then used by a general’s heirs as a form of promotion and 
publicity, emphasising their connection with praiseworthy Roman ancestors.1063 
However, unlike that of past triumphators, Pompey’s triumph was a way by which he 
launched his career, enabling him to ingratiate himself with the Roman people, which 
soon caused Sulla to worry about Pompey’s rising popularity.1064 As a result, the self-
promotion and boost in power became beneficial to Pompey immediately, rather than 
for the benefit of his descendants in the long-term. Pompey’s triumph was the first to 
show the career building possibilities for triumphators and the emphasis on the 
individual, which was viewed as both potentially beneficial and dangerous. This may 
account for why during the reign of Augustus, triumphs were monopolised by the 
Imperial family,1065 and became a means of demonstrating succession, as evident with 
Titus’ triumph of 71 CE when his father the Emperor Vespasian and brother Domitian 
accompanied him.1066 This shows the role of triumphs in emphasising and securing 
individual and dynastic power, a factor which could pose problems for the recently 
established Imperial family should the opportunity be extended to those outside of 
their immediate circle. 
In addition to highlighting the use of the triumph in career-building and the rise of the 
individual, Pompey’s triumph also marks another turning point. Pompey’s 
extravagant triumph set a higher precedent for later triumphators to match or outshine 
their predecessors, especially when compared to earlier triumphs like that of the 
Roman general Gaius Marius’ in 104 BCE for his role in the Jugurthine War (112-106 
BCE). The sense of competition is evident as Pompey’s triumph was elaborate, to the 
point that it supposedly had to be toned down when the elephants pulling Pompey’s 
chariot could not fit through the gates of Rome because of their size.1067 The reference 
to the elephants is problematic as there are no contemporary accounts of Pompey’s 
triumph which allude to the procession being disrupted by elephant related issues. We 
would expect to find such a reference in Cicero, as he mentions that he was present for 
Pompey’s games following his Third Triumph.1068 These games featured the killing of 
elephants in the arena which evoked a sympathetic response from the crowd. It seems 
improbable that Cicero, even as a supporter of Pompey, would have missed the 
opportunity to draw a comparison between the elephants at Pompey’s First Triumph 
and those at his later games, as both were failed attempts at self-promotion.  
 
1063 As we have seen in iconography, cf. pp. 121-124. 
1064 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 14.6-15.1-2. Other examples include Tiberius and Marcellus riding on 
horseback in Augustus’ Triple Triumph of 29 BCE, cf. Suet. Tib. 6.4. 
1065 Beard, 2007: 68-71. For the changes to the triumph after Augustus, cf. Goldbeck, 2017: 103-
124, Itgenshorst, 2017: 59-82. 
1066 Joseph. BJ. 7.123-8. We shall discuss Titus’ triumph shortly. 
1067 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 14.1-2. 
1068 Cic. ad. Fam. 7.1. 
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On another note, the elephants may have held symbolic meaning which enabled 
Pompey to indirectly allude to his victory over his fellow Romans during the Civil 
Wars between Sulla and Marius’ factions (88-87 BCE), an issue we shall discuss in more 
detail later in relation to Arsinoë and Cleopatra. Triumphs could not be celebrated over 
another Roman, but this proved problematic for prospective triumphators, as many of 
the wars Rome was involved in during the 1st century BCE, such as Caesar and 
Octavian’s conflicts, concerned opposing Roman factions. Pompey, as an ally of Sulla, 
had been involved in the Civil War against Marius. Havener suggests that Pompey’s 
elephants were symbolic of Marius, the leader of the faction defeated by Sulla, and 
were used by Pompey to hint at his victory over the Marian forces in Sicily without 
explicitly acknowledging victory over a Roman.1069 This may be the reason why Cicero 
was so critical of Pompey’s elephants in the arena, as they had previously been used to 
symbolise Pompey’s fellow Romans who had been defeated in abhorrent civil strife. 
This example shows how each part of the triumph was carefully thought out with 
allusions to specific symbols which some parts of the audience would have recognised. 
However, Pompey’s elephants also tell us how some aspects of presentation, including 
the use of symbols, could be misjudged and could incur the public’s disapproval, as we 
shall see in the later discussion of women and children in triumphs.  
6.4. The Triumph of Titus, 71 CE 
As we have established how the Romans thought about captives in triumphs, and how 
the ceremony could be used for self-promotion, we should now consider some of the 
ways by which the appearance of captives was staged both in actuality and in later 
representations in art and literature. In order to achieve this, we should turn to the 
best-documented example of a triumph in ancient literature. This can be found in the 
writings of Josephus and concerns the triumph of Titus, the son of the Emperor 
Vespasian, in 71 CE. Titus was awarded the triumph for his victories in Judaea during 
the First Jewish Revolt (66-73 CE), which were noteworthy for the looting and 
destruction of the Temple Mount in 70 CE. 
Josephus is an important observer, as he was a captive of Rome and an eyewitness to 
the triumph,1070 essentially watching his countrymen and sacred objects from the 
Temple Mount being displayed in Rome.1071 In a similar way to the hostage writer 
Polybius and his captor and later patron Scipio Africanus,1072 Josephus was closely 
associated with Titus and his family. As Josephus had been freed by Titus, he became a 
 
1069 Havener, 2014: 169-70. 
1070 I briefly discuss the importance of Josephus’ account at the end of the section. For an 
overview of scholarship on Josephus’ reliability and account of the triumph, cf. Frilingos, 2017: 
50-67, Mason, 2017: 125-176. 
1071 Mason casts some doubt over whether Josephus actually witnessed the triumph first-hand 
and claims it is a piece of Flavian ‘propaganda’. I do not contend with Mason’s characterisation 
but would suggest that dismissing Josephus’ account as being merely promotional is unhelpful 
for research into the triumph as Josephus’ description illuminates aspects of the triumph which 
are found throughout Roman history, cf. Mason, 2017: 125-176. As such, I use Josephus’ 
description to highlight the attitudes towards and customs concerning captives which were 
present within the triumph. 
1072 Cf. pp. 75. 
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freedman who was reliant on his former master for his future security, and was 
therefore also required to support the careers of the Flavian family.1073 Therefore, 
Josephus had an agenda which served the Flavians’ best interests. That being said, as 
he was close to the triumphator, it is likely that Josephus was party to the preparations 
for the triumph and may have deliberately stressed favoured areas of Titus’ self-
promotion and display within his description, thus illuminating key aspects of 
promotion for triumphators. Josephus’ account of the triumph focusses on the role of 
the triumphator, the soldiers and Roman people in the triumph, before his attention is 
turned to spoils and physical representations of warfare and the conquered land, 
including paintings, signs and captives. Given Josephus’ close proximity to the 
triumphal preparations and our awareness that the triumph developed over the course 
of time, Titus’ triumph can be seen as an amalgamation of practices which were 
established during the 1st century BCE. Therefore, we will use Josephus’ description as 
a skeleton structure which will be fleshed out with examples from the time period 
pertinent to this thesis. 
6.5. Advertising the Triumph 
Josephus begins his description by detailing the reaction of the crowd, claiming that 
most of Rome’s population were in attendance. The triumph was advertised to the 
people through public notices,1074 which were probably not dissimilar to painted 
notices found in Pompeii which advertised gladiatorial combat.1075 Furthermore, the 
population was likely aware of the triumphator’s return. For instance, Caesar and 
Pompey’s achievements were celebrated throughout Italy as they travelled back to 
Rome.1076 This suggests that rumours about the spoils and captives on show may have 
spread widely. In addition, in Pompey’s case, his first triumph would have been within 
the cultural memory during his following triumphs and, as we know, it had been a 
grand affair.1077 The anticipation may have been as keen for Pompey’s next ‘show’, as it 
was for confirmation of Rome’s victory over foreign enemies.  The cumulative effect 
would have created a sense of anticipation surrounding the most well-known captives 
or objects. 
Furthermore, the audience may have been aware of and anticipated the triumph, 
including the appearance of particular spoils and captives, because of reports sent to 
Rome from the frontlines. For instance, such reports may have been read out to the 
Roman public, as suggested by scholars researching the dissemination of Caesar’s 
Gallic Wars.1078 Public communication of this kind, such as the Acta Diurna (Daily 
Acts),1079 and such examples as the proscription lists placed in the forum, suggests that 
wider Roman society were aware of the key players within conflicts. Furthermore, 
upon becoming dictator, Caesar reinstated the tradition of publishing the daily 
 
1073 Bellemore, 1999: 94-118, Mouritsen, 2011: 36-65. 
1074 Joseph. BJ. 7.122. 
1075 For a specific example of such advertisements see Coleman’s discussion of CIL IV 8056, cf. 
Coleman, 1996: 194-6. 
1076 Caes. B Gall. 8.51. For Pompey, see: App. Mith. 12.116. 
1077 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 14.1-2. 
1078 Riggsby, 2006: 12-13. 
1079 A source archived and frequently used by writers of history, cf. Swan, 1987: 272-91. 
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dealings of the senate in a public setting.1080 This indicates that Caesar recognised the 
impact of the lists and how they could be, and certainly had been, harnessed for his 
own means. In addition, such accounts were yet another way in which the Roman elite 
could represent enemy individuals, both before and after their capture, and stress their 
victory over the most impressive of their enemies, a consideration we shall address 
shortly. 
6.6. Preparing for the Triumph 
To return to Titus’ triumph, prior to the procession, the army remained outside the 
walls of Rome on the Campus Martius, as armies were only permitted into the city for 
the triumph itself. The morning of the triumph, Titus and his father Emperor 
Vespasian, wearing civilian garb, spoke to the senators and equestrians at the Porticus 
Octaviae, a portico to the east of the Capitoline Hill within the pomerium, before 
offering sacrifices to the gods, presumably at the temples of Jupiter Stator and Juno 
Regina which were housed within the Porticus.1081 The triumph also concluded with 
sacrifices to Jupiter, Juno and Minerva at temples on the Capitoline Hill. Therefore, the 
triumph had a religious element which gave thanksgiving to the gods who had 
ensured Roman victory. In turn, this also emphasised how the triumphator was 
divinely favoured, and this has an impact on how captives were perceived, as the 
Roman public would have thought that the enemy were condemned by the gods’ will 
to be suffer defeat. After offering sacrifices near the Porticus Octaviae, Titus and 
Vespasian returned to the troops stationed outside the city walls, and Titus re-entered 
the city wearing the costume of a triumphator.1082 The costume typically involved the 
triumphator wearing full military regalia and a purple cloak.1083 The costume change 
indicated Titus’ shifting role from a Roman citizen to military general, symbolising the 
dual role whilst ensuring that war was kept outside of the city unless in exceptional 
circumstances like the triumph. Such a change is also indicative of the staging of the 
triumph with Roman generals presenting themselves in a way which was suitable for 
the ‘performance’ or ‘ritual’ of the triumph. 
6.7. The Triumph’s Route and Order 
Another ‘staging’ issue was the triumph’s route and order which were important 
presentation considerations for the triumphator,1084 and inform us about the 
presentation of captives. There have been attempts to reconstruct the order of the 
 
1080 During his consulship of 59 BCE, cf. Suet. Jul. 20. 
1081 Joseph. BJ. 7.123-8, cf. Richardson, 1992b: 317-8. 
1082 Joseph. BJ. 7.130-2. This part of Titus’ triumph was a feature unique to the principate as, 
prior to Augustus, triumphators had to remain outside the city boundaries before the triumph. 
Should triumphators enter the pomerium, they had to relinquish imperium proconsulare which 
was required for a triumph. From Augustus onwards, emperors had permanent imperium 
proconsulare, thus allowing Titus to cross across the pomerium before the triumph, cf. Drogula, 
2007: 419-452. 
1083 For discussion of the appearance of a triumphator, particularly in relation to Pompey 
wearing the ‘cloak of Alexander’, cf. Beard, 2007: 13-14, Östenberg, 2009: 284. 
1084 Östenberg, 2005: 13-22. 
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triumph,1085 but we cannot be entirely certain given the ancient authors’ lack of interest 
in this aspect.1086 That said, it is generally thought that from the early Imperial period, 
as evident in Josephus’ description, a triumph would begin outside of Rome’s city 
boundaries, pass through the Porta Triumphalis, by the Portico of Octavia (Porticus 
Octaviae),1087 and follow a route through the streets of Rome to the Temple of Jupiter 
on the Capitoline Hill.1088 The order and processional route may have developed over 
the course of time, given Rome’s continually developing urban landscape,1089 as 
evident in the inclusion of the Porticus Octaviae which was built during Augustus’ 
reign. However, the start and end points are likely to have remained the same to retain 
a sense of tradition and to ensure that the triumph remained a set ‘public ritual’. 
Nevertheless, a vague ‘set route’ must have been widely understood as there are 
examples where an excessive divergence from tradition was used as a means of 
denigrating an individual’s character or commenting upon societal changes.1090 The 
position of captives within the procession is significant for this study as it pertains to 
how captives were presented within elite promotion.  
There was also supposedly a set processional order, as suggested by comments 
pertaining to Octavian’s inclusion of senators walking ahead of his chariot during his 
Triple Triumph in 29 BCE.1091 This links to how spoils and captives which were closest 
to the triumphator are of particular note in the writings of Greco-Roman authors. In his 
description of Titus’ triumph, Josephus details the masses of spoils which accompanied 
the triumphator’s chariot.1092 The spoils included precious metals, ivory, plundered art, 
jewellery and crowns, images of deities, animals, and captives adorned in ‘ornaments 
of amazing richness’ [Figure 28].1093 Triumphators usually followed the procession, as 
shown by Josephus’ use of the word πέμπω (pémpō) meaning ‘send’ in the description 
of the triumph, thus indicating that Titus sent forth his army and the spoils before 
entering the city in his chariot.1094 Josephus’ structure may also convey the 
triumphator’s delayed appearance, as Josephus proceeds to outline in detail the spoils 
in question before the entry of the triumphator. This is also evident in art and 
iconography, and in this case is apparent on the Arch of Titus in Rome. Constructed in 
82 CE under the Emperor Domitian, the Arch features idealised scenes from Titus’ 
triumphal procession. On the north frieze within the archway [Figure 29], Titus is 
 
1085 Beard, 2007: 92-3. Much debate centres on the role of the Porta Triumphalis in the 
procession, cf. Versnel, 1970: 132-163. 
1086 For instance, Josephus skips over the order of the triumph to describe the spoils on display, 
cf. Joseph. BJ. 7.123-153. 
1087 Joseph. BJ. 7.123-4. 
1088 Badian, 2003: 1554, Beard, 2007: 92-6.  
1089 Favro, 1999: 204-219. 
1090 For instance, Antony held a triumph in Alexandria and paraded Artavasdes, the King of 
Armenia, whose surrender he had acquired through false promises, cf. Dio 49.39-40, 41.5-6, Plut. 
Vit. Ant. 1.4, Vell. Pat. 2.82.3. Octavian used Antony’s triumph in Alexandria to claim that he 
wanted to move the Roman capital, cf. Scott, 1933: 37. 
1091 Dio 51.21.9, cf. Östenberg, 2015: 13-22. 
1092 Joseph. BJ. 7.132-139. 
1093 Joseph. BJ. 7.132-139.  
1094 Joseph. BJ. 7.131, LSJ, 1359: πέμπω. 
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shown on his chariot, accompanied by a winged victory, and positioned behind the 
army. This is also the case for the depiction of Tiberius’ triumph on one of the 
Boscoreale Cups,1095 in which Tiberius, who is depicted riding his chariot, is located 
behind the rest of the triumphal procession which features his soldiers ahead of him 
and the sacrifice of a bull [Figure 30].1096 When the triumphator did enter the city, Titus 
followed the most important spoils, those from Temple Mount, and images or statues 
(ἀγάλματα, agálmata) of victory.1097 Presumably, this delayed entry enabled Titus to 
create anticipation for his appearance, impressing the crowds with the mass of spoils 
before appearing as the conquering hero. 
These examples speak to the importance of the triumph in elite promotion, and we can 
now turn our attention to how the captives’ position in the triumph may have been, as 
suggested by Josephus’ description, carefully staged for maximum impact. We have 
previously seen how anticipation could be created by the use of signs advertising the 
triumph or a triumphator’s delayed entry into Rome. However, a sense of anticipation 
may have been exploited in relation to the position of principal captives. We should 
note that, much like the rest of the triumph’s order, we cannot be entirely certain of the 
position of captives.1098 However, I would suggest that, whilst lesser-known captives 
were paraded at different points throughout the triumph,1099 high-status captives were 
led either in front of the triumphator’s chariot, as suggested by iconography [Figures 29 
and 30] and by Appian’s account of Pompey’s Third Triumph and Josephus’ account of 
Titus’ triumph,1100 or immediately behind it.1101 Either way, the captives were located 
close to the triumphator’s chariot. This is significant as the surrender of enemies 
shortly after their defeat is often characterised as ‘passing under the yoke’,1102 a term 
which links to agricultural practices involving oxen.1103 There may arguably have been 
a semi-ritual involved in the surrender scene,1104 as evident in other sequences of 
surrender which were orchestrated by the Roman elite,1105 although I would argue that 
regardless of the actual practice, the use of the term is indicative of how the Romans 
viewed their captives. Specifically, the transition from freed to enslaved person, a 
status which effectively rendered individuals as commodities, was characterised as a 
 
1095 Cf. pp. 152-163. 
1096 Cf. Kuttner, 1995: 143-153. 
1097 Joseph. BJ. 7.151-2, cf. LSJ, 5: ἀγάλμα. 
1098 Beard suggests that the position of captives was exploited depending on the medium in 
which they were represented. As a result, artists and writers had plenty of opportunity to play 
with the dynamic between captive and triumphator, cf. Beard, 2007: 125-7. 
1099 After the bulk had been sold into slavery, cf. 96-111. 
1100 As was the case for Pompey’s triumph of 61 BCE, cf. App. Mith. 12.117. 
1101 Cic. Pis. 60-61. 
1102 Cf. pp. 32-35. 
1103 Cf. Fronto, Ep. 217.7-8, Livy 9.4.1-6, 10.36.19, 40.49.4-6, Tac. Ann. 15.15. 
1104 Cassius Dio suggests that a ceremonial yoke was set up, cf. Dio 5=Zonaras 7.17. However, 
other references are vaguer and do not suggest there was a physical yoke set up for defeated 
enemies to pass under. I agree with a more figurative interpretation of the ‘yoke’, as an 
expression used to indicate a transition in status. 
1105 De Libero, 2012: 29-40. 
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form of dehumanisation, i.e. men took on the status of ‘yoked’ animals.1106 Oxen are 
strong, docile animals and the use of the ‘yoke’ as a figurative device enabled the 
Romans to show their ability to tame and control their powerful enemies, thus 
enabling a contrast between an enemy’s former and present status. This links closely to 
triumphs as captives who were close to the triumphator’s chariot were presented as 
being under the triumphator’s control. The proximity to the triumphator would 
suggest that the captives were key enemies of Rome who were previously powerful 
figures but, through their defeat, were presented as similar to animals in that their 
status had been degraded to something which could be easily led. As such, it may be 
the case that triumphators adapted the triumphal procession order, as they did with 
the route, to suit their agenda and preferences. 
However, whilst we cannot be certain of the position of high-profile captives, their 
overall position close to the triumphator should be noted. Triumphators entered the 
city towards the end of the triumph which, as we have seen, was probably a deliberate 
arrangement to heighten the crowd’s excitement. By the time a triumphator entered the 
city, within close proximity to principal captives, the Roman public would have 
witnessed the passing army, shouting support for (or even playfully ridiculing) the 
triumphator, and elaborate stages with masses of spoils, including precious metals, 
statuary, art, exotic animals and captives. The eventual appearance of the triumphator 
would have been highly anticipated, and the carefully selected spoils suggested that 
the triumphator was personally responsible for bringing wealth and further power to 
Rome. With the captives accompanying the triumphator, the Roman people would 
have been able to see that such wealth and prestige was a direct result of the 
triumphator defeating Rome’s troublesome enemies and the nations they represented. 
The principal captives, sometimes chained, would then be led to the bottom of the 
Capitoline Hill, in the north west corner of the forum.1107 Here, they would either be 
executed, imprisoned, or placed in the custody of a member of the Roman elite. 
Considering the standardised route and procession order, a sense of performance is 
evident.1108 
6.8. Principal Captives 
Authors writing of the triumph named key enemy figures from Rome’s wars, which 
then enabled the Roman audience to focus on individuals as symbols of their nation. 
On this note, the numbers of captives displayed within a triumph were relatively low 
in comparison to the numbers taken during warfare,1109 and there are discrepancies 
between Greco-Roman accounts of captives within triumphs, particularly the numbers 
and the names of those who attended.1110 References to high-profile captives presented 
during triumphs are in line with literary sources pertaining to enemies captured 
 
1106 The connection between the two is clear in Ovid, cf. Ovid, Am. 1.2.19-30. 
1107 App. Mith. 12.117. 
1108 Östenberg, 2009: 1. 
1109 Cf. pp. 98-102, 104-111. 
1110 Compare the description of the different material spoils on display in Pompey’s triumph of 
61 BCE: Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.1-4, App. Mith. 12.17, Pliny, NH 37.13. 
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during warfare, namely that only the number of captives and the most famous 
amongst their number are recorded.1111 This is the case for Pompey’s Third Triumph in 
61 BCE in which he displayed 324 captives, which were presumably spread out 
throughout the procession, yet fewer than 10 captives are named.1112 High-profile 
captives tended to be either Rome’s well-known enemies or those closely associated 
with them, including their wives and offspring of all ages.1113 Östenberg refers to such 
people as the ‘principal captives’ within the triumph, and I shall use this term to refer 
to the named captives within the procession, which were those the ancient authors 
considered to be of note. 
As we know, the ancient Mediterranean world was heavily patriarchal and, as a result, 
the principal captives within triumphs were mostly male, often with accompanying 
female and child family members who were not directly involved in warfare. For 
instance, in Pompey’s triumph over Mithridates in 61 BCE, Mithridates’ seven adult 
offspring, both male and female, were presented alongside Pontic generals and their 
wives and children.1114 As we shall see, this may have been because Mithridates, 
Rome’s main enemy, was dead, but it appears to be standard practice for women and 
children, who would have been non-combatants, to appear in the triumph. In Roman 
thought, women and children were considered to be extensions of their male 
relatives.1115 As such, the Roman population may have been made aware of the key 
captives involved in warfare, or those closely associated with them, and it is possible 
that the Romans would have heard the names of the principal captives in public 
reports. Thus, they would have recognised the triumphator’s longstanding struggle 
with the nation or the individuals in question.  
6.9. Selecting Principal Captives 
A concern for the presentation of captives is clear in instances in which people or 
objects were chosen and retained by generals specifically for display in their triumphs. 
As we have seen in relation to Titus’ triumph, the selection sometimes took place even 
before a triumph had been awarded, suggesting that the general had taken 
consideration of how captives would be presented, and what adornments would most 
please or impress the Roman people. In such cases, the selection process may have 
taken place months or even years before the conclusion of a war,1116 as was the case 
when Pompey picked parts of Mithridates’ treasure for his triumph.1117 Such a time 
delay may have posed logistical problems for future triumphators, as they had to 
consider the transport and upkeep of the captives or objects they had chosen.1118 As a 
 
1111 For instance, cf. Plut. Vit. Ant. 38.3. 
1112 App. Mith. 24.117. 
1113 Beard, 2005: 28-29, Östenberg, 2009: 129-131. 
1114 App. Mith. 117. Pompey also displayed Tigranes the Younger of Armenia alongside his wife, 
and Aristobulus of Judaea and his children, cf. Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.4. 
1115 As discussed throughout this thesis, cf. pp. 66-73, 117-128, 152-157.  
1116 Östenberg, 2009: 128. 
1117 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 36.3-6.  
1118 Beard, 2005: 28-29. 
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result, triumphators may have weighed the political and symbolic value of captives 
against the trouble of keeping them for months if not years before the triumph. 
Given that triumphators were aware of how well-known prominent figures would 
have been in Rome, they were able to consider which individuals would make the 
most impact. In Titus’ triumph, the captives included key figures from the war, 
including Simon bar Giora, one of the main rebel leaders, and individuals who had 
been carefully selected for their physical attributes, e.g. their height.1119 This select 
group of captives were dressed in elaborate costumes which may have been used to 
indicate their ethnicity.1120 As we know, it was common for triumphators to handpick 
individuals they wished to display, with the much earlier example of Scipio Africanus 
selecting fifty individuals from Numantia to display in his triumph.1121 In the case of 
Scipio, it was apparently because of their wretched appearance as it reflected the long 
siege they had withstood.1122 Criticism by ancient authors was also levelled at the 
Emperors Caligula, Domitian, and Gallienus for using impressive looking individuals 
to display in their respective triumphs who had not actually been captured during the 
course of warfare.1123 This example also shows how captives were dressed in their 
‘native costumes’ to clearly convey the difference between them, the Roman 
triumphator, and the Roman people.1124 Therefore, by emphasising the captives’ 
‘otherness’, the Romans were able to humiliate captive individuals without reproach as 
they were clearly identifiable as the defeated enemy who could face whatever 
treatment the triumphator subjected them to.  
The careful display of captives shows the significance of presenting captives as ‘worthy 
enemies’, i.e. those who could challenge Roman military might but, despite these 
fearsome qualities, had been conquered by triumphant general.1125 The concept of a 
‘worthy enemy’ is evident in Suetonius’ description of Caligula selecting Gallic 
enslaved people to stand in the stead of the Germans he was meant to have captured.  
Then turning his attention to his triumph, in addition to a few captives and deserters from the 
native tribes he chose all the tallest of the Gauls, and as he expressed it, those who were “worthy 
of a triumph,” as well as some of the chiefs. These he reserved for his parade, compelling them 
not only to dye their hair red and to let it grow long, but also to learn the language of the 
Germans and assume barbarian names.1126 
Conversus hinc ad curam triumphi praeter captivos ac transfugas barbaros Galliarum 
quoque procerissimum quemque et, ut ipse dicebat, ἀξιοθριάμβευτον, ac nonnullos ex 
 
1119 Joseph. BJ. 7.132-139.  
1120 Cf. pp. 117-124, 154-157. 
1121 App. Iber. 98, cf. Ostenberg, 2009: 129. 
1122 App. Iber. 97. 
1123 Suet. Vit. Cal. 47, Pers. 6.43-7, Tac. Agr. 39, SHA, Gall. 9.5, cf. Östenberg, 2009: 153-5. 
1124 For the use of costume in the triumph, cf. Meister, 2017: 83-102. 
1125 As Beard concisely puts it ‘a good victory always requires a good enemy‘, cf. Beard, 2005: 30, 
Hekster, 2007: 96. 
1126 Suet. Vit. Cal. 47. Loeb translation. 
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principibus legit ac seposuit ad pompam coegitque non tantum rutilare et summittere 
comam, sed et sermonem Germanicum addiscere et nomina barbarica ferre. 
This was supposedly because the captives were tall and therefore could make a more 
striking impression when set amongst the triumph’s multimedia display. Clearly, 
Suetonius’ intention was to further denigrate Caligula’s notoriously bad character by 
making him appear like an incompetent general and a deceiver of the Roman people, 
more concerned with spectacle than with showcasing his military achievements (or 
lack thereof). However, Suetonius claimed that Caligula had coined the Greek term 
(ἀξιοθριάμβευτον) which translates as ‘deserving to be led in triumph’.1127 Usually 
translated as ‘worthy’ rather than deserving, the inclusion of the term by Suetonius 
conveys two important points. Firstly, despite Caligula’s use of the neologism, the 
Roman elite clearly understood that some captives were more appropriate than others 
to display in a triumph. In Caligula’s case, he selected those who appeared to be more 
suitable than the individuals he had triumphed over who were ‘deserving’ of defeat, in 
that they were ‘worthy enemies’ who had the potential to challenge Rome. The second 
thing to note is that captives displayed in the triumph were effectively undergoing a 
form of punishment for rising up against Rome. Therefore, captives needed to look the 
part, as formerly fearsome male warriors who looked utterly defeated, and who had 
also committed an ‘offense’ against Rome. In this respect, the appearance of a ‘worthy 
enemy’ was a universally understood expectation of triumphators. With regards to 
Titus’ triumph, presenting a ‘worthy enemy’, like Simon Bar Giora and the Judaean 
generals, served to illuminate Titus’ military prowess in comparison to the impressive 
enemy. The careful selection of captives and spoils, particularly those from The 
Temple, demonstrates Titus’ acute awareness of the audience and what he perceived 
they would find most impressive, in addition to using symbols of the Judaean peoples’ 
faith which may have been understood by the Roman people given that there was a 
large Jewish population in Rome at the time.1128  
6.10. Signs and Placards 
Whilst the audience may have been aware of current affairs, they may not have 
recognised high-profile captives or representations of significant events on sight. This 
may account for the inclusion of placards presumably bearing the names and places 
from which the captives hailed.1129 Iconography shows that the placards were 
presented within close proximity to the captives, as Beard argues is the case with the 
Arch of Trajan at Beneventum, in which a number of female figures, identified as 
prisoners, walk ahead of placards which may have included their names and details of 
their origins.1130 The inclusion of placards may have been because the Roman audience 
would probably not have been able to recognise individuals by sight.1131 As a case in 
point, during Pompey’s Third Triumph of 61 BCE, his soldiers involved in the 
 
1127 Suet. Vit. Cal. 47. On the use of the term, cf. Woods, 2008: 900-904. 
1128 Gruen, 2002: 15, Goodman, 2004: 3-5. 
1129 Plin. NH 5.5.36, SHA, Aurelian 34.1-2, cf. Östenberg, 2009: 153-4. 
1130 Beard. 2007: 125-7. 
1131 Cf. Östenberg, 2009: 245-8. For Aurelian’s triumph over Zenobia, cf. Ando, 2000: 255.  
185 
 
procession carried inscriptions which listed Pompey’s achievements, including details 
of his victories over the captives and their nations. These included the number of pirate 
ships he had captured, the cities he had conquered, how much the soldiers had been 
rewarded, and how much the wars in the East had contributed to the public treasury 
which, as we have seen previously, may have included profits from the sale of 
captives.1132 This would suggest, given that literacy is thought to have been relatively 
low in the Roman world,1133 that the placards were aimed at the elite audience, who 
would have been reminded of Pompey’s contribution to their coffers. This is significant 
for two reasons. Firstly, as Brice points out, the financial issues surrounding warfare 
during the late Republic, including the cost of paying, equipping and moving the 
army, should not be underestimated.1134 Secondly, the use of placards within close 
proximity to captives shows how a triumphator could use different parts of the display 
to appear to different audiences. 
However, despite the assumption of the non-elite audience’s illiteracy,1135 there were 
other means by which the population at large would have understood the placards. For 
instance, crowd members who were literate may have shouted out the information 
presented on the placards, enabling those who were illiterate to understand the 
triumphator’s intended message. Alternatively, it may be that the names were chanted 
by the soldiers, akin to the way in which Caesar’s soldiers chanted of his achievements 
during his Gallic triumph.1136 Furthermore, as Woolf argues, the use of numbers, signs 
and diagrams, effectively reflects that ‘very few members of the ancient world can be 
considered as functionally illiterate.’1137 This may account for the placards bearing 
Roman numerals, as in Pompey’s Third Triumph of 61 BCE, which detailed the 
numbers of cities taken.1138 As we have seen in the introduction to this thesis,1139 
generals were awarded triumphs if they had killed a specific number of the enemy,1140 
and the placards may have been used to provide evidence of how Pompey had not 
only matched but exceeded the numbers necessary, emphasising his worthiness at 
being granted a triumph. We can see here that there were other means by which the 
audience were able to see representations of captives beyond the appearance of their 
person as, like our discussion of massacre, it was the general’s decision whether or not 
to kill or spare individuals. Alternatively, the placards may have been indicative of the 
captives’ enslaved status, as enslaved people were typically displayed within markets 
 
1132 Again, consider Pompey’s triumph with its use of placards and inscriptions: Plut. Vit. Pomp. 
45.1-5, App. Mith. 12.17, Plin. NH 37.13. 
1133 Stewart, 2008: 1. 
1134 Brice, 2008: 73-74. 
1135 Stewart, 2008: 1, Woolf, 2015: 31-42. 
1136 Varro, On the Latin Language 6.86, Ov. Am. 1.7.38-39. 
1137 Woolf, 2015: 31-42. 
1138 Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.1-4, App. Mith. 12.117. 
1139 Cf. pp. 5-7. 
1140 5000 is generally thought to have been the minimum number of enemy troops killed in 
battle, cf. Val. Max. 2.8.1. For an overview of the debate on the rules for obtaining a triumph, cf. 
Lundgreen, 2014: 17-32. 
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underneath similar noticeboards,1141 usually about their age and origins. Thus, the 
Roman audience would have been able to see, much like those presented in chains, 
how far Rome’s fearsome and formerly powerful enemies had fallen.  
6.11. Captives on Display: Paintings, Platforms, and Effigies 
In Josephus’ account of Titus’ triumph, material and human manifestations of the war 
and defeated nations were just some of the representations on display. There were also 
artistic depictions of key scenes from the First Jewish Revolt, including those showing 
the enemy being led into captivity.1142 The connection with theatrical performances is 
evident in such artistic representations, as the scenes were presented on moving 
scaffolds, called πῆγμα (pegma) by Josephus. The pegma, as they are also called in 
Latin,1143 were used within the theatre, and it is noteworthy that in Titus’ triumph a 
number of the defeated were presented on the same stage as artwork depicting the fall 
of the cities they had once protected. The combination of paintings and captives would 
have evoked the scenes in which the enemy were defeated more clearly for the 
audience, many of whom would have had little idea of Judaea’s cities or landscape. In 
turn, as Frilingos argues, by including graphic depictions of the war alongside the 
defeated generals, Vespasian and Titus were able to present the war as being justified, 
as a sense of self-destruction amongst the Judaean people is present throughout the 
description of the triumph and within Josephus’ account of the First Jewish Revolt.1144 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, such justification for warfare, which inevitably 
entailed financial and human losses, was crucial for generals to retain support after 
engaging in conflict.  
Captives may have had a status akin to an object, but their incarnation in human form 
had the potential to cause problems for triumphators. During the Republican period, 
there was often a delay of months or years between the capture of principal enemies, 
and the triumph.1145 One of the longest terms of captivity was that of the Gallic leader 
Vercingetorix, who was kept by Caesar for six years before appearing in Caesar’s 
triumph of 46 BCE. Given the effort prospective triumphators went to in order to 
display captives, it was clear that living specimens were preferable to objects or 
alternative representations. However, there were logistical issues in terms of guarding 
and transporting the captives. As we have discussed in a previous chapter,1146 little 
detail of such logistical concerns is included within the primary sources. However, 
there are instances where captives were unavailable, or were possibly considered too 
troublesome to transport to Rome. In such instances, effigies were used, as in the cases 
of Mithridates and Cleopatra. Both were dead months before Pompey and Octavian’s 
respective triumphs took place. Practically, cadavers could not be easily displayed 
given both decomposition and the Romans’ concern with pollution from unburied 
 
1141 Gell. NA 4.2.1, cf. Bradley, 1992: 125-138. 
1142 Joseph. BJ. 7.142-145. 
1143 OLD: pegma. 
1144 Frilingos, 2017: 58-60. 
1145 Beard, 2005: 28-29. 
1146 Cf. pp. 98-102. 
187 
 
bodies, and it was not common practice during this period for captives’ bodies, even 
executed after the triumph, to be publicly displayed post-mortem.1147 However, the use 
of an enemy’s body following their defeat could be indicative of the Romans’ feelings 
towards their former foe. For instance, Pompey chose to bury Mithridates’ body with 
full funerary rights. Interestingly, Romans rarely refer to the burial of their own dead 
in warfare,1148 so it is significant when the Romans chose to bury their enemies. 
Granted, Mithridates’ body was supposedly in a poor condition (despite its 
embalmment) and would have certainly been unsuitable for transport to Rome. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Pompey afforded Mithridates proper burial rites, rather than 
leave his body exposed, is telling of Pompey’s acknowledgement of his grudging 
admiration for Mithridates.1149 Pompey’s admiration was used to convey his own 
military capabilities as, by stressing Mithridates’ power, he was able to show his 
superior capabilities in having defeated one of Rome’s most powerful enemies. 
Despite Mithridates being dead and buried by the time of Pompey’s triumph, he did 
make an appearance in some form. According to Appian,1150 a gold statue of 
Mithridates which was likely appropriated by Pompey was included in the procession, 
carried either on a litter or, given its size and weight, by horse drawn carriages.1151 It is 
likely, like the throne and chariot also on display, that the statue was part of Pompey’s 
spoils taken during the Mithridatic War. The size of and material the statue was made 
from are significant as gold was a precious commodity. It is possible that the oversized 
gold statue was presented as a means of conveying Mithridates’ lavish ‘Eastern’ 
excesses, in line with the Roman stereotypes of near Eastern cultures. In addition, 
Pompey may have been attempting to surpass Sulla’s triumph of 81 BCE, in which 
lavish spoils taken from his conflict with Mithridates were on display.1152 In Pompey’s 
triumph, he had not only defeated Mithridates decisively, but exceeded the wealth 
Sulla had taken with symbols of Mithridates as a wealthy and powerful leader on 
display. 
However, the appearance of the statue may also have indicated Pompey’s begrudging 
admiration for Mithridates. Evidence indicates that only the greatest of individuals 
were presented using gold as a material, including Augustus at his funeral and 
(scandalously) Cleopatra in the temple of Venus Genetrix,1153 and there was an implicit 
 
1147 In 106 CE, the Dacian leader Decebalus was forced to commit suicide in Dacia, but Trajan 
retained his head and bought it to Rome (Dio 68.14.3-4), where Barry suggests that it was 
probably thrown down the Gemonian Stairs, the first time a high-profile captive’s body had 
been desecrated in public, cf. Barry, 2008: 224-6. 
1148 Except in the exceptional circumstances of Civil War, cf. Cooley, 2012: 63-77. 
1149 Other enemies who were afforded full burial rites were Antony and Cleopatra by Octavian, 
cf. Plut. Vit. Ant. 86.4. 
1150 App. Mith. 12.116. 
1151 Appian claims that the statue was 8 cubits high (3.6576 metres), cf. App. Mith. 12.116. 
Appian does not specify if the statue was carried on a litter or on a horse-drawn carriage.  
1152 Pliny, HN 33.16, Plut. Vit. Sulla 34.1-2. 
1153 For Augustus, cf. Dio 56.34.2. Caesar infamously placed a golden statue of Cleopatra in the 
Temple of Venus Genetrix, cf. Dio, 51.22.3, App. B Civ, 2.102. 
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understanding of the significance of gold in Plautus’ works.1154 As such, by presenting 
Mithridates in gold, Pompey was able to show that Mithridates was a worthy enemy, 
thus emphasising Pompey’s great achievement and his superiority over the impressive 
Mithridates. Furthermore, if taken as spoils of war, gold statues were frequently 
melted down.1155 As such, the people watching the triumph may have recognised that, 
whilst the statue was a reminder of the worthy enemy Pompey had defeated, it was 
also financially beneficial for the Roman treasury.  
6.12. Captives in Chains 
Triumphators often presented high-profile captives was in chains. Like the issues 
surrounding Pompey’s elephants, we are once again faced with attempting to 
disentangle the Romans’ actual behaviour in relation to their captives, and how this 
was represented in later literary works, such as in Plutarch’s biographies.1156 Such a 
dichotomy is evident in the use of chains and the display of chained captives in 
triumphs. As we have previously discussed,1157 it was common practice for captives to 
be chained to prevent escape, which shows that chains had a practical purpose. This is 
attested to in literary, archaeological and iconographic evidence.1158 Nevertheless, 
beyond the practicalities, chains could be used as symbols of both captivity and 
slavery, which is also evident in art, iconography, and later literature,1159 or even for 
comic effect as we have seen with Plautus’ Captivi.1160 Given the evidence showing that 
enslaved people were regularly chained, it is likely that most captives in triumphs 
were restrained in some way. This is apparent in artistic depiction of triumphs, with a 
frieze from Campania dating from 1st century CE [Figure 31] possibly depicting chained 
captives being led in a triumph on a horse-drawn carriage. Their physical appearance 
is indicative of ‘barbarian’ warriors, with the men sporting beards and wearing 
trousers. Their body language is also indicative of their defeat, with one man using 
hand gestures which seem to indicate a sense of despair, and the other slumped 
forward with his head in his hands. Beard argues that the guards in this image are 
presented as ‘controlling (or harassing) their captives’ through the use of the chains 
placed around their necks,1161 a common feature in the display of principal captives. 
Figure 32, a fragmentary sarcophagus, may show the triumph of Dionysus. The 
sarcophagus image conveys a mythical scene, but it is likely that the artistic used 
 
1154 For gold in Plautus’ works, cf. Richlin, 2017: 441. For gold statues in Greco-Roman literature 
generally, cf. Whitehorne, 1975: 109-119. 
1155 Cf. Whitehorne, 1975: 109-119. 
1156 Captives were frequently presented in chains, cf. Dio 53.19.3, App. Mith. 12.15, Sall. Jug. 
113.7.  
1157 Cf. pp. 10-12, 108-111. 
1158 For literary uses of chains, cf. Butrica, 1989: 258-259. Seneca even suggests that torturers used 
a range of different types of chains, suggesting that it was common practice for those 
administering punishment, cf. Sen. Dial. 5.3.6, Granger Cook, 2012: 68-100. For archaeological 
evidence, cf. pp. 108-111. 
1159 Hope, 2003: 79-97, De Souza, 2011: 40. 
1160 Cf. pp. 10-12. 
1161 Beard, 2007: 134. 
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practices found in real life triumphs. The scene features two prisoners,1162 including a 
female captive, being led in the procession with their hands chained behind their 
backs. The use of chains is also suggested by Appian’s claim that Pompey displayed 
his captives without chains. As Appian specifically pointed out this aspect of Pompey’s 
triumph out, it would suggest that keeping captives unchained was an unusual 
practice.1163 In Pompey’s case, it may have been that Pompey wanted to convey that he 
had complete dominion over his captives, and that restraints were not necessary given 
their complete subjugation.1164 
Chains had symbolic currency and were used in warfare to indicate a transition from 
freedom to a captive status. This is suggested by the language used, as captives are 
often referred to as being ‘placed or delivered in chains’.1165 The symbolic currency of 
chains is particularly evident in cases of high-profile captives, particularly those who 
were presented with chains made of precious metals.1166 This was a practice which 
occurred throughout the Republican period and until the 3rd century CE. The use of 
precious metals may have been, as Dio suggests, a means of denoting a captive’s high 
status.1167 However, as chains denoted captivity or slavery, statuses which were 
thought of as deeply shameful in Mediterranean warfare,1168 it was an additional insult 
for the defeated kings to be shown in chains. Yet, as Braund suggests, the gold or silver 
chains may have been deliberately selected to create a contrast between the king’s 
former powerful position, including having control over his own body in being able to 
move freely, and his physical restraint under Roman control. As a result, it is likely that 
this carefully constructed contrast was more important than the king’s ‘enslaved 
status’. The enslaved status suggested by the chains was simply a means by which the 
Romans could create this contrast whilst acknowledging the status of a worthy enemy, 
and this links closely to the Romans’ preoccupation with the fickle nature of fortune.1169 
Given that captives exhibited in triumphs were part of a visual display, this also links 
closely to representations of enemies in classical art. As Hölscher and Snodgrass 
suggest, enemy forces represented in art and iconography were presented with 
‘sympathy’.1170 As we shall discuss, representations which depict fallen enemies 
 
1162 For the use of prisoners in Dionysian triumph sarcophagi and the connection with historical 
triumphs, cf. Leveritt, 2016: 123-138. 
1163 App. Mith. 12.14. 
1164 Cf. pp. 115-128. 
1165 Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.26.66, Livy 23.38.7-8.  
1166 Braund, 1986: 1-5. Syphax of Numidia was displayed in chains of precious metals during the 
Second Punic Wars (Sil. Ital. 17.629-30), Artavasdes was displayed in either gold or silver in 
Antony’s Alexandrian triumph of 34 BCE (Vell. Pat. 2.82, Dio 49.39.5-6), Cleopatra Selene and 
Helios were displayed in gold chains in Augustus’ Triple Triumph of 29 BCE (Prop. 2.133), and 
Zenobia appeared in gold chains in Aurelian’s triumph in 260 CE (SHA. Tyr. Trig. 30.26, Aur. 
34.3).  
1167 Dio 49.39.5-6. 
1168 Cf. pp. 9-12, 91-64. 
1169 Braund, 1986: 5.  
1170 Hölscher, Snodgrass, 2004: 26-41. Famous examples include the Dying Gaul and the 
Kneeling Gaul, Roman copies of Hellenistic statues which depict the fallen enemies as noble 
and stoic in defeat and death, cf. Ferris, 2011: 185-201. 
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sympathetically did not mean that the Romans pitied the captive,1171 but they 
recognised his former status, and this enabled the triumphator to show the audience 
the greatness of his victory, and his and Rome’s favourable fortune, in comparison to 
that of the defeated enemy.1172  
6.13. Women in Triumphs 
As previously stated, triumphs tended to be predominantly male affairs. Flory’s study 
focusses on Roman women’s role within triumphal processions, and she shows that 
even free women involved in the triumph were in the minority.1173 Nevertheless, 
captive women were present within triumphs, but they generally appeared amongst a 
collective group, rather than as named individuals.1174 There were exceptions, 
including Cleopatra VII, who appeared as an effigy, and her sister Arsinoë IV of Egypt. 
The daughters of Ptolemy Auletes XII, Cleopatra and Arsinoë competed with one 
other, and their two brothers for the Egyptian throne following their father’s death in 
51 BCE. The teenage Arsinoë was Queen of Egypt between 48 and 47 BCE, before being 
usurped by her sister, Cleopatra, who had the support of Caesar. Following her defeat 
and capture, Arsinoë was transported to Rome and appeared in Caesar’s triumph of 46 
BCE. Less than two decades later, Cleopatra may have appeared as an effigy in 
Octavian’s triumph of 27 BCE. The last Ptolemaic queens provide a basis for 
comparison between the treatment of women and girls and serve to illuminate the 
difficulties of displaying female captives in triumphs. I will consider Arsinoë first, 
before continuing to discuss the possible representations of Cleopatra at Octavian’s 
triumph, which will also inform our discussion of executions and the suicide of foreign 
leaders.  
6.14. Arsinoë IV and Cleopatra the Great of Egypt 
Arsinoë appeared in Caesar’s triumph of 46 BCE, months after her capture in Egypt in 
47 BCE. We have little information about her detention, and it is difficult to ascertain 
Caesar’s motivation for presenting a woman as the ‘principal captive’ for his Egyptian 
triumph, particularly as women were rarely displayed in such a manner. This would 
certainly account for the people’s negative reaction to Arsinoë’s appearance, and 
Caesar’s subsequent decision to free Arsinoë.1175 According to Cassius Dio, the Roman 
people felt pity for Arsinoë as she was both a woman, and a former queen.1176 The 
presentation of women in triumphs was problematic given that the ancient 
Mediterranean was heavily patriarchal, and a later case highlights the criticism 
triumphators could face should they choose to present a female in a position usually 
held by male warriors or statesmen. The Palmyrene Queen Zenobia, who was 
supposedly a descendent of the Ptolemies,1177 caused similar problems for the Emperor 
Aurelian who captured her in 260 CE after her revolt against Rome of the same year. 
 
1171 Although, much like Pompey’s elephants, there are examples of this, as we shall see shortly. 
1172 Hölscher, Snodgrass, 2004: 26-41. 
1173 Flory, 1998: 489-494. 
1174 Östenberg, 2009: 141. 
1175 Dio 43.19.2-4. 
1176 Dio 43.19.2-4. 
1177 SHA, The Thirty Pretenders 30. 
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Zenobia was supposedly taken to Rome and was displayed in a triumph, yet Aurelian 
had to go to great lengths to emphasise her masculine qualities in order to present her 
as worthy of being the principal captive within his triumph.1178 This example is from 
outside the scope of this study, yet it highlights the extensive justification which was 
necessary for Roman generals who either could not or chose not to display male 
leaders. This is possibly a result of how the Romans recognised men as being at the 
forefront of warfare, and women who were involved in military matters were often 
presented as masculine.1179 In Roman thought, female involvement in warfare would 
have been considered an inversion of gender norms, as the female sphere was within 
the domus. This idea is embodied in a distich by Propertius in which he criticises the 
possibility of Cleopatra being paraded in Octavian’s triumph.1180  
How paltry a triumph would one woman  
make in streets through which Jugurtha once was led! 1181 
…quantus mulier foret una triumphus, 
ductus erat per quas ante Iugurtha vias! 
Clearly, Propertius is more concerned with Cleopatra’s gender than with the fact that 
she was a highly competent ruler who was more than capable of challenging Rome, as 
other authors in support of Octavian are keen to stress.1182 Propertius further claims 
that Augustus saved them from a woman’s dominion, which also denigrated 
Cleopatra’s partner Antony’s character, which was considered to be effeminate, whilst 
acknowledging that Octavian was forced to act against such a threat against Rome.1183 
Velleius Paterculus only briefly mentions the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra, but he 
places the blame for the other Romans’ deaths, namely Sextus Pompey and Decimus 
Brutus, on Antony.1184 Therefore, despite only appearing in the triumph as an effigy, 
Propertius’ comments show how Cleopatra was considered to be the ‘principal 
captive’, thus Octavian’s primary enemy as opposed to Antony.1185 She was therefore 
considered to be an acceptable option for Octavian to display when compared with 
previous triumphs which had featured traditional male leaders. Similar criticism is also 
implicit in Dio’s account of Caesar’s Egyptian triumph. Östenberg’s analysis of his 
account centres on Dio’s displeasure with Arsinoë being ‘assigned the role of the 
principal prisoner on display’, thus implying that she was the ‘principal enemy of the 
 
1178 SHA, Aurelian 26.3-9, 33-34, SHA, The Thirty Pretenders 30. 
1179 As we have seen with Fulvia on p. 79, cf. Hallett, 2015: 247-253. 
1180 Prop. Eleg. 4.6.65-66. 
1181 Prop. Eleg. 4.6.65-66. Translation by Goold, 1990. 
1182 Vir. Aen. 8.675-728, Hor. Odes 1.37, Vell. Pat. 2.87, Suet. Vit. Aug. 17.11, Florus, Epit. 2.21.10, 
Dio 51.13.5, cf. Tronson, 1999: 177-8. 
1183 Antony is often criticised for being ‘enslaved’ by women, including Cleopatra and Fulvia, cf. 
Plut. Vit. Ant. 10.3. 
1184 Vell. Pat. Hist. 2.87.1-2.  
1185 Antony was also a problematic individual to display given his Roman citizenship; this is an 
issue we shall address in more detail shortly. 
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Egyptian campaign’.1186 This is in line with Dio’s description of Arsinoë’s actions in 
Egypt, in which he maintains that she was used as a pawn by eunuchs and her 
followers.1187 Östenberg’s assessment of Arsinoë’s role in the triumph is in line with the 
Roman audience’s concerns. Namely that, as a teenage girl,1188 Arsinoë was unlikely to 
have been capable of acting as a true menace to Rome’s interests in Egypt.1189 However, 
this undermines Arsinoë’s achievements or, at the least, her role as a figurehead within 
Egyptian society, which had long accepted female rulers.1190 Furthermore, Arsinoë is 
cited by Caesar and Lucan as having full control over her army,1191 although Caesar 
clearly had an agenda in presenting Arsinoë as a military leader and Lucan as a poet 
may have been using artistic license. As such, much like Aurelian’s comments on 
Zenobia, authors in support of Caesar emphasised Arsinoë’s role as a military 
commander, thus presenting her as a worthy enemy of Rome. Arsinoë’s power as a 
figurehead is supported by her assassination, whilst exiled in Ephesus, on the orders of 
Cleopatra in 41 BCE.1192 Antony and Cleopatra’s interference in Caesar’s act of 
clemency in sparing Arsinoë enabled later authors to present the couple as 
disrespecting Caesar’s decisions, barbaric in the execution of a family member whose 
presence in the triumph had elicited sympathy, and as Antony being under the will of 
a woman.1193 
As stated, the Roman audience’s displeasure with Arsinoë’s appearance may result 
from the fact that the use of solitary female captives was uncommon. As Wyke argues, 
captive women typically served as personifications of their nation, or as a symbol for 
all female captives taken during a particular conflict.1194 However, Caesar’s intention 
may have been to appeal to the Roman audience’s understanding of symbolism. 
Florus’ account suggests that Arsinoë was carried alongside physical representations of 
the Nile and the Pharos, the famed lighthouse of Alexandria, which was apparently 
lit.1195 Forster, the translator of the Loeb edition of Florus, adds that each of the 
aforementioned ‘symbols’ was displayed on ‘moving platforms’. However, there is 
nothing in the Latin to suggest this was the case, and it may be that Forster was basing 
his assessment on visual representations. Nevertheless, given the evidence from Titus’ 
triumph, as discussed earlier, it is certainly logical to assume that Arsinoë and the two 
inanimate symbols would have been carried along on ‘platforms’ or shields, or on the 
back of carriage, as is typically presented in art [Figures 15, 16, 31, 32].  
 
1186 Östenberg, 2009: 141-2. 
1187 Dio 52.39.1-2, 52.40.1-2. 
1188 There is some debate about Arsinoë’s date of birth, but it is likely that she was either a 
teenager (between 13 and 18 years of age) or in her early twenties at the time of Caesar’s 
triumph. 
1189 Östenberg, 2009: 141 
1190 Green, 1985: 133-168 outlines the power of the Ptolemy women, cf. White, 1989: 238-266. 
1191 Caes. BAfr. 4-5, Luc. B Civ. 10.519-21. 
1192 Green argues that Arsinoë’s death was a political calculation, as she had been Egypt’s queen 
c. 48-47 BCE and continued to pose a threat to Cleopatra’s reign, cf. Green, 1985: 160. 
1193 App, B Civ. 5.9, Joseph, Ap. 2.56-60, AJ 15.88-59. 
1194 Wyke, 2002: 234-5, cf. pp. 124, 121-128. 
1195 Flor. Epit. 2.13.88-9. 
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It was not uncommon for triumphs to include paintings and images of landscapes,1196 
particularly those which featured exotic scenery.1197 As such Caesar’s intention may 
have been to create a physical background to contextualise the conflict for the 
audience, as many Romans would not have visited or seen depictions of the farflung 
places over which the general had triumphed.1198 The Romans associated the natural 
landscape with the ‘enemy’, and the natural world was also yet another ‘enemy’ which 
had to be overcome.1199 Caesar was certainly aware of this understanding, as he makes 
reference to being unable to completely capture Gaul, even when he had control over 
the towns, as its people were still eluding him.1200 Furthermore, Arsinoë was displayed 
in chains and Dio claims that Caesar ‘produced’ (παράγω, parágō) her to show the 
Roman people. The word Dio uses had connotations of presentation and secrecy, as it 
can also mean to ‘introduce on the stage’ or ‘mislead’.1201 Therefore, Dio may have been 
implying that Caesar’s presentation of Arsinoë as the principal captive was a form of 
sleight of hand which obscured the fact that that the Alexandrian War was not a full-
blown conflict, when compared to Caesar’s victories in Gaul. 
Nevertheless, Arsinoë’s position within the triumph suggests that Caesar was aware 
of, and attempting to appeal to, the Roman audience’s appreciation of symbolism. 
Arsinoë was presented alongside symbols of Egypt, a natural phenomenon and man-
made landmark, and she may have been intended to represent the people of Egypt, or 
Caesar’s dominion over the Ptolemaic dynasty. This would indicate that Caesar’s 
conquest over Egypt was complete. However, Arsinoë’s role as a symbol was 
seemingly unsuccessful, as Arsinoë was viewed as the ‘principal captive’, which 
supposedly damaged Caesar’s credibility.1202 This highlights the dangers for elite 
Romans of presenting captives in triumphs, particularly if the captives were not 
considered ‘worthy’ of being triumphed over.1203   
Arsinoë was certainly taken prisoner by Caesar in 47 BCE, yet Cleopatra’s position as a 
captive in 30 BCE is less clear. Cleopatra’s infamous demise in 30 BCE does not need to 
be outlined in any detail. At the time of her death, Cleopatra was surrounded by 
Octavian’s forces and, despite Octavian’s supposed willingness to allow her a degree 
of freedom within her own palace, she was evidently a captive. This appears to have 
been understood in ancient texts, as Cleopatra is described as such in a number of 
sources, including by Plutarch who uses ἄγω (ágō) meaning ‘to lead into captivity’ to 
describe her position.1204 Cleopatra had supposedly long planned for her death and 
 
1196 Ando, 2000: 12, Östenberg, 2018: 257. 
1197 Holliday, 1997: 130, Östenberg, 2009: 189-198. 
1198 Östenberg, 2009: 1. 
1199 Östenberg, 2018: 240-261. 
1200 Caes. BGall. 3.14 
1201 The word could be used in a practical sense, as in the introduction of a witness in court, 
although in many instances, the word is used to convey a negatively perceived act, including 
secrecy and deceit (particularly in relation to legal proceedings), cf. LSJ, 1307: παράγω. 
1202 Dio 43.19.2-4. 
1203 Beard, 2005: 30, Hekster, 2007: 96. 
1204 Plut. Vit. Ant. 84.3-4, LSJ: ἄγω. 
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then made preparations for suicide during her imprisonment in her palace at 
Alexandria.1205 She only hesitated before her suicide when Octavian threatened her 
children’s well-being should she harm herself. The fact that Octavian mentioned the 
possibility of Cleopatra killing herself suggests that it was expected behaviour for those 
faced with the possibility of capture, display in the triumph, and execution. However, 
it is also likely, given Octavian’s hesitation to storm the palace or hurry in person to 
Cleopatra after receiving her suicide note, that he was complicit in her demise,1206 
either in not preventing it, or giving her little choice but to die by suicide. 
Octavian was probably not personally involved in Cleopatra’s death, but it is likely 
that, considering his carefully cultivated image, he recognised that Cleopatra’s 
preservation would have been problematic for his agenda and in the wider political 
world.1207 Like Arsinoë before her, Cleopatra would always be a dangerous and 
untameable figurehead. As Caesar had discovered with Arsinoë, the Roman gaze was 
notoriously difficult to control,1208 and triumphators evidently became aware of the 
difficulties they would face should the presentation not be in line with Roman 
expectations. Such an awareness was probably based on the public’s response to 
captives in triumphs within cultural memory. Furthermore, as Fletcher argues, 
Cleopatra’s suicide enabled Octavian to scapegoat a non-Roman enemy for the Civil 
Wars, rather than Antony, whilst avoiding the resistance Caesar faced when he 
exhibited Arsinoë in his triumph of 46 BCE.1209 Given the rhetoric surrounding 
Cleopatra as being ‘domineering’, a common accusation levelled against powerful 
women in the ancient world,1210 it was more convenient for Octavian to continue to 
present Cleopatra as the primary adversary, despite the issues with displaying a 
female captive in a triumph. On the issue of scapegoating, captives such as Arsinoë 
and Juba II may have been used as a distraction from triumphs over fellow Romans. As 
Havener argues, no Roman general celebrated a triumph over a Roman enemy, at least 
not in an official capacity.1211 This would explain why the emphasis in Augustus’ 
triumph was on Cleopatra, rather than Marcus Antonius. Triumphators who had been 
victorious in civil strife had to ensure that they were consolidating power, which was a 
primary objective of the triumph, and not celebrating victory over Romans.1212  
Arsinoë’s appearance in Caesar’s triumph may have also had an impact on Cleopatra’s 
decision to commit suicide, and Octavian’s lack of motivation in preventing it. Firstly, 
 
1205 Dio 51.13.1-5. On her preparations for death cf. Fletcher, 2008: 301-303. 
1206 Plut, Vit. Ant. 85.2-3, cf. Chauveau, 2002: 74-5. 
1207 It is interesting that Virgil does not mention Cleopatra or her children’s appearance in 
Octavian’s triumph on the Shield of Aeneas, cf. 8.626-731. 
1208 Beard, 2007: 111. 
1209 Fletcher, 2008: 314-7, Östenberg, 2009: 143-4, Havener, 2015: 173-5. 
1210 Wyke, 2002: 195-6. 
1211 Havener, 2015: 165-205. However, individuals could be awarded a ‘lesser triumph’ known 
as an ovatio over Roman enemies, as Cicero received following the Catiline conspiracy, cf. Cic. 
Att. 16.11. 
1212 Havener, 2015: 165-6. 
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Cleopatra was aware of Arsinoë’s role in Caesar’s triumph and of Roman customs,1213 
and she would have recognised the humiliation of appearing in the procession. 
Cleopatra’s pride and her desire to thwart Octavian’s plans to display clementia are 
often cited as Cleopatra’s motivation for suicide.1214 Cleopatra’s suicide also places her 
in good company with other ‘worthy’ enemies of Rome, as Mithridates committed 
suicide to avoid appearing in the triumph.1215 This was a common trope in Greco-
Roman writings, as the Romans viewed the suicide of individuals in desperate 
circumstances as a brave act. Such an assessment of suicide was based on the fact that 
this final act enabled an individual to retain their autonomy and not have to subjugate 
themselves before the victor who could, as the rules of war dictated, treat a defeated 
enemy as they saw fit.1216 This concept is embodied in a sculpture known as the 
Galatian Suicide, or the Ludovisi Gaul [Figure 33].1217 The sculpture depicts a nearly 
naked man holding up a dying woman, about to stab himself in the chest, roughly 
where his heart would be located. The man’s head is turned away from his sword, a 
gesture viewed as defiant, but his chest is pushed forward, and he is clearly accepting 
of the anticipated fatal blow. Despite the fact that the man is in the process of ending 
his life, there is a sense of nobility about his actions and, whilst the sculpture is a copy 
of a Hellenistic original, it shows a theme which the Romans understood well: there 
was nobility in suicide for those who had no other choice but to subjugate themselves 
before a conqueror.1218  
Cleopatra could have been used as a symbol of Egypt and Octavian’s dominance over 
the nation, especially given her military status and ‘noble’ suicide. However, as a result 
of the problematic nature of females as enemies, including Cleopatra’s own sister, 
Octavian would have been acutely aware of the possibility of angering the crowd. 
Similarly, the connection between Cleopatra and her children by Caesar, Octavian’s 
adoptive father, would have probably reminded the crowd of Caesar’s indiscretions 
with Rome’s current enemy and his ‘other heir’, Caesarion. Should Cleopatra have 
been pardoned, her presence would have drawn, whether deliberately or not, her sons 
into scrutiny. Octavian was aware of the use of figureheads, as Antony, at Cleopatra’s 
behest, had arranged for Arsinoë and her supporters in Ephesus to be assassinated in 
41 BCE.1219 Cleopatra’s sons, as the children of two of Rome’s greatest military leaders, 
would have posed the danger of undermining Octavian’s claim to power, and this may 
have been the reason for Caesarion’s alleged assassination on Octavian’s orders.1220 
 
1213 Cleopatra may have seen Caesar’s triumph first-hand, witnessing her sister’s humiliation, 
and would have been present for Antony’s triumph over Artavasdes II of Armenia, cf. Plut. Vit. 
Ant. 27-29. 
1214 Hor. Odes 1.37, Dio, 51.13.1, Plut. Vit. Ant. 68.3. 
1215 Appian created a direct speech for Mithridates explicitly stating his reasons, cf. App. Mith. 
12.11. 
1216 Van Hooff, 1990: 87-90, 110-117, cf. Griffin, 1986: 64-77, Edwards, 2005: 200-222. 
1217 The sculpture was unearthed during the building of the Ludovisi Villa in Rome during the 
17th century. 
1218 Cf. Brown, 2001: 33-37. 
1219 App. Civ. 5.9, Joseph, Against Apian, 2.56-61, Ant. 15.89-90. 
1220 Suet. Aug. 17. 
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Much like Arsinoë, Cleopatra would have continued to be an Egyptian figurehead and 
a continual threat to Rome’s peace in Egypt, should she have been allowed to live.  
6.15. Mother and Child Captives: Thusnelda and Thumelicus 
We have seen how the display of females as principal captives could be problematic for 
triumphators. Interestingly, the women discussed above are not characterised or 
described using terms which link to what the Greco-Romans deemed to be typically 
‘female qualities’, i.e. as pious matrons dedicated to child-rearing. Instead, Arsinoë and 
Cleopatra’s ‘feminine’ qualities are underplayed, or, in the case of Cleopatra, 
antithetical characteristics are presented. However, as the majority of female captives 
appeared alongside their children and extended families,1221 it is clear that the mother-
child relationship was one the Romans wished to exploit in the triumph. As we have 
seen in the chapters on sexual violence and enslavement, women were used to 
symbolise land, the people belonging to it, and the future of a nation. By presenting 
women as mothers alongside their children, the Romans were able to demonstrate 
their dominion over the whole nation: men (as principal captives), women (as symbols 
of a nation who carry the future), and children (representative of the future). Therefore, 
it is necessary to discuss how women were presented alongside their children.  
The case of the Germanic noblewoman Thusnelda and her infant son Thumelicus 
exposes some of the issues with presenting child captives and introduces some of the 
difficulties for the triumphator with displaying women and children as ‘principal 
captives’. Before continuing further, it is important to outline the sources we are reliant 
on for details of Thusnelda. Thusnelda’s story is relayed by two writers: Tacitus and 
Strabo. Tacitus discusses Thusnelda’s marriage and capture in some detail, but does 
not detail Germanicus’ triumph and therefore omits all reference to Thusnelda and her 
son appearing in the triumph. The only evidence we have that Thusnelda appeared in 
the triumph comes from Strabo who casts Germanicus’ triumph as a success, 
describing it as ‘most brilliant’.1222 This is in contrast to Tacitus who stressed that 
Germanicus’ triumph had been awarded before the war was over, in contradiction to 
the conventions for awarding a triumph. We shall discuss Tacitus and Strabo’s 
presentation, or lack thereof, in more detail later in the discussion. 
To briefly outline Thusnelda’s case: in 15 CE, Germanicus was granted a triumph by 
the senate for the on-going conflict in Germany,1223 and in 17 CE displayed the wife 
and child of the Romans’ greatest enemy in the region, Arminius. Arminius had been 
instrumental in the crushing defeat of the Roman general Varus’ legion in the 
Teutoburg forest in 9 CE. Having been captured two years before, Thusnelda, who was 
also the daughter of the Roman ally Segestes, was presented in the triumph alongside 
her infant son with Arminius, Thumelicus.  
 
1221 As evident in Pompey’s triumph of 61 BCE, cf. App. Mith. 12.117. 
1222 Strabo 7.4. 
1223 Tac. Ann. 1.55, Strabo 7.4. 
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Thusnelda had supposedly been abducted by Arminius from her father’s home,1224 
thus casting aspersions on the appropriate conduct of the hostile Arminius and the 
legitimacy of his child. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Thusnelda was taken captive 
by the Romans whilst pregnant and in her father’s home, Thusnelda is cast as being 
more like Arminius in temperament than her father, who was amenable to Roman 
leaders and influence in the region. In the absence of Arminius, who continued to wage 
war against Rome for many years, Thusnelda and their child acted as symbols of his 
power and the future of the rebellion in Germany. As we know, women were 
problematic for triumphators to display. However, Tacitus presented Thusnelda as 
being powerful and the harbinger of potential doom for the Roman people. Upon her 
capture by Germanicus, Thusnelda is described by Tacitus as staring down at her 
pregnant stomach.1225 Rather than this being a demure or maternal gesture, an 
expression of concern for her offspring’s future, Thusnelda is defiant when faced with 
her Roman captor and is unmoved by the horrific prospects which she and her unborn 
child faced. The emphasis placed on Thusnelda’s pregnant stomach is an indicator of 
the Roman readers’ concern with the threat posed by Thusnelda’s offspring, a possible 
future Arminius.1226  
They included some women of high birth, among them the wife of Arminius, who was at the 
same time the daughter of Segestes, though there was more of the husband than the father in 
that temper which sustained her, unconquered to a tear, without a word of entreaty, her hands 
clasped tightly in the folds of her robe and her gaze fixed on her heavy womb.1227 
Inerant feminae nobiles, inter quas uxor Arminii eademque filia Segestis, mariti magis 
quam parentis animo neque victa in lacrimas neque voce supplex; compressis intra 
sinum manibus gravidum uterum intuens. 
Thusnelda’s behaviour may appear passive,1228 but it is significant that Tacitus’ literary 
portrayal of her actions suggests how she and her future offspring had a temperament 
similar to that of Arminius. This is particularly evident in contrast to Segestes’ 
behaviour, where he passes the decision of Thusnelda’s fate over to Germanicus, rather 
than making any attempt to protect his daughter.1229 On this point, it has been 
frequently noted that Tacitus does not name Thusnelda, but simply refers to her as 
Arminius’ wife.1230 Therefore, Thusnelda is presented as an extension of Arminius and 
 
1224 Tac. Ann. 1.58. 
1225 Tac. Ann. 1.57. Goodyear comments that whilst Thumelicus was not born, he was still 
treated like a prisoner by appearing in the triumph, cf. Goodyear, 1981: 79. This would cause 
issues with the presentation of the child, as we shall discuss shortly.  
1226 Benario, 2004: 83-94. 
1227 Tac. Ann. 1.57. Translation by Moore, 1931. 
1228 Or rather less glamorous than Arminius who famously ambushed and massacred a Roman 
legion in the so-called Varian Disaster of 9 CE, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121. For details of the Disaster, cf. 
Florus. Epit. 2.30, Front. Strat. 2.9.4. 
1229 Tac. Ann. 1.58, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121-123. 
1230 Strabo is the only writer who records Thusnelda’s name, cf. Strabo 7.1.4. For modern 
scholarship, cf. Prieur, 2000: 121, Benario, 2004: 88-89.  
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she could then be used as a means of harming her husband from afar.1231 This is clearly 
outlined in an exchange between Arminius and his brother Flavus in Tacitus’ Annals. 
Arminius and Flavus may have been hostages of Rome and both had entered the army 
upon reaching adulthood.1232 Flavus had remained loyal, whilst Arminius waged war 
against his former keepers. Flavus attempts to convince Arminius to surrender and in 
doing so makes a specific reference to the treatment of Thusnelda and Thumelicus.1233 
Whilst clearly intended to show Germanicus’ clemency, an unspoken threat is also 
implicit in Tacitus’ description as Flavus claimed that Thusnelda and Thumelicus were 
not being treated ‘as enemies’.1234  
Arminius refused to surrender even though his family were at risk and this may 
account for Thumelicus’ fate after his appearance in the triumph. Tacitus suggests 
Thumelicus’ death was a shameful one,1235 although the specifics are lost to us as 
Tacitus promises to detail the death in another (now lost) book of the Annals. With 
regards to Thumelicus’ death, it is telling of his status as a symbol that it is mentioned 
at all. By the time of Thumelicus’ death, his father had been vanquished, his mother 
forgotten, and his grandfather (after murdering his father, Arminius) retired in comfort 
by his mother’s captor, Germanicus. The details of Thusnelda’s fate, as the only female 
involved in Arminius’ rebellion, are missing from the histories. It is clear that 
Thusnelda had outlived her usefulness as a symbol which could be exploited by 
Roman promotion. However, Thumelicus’ short life continued to be dominated by the 
fact that he was his father’s son.  
The nature of Thumelicus’ death may have been why Tacitus goes to great lengths to 
suggest that Thumelicus was illegitimate as his status would have enabled the Romans 
to justify harsh treatment as legitimacy often equated to citizenship and legal 
protection. There is some suggestion that Thumelicus died in the gladiatorial arena. 
This is based on a short reference in Tacitus to Thumelicus’ ‘humiliation’ at Ravenna, 
where he was supposedly ‘educated’. Tacitus uses the word ludibrium, meaning 
mockery, which has associations with games and public spectacles (ludus). Therefore, 
in addition to Ravenna being known as a centre for gladiatorial training, Thumelicus’ 
fate is assumed by some scholars to be that of a gladiator. Alternatively, Goodyear 
suggests that Thumelicus was sent to the custody of naval officers who would have 
been stationed close to Ravenna, a coastal city.1236 However, if Thumelicus had been 
 
1231 Prieur, 2000: 121. 
1232 Arminius is recorded as having joined the army and we know from Tacitus that Flavus 
continued to serve in the army after Arminius absconded, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.118.1-3. Flavus may 
also have been a hostage in Rome, given that his son Italicus was born there, cf. Tac. Ann. 6.16. 
Tylawsky suggests Flavus may have been one of 40000 captives taken by Tiberius, cf. Suet. Vit. 
Tib. 9.1, Tylawsky, 2002: 254-258. 
1233 Tac. Ann. 2.9-10. 
1234 Tac. Ann. 2.10. 
1235 Tac. Ann. 1.58. 
1236 Goodyear, 1981: 85. Goodyear bases his assessment on Bato the Pannonian (Suet. Tib. 20) 
and Maroboduus (Tac. Ann. 2.63.4) being sent to Ravenna. However, there is nothing in these 
texts to suggest that they were under the care of the navy, this is conjecture based on the 18th 
century scholar Orelli’s assertions. 
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under the care of naval officers, this would not explain Tacitus’ reference to the child’s 
humiliation. As we know the majority of gladiators were enslaved and, even if 
Thumelicus was not a slave, the infamis status of a gladiator was comparable. Infames 
could not, similarly to actors and athletes, be Roman citizens. 
Assuming that Thumelicus was sent to a ludus to be trained as a gladiator, then such an 
act was a deliberate ploy to hurt and humiliate Arminius and his reputation, even after 
his death in 21 CE. From Thumelicus’ appearance in Germanicus’ triumph, regardless 
of whether he was legitimate or not, it is evident that the two-year-old was valuable to 
the Romans and for Germanicus’ promotion. Amongst a group of Germanic captives, 
Thumelicus would have stood out for his youth and, as an infant, may have been 
carried in his mother’s arms.1237 As a result, the pairing of Thusnelda with Thumelicus 
in the triumph was likely deliberate and intended to show Germanicus’ success in 
conquering all strata of Germanic society. This may have been the intention and may 
also have been intended to act as a distraction from the fact Arminius was not present. 
If this was the case, it was successful as with Strabo claiming that Germanicus’ triumph 
was ‘most brilliant’.1238  
Tacitus’ presentation of Germanicus is largely positive throughout his works,1239 and 
this may account for why he did not refer to Thusnelda or Thumelicus in Germanicus’ 
triumph.1240 This may suggest that, as we have seen with Arsinoë and Cleopatra, 
Tacitus was uncomfortable with the display of high-status women in the triumph. 
However, Tacitus’ description of Thusnelda before the triumph, Thumelicus’ fate and 
the lack of details for Thusnelda’s, shows the symbolic value of the two captives. 
Thusnelda, carrying Thumelicus both in utero and postnatally, acts as an extension of 
Arminius and the future of Germania. Arminius in turn is symbolic of Germania, as he 
was again in the 19th and early 20th century, and the rebellion against Roman 
dominance in the area. As such, whilst Thumelicus’ appearance in the triumph may 
have been criticised by the Roman people, it is likely the Romans would have 
recognised the symbolism: Germanicus, by using Arminius’ wife and offspring, had 
effectively defeated Arminius’ revolt as it could not be continued by the next 
generation.  
6.16. Child Captives: Juba II and the Ptolemy Twins 
As we have seen with Thusnelda and Thumelicus, it was more common for child 
captives to appear alongside their family members. However, there are exceptions to 
this as when those who would have been principal captives were deceased,1241 and 
 
1237 Thumelicus was probably around two years old at the time of the triumph and would have 
been unable to walk long distances without assistance. 
1238 Strabo 7.4. 
1239 Cf. Shotter, 1968: 194-214, Pelling, 1993: 59-85, Williams, 2009: 117-130. 
1240 Tac. Ann. 2.41. Tacitus’ account centres on Germanicus and his children’s role in the 
triumph, cf. Beard, 2007: 107-111.  
1241 For instance, Mithridates’ adult children were placed on display in Pompey’s Third 
Triumph as Mithridates was deceased. Pompey also displayed Tigranes the Younger of 
Armenia alongside his wife, and Aristobulus of Judaea with his children, cf. App. Mith. 117, 
Plut. Vit. Pomp. 45.4. 
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some of the most prominent in this period include three individuals we encountered in 
the previous chapter: Juba II of Numidia, Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios of 
Egypt. Their treatment can be compared as Juba and Cleopatra Selene were raised in 
the same household and were later married, whilst Alexander Helios’ disappearance 
from the record raises issues surrounding displaying the offspring of male military 
leaders. Similarly, the connection between the triumphators who paraded them cannot 
be ignored. Juba II was paraded in Caesar’s triumph of 46 BCE, whilst the Ptolemy 
twins were displayed in the triumph of Caesar’s heir Octavian of 29 BCE. The trio were 
all presented in a similar manner, although the age difference between Juba and 
Alexander may have accounted for the different treatment they received after the 
triumph took place. Juba II was probably a toddler at the time of his appearance in 
Caesar’s triumph,1242 whilst Cleopatra and Helios were either 11 or 12 years old.1243 
As we know, children were regarded as representing the future of a nation. As a result, 
the sons of triumphators would regularly appear alongside their fathers in the 
procession,1244 including Tiberius and Marcellus’ appearance in Augustus’ triumph of 
29 BCE.1245 As we have seen in the previous chapter,1246 the Imperial family frequently 
used their children as symbolic currency, and it is evident from the procession on the 
Ara Pacis that Octavian’s adoptive children, as his heirs, were the future of Rome, 
whilst the ‘hostages’ were used to show the dependence of foreign nations on Rome. 
This is significant when discussing the Ptolemy twins’ appearance in Octavian’s 
triumph as the captive children would have created a contrast with Octavian’s heirs 
who followed immediately afterwards. As we have seen previously, Octavian used a 
statue of Cleopatra in the procession and presented Cleopatra Selene and Alexander 
Helios alongside the effigy.1247 The Ptolemies were presented as a family group which 
may have enabled Octavian to avoid presenting Marcus Antonius as the primary 
enemy.1248 The twins were presented as being part of Cleopatra’s ‘possessions’, as her 
effigy was surrounded by some of the wealth she had amassed. Like Thumelicus, 
Cleopatra Selene and Alexandra Helios were not seen as the principal captives, but as 
extensions of their parents, or rather as the children of Cleopatra, not Antony. 
Legitimacy may also have played a part here as Cleopatra and Antony’s children were 
not, in Roman eyes at least, legitimate, having been born out of wedlock whilst Antony 
was still married to Octavia. In the primary sources, Juba was considered to be the 
principal captive for Caesar’s African triumph, but few details of his presentation are 
given, and emphasis is instead placed on Arsinoë.1249 Havener suggests that Juba was 
not presented as a ‘full enemy’,1250 and this may have indicated Caesar’s 
 
1242 Juba was mostly probably under four years old, cf. Roller, 2003: 59, Fletcher, 2008: 170-1. 
1243 Roller suggests that the twins were around 3 years old when Antony acknowledged 
paternity of them in 37 BCE, cf. Roller, 2003: 77-8. 
1244 Flory, 1998: 489, Beard, 2007: 224-225. 
1245 Suet. Tib. 6.4.  
1246 Cf. p. 154-157. 
1247 Dio 51.15.5, 51.21.6, Plut. Vit. Ant. 87.1, 
1248 Havener, 2014: 172-3. 
1249 Flor, Epit. 2.8, Dio 43.19, App. B Civ. 2.101. 
1250 Havener, 2014: 170-1. 
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acknowledgement that his war in Africa was ‘morally dubious’.1251 However, Juba’s 
very young age may have enabled him to be viewed as belonging to his father and 
Numidia, rather than as a participant in the war itself. As Juba was clearly associated 
with his father, Rome’s principal enemy in the war, the Romans were able to present 
and use Juba as a useful hostage, brought up in Roman culture,1252 without the 
suggestion of the threat.  
On this note, in the case of the Ptolemy twins, despite the victory being over Cleopatra 
rather than a Roman, the children could not be disassociated from their father. Dio and 
Paterculus’ accounts of Octavian’s actions after the deaths of Antony and Cleopatra are 
in line with Octavian’s emphasis on clemency in his political promotion.1253 However, 
it is clear that Octavian recognised the threat posed by allowing the children of Marcus 
Antonius to live, as he immediately ordered the execution of Antony’s son (with 
Fulvia), the teenage Antyllus, who was Antony’s official heir.1254 Similarly, Caesarion 
(Caesar’s son with Cleopatra) was quickly despatched, meaning Octavian’s claim to 
Caesar’s legacy was secured.1255 That none of Cleopatra’s male children survived into 
adulthood is significant. Alexander Helios was of an age the Romans considered close 
to adulthood when he was displayed in the triumph. This made him potentially 
dangerous as, the son of two powerful people: Antony of Rome, and Cleopatra of 
Egypt, meaning he could have been used as a figurehead by Octavian’s enemies. As a 
woman, Cleopatcra Selene was a more appropriate captive to keep given that the 
Romans did not consider women to be capable of political or military acumen and she 
could also be used to strengthen Roman interests by marrying, as she did, into families 
from around the Mediterranean. In the case of children who were presented in 
triumphs, the triumphator had to create a careful balance between casting the children 
as principal captives, whilst acknowledging that they were extensions of their parents. 
The children had symbolic value which was useful whilst they were at too young an 
age to wield power. However, it became dangerous when children, particularly males, 
came of an age where they could pose a threat to Rome. 
6.17. Execution 
Members of the enemy elite who survived to appear in the triumph could face 
execution. Executions appear to have been relatively uncommon, particularly during 
the Republican period,1256 and evidence pertaining to the method of execution is 
surprisingly scant. Östenberg suggests that execution did not take place in every 
triumph, as there are only eight named ‘principal captives’, out of the 324 named in 
literary sources, in addition to a group of pirate captains, who are explicitly described 
 
1251 Roller, 2003: 61.  
1252 Cf. pp. 165-169.  
1253 Dio 51.15.5-7, Vell. Pat. 2.87. 
1254 Dio 51.15.5, 51.21.6, Plut. Vit. Ant. 87.1. 
1255 Dio 51.15.5. 
1256 Beard, 2007: 129-130. 
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as being executed.1257 Descriptions of executions in general during this period lack 
detail, as the condemnation or aftermath of a victim’s death was often of more note 
than their manner of death. For instance, of the sources which refer to the triumph over 
Jugurtha, only two (Plutarch and Florus) of multiple sources address his death.1258 The 
lack of detail may suggest that, as we shall discuss shortly, authors were not party to 
executions. Nevertheless, execution was an accepted part of the triumph, as Cicero and 
Appian suggest.1259 For instance, it was such an expected trope that Appian incorrectly 
claims that Aristobulus of Judaea was executed during Pompey’s third triumph of 61 
BCE, despite later acknowledging that Aristobulus died 12 years later, in 49 BCE.1260  
Execution appears to be reserved for male captives, possibly because they were the 
‘principal captives’, who were usually seen as the leaders or generals, but also for the 
symbolic reasons which were outlined in the sections on female and child captives, and 
which will be discussed in the following section on women and execution. On this 
note, a discussion of execution should be prefaced by an understanding of ‘the body’ in 
a Roman context. As we know, the body and its parts are frequently harnessed for 
symbolic purposes, and this is certainly the case for the Roman world.1261 Violence was 
omnipresent in Roman society, and was prevalent in the judicial system.1262 Clearly 
legal punishment only applied to Roman citizens, yet penalties inflicted on non-elites, 
especially those without Roman citizenship, could be severe.1263 Stratton argues that 
this was the case during the Imperial period, when harsh penalties for the lower orders 
were used to create a contrast between the ‘nobility’ which resided in the body of the 
elite, and the lower class humiliores.1264  
As Stratton continues: ‘social worth was demonstrated graphically by the sanctity and 
integrity of the elite bodies versus the vulnerability and indignity of the lower-class 
bodies.’1265 On this point, we need to remember that enslaved people, particularly those 
involved in acting, sex-work, and gladiatorial combat, were akin to infames, and that, as 
Frederick argues in relation to actors, such individuals ‘sold [whether willingly or not] 
his or her body, and, for this reason, no matter how sensational or extravagant the role 
played, he or she was always subject to the body.’1266 Considering such a contrast, it is 
not surprising that such meaning was also harnessed for the execution of captives at 
the end of the triumph and, as we have seen throughout this thesis,1267 the use of 
captives to represent their nation or people. Given the symbolism of the body, it 
 
1257 Östenberg, 2009: 161. The individuals in question were: Gaius Pontius, Aristonicus, 
Jugurtha, Tigranes the Younger, Aristobulus, Vercingetorix, Adiatorix, Simon Bar Giora, cf. 
Table 1. 
1258 Plut. Mar. 12.3, Flor. Epit. Summaries 57, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.11-12, Sall. Jug. 114., Prop. 4.6.65-70.  
1259 Cic. Verr. 2.5.77, App. Mith. 12.117. 
1260 Cf. App. Mith. 12.117. 
1261 Cf. pp. 111-115. 
1262 Barry, 2008: 222-246. 
1263 Stratton, 2014: 155-7. 
1264 Stratton, 2014: 155-7. 
1265 Stratton, 2014: 156-7. 
1266 Frederick, 2002: 246. 
1267 Cf. pp. 68-73. 84-89, 115-124, 154-157. 
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follows that the Romans executed enemies in order to demonstrate their control over 
captives’ bodies which in turn represented foreign nations or peoples. 
6.18. The Execution of Simon bar Giora 
The triumph, like public spectacles, involved the audience being able to witness the 
increasing terror of those forced to participate.1268 The increasing violence against a 
high-profile captive is evident in Titus’ treatment of Simon bar Giora, as told in detail 
by Josephus in his Jewish Wars [Table 1]. After being presented in front of Titus’ chariot, 
a halter was thrown over Simon’s neck and he was tortured either, as we shall discuss 
shortly, during the triumphal procession or in prison. Josephus used the word αἰκίζω 
(aikizō), meaning ‘to treat injuriously, to plague, torment’.1269 The word has been 
translated as being ‘scourged’ or ‘whipped’,1270 but there is nothing in Josephus’ 
description to indicate a specific form of maltreatment. Still, flogging was a common 
punishment in Roman society for non-Roman citizens and criminals,1271 and it was 
closely associated with the use of the halter.1272 Furthermore, flogging was not only 
extremely painful but also shaming, as the victim was stripped of their clothing before 
their ordeal.1273 Flogging therefore damaged an individual’s reputation (existimatio),1274 
and can be viewed in the context of Simon’s execution as being one final act of 
degradation before his death. Whatever the exact form of maltreatment inflicted by the 
Romans, it is clear that Simon suffered for an extended period before his death. As we 
shall discuss shortly, the exact method of execution is unknown as Josephus does not 
specify, but focuses his discussion on the lead up to the execution. 
Another point of interest is the location in which captives’ executions were held as, 
unlike other forms of public spectacle, the execution of high-profile prisoners took 
place in private. Josephus tells us that Simon’s execution took place in an area off the 
forum. The area in question may have been the Tullianum, given its location in the 
northern corner of the forum, and Josephus may have expected that this was 
understood by his readers given their awareness of previous triumphal practices and 
criminal proceedings. The use of a carcer (prison) as a holding cell for captives is 
referenced by a number of ancient authors,1275 but as Kyle notes was merely a holding 
place for those awaiting execution and was not usually intended as a long-term 
punishment.1276 Cadoux has argued that the Tullianum was a secure location where 
high-status prisoners were detained. By contrast, the Lautumiae, a series of caverns, 
was where low status individuals awaiting execution were housed from the 2nd century 
 
1268 Frederick, 2002: 243-4. 
1269 LSJ, 38: αἰκ-ία. 
1270 Another use of the word can be found in Lucian and refers to ‘torture’ by use of whipping 
(μαστιγόω), cf. Lucian, Anacharsis 38. 
1271 The Porcian laws prevented Roman citizens from being whipped, cf. Sall. Cat. 51.21-24. For 
scourging in criminal law, cf. Just. Digest 48.19.6. Flogging was also indicative of status as those 
classed as infames could be whipped on sight by magistrates, cf. Sandbach, 1977: 110. 
1272 Cf. Hyldahl, Salomonsen. 1991: 342-366. 
1273 Bauman, 1996: 151. 
1274 Bauman, 1996: 151. 
1275 Joseph. BJ. 7.153-5, Eutr. 4.20, 4.27, Oros 5.15. 
1276 Kyle, 1997: 19, Beard, 2007: 128-132, Östenberg, 2009: 161. 
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BCE.1277 Security was key here as Cadoux argues that the caverns could easily be 
guarded by a few sentries, but even if escapes did occur, the low status of the prisoner 
meant that ‘if a few did escape it was no great disaster.’1278 Therefore, Simon’s high 
status is denoted to the Roman public through his detention in the Tullianum before 
his execution. 
As Simon’s execution was announced to the public, it seems likely that the execution 
was carried out in private as the crowd, despite its size,1279 would have been quickly 
made aware of Simon’s death had some amongst their number been witness to it. 
However, Josephus provides us with more detail about Simon’s treatment than any 
other author, even those who would certainly have witnessed triumphs first-hand (i.e. 
Cicero, Ovid, Appian). As Josephus had personal access to the triumphator, he may 
simply have had more information available to him about the execution than previous 
authors writing about triumphs had. However, Josephus’ focus rests on Simon’s 
treatment before the triumph and it may have been the case that this part of Simon’s 
punishment took place in full view of the public. 
This was Simon, son of Giora, who had just figured in the pageant among the prisoners, and 
then, with a halter thrown over him and scourged meanwhile by his conductors, had been 
hauled to the spot abutting on the Forum [possibly the Tullianum], where Roman law requires 
that malefactors condemned to death should be executed.1280 
Σίμων οὗτος ἦν ὁ Γιώρα, τότε πεπομπευκὼς ἐν τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις, βρόχῳ δὲ περιβληθεὶς 
εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσύρετο τόπον αἰκιζομένων αὐτὸν ἅμα τῶν ἀγόντων· νόμος δ᾿ ἐστὶ 
Ῥωμαίοις ἐκεῖ κτείνειν τοὺς ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ θάνατον κατεγνωσμένους. 
6.19. Reasons for Execution 
As executions were relatively infrequent in triumphal processions, it is significant to 
note why they took place at all. For one, it is possible that the execution of captives 
enabled the audience to share in the triumphator’s, thus Rome’s, victory over an 
enemy nation. Barry considers the relationship between public execution, the 
mutilation of corpses and the Roman population during the Imperial period, and 
suggests that public displays of this nature enabled the Roman populace to take an 
active part in ‘justice’.1281 Barry’s argument can be applied to the execution of captives, 
despite their executions not being public spectacles, as the triumph was intended to 
display the defeat of a nation, and the violence which was inevitable in warfare, within 
the ‘safe’ setting of Rome. Furthermore, the executions of prisoners of war within the 
city itself had connections to sacrifice, as a sacrifice of thanksgiving was made by the 
triumphator at the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus after the execution had taken 
place.1282 The sacrifice had connections to the communal thanksgiving element of the 
 
1277 Cadoux, 2008: 203. 
1278 Cadoux, 2008: 203. 
1279 As the triumph attracted large crowds, it seems likely that not all would have been able to 
see every aspect of the triumph, including if an execution had taken place in public. 
1280 Joseph. BJ. 7.153-5. Translation by Thackeray, 1928. 
1281 Barry, 2008: 229.  
1282 Flower, 2004: 326-7. 
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triumph, enabling the Roman public to participate, albeit from a distance, in the 
execution of Rome’s enemies before offering sacrifices to the gods who had ensured 
Roman victory. The sacral element of the triumph had implications on the method of 
execution, as we shall discuss shortly. 
Violence was further alluded to in the triumph through the inclusion of ‘battle scarred’ 
veterans, depictions of warfare on paintings, and with the degraded captives.1283 The 
violence prevalent in the promotional activities of the political elite, including in 
spectacles and iconography, enabled the Roman population at large to become 
accustomed to the wholescale slaughter, sexual assault, and enslavement of enemy 
nations. In the case of the triumph and the execution of captives, the Roman public, 
anxiously awaiting the announcement of their enemy’s death, participated in its 
perpetration through witnessing the last hours of enemy leaders’ lives and celebrating 
their end. In this respect, it was unnecessary for the Roman people to witness the 
execution first-hand as they would have been acutely aware of the types of executions 
carried out against criminals. As we saw in relation to Sulla’s execution of the Samnite 
soldiers within hearing distance of the Roman senate,1284 allowing the audience to 
imagine the execution then announcing it was, given the creation of anticipation, more 
theatrically terrifying than the reality. 
Nevertheless, the execution of enemies within the city of Rome marked the defeated 
foes as being ‘the other’ and enabled the Romans to create a sense of superiority. This 
was reinforced by the Romans’ understanding that victory equated to divine favour. 
As we have seen with Simon bar Giora’s treatment, the gradual humiliation and 
increasing terror was a means of foreshadowing his death and the destruction of his 
community. Foreshadowing, a technique commonly used in theatre, may have been 
another way by which triumphators could create a sense of performance as, much like 
tragedy, the triumph’s audience would have been acutely aware of these fallen heroes’ 
fate but would have recognised that this was the end allotted to them. Thus, the 
audience would have seen that the captives’ deaths were justified as such a fate was 
inevitable. This links closely to Roman imperialism, as whilst the view of ‘defensive 
Imperialism’ is no longer widely accepted within modern scholarship,1285 the 
representation of captives as being violent, savage barbarians in terms of their dress 
and the contrast created between the triumphator and the captive’s humiliation, 
enabled the Roman elite to present the idea of Roman imperialism as justified. In turn, 
the death of the enemy leader within the triumph was also justified as it was part of the 
wider fate. Thus, although the expression of imperialist goals was considered 
unacceptable in Roman culture,1286 triumphators were able to convey Roman dominion 
through the performative elements of the triumph, using the captive’s body as a 
symbol.  
 
1283 Brilliant, 1999: 221. 
1284 Cf. pp. 60-61. 
1285 De Souza, 1999: 131. 
1286 De Souza, 1999: 131. 
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Furthermore, as the executions were likely carried out in private, usually in the 
Tullianum, the death of principal captives had to be announced to the crowd, as we 
have seen in relation to Simon bar Giora in the triumph and will see with the Catiline 
conspirators in an ovatio context. Given that the Roman audience recognised that 
execution was expected in exceptional cases, a sense of anticipation would have been 
created by the delay between captives being led towards the Tullianum and the 
announcement of their deaths. This mirrors theatrical performances in which deaths 
took place offstage, thus enabling a messenger to deliver a monologue with details. 
This may explain Cicero’s proclamation of ‘they have lived’ in relation to the Catiline 
conspirators which not only stressed the unusual nature of the execution but create a 
sense of drama by limiting the information available, something an orator like Cicero 
would have been acutely aware of. Like Sulla’s massacre of the Samnite PoWs,1287 the 
audience’s imagination was more powerful than the impact of watching the event 
itself. 
6.20. Methods of Execution 
The type of execution that captives were subjected to contrasts with the few recorded 
occasions on which Roman citizens were executed, specifically by decapitation outside 
of the city wall.1288 As a case in point, the Gallic leader Vercingetorix was executed after 
Caesar’s triumph in the Tullianum.1289 It is generally assumed that he was strangled,1290 
although the language used translates as ‘put to death’ which does not indicate the 
nature of the execution.1291 
On this point, the style of executions of other captives are not mentioned, including the 
deaths of Aristobulus and Tigranes who were supposedly executed at the end of 
Pompey’s triumph.1292 Plutarch references the captives involved in Pompey’s triumph 
in detail, but does not provide any details of their fate.1293 However, by conducting a 
survey of the language used in relation to the eight individuals whose executions are 
explicitly referenced in primary sources [Table 1], we can see that there was a range of 
different methods. This is significant as the method of execution has not been fully 
explored in previous scholarship. Three significant studies of the triumph: Versnel, 
Beard and Östenberg make little reference to the method of execution. Versnel does not 
discuss execution at all, and Beard and Östenberg make brief references, both focussing 
 
1287 Cf. pp. 60-61 
1288 Stratton, 2014: 156-7. There were some exceptional circumstances, cf. Bauman, 2002: 20. The 
victims of proscription were also beheaded, and their heads displayed in the forum (evidence of 
their execution by bounty hunters), cf. Dio 47.3.2. Cicero is highly critical of Verres for abusing 
power by beheading Roman citizens, cf. 2.30.76-77. 
1289 Dio 43.19.4. 
1290 Cf. Kyle, 1993: 217-8 
1291 Dio uses ἀποκτείνω at 40.41.3, which translates as ‘kill’, and θανατόω at 53.19.4, meaning ‘to 
put to death’, cf. LSJ (online): ἀποκτείνω and θανατόω. 
1292 App. Mith. 12.117. As we know, neither captive was executed at the end of the triumph: 
Aristobulus probably escaped from Rome, and Tigranes became a hostage whose ultimate fate 
is unknown.  
1293 Plutarch, Vit. Pomp. 65. 
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on the rarity of execution and assuming that the main method was strangulation 
without interrogating the sources.1294 
There are eight examples of executions which range from 291 to 71 CE. Only two 
include explicit references to the type of execution: one case of beheading, 1295 and the 
other which lists strangulation, starvation or immuration as the causes of death. The 
example of Simon Bar Giora implies strangulation, but is not explicit, and the cause of 
death of the remaining five is not stated. The following table outlines the named 
captives and the method of execution used. 
Table 1. Survey of execution methods of captives in the triumph1296 
Date and 
Captive 







he was struck with an [headman’s] axe. 




alleged son of 
Eumenes II of 
Pergamon 
hostium more per triumphum duxere 
they led his son Aristonicus in triumph like an 
enemy. 
Sall. Hist. 4.fr.60.9-10 
 
capite poenas dedit 
He paid with his life the penalty  
Vell. Pat. 2.4.1 
Aristonicus iussu senatus Romae in carcere 
strangulatus est. 
Aristonicus, by order of the senate, was 









of his sons 
ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἓξ ἡμέραις ζυγομαχήσαντα τῷ 
λιμῷ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ὥρας ἐκκρεμασθέντα 
τῆς τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμίας εἶχεν ἀξία δίκη τῶν 
ἀσεβημάτων. 
But the wretch, after struggling with hunger for 







1294 Versnel, 1970, Beard, 2007: 128-132, Östenberg, 2009: 161. 
1295 Gaius Pontius (291 BCE), cf. Liv. Per. 11. 
1296 All translations, with the exception of Liv. Per. 11, Eutropius and Orobius which are my 
own, are from the Loeb editions. 
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the desire of life, paid the penalty which his 
crimes deserved. 
Plut. Mar. 12.3 
Ante currum tamen Marii Iugurtha cum duobus filiis 
ductus est catenatus et mox iussu consulis in carcere 
strangulatus est. 
Yet with his two sons, Jugurtha was led in chains 
before Marius’ chariot, and was soon strangled 
in prison by order of the consuls. 
Eutr. 4.27 
Iugurtham dolo captum catenisque obrutum per 
Syllam legatum misit ad Marium. qui in triumpho 
ante currum cum duobus filiis suis actus et mox in 
carcere strangulatus est.  
He [Bocchus] sent Jugurtha, captured by deceit 
and weighed down with chains, by means of the 
legate Sulla to Marius. He was driven in triumph 
before the chariot with his two sons and soon 
strangled in prison. 
Oros 5.15 
nam domi pressus strangulatusque servorum 
manibus obstructo anhelitu gutture obstricto, ne 
dicam Lentuli Iugurthae atque Seiani, certe 
Numantini Scipionis exitu periit. 
In his own home he was choked and strangled 
by the hands of his slaves, who stopped his 
breath by throttling, thus causing him to meet 
the end of Scipio Numantinus at least—I will not 
say of Lentulus, Jugurtha, and Sejanus. 






καὶ τούτων μόνος Ἀριστόβουλος εὐθὺς ἀνῃρέθη, 
καὶ Τιγράνης ὕστερον. 
Of these Aristobulus alone was at once put to 
death and Tigranes somewhat later. 












of the Averni 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα αὐτὸν 
ἠλέησεν ἀλλ᾿ εὐθὺς ἐν δεσμοῖς ἔδησε, καὶ ἐς τὰ 
ἐπινίκια μετὰ τοῦτο πέμψας ἀπέκτεινε. 
Therefore he did not pity him even at the time, 
but immediately confined him in bonds, and 
later, after sending him to his triumph, put him 
to death. 
Dio 40.41.3 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐκείνη μὲν διὰ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ἀφείθη, 
ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ ὁ Οὐερκιγγετόριξ ἐθανατώθησαν. 
She [Arsinoë IV of Egypt], to be sure, was 
released out of consideration for her brothers; 










ὁ μὲν γὰρ Καῖσαρ, θριαμβεύσας τὸν Ἀδιατόριγα 
μετὰ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, ἔγνω ἀναιρεῖν μετὰ 
τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου τῶν παίδων (ἦν δὲ πρεσβύτατος 
οὗτος), τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου τῶν ἀδελφῶν αὐτοῦ 
φήσαντος εἶναι πρεσβυτάτου πρὸς τοὺς 
ἀπάγοντας στρατιώτας, ἔρις ἦν ἀμφοτέροις 
πολὺν χρόνον, ἕως οἱ γονεῖς ἔπεισαν τὸν 
Δύτευτον παραχωρῆσαι τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῆς νίκης· 
αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἐπιτηδειότερον 
κηδεμόνα τῇ μητρὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ τῷ λειπομένῳ 
ἀδελφῷ· οὕτω δὲ τὸν μὲν συναποθανεῖν τῷ πατρί, 
τοῦτον δὲ σωθῆναι καὶ τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. 
For Caesar, after leading Adiatorix in triumph 
together with his wife and children, resolved to 
put him to death together with the eldest of his 
sons (for Dyteutus was the eldest), but when the 
second of the brothers told the soldiers who 
were leading them away to execution that he 
was the eldest, there was a contest between the 
two for a long time, until the parents persuaded 
Dyteutus to yield the victory to the younger, for 
he, they said, being more advanced in age, 
would be a more suitable guardian for his 
mother and for the remaining brother. And thus, 




father, whereas the elder was saved and 
obtained the honour of the priesthood. 





Σίμων οὗτος ἦν ὁ Γιώρα, τότε πεπομπευκὼς ἐν 
τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις, βρόχῳ δὲ περιβληθεὶς εἰς τὸν 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐσύρετο τόπον αἰκιζομένων αὐτὸν 
ἅμα τῶν ἀγόντων· νόμος δ᾿ ἐστὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐκεῖ 
κτείνειν τοὺς ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ θάνατον 
κατεγνωσμένους. 
This was Simon, son of Giora, who had just 
figured in the pageant among the prisoners, and 
then, with a halter thrown over him and 
scourged meanwhile by his conductors, had 
been hauled to the spot abutting on the Forum 
[possibly the Tullianum], where Roman law 
requires that malefactors condemned to death 
should be executed. 








The assumption in scholarship that strangulation was the cause of death may be based 
on later references which state that captives who appeared in the triumph were 
strangled (or choked) in prison. This assumption is found in the Historia Augusta where 
a reference is made to ‘captives of old’ being strangled in prison.1297 For example, in the 
case of Jugurtha, the earliest reference we have to his death is found in Plutarch, 
writing in the 1st century CE, who states that Jugurtha starved to death in prison.1298 
The three later references, found in Eutropius (4th century CE), Orosius (4th century CE) 
and Sidonius Apollinaris (5th century CE), suggest that Jugurtha died by 
strangulation.1299 Similarly, earlier sources do not allude to the nature of Aristonicus’ 
death, but Eutropius states that it is strangulation.1300 We are clearly seeing that there is 
an understanding found in the writings of later authors that strangulation was the 
primary method of execution. However, writers before the 4th century CE make no 
indication that this is the case, and only beheading is mentioned as a form of execution. 
These authors were writing centuries after the events in question and, although using 
more contemporaneous sources, there is clearly an assumption based on their 
 
1297 SHA, Tyr. Trig. 22.8. 
1298 Plut. Mar. 12.3 
1299 Eutr. 4.27, Oros 5.15, Sid. Apoll. Epist. 8.11. 
1300 Sall. Hist. 4.fr.60.9-10, Vell. Pat. 2.4.1, Eutr. 4.20. 
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understanding of Roman executions more widely, including those which pertain to 
Roman citizens. 
Therefore, the hypothesis may reside in the understanding that strangulation, as a 
method of capital punishment, was reserved only for those in Roman society who had 
broken the most sacred laws, such as treason or sacrilege.1301 Non-Romans could not be 
found guilty of treason, but the actions of enemies against Rome were like treason and 
the treatment of Roman traitors and enemies is therefore comparable. References in 
accounts of triumphs indicate that enemies were kept in the Tullianum, the same 
location as where those accused of treason were held and later executed. Kyle suggests 
that all those who were imprisoned in the Tullianum, Roman and non-Roman, were 
strangled to death.  For instance, Kyle assumes that Vercingetorix was imprisoned in 
the Tullianum and therefore strangled,1302 but the evidence does not support this claim. 
Furthermore, Kyle states that it was Tiberius who ended the use of strangulation in 
triumphs, but the reference from Suetonius which Kyle uses does not allude to a form 
of punishment, but rather to Tiberius sparing an enemy leader’s life as a form of 
reward for honourable conduct in war.1303 This widely held belief that all captives, 
regardless of status, were strangled in the Tullianum has caused some unsupported 
assumptions within scholarship which have been perpetuated in works on the triumph 
and executions.  
As we have little evidence, we must therefore consider where this assumption 
originated. Some captives were presented as having chains (vinculum, vincla) around 
their necks or heads,1304 and Simon bar Giora had a halter thrown around his neck.  
This may have been a means of foreshadowing the captives’ death by strangulation at 
the conclusion of the procession, but this is by no means clear and as we have 
established, we do not know the cause of Simon’s death. As said, it is possible that an 
understanding of strangulation as punishment for treason has led to this assumption. 
This is embodied by the punishment of five of those involved in the Catiline conspiracy 
of 63 BCE, who were all taken to prison and strangled.1305 Sallust and Florus record 
how Cato, supporting Cicero, advocated that the conspirators should be executed in 
line with their offence and without trial.1306 The motion was passed by the consul 
Cicero and senate, but proved controversial as Roman citizens would normally be 
permitted to avoid execution by going into exile.1307 Furthermore, in his oration against 
 
1301 Bauman, 1996: 48. 
1302 Kyle, 1997: 217-8. 
1303 Kyle, 1997: 217, 232, cf. Suet. Tib. 20. 
1304 A specific reference is made at Ov. Trist. 2.20-21. However, it is likely that the symbolic use 
of chains meant that captives were laden with chains which would have been wrapped about 
their person, including around their necks. For instance, Zenobia in Aurelian’s triumph had to 
have her chains carried as the weight was too much for her to bear alone, cf. SHA, Aurel. 34.   
1305 The method of execution is recorded by Flor. Epit. 2.7.11-12. 
1306 Sall. Cat. 52, 55, Flor. Epit. 2.7.11-12. 
1307 Sall. Cat. 51, cf. Cic. Cat. 4.10. The executions would later prove to be an issue which Cicero’s 
enemies could force, including Clodius who introduced a law in 58 BCE against those who had 
put Roman citizens to death with trial, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.45.1, Dio 38.14. Cicero was forced into exile 
but was later recalled. 
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Verres, Cicero references Verres’ misconduct in executing Roman citizens by 
strangulation whilst they were in prison.1308 In both examples, there is the sense that 
strangulation is an extreme measure which was usually not carried out against Roman 
citizens, unless in cases of treason. 
The method of execution is telling of the attitude towards the conspirators and of 
Verres’ misconduct. Strangulation is not a quick or painless death, and the ‘long drop’ 
style of hanging, which effectively broke the neck of the condemned, was not used by 
an executioner until 1874.1309 However, before this, it was commonly understood that 
breaking the neck was preferable to slow strangulation or choking.1310 Strangulation, 
which results in fatalities by depriving oxygen to the brain, is a slow and painful death 
in which the individual can be conscious for minutes before they succumb to 
unconsciousness.1311 Depending on where the rope was positioned on the neck, the 
condemned could recover, and there are cases throughout history in which individuals 
had to be hanged twice to achieve the intended result.1312 Therefore, it is likely that the 
Romans employed this method of execution as it was a more prolonged death than 
decapitation.  
However, strangulation is also a method of execution which preserves the body as a 
whole, in contrast to decapitation or damnatio ad bestias. The assumption that 
strangulation was the main method of execution in triumphs may arise from the idea 
that the execution as a form of sacral thanksgiving.1313 The shedding of blood may also 
have been a consideration here, as strangulation is less bloody than beheading. Blood 
was seen as a polluting agent which could create a sense of communal guilt and 
contamination.1314 Some scholars, including Beard, have suggested that triumphal 
execution was a form of human sacrifice.1315 Keeping the body whole is evident in 
instances which have previously been identified as being forms of human sacrifice, 
including the burial of Vestal Virgins and Gallic captives, or the drowning of intersex 
children in the earlier Republican period.1316 However, human sacrifice was rare in the 
Roman world, evident only in extreme circumstances during the early Republic.1317 By 
the period in question in this thesis, descriptions of human sacrifice were used as a 
means of ‘othering’ foreign peoples and would not have been an element the Roman 
 
1308 Cic. Verr. 2.62. Other examples of strangulation in prison can be found in Cic. Vat. 8 
1309 Aitchison Robertson, 1935: 121-2. 
1310 As was the case for Guy Fawkes who, having been tortured and dragged (drawn) from his 
prison on a wattle hurdle, escaped an even more prolonged death by breaking his neck in the 
hanging part of his execution. His fellow conspirators were quartered, whilst still conscious 
after being hanged, cf. Fraser, 2003: 283. 
1311 A doctor in 1882 arranged for two of his colleagues to strangle him and recorded that he was 
conscious for 1 minute 20 seconds before falling unconscious, cf. Hammond, 1882: 292. 
1312 Aitchison Robertson, 1935: 121-2, Clegg, 1935: 280. 
1313 Cf. Beard, et al., 1998: 159-162.  
1314 Lennon, 2014: 131-145. 
1315 Beard, 2008: 129 
1316 Schultz argues that only the example of the buried Gauls counts as sacrifice, the other 
examples have been misidentified as such, cf. Schultz, 2010: 516-541. 
1317 Schultz, 2010: 516-541. 
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elite would have wanted to be associated with. Furthermore, executions within Rome’s 
city boundaries were uncommon and there was clearly some concern about executions 
within the heart of the city.  
There may also have been an acknowledgement of the victim being a ‘worthy enemy’ 
as strangulation, unlike decapitation, enabled the body to remain whole and therefore 
able to pass on to the afterlife.1318 For instance, following the execution of the Catiline 
conspirators, Cicero confirmed their deaths to the other conspirators waiting in the 
crowd by stating, according to Plutarch, ‘they have lived’ (Ἔζησαν).1319 In this example, 
Cicero avoids explicitly stating that the conspirators had died which may have resulted 
from the unusual nature of the execution and its location because of the nature of the 
crime: treason. As a result, the method of execution triumphators chose to employ 
against their enemies may have been used to show the enemy as someone who had 
committed a grievous crime against Rome, despite the fact that Roman law only 
applied to Roman citizens.  
6.20.2. Decapitation 
Another possible method of execution for principal captives in triumphs was 
decapitation. Decapitation was a quicker death than strangulation and was the method 
which was employed, albeit infrequently, to execute Roman citizens who did not go 
into exile.1320 The seemingly more common use of decapitation would make 
strangulation more significant as a punishment as it highlighted the nature of the crime 
the captives had committed in trying to oppose Rome. However, as Livy shows, 
beheading was employed as a method of execution during the triumph.1321  
The victims of proscription were also beheaded, and their heads displayed in the 
forum as evidence of their suicide or execution by bounty hunters.1322 Clearly, the 
proscriptions indicated a breakdown of Roman society, and the abuse of bodies after 
death was a way by which those behind the proscriptions could degrade them and 
therefore justify their actions. The symbolism of the abuse of corpses was widely 
understood by the Roman elite. For instance, Cicero’s body was decapitated, and his 
hands nailed to the senate door.1323 Fulvia, Mark Antony’s wife (who had also been 
married to Cicero’s enemy Clodius), also pierced the severed head’s tongue.1324 The 
mutilation of the hands and tongue was significant for Cicero as they were essentially 
the tools of his trade: the hands used for oratorical gestures and the tongue to deliver 
 
1318 As Kyle notes in relation to decapitation, cf. Kyle, 1997: 221. 
1319 Plut. Cic. 22.2. 
1320 Dig. 48.19.8.1, cf. Garnsey, 1970: 105. Garnsey argues that the term could be applied to a 
number of different punishments, but translates directly as ‘by the sword’ which suggests that 
the earliest and perhaps most typical form of punishment for Roman citizens was beheading. 
Crucifixion, damnatio ad bestias, and immolation were typically reserved for non-Roman citizens 
or those of lower status. 
1321 Liv. Per. 11. 
1322 For Sulla’s proscriptions, cf. Dio 47.3.2. 
1323 Plut. Cic. 48-9. 
1324 Dio 47.8.4. 
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the speeches.1325 However, the triumph did not indicate a breakdown in Roman 
society, but rather celebrated the destruction of another nation or people’s social 
structure.  
The only example we have where the method of execution is explicitly stated is from 
Livy and concerns Gaius Pontius.1326 Pontius was a Samnite leader who was 
responsible for the Romans’ defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321 BCE. In Chapter One, 
we considered the embarrassing surrender which the Romans had to endure before 
they were subsequently taken captive.1327 As we have seen, beheading was bloody, 
potentially polluting through bloodshed, and destroyed the integrity of the body. In 
the case of Pontius, beheading could therefore have been used to convey the severity of 
Pontius’ actions against Rome. Like the abuse of Cicero’s corpse, beheading may have 
been used to denigrate Pontius and show the extent to which he was in Roman control, 
and had fallen from his position of power. 
The triumphator was acutely aware of their audience and how different types and the 
location of executions could be perceived. Therefore, it is likely that the execution style 
was a consideration for triumphators, one which centred on their desire to stress their 
own power in contrast to that of the principal captive. Execution methods which 
preserved the body whole, such as strangulation or starvation, may have been selected 
to suggest that the actions of principal captives were akin to treason against Rome. In 
turn, this served to illuminate the triumphator’s power and service to Rome in 
defeating such a foe. Alternatively, the triumphator may have wanted to demonstrate 
their power by humiliating the enemy through the decapitation of their body. As such, 
whilst evidence of execution in triumphs is scant, strangulation was not always the 
primary method of execution. Rather the method of execution was the choice of the 
triumphator, and clearly selected with careful consideration of the optics and how it 
illuminated aspects of their and the enemy’s characters.  
The aforementioned examples have dealt with high status captives who we know were 
executed, either during the triumph or shortly afterwards. However, we do not know 
what happened to less well-known captives after the triumph. Once again, the decision 
is likely to have been the triumphator’s. It is possible that some were executed having 
outlived their usefulness, possibly in games associated with the triumph,1328 others 
certainly became hostages,1329 and others may have been sold into slavery. 
Unfortunately, the numbers detailed in accounts of triumphs are by no means 
comprehensive, and we cannot speak to how many people were executed, enslaved, or 
 
1325 Richlin further argues that the public nature of the display linked to Cicero’s professional as 
an orator, cf. Richlin, 1999: 189-200. 
1326 Liv. Per. 11 
1327 Cf. pp. 31-33. 
1328 The only evidence we have to support this assessment relates to Caesar’s triumph of 46 BCE 
in which captives appeared in the arena. However, it is uncertain if the captives were those who 
had appeared in his triumph, cf. Dio 43.23.4.  




held hostage. The fact that we have so little information suggests that, regardless of the 
numbers involved, captives were only as important as their role in the triumph, and 
how their display could be used for the benefit for the triumphator.  
6.21. Women and Execution 
As we have seen, military commanders were, on rare occasion, executed at the end of a 
triumph. The victims were all male and there are no references to the execution of 
females within the triumph. This is an important issue to discuss as it shows how 
Roman triumphators had to carefully consider gender roles, despite some of the 
captive women acting in ‘masculine’ roles, including as leaders and generals. Before 
looking at specific cases, we should acknowledge that the execution of women is rarely 
discussed within Greco-Roman literature. If we consider the punishment of Roman 
women, there is evidently a sense of discomfort with discipline being in the public 
domain which, as we have seen with the case of Simon Bar Giora, was the case in the 
lead up to the private execution. We need to consider the reasons for this reluctance to 
execute women publicly, initially using examples concerning the punishment of Vestal 
Virgins, priestesses who were chosen to tend the Temple of Vesta in the Roman Forum 
and who were required to remain chaste for the duration of their service (usually 25 
years). It should be noted that the Vestal Virgins were exceptional women who 
exercised more power, albeit under strictly defined circumstances, than the majority of 
other women in Roman society.1330 Nevertheless, as we shall see, the treatment of these 
remarkable women once condemned closely links to how ordinary women were 
punished, seemingly executed by strangulation in prison.1331 Further following, female 
captives who appeared in the triumph were high-profile and, like Arsinoë and 
Cleopatra, exceptional individuals. Vestal Virgins, should they break their vow to 
retain their virginity during their tenure at the Temple of Vesta, were buried alive with 
a small amount of food and water placed in a burial chamber.1332 Even Vestal Virgins 
who were condemned to suffer corporal punishment (in the form of whipping) were 
privately punished, with the act carried out by a high priest behind a curtain.1333 Such 
private forms of punishment, imprisonment and execution allowed the Romans to 
avoid impiety by directly harming (or seeing harmed) a Vestal Virgin who, even if 
found guilty of a crime, was still a member of a sacred organisation. 
Wolfgang notes that accusations against Vestal Virgins usually coincided with times of 
political and military unrest, particularly when Roman women became more obviously 
interested in political life.1334 Essentially this was because the Vestal Virgins were 
representative of Rome and its prosperity, therefore dealing with internal ‘problems’ 
may have distracted the population from outside threats whilst simultaneously giving 
 
1330 Fantham, 1995: 236-7, Wolfgang, 2006: 64-75. 
1331 As the unpleasant fate of Sejanus’ daughter in 31 CE shows. According to Dio, virgin girls 
could not be imprisoned and then executed so the executioner was ordered to sexually assault 
her before her death, cf. Dio 58.11.5 
1332 Cf. Livy 4.44.2 (420 BCE), 8.15.7-8 (337 BCE), 22.57.2-3 (216 BCE).  
1333 Plut. Numa 10, cf. Bauman, 93, 186fn. 
1334 Such as in 216 BCE after the Battle of Cannae (discussed at length in Chapter One), cf. 
Wolfgang, 2006: 79-81. 
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the impression that the Roman state was in control of its own destiny. As such, in 
turbulent times, news of the executions of Vestal Virgins would have been well-known 
to many in Rome, and it appears that the processions leading condemned Vestal 
Virgins to the burial chambers were in full view of the public.1335 According to 
Plutarch, condemned Vestals were carried in a covered litter to their burial chamber, 
but that did not stop the public from hearing their screams.1336 Much like the example 
of Sulla’s execution of the Samnite soldiers,1337 the Roman public may not have been 
able to see the women, but that did not matter as the screams alone would have 
conveyed their terror. Similarly, how the senate or an emperor responded to 
accusations of a Vestal Virgins’ bad behaviour was indicative of their control over the 
Roman state. This is evident in Domitian’s execution of three Vestal Virgins, at least 
two of whom were probably convicted on trumped up charges.1338 The procession of 
the condemned Vestal took place in public, but her death was in the confines of a 
private cell. 
The nature of the execution conveys the attitude of the Romans to the public execution 
of women. The Digest suggests that an alternative form of execution for women was 
being condemned to hard labour mines.1339 Whilst seemingly not an immediate form of 
execution, the women were deprived of their citizenship and would have likely 
succumbed to the horrific conditions in the mines. As such, the Roman legal system 
was not directly responsible for the death of the female criminal, but still ensured that 
she was removed from society and her demise was not seen as being the action of the 
Roman state. The immurement and starvation of women, which hard labour in the 
mines certainly constituted, was similar to that suffered by Jugurtha, who was 
incarcerated in Rome and starved to death after the triumph of Marius in 104 BCE. The 
conclusion of the Jugurthine War had not been a fair one, with Jugurtha’s followers 
massacred after Marius had agreed to accept Jugurtha’s surrender; a clear violation of 
the Romans’ ‘rules of war’. Jugurtha’s fate may have been designed to assuage Marius 
of the guilt of executing an opponent who had not been taken captive in an appropriate 
manner, an issue we encountered earlier in this chapter with Antony’s triumph over 
Artavasdes II of Armenia.  
Granted, the Vestal Virgins were afforded special treatment given their role in religious 
life,1340 which may appear to be considered as apart from the average woman. In 
Roman society generally, women were typically punished privately, with the most 
 
1335 As Plutarch suggests in relation to an incident in early Roman history, cf. Plut. Numa 10. 
Pliny’s letter about the reign of Domitian details how he witnessed the descent of a Vestal 
Virgin into her tomb, cf. Plin. Ep. 4.11. It should be noted that Plutarch wrote after Domitian’s 
reign and may have been inspired by the emperor’s actions or typical treatment of condemned 
Vestal Virgins, cf. Bauman, 93, 186fn. 
1336 Plut. Numa 10. 
1337 Cf. Plut. Sulla 30.2-3, Dio. fr. 109.3-9, pp. 55-56. 
1338 For Domitian’s reign, cf. Plin. Ep. 4.11, Suet. Dom. 8.3, Wolfgang, 2006: 104-105, Bauman, 
1996: 92-99. 
1339 Digest 48.19.8, 48.19.28, cf. Bauman, 1996: 141-2.  
1340 Fantham, 1995: 236-7. 
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commonly cited reason being charges of adultery, with the pater familias administering 
death to his daughter and her lover. However, the privacy we encounter in adultery 
cases was observed even when the crimes committed were of a public nature, as 
Fantham discusses in relation to the Bacchanalian scandal of 189 BCE, in which 7000 
cult members were accused of conspiracy against the Roman state.1341 The male 
ringleaders were executed, but the women involved were confined to their family 
estates in the country, away from the public eye. According to Livy, if women’s 
executions were not carried out by a family member, then they would be handed over 
to the public executioner.1342 The fact that the Roman state handed the women into the 
custody of their families suggests a number of things. Firstly, women were under the 
supervision of the pater familias and should be dealt with accordingly. Secondly, the 
Roman state would not be responsible for the deaths of these women, despite the 
ruling that they should be executed. Thirdly, a sense of shame would have been felt by 
those unable to execute the women as they were failing to do their duty to Rome, and 
they would have also witnessed their daughter’s reputation (and by extension their 
own) tarnished by surrendering her to the mercy of the public executioner and the 
public at large. 
The private practice of punishing women is evident in the period in question in this 
thesis with Augustus choosing to exile his daughter Julia rather than kill her when she 
was accused of treason and adultery.1343 Augustus, who had introduced moral 
legislation, based on ancient traditions,1344 would have been legally permitted, as the 
pater familias, to execute Julia should he have wished. Cohen suggests that Julia’s lovers 
were punished in a manner which was akin to treason, but Augustus chose to punish 
Julia in a less severe manner, with exile rather than death, which kept the punishment 
in the private domain.1345 These examples pertain to elite women, but Valerius 
Maximus tells us of the extraordinary story of a woman who breastfed her imprisoned 
mother whilst she was anticipating her execution via strangulation.1346 Maximus relates 
how the prison warder was the person in charge of execution, thus suggesting that the 
execution was set to take place in the privacy of the prison.1347 Evidently an exemplum, 
linked to Pero and Cimon whom Maximus discusses next, this instance reveals a 
common theme in relation to the Romans’ execution of women: criminal or captive. 
The common denominator, as Bauman’s study of execution in the Roman world 
suggests, was the importance of preserving a condemned female’s modesty during the 
execution.1348 
 
1341 Liv. 39.8-19, cf. Fantham, 1995: 263-4. 
1342 Liv. 39.18. 
1343 Suet. Aug. 65, Veil. 2.100.2-5, Dio Cassius 55.10.12-16, Sen. Ben. 6.32.1-2. 
1344 There are examples of women being killed by their families before Augustus’ legislation, cf. 
Val. Max. 6.8. 
1345 Cohen, 2008: 206-217. 
1346 Val. Max. 5.4.7. 
1347 Val. Max. 5.4.7. 
1348 Bauman, 1996: 18.  
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The Vestal Virgins, those involved in the Bacchanalian scandal, and Julia all belonged 
to the Roman elite, whilst the imprisoned woman and her daughter’s statuses are 
unknown. Unfortunately, for the period in question, we have little evidence pertaining 
to the execution of non-elite women. No doubt execution of females took place during 
this period, and the lack of reference to executions within ancient sources may have 
been because the execution of non-elite females was commonplace. However, 
considering the private punishment of elite women, it is likely that executions of 
women during this period took place away from the public’s gaze. As far as we know, 
no women were executed in the context of the triumph. The discussion throughout this 
section demonstrates how uncomfortable the Romans were with even the hint of 
women being executed, as evident with the Vestal Virgins. Therefore, whilst we have 
seen that women could be considered as principal captives, the issue of execution was 
yet another problem for the triumphator in choosing to display a female leader, rather 
than a man. In the triumph, which acted as a form of punishment, the presence of 
females as the principal captives presented a problem. Like Cleopatra and Arsinoë, the 
Roman public would have been aware of their position as former queens who had 
been subjugated and were associated, through the use of chains, with slavery. 
Returning to Cleopatra, Octavian could not have executed the queen without risking 
criticism, thus her suicide was highly convenient for Octavian’s self-promotion, despite 
his supposed desire to preserve her for the triumph.  
6.22. Chapter Conclusion 
Captives were central to Roman triumphs and triumphators went to great lengths to 
display them in ways which signified Roman dominion over foreign enemies and their 
nations. Humiliation and degradation were key to the presentation of captives in 
triumphs, primarily because the Roman audience would have recognised their lack of 
autonomy. Captives could be chained, forced to walk in front of crowds, placed on 
platforms, wear elaborate costumes, and face execution, and they had no means of 
escape other than to commit suicide before their capture. The presentation of captives 
was created to exacerbate their defeated status. However, triumphators had to also 
acknowledge their enemies’ former power in order to stress how they had overcome a 
‘worthy’ adversary. This was problematic when triumphators presented women and 
children. In such cases, the masculinity of a female was stressed, as with Cleopatra and 
Zenobia, or emphasis was placed on the symbolic use of women in elite promotion, as 
with Arsinoë appearing alongside other symbols of Egypt. Alternatively, like 
Thusnelda, Thumelicus, Cleopatra Selene and Alexander Helios, women and children 
were presented as extensions of their male relations. Overall, captives in triumphs 
were presented in ways which created a contrast between them and the triumphator. 
This was done in order to emphasise the triumphator’s military prowess and the 
Romans’ superiority over inferior nations which in turn justified the treatment captives 







This thesis has shown that the Romans recognised that there was something akin to a 
standardised process for captive-taking which was designed to gradually humiliate 
and degrade enemy captives and their wider community. In turn, the destruction of an 
individual’s well-being and society enabled the Romans to control enemy captives 
more easily. Captive-taking occurred on a vast scale and the Romans’ ability to take 
large numbers of captives relied upon a campaign of terror against the enemy. 
Captives taken during warfare were used for military intelligence, and hostages, like 
Dumnorix and Tigranes, were used to cement alliances between Rome and nations 
involved in or geographically close to the conflict. Once an enemy had been subdued, 
massacre and sexual violence were essential components in degrading and destroying 
communities which made individuals more compliant when they were taken 
ultimately captive. The Roman general could then decide the captives’ fates with 
consideration to logistics and the financial, diplomatic, political or symbolic value of 
the captives, which largely depended upon captives’ socio-economic background. The 
majority of captives were either massacred or enslaved, although elite individuals were 
retained as hostages or for use in the triumph. 
The evidence we have pertaining to captive-taking is written from a Roman viewpoint, 
including histories by former captives like Polybius and Josephus, who relied upon 
their captors for their security and wellbeing. Therefore, I have used sources which are 
essentially elite self-representation to identify and explore common practices and 
provide a detailed overview of captive-taking from the use of captives within warfare 
to the process of enslavement and through to subsequent public presentations of 
captives in triumphs or elite households. Using representations to identify historical 
realities, expected norms and how concern for representations impacted upon captives’ 
treatment has not been fully explored in previous scholarship on captive-taking. 
Furthermore, there is a tendency to focus on such concepts as the institution of slavery 
or Imperialism, rather than on how a group of individuals were affected by the 
Romans’ actions or need to represent their behaviour in a certain way. 
Aggression of all forms had to be heavily justified by the Roman elite in their 
representations of events, which accounts for Caesar’s frequent references to his 
foreign enemies’ wrongdoings, according to the Roman rules of war. Therefore, 
captive-taking was seen as justifiable conduct if an enemy had broken the rules of war 
and had been defeated in conflict. It is within the area between expectation and reality 
where we find the Roman elite manipulating representations of captive-taking and 
captive management for their own agenda. It has therefore been appropriate to 
consider the impact the Roman elite’s concern for subsequent representations had on 
their treatment of captives. 
Gender 
It is clear that there were gendered dimensions to Roman captive-taking. Those 
capturing and subsequently representing capture were all male and were heavily 
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influenced by Rome’s heavily patriarchal society. Subsequent scholarship, particularly 
on Roman warfare, has largely ignored the impact of war on women and children. This 
thesis has shown that the process of captive-taking was designed to degrade, 
humiliate, and make malleable everyone in an enemy society, including elite and non-
elite men, women, and children. Men are most frequently referenced, given our 
sources (all men) and their interests in representing male enemies, who were most 
often commanders and combatants, as being subjugated. Men were subjected to all 
forms of treatment, including being used as informants and combatants in warfare, 
massacre, enslavement and in subsequent public presentations of captives. However, 
women (and sometimes children) were subjected to sexual violence, both during 
warfare and, if they were enslaved, for the remainder of their lives. The motivations 
behind sexual violence were demonstrating how women’s male relatives were no 
longer able to protect them, and also suggesting the next generation was illegitimate. 
These concerns largely centre around women’s relation to men, in that they were under 
the authority and protection of their male relatives, and the Romans had destroyed that 
relationship. Therefore, the treatment women received was designed to humiliate and 
degrade both the women and their male relatives, and was significant within Roman 
representation because it was not about humiliating the women as an isolated group, 
but rather demonstrating that women represented and linked to the rest of an enemy’s 
society: be it the men or children of all social statuses.  
Despite the importance of women within society, and the symbolic roles associated 
with fertility that they hold, the role of women in enemy societies was often 
underestimated and therefore underrepresented. We see this within examples of elite 
captive-taking, where women were held as hostages and appeared in triumphs but 
were rarely seen as being serious contenders for foreign thrones, as we see with 
Clodius’ meddling with the male hostage Tigranes. Similarly, there are no references to 
female hostages ruling kingdoms in their own names, other than Cleopatra Selene who 
ruled jointly with Juba II. Neither were women normally considered as military 
commanders, as we see with the representation of Arsinoë and later Zenobia in the 
triumph, and how no female leader was ever executed. The Romans certainly took 
female captives, and they were often subjected to horrific treatment which had long-
term consequences. However, the Romans were also conscious of how their own 
society viewed women as being under the dominion of their male relatives, and 
therefore the treatment their received was always in connection to damaging the 
reputation of men. 
The process and representation of Captive-taking: From the Mid-Republic to the 
Early Principate 
Having briefly outlined the historical realities, we should consider representations of 
captive-taking during the late Republic and early Imperial period, and what they tell 
us about changes to the captive-taking process. We need to acknowledge that 
representations of captive-taking and its practices remained fairly stable over the 
course of time, particularly the period under scrutiny in this thesis, as elite individuals 
used captive-taking to compare and contrast the behaviour of high-profile figures to 
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past Romans. This would suggest that the practice of captive-taking did not change 
during this period as representations would only have been successful if discussion of 
captive-taking was in line with reality.  
In terms of representation, during the mid to late Republican period, it is clear that the 
Roman elite moved towards using less explicit references to captive-taking practices. 
For instance, Polybius’ account of Scipio at New Carthage explicitly addresses the 
controversial use of captives in the army, the soldiers’ desire for material rewards, and 
sexual violence.1349 By the time of Augustus, such references were made only implicitly 
in relation to Roman military practices, or were used in hostile sources to stress the bad 
behaviour of Roman commanders during Civil War contexts, such as Cicero’s 
description of Lucius Antonius’ actions at Perusia.1350 Arguably, the lack of detail may 
have been because the Roman elite recognised that such acts as massacre, sexual 
violence and enslavement were expected parts of warfare. However, whilst it was 
necessary for commanders to reference such acts, as they indicated the complete 
subjugation of a society, behaviour of this kind may have been considered morally 
dubious, as indicated by Cicero’s De Officiis,1351 Caesar’s justification of his actions 
throughout the Gallic Wars, and accounts of attacks on Roman citizens at Perusia and 
Cremona.1352Another point we need to consider is the change in the political and 
military structures during the late Republic and early Principate. During the Republic, 
generals had to stress their military prowess as they were in competition with others 
for political power. However, by the time of Augustus, military prowess came to be 
monopolised by the emperors and there was less incentive for military commanders to 
highlight their achievements to the same extent as their late earlier counterparts. 
During this period, despite the use of more subtle references to the types of treatment 
captives were subjected to, captive-taking was central to elite self-promotion and the 
perpetuation of ideas surrounding Roman Imperialism and slavery. Enemy captives 
were seen by the Roman elite as representatives of their nations, with men used to 
symbolise combatants and protectors of a nation, women as bearers of offspring and 
symbols of fertility and their land, and children as the future of a nation. Therefore, the 
Romans’ treatment and representation of captives at each stage of the captive-taking 
process was designed to convey the complete subjugation of a people by portraying 
the treatment each group faced in elite self-promotion. Male combatants were often 
massacred during warfare to show that a society was unprotected, women sexually 
assaulted to destroy the legitimacy of any offspring, and all surviving people enslaved, 
including children who represented a nation’s future. Meanwhile, elite members of 
society were taken hostage and/or held by the elite for display in their triumphs, to 
secure future diplomatic relations with the defeated enemy, or to symbolise Roman 
control over the nation’s leaders and their families. The differing treatment of captives 
 
1349 Polyb. 10.18, cf. Livy 26.49.12-.16. 
1350 Cic. Phil. 3.12. 
1351 ‘As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great care should be taken that 
nothing be done in reckless cruelty or wantonness’, cf. Cic. Off. 1.24. 
1352 For Perusia, cf. Cic. Phil. 3.12, and Cremona, cf. Tac. Hist. 3.33. 
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of different genders and backgrounds was part of the process of captive-taking, and 
was designed to humiliate and degrade an entire community, thus enabling the 
Romans to impose their will on vulnerable people more easily. Furthermore, by 
alluding to the treatment of different types of captives taken from across an enemy’s 
society, the Roman elite were able to convey how a whole enemy nation was under 
Roman control. The Romans’ expectations and understanding of the treatment and 
symbolism of different types of captives was harnessed by the political elite to 
perpetuate the acceptance of violence and expansionism in Roman society. 
Throughout this thesis, I have outlined the treatment and subsequent representation of 
different types of captives, commenting upon linguistic differences where appropriate. 
However, the following sections highlight how, regardless of the terms used by the 
Roman elite or captives’ gender, age or socio-economic background, captive-taking of 
all forms was used within elite self-representation to demonstrate several key themes. 
Therefore, we should consider all captives to be ultimately thought of by the Roman 
elite as having an inferior status which was often in line with their perceived ‘worth’, 
be it financial, political or diplomatic. The treatment they received often dictated their 
perceived ‘value’, with elite individuals being subjected to relatively more favourable 
treatment than their non-elite counterparts. Here we see how the Romans’ concern for 
status and how they treated their high-ranking enemies informed the treatment of their 
captives, as later representations of their actions were of concern to Roman 
commanders. The following sections outline the treatment of men, women and 
children, and non-elite and elite groups, although gendered dynamics are referenced 
where appropriate. Captives, regardless of the aforementioned categories, were 
ultimately reduced to commodities or tokens, both in actuality and representations, 
which were used within elite self-promotion for the benefit of the elite and their 
agenda.  
Captive-taking and Elite Characterisation 
By stressing the complete subjugation of a nation through literature, art and 
iconography, elite individuals were able to emphasise how they or well-known figures 
from history were successful military commanders. As Roman society highly prized 
military prowess, elite individuals were therefore appealing to their audiences’, elite 
and non-elite alike, investment in Roman concepts of military power and 
expansionism. For instance, in his Gallic Wars, Caesar claims that captives taken for the 
purpose of extracting military intelligence often provided false information. This is 
hardly surprising given that the enemy would want to protect their own people. Yet, 
by claiming that he recognised captives’ deceptions, Caesar was able to demonstrate 
his military and intellectual superiority as he supposedly saw through the enemy’s 
deceit. Therefore, captive-taking and the careful management of captives was used to 
illuminate personal qualities of an elite individual which contributed to their image as 
a conqueror acting for Rome’s interests. 
Captive-taking of all forms could also be used to indicate the extent of an individual’s 
power. In particular, the use of language and symbolism associated with slavery was 
key to conveying military success and complete dominion over a nation. For example, 
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the enslavement of enemy peoples enabled Caesar to present himself in the Gallic Wars, 
acting as a representative of Rome, as completely subjugating the whole of an enemy 
nation. This links closely with representations of sexual violence, as women were cast 
as symbols of their nation or the land they inhabited, and were understood to be 
crucial to the enemy’s society. Therefore, Caesar presented his actions in relation to 
capture for enslavement as being necessary to completely conquer an enemy. As we 
have seen, Caesar benefitted financially from the mass enslavement of Gallic and 
Germanic peoples, and also harnessed the optics of conquering an enemy within his 
self-promotion, including in his commentaries and numismatic imagery. However, the 
Roman elite had to strike a balance between presenting their own actions as being 
admirable, essentially pushing their own agenda, and ensuring that they ultimately 
showed their behaviour as contributing towards Rome which could be achieved by 
emphasising an elite individual’s contribution through captive-taking to the economy, 
labour force, or diplomacy.  
However, military aggression and enslavement were not the only means of conveying 
an individual’s power or prestige. For instance, Scipio showed his power at New 
Carthage by freeing individuals who were politically or diplomatically useful for Rome 
in their war against Carthage, and retaining the craftsmen for labour in the Roman 
army. This enabled Polybius to present Scipio as a wise general who displayed his 
authority through clemency, rather than wholesale enslavement. Hostage-taking is 
another example of where diplomatic captive-taking was used to convey dominion, 
rather than stress military action. Presenting ‘peaceful’ methods of controlling a foreign 
nation became especially important during Augustus’ reign given the emphasis on the 
Pax Romana throughout his self-representation. Hostages, including many of those not 
explicitly labelled using such terms, were usually kept in comfortable conditions, even 
building lives for themselves in Rome. However, once an enemy nation handed over 
hostages to Rome, they were effectively acknowledging Roman dominion, as the 
hostages, who were usually the offspring of foreign leaders, represented the future of 
their nation. The supposed foreign acknowledgement of Roman authority enabled elite 
individuals to utilise references to hostage-taking within their self-promotion, 
including on the Ara Pacis, to show the reach of their power. 
In these examples, we see how captives were considered in the Roman mindset as only 
worth preserving if they held some political, diplomatic or financial value. This is true 
whether the captives were non-elite or elite. The reduction of people to commodities is 
clear for both non-elite captives, such as those given by Caesar as rewards to his 
soldiers,1353 and for elite hostages, with Augustus describing his Parthian hostages as 
pignora (surety pledges) rather than hostages (obsides).1354 With regards to the latter 
example, the fact that such individuals were known as pledges further stresses that 
they were not seen as people, but rather as diplomatic or political tools. 
 
1353 Suet. Vit. Iul. 26.3, Caes. BGall. 6.3, 7.89-90, 8.89. 
1354 Aug. RG 32. 
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The degradation of a captive’s status to something akin to an object or tool links to the 
issue of slavery which runs throughout this thesis, as enslaved people were viewed as 
instrumentum vocale (‘talking hardware’). The reduction of captives to the status of 
enslaved people, despite the language Greco-Roman authors used to describe them, 
and the justification for enslavement in Roman society, literature and art contributed 
towards how the Romans were able to continue perpetuating the idea that non-Roman 
enemies were inferior and deserving of their fate. Therefore, the presence of enslaved 
people, particularly as they were thought to have been taken in conflict, was a constant 
reminder of Roman expansionism and superiority in warfare. This is particularly 
evident in art and iconography, with the captives’ inferiority stressed through their 
positioning in relation to a Roman general, such as on tropaea where captives are 
presented in subjugation under symbols of Roman military power. Roman elite self-
representation relied upon creating a sense of contrast between themselves and their 
captives, a point we shall discuss in more detail in the following section. 
We have seen examples of the successful use of captive-taking in elite self-promotion, 
particularly depictions of the practice in Caesar’s Gallic Wars and by famous military 
commanders like Scipio. However, the use of captives as a form of self-representation 
could also be used against elite individuals. For example, hostile representations of 
Sulla’s massacre of the Samnites show how representations of the treatment of captives 
could be used by later writers to stress, in contrast to Scipio, unattractive qualities of 
controversial Roman figures.1355 For Sulla, the example emphasised his theatrical and 
violent reputation. Descriptions of Sulla’s massacre of the Samnite captives appear in 
literature written centuries after the events in question and speaks to captive-taking 
and the subsequent management of captives as a means of highlighting the behaviour 
or characteristics of well-known Roman figures long after the events took place.  
However, captive-taking could also be used in contemporary elite self-promotion to 
attack a high-profile figure. As we have seen that all captives were essentially reduced 
to commodities, high-status captives, particularly hostages who held political and 
diplomatic value, were used as tokens of an individual’s power which could easily be 
manipulated. A prime example of this is Clodius’ decision to kidnap Pompey’s hostage 
Tigranes and attempt to return him to Armenia.1356 The incident made Pompey appear 
weak as it seemed as if he was not able to control his affairs in Rome, let alone on the 
battlefield. We do not know what happened to Tigranes after his attempted escape, 
and this stresses how the Romans had little interest in Tigranes himself, but how his 
manipulation by Clodius affected the reputation of members of the Roman elite. 
Essentially, this was how the Romans presented captives generally, as being only 
worthy of discussion when they illuminated a feature of Roman culture, particularly 
Roman military or political dominance in a region, or an individual’s characteristics. 
 
1355 Plut. Vit. Sull. 30.2-3, Dio. fr. 109.3-9. 
1356 Asc. 47, Cicero, Dom. 66. 
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Characterisation of the Enemy: ‘Worthy’ and ‘Deceitful’ Captives 
Descriptions of captive-taking practices could also be used to illuminate the often 
negative characteristics of a foreign leader or nation, usually in contrast to Roman 
behaviours. By stressing the ‘otherness’ and ‘non-Roman’ characteristics of foreign 
peoples, the Roman elite were able to justify their aggression and the subsequent 
treatment of captives. Non-Roman barbarity was stressed to ensure that the elite 
Roman audience, at whom elite self-promotion was primarily directed, could identify 
the enemy clearly, and recognise a contrast between Roman and foreign behaviours. By 
emphasising how non-Romans broke or ignored certain conventions dictating conduct 
in conflict, the Roman elite were able to present their subsequent attacks on non-
Roman enemies as being justified. Inevitably, as the enemy were portrayed as 
unworthy and dishonest opponents, the Roman elite were presented as being 
vindicated, beyond the rules of engagement which allowed them complete authority 
over captives, in treating the captives in whatever manner they saw fit. This also 
supported the Romans’ view of themselves as being superior and enabled the 
perpetuation of their Imperialist ideology which was largely disseminated through 
elite self-promotion. 
For instance, the ‘deceitful captive’ trope was common across Greco-Roman writings, 
and not only excused some of the Romans’ military failures, but furthered the Romans’ 
idea that non-Romans were untrustworthy and abusers of wartime conventions. A key 
example of this is how Caesar managed to avoid criticism for losing the hostages at 
Noviodunum by stressing the brutality of the enemy.1357 This enabled Greco-Roman 
writers to justify Roman military aggression and expansionism as foreign peoples were 
deemed to be inferior and therefore deserving of violent and degrading treatment. 
Once again, we can turn to Caesar for a prime example of captive-taking practices to 
stress this aspect of elite self-promotion. Caesar presents the Roman massacre of the 
people of Avaricum during the Gallic Wars as retribution for the killing of Roman 
citizens at Cenabum.1358 In order for the justification to make sense, given the 
geographical distance between the two towns, Caesar conflagrated the two tribes: the 
Carnutes who had killed Roman soldiers, and the people of Avaricum who Caesar’s 
troops massacred. In doing so, Caesar was able to cast all ‘Gauls’ as being murderous. 
He was therefore able to present the Romans’ massacre at Avaricum as justified, as the 
people of Avaricum were easily identifiable as being the enemy who exhibited non-
Roman behaviour, signifying ‘The Other’. Therefore, Caesar’s troops’ actions were 
presented as justified not only because they were avenging Roman citizens, but 
because the enemy were deserving of massacre.  
As we have seen, the Romans applied conventions which dictated warfare and 
descriptions of foreign enemies in a pragmatic way. This enabled the Roman elite to 
manipulate such behaviour and their subsequent presentation in literature in order to 
promote certain characteristics of elite Romans or the Roman people as a whole. A 
recurring theme found in representations of captive-taking is the Romans’ concern 
 
1357 Caes. BGall. 7.55. 
1358 Caes. BGall. 7.3. 
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with presenting their enemies as ‘worthy’, specifically as powerful enough to challenge 
Roman dominion, but ultimately subdued by superior Roman intellectual and military 
prowess. Such a concern is found throughout Greco-Roman writings, particularly in 
relation to triumphs. Successful displays of captives in triumphs relied upon the 
Roman triumphator creating a contrast between himself as the victor and the defeated 
enemy in subjugation.  
However, the triumphator had to strike a balance between presenting the enemy 
captives as being utterly defeated, whilst also suggesting that they were a difficult 
adversary to defeat. Such an acknowledgement was made through the triumphator 
placing principal captives in close proximity to his chariot, by emphasising their high 
status through costume and the display of the most lavish of their former possessions, 
and by in rare cases executing key captives within the city boundaries, a clear 
indication that the captives were significant and had broken sacred laws. The method 
of execution is a feature of the triumph which has not been previously fully explored in 
scholarship. This thesis has shown that we cannot assume strangulation was the 
primary method of execution in the triumph, although it has often assumed to be the 
case given the connection between strangulation and treason in Roman law. The 
Roman triumphator may have had a degree of choice concerning the method of 
execution (strangulation, beheading or immuration) which had different connotations. 
However, the execution was never in a public space, but always within a prison 
setting. This suggests a level of concern for protecting the reputation of the captive at 
the moment of their execution, thus stressing their status as a high-ranking prisoner 
who had committed a crime akin to treason against Rome. The contrast created 
between the triumphator and the formerly powerful captive was ultimately used to 
emphasise the triumphator’s strengths and abilities as they had been able to overcome 
challenging enemies. This is essentially where difficulties lay in triumphators 
attempting to present women as principal captives, as in the case of Caesar and 
Arsinoë, as women were not considered to be capable military commanders and were 
more often used as symbols of land and fertility. 
Humiliation and Degradation 
The treatment outlined throughout this thesis was designed both to humiliate a people 
in reality, thus making them more compliant to Roman authority, and to degrade their 
status in Roman thought. For example, as sexual violence was seen as a force which 
could cause moral and bodily corruption, it was therefore used (and continues to be 
utilised) as a means of attacking women and children, with long-term ramifications. In 
previous scholarship, sexual violence has been studied in the context of the lives of 
enslaved people within Roman households, but little focus has been on sexual violence 
in warfare, including examples outside of sieges, and with reference to examples from 
modern warfare. Such examples include Caesar’s actions in Gaul against the Eburones 
which can be considered akin to genocide which also often involves sexual violence 
against women before mass executions. Sexual violence is physically and mentally 
harmful, with those subjected to it often experiencing long-lasting trauma, both in 
terms of mental health and societal implications. We find evidence of the Romans’ 
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recognition of this trauma in Andromache’s tale in the Aeneid, and concerns for the 
protection of women in Calgacus’ speeches in Tacitus. The Romans used sexual 
violence because it traumatised the women and their families, but also stressed that the 
male members of the women’s community were unable to protect them, as we can see 
in the supposed origins of Boudica’s revolt.  
Sexual violence also has symbolic value which the Romans used to their advantage in 
stressing that the next generation were illegitimate, and the women violated by enemy 
troops. The violation of women and children signified a degradation in status from a 
free to an enslaved person. As enslaved people could be subjected to whatever 
treatment the enslaver chose, this further justified the Romans in presenting sexual 
violence, an act they were clearly uncomfortable with relaying in detail, as an 
acceptable and even necessary practice in wartime captive-taking. In historical reality, 
those who were subjected to sexual violence during warfare would have inevitably 
been in states of severe emotional distress given that their community had been 
destroyed, and they had often been witness or subjected to atrocities carried out 
against their families and friends. Such anguish would have enabled the Romans to 
enslave people more easily.  
Therefore, in an endless cycle, the treatment of captives was only justified if an 
individual was reduced in the Roman mind by how the Roman elite presented their 
behaviour or the treatment they received. A sense of justification was necessary within 
elite self-promotion as the Romans clearly recognised the human cost of war and were 
uncomfortable with directly referring to behaviour which was excessively aggressive. 
However, the treatment captives were subjected to relied upon the Romans’ 
understanding that the captives were inferior and could therefore be subjected to 
violence of all forms. A key part of presenting captives as inferior was by alluding to 
the treatment they were subjected to, particularly sexual violence and enslavement 
which were, in Roman thought, degrading to a person, as they damaged an 
individual’s autonomy.  
Captives of Rome 
Ultimately, captives were essentially reduced to pawns who were used in reality, as 
exempla, or as symbols in artistic and literary representations, to indicate an individual 
or nation’s characteristics which could then be used for political means. Such means 
included the justification of controversial military action, or stressing the military 
prowess of a Roman general to strengthen their political position in Rome. The status 
of captives relied upon the Romans’ recognition that all those captured in warfare 
became enslaved and were, as a result of the treatment they were subjected to and the 
language used to describe them, essentially stripped of their humanity. By 
dehumanising their captives in representations, the Roman elite could present their 
actions against captives, including massacre and sexual violence, as being justified in 
elite literary works and self-promotion. This shaped Roman thought across all levels of 
society, ultimately enabling the Roman people to accept the militaristic and 
Imperialistic agenda of the elite.  
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The human cost of Roman captive-taking cannot be underestimated, and the Romans 
clearly understood how their actions could be used to degrade individuals and destroy 
their community. Warfare affected all members of a community, but captives were 
subjected to different treatment depending upon their gender and socio-economic 
status. Captive-taking continues today, albeit in a different guise, and the treatment 
different captives were subjected to, including massacre, sexual violence, enslavement, 
and hostage-taking, continues to be utilised, often motivated by the same concerns the 
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